i^f^f^mmW^^W^c?^ 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 


A  TREATISE 


ON  THE 


Law  of  Naturalization 


OF  THE 


United  States 


BY 


FREDERICK  VAN  DYNE,  LL.  M., 

American  Consul;    formerly  Assistant  Solicitor  of  the  Department  of 

State  of  the  United  States;  Author  of  ''Citizenship 

of  the   United   States,"   etc. 


Washington: 
FREDERICK  VAN  DYNE, 
1907. 


r 

\imi  n 

19^7 


Copyright,  1907,  by  Frederick  Van  Dyne. 


The  Law  Reporter  Printing  Company, 
Washington,  D.  C. 


a. 


To    My    Devoted    Wife,   Clara  M., 
This  Book  is  Affectionately  Inscribed. 


740095 


PREFACE. 


One  of  the  most  creditable  achievements  of  the  ad- 
ministration of  President  Roosevelt  was  the  reformation 
of  our  naturalization  laws. 

These  laws,  substantially  the  statutes   enacted   more 
than  a  hundred  years  ago  when  our  population  was  less 
than  four  millions,  and  when   it  was   the  policy  of  our 
government  to  invite   immigration,  were  ill  adapted  to 
our  modern  conditions,  with  a  population  of  eighty  mil- 
lions and  an  influx  of  foreigners  of  more  than  a  million 
annually.      Under    these    laws    lax   and    unsatisfactory 
methods  of    naturalization   had   grown  up,  opening  the 
way  to   gross   frauds   against   our  citizenship,  including 
perjury,  false    impersonation,   and    traffic    in    false    and 
counterfeit  certificates  of  citizenship.     Such  certificates 
were  sometimes  sold  to  alien  criminals  to  secure  their  ad- 
mission to  the  United  States,  and  frequently  to  procure 
protection  against  their  home  governments.    Cases  have 
actually  occurred  where  aliens  have  landed  on  our  shores 
for  the  first  time,  having  in  their  possession  certificates 
entitling  them  to  the  full  rights  of  American  citizenship. 
Our  Presidents  had  on  numerous  occasions  brought  the 
subject  to  the  attention  of  Congress  and  urged  legislation, 
but  without  effect.     At  length,  in  March,  1905,  President 
Roosevelt— at  the  suggestion,  it   is   understood,  of   the 
Honorable  Oscar  Straus,  now  Secretary  of  Commerce  and 
Labor — appointed,  by  Executive  order,  a  special  commis- 
sion, composed  of  Milton  D.  Purdy  of  the  Department  of 
Justice,  Gaillard  Hunt  of   the  Department  of  State,  and 
Richard  K.  Campbell  of   the  Department  of   Commerce 

(V) 


VI  PREFACE 

and  Labor,  to  investigate  the  subject  of  naturalization, 
and  recommend  legislation.  The  Commission  made  a 
thorough  investigation  and  report  and  submitted  drafts 
of  bills  which  the  President  transmitted  to  Congress. 
While  the  bills  drafted  by  the  Commission  were  not 
enacted  into  law,  their  recommendations  formed  the  basis 
for  the  bill  prepared  and  reported  by  the  House  Com- 
mittee on  Immigration  and  Naturalization,  which,  with 
some  modifications,  became  a  law  on  June  29,  1906. 

This  law  effects  a  revolution  in  our  system  of  natural- 
ization, giving  the  Federal  Government  effective  control 
of  the  matter  through  a  central  bureau  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor,  and  throws  such  safeguards 
around  naturalization  as  will  effectually  prevent  frauds 
if  the  law  is  enforced, — and  no  one  who  knows  President 
Roosevelt  and  Secretary  Straus  can  doubt  that  it  will 
be  faithfully  and  rigidly  enforced. 

Besides  the  numerous  changes  in  our  statutes  made 
by  this  law,  as  shown  in  the  text,  still  more  recent  legis- 
lation, making  further  modifications  of  importance  and 
far-reaching  consequences  in  our  naturalization  laws,  has 
been  enacted.  In  pursuance  of  a  report  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  (H.  Rep.  No.  4,784,  59th 
Cong.,  1st  session),  Secretary  Root  designated  James 
B.  Scott,  Solicitor  for  the  Department  of  State,  David  J. 
Hill,  Minister  to  the  Netherlands,  and  Gaillard  Hunt, 
chief  of  the  Passport  Bureau  (now  the  Bureau  of  Citizen- 
ship), to  make  an  inquiry  into  the  subjects  of  citizen- 
ship, expatriation  and  protection  abroad,  and  to  report 
with  recommendations.  The  report  of  this  board,  which 
was  embodied  in  House  Document  No.  326,  59th  Cong., 
2d  session,  together  with  recommendations  of  the  board, 
was  transmitted  to  Congress,  and  nearly  all  of  the  recom- 
mendations were  incorporated  in  the  law  of  March  2,  1907. 

These    numerous  modifications    of  our   laws,   and  the 


PREFACE  Vll 

lack  of  any  comprehensive  work  on  the  subject  of  natu- 
ralization, have  influenced  the  writer  to  prepare,  as  a 
companion  volume  to  his  work  "Citizenship  of  the 
United  States,"  an  independent  treatise  on  Naturaliza- 
tion. While  the  recent  legislation  completely  changes 
the  method  of  naturalizing  aliens,  parts  of  the  old  laws 
remain  in  force.  This  work  clearly  indicates  the  changes 
made,  and  undertakes  to  show  by  an  exhaustive  analysis 
of  the  new  legislation  and  by  reference  to  and  discussion 
of  the  judicial  decisions  and  the  opinions  and  rulings  of 
the  Executive  and  international  claims  commissions, 
what  the  law  of  naturalization  now  is. 

The  work  is  specially  designed  to  meet  the  needs  of 
judges  and  clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  in  natu- 
ralization matters,  of  United  States  Attorneys  who  appear 
for  the  government  in  naturalization  proceedings  and  in 
proceedings  to  set  aside  or  cancel  naturalization  certifi- 
cates, of  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  and  other 
officers  in  the  various  branches  of  the  government  serv- 
ice dealing  with  questions  relating  to  citizenship  and 
naturalization.  It  is  believed  that  the  work  will  also  fill 
a  real  need  in  furnishing,  in  comprehensive  and  conven- 
ient form,  to  lawyers  who  desire  to  advise  their  clients 
seeking  naturalization  or  to  establish  rights  of  citizen- 
ship, and  to  general  readers  and  students  wishing  to  be 
well  informed,  the  complete  law  on  this  important  sub- 
ject. Executive  and  Departmental  orders  and  regula- 
tions are  included  in  their  appropriate  places  and  the 
book  will  be  found  to  constitute  an  exhaustive  manual. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  work  considerable  assistance 
was  derived  from  the  comprehensive  report  of  the  citi- 
zenship board  referred  to,  as  well  as  from  the  chapter  on 
nationality  in  John  Bassett  Moore's  monumental  work, 
the  International  Law  Digest,  and  the  author  desires  to 
make  due  acknowledgment  therefor. 


Vlll  PREFACE 

By  an  order  of  the  Secretary  of  State  dated  May  31, 
1907,  the  designation  of  the  Passport  Bureau  of  the 
Department  of  State,  to  which  numerous  references  are 
made  in  this  worli,  was  changed  to  the  Bureau  of  Citizen- 
ship. Since  the  Secretary's  order  was  made  too  late  for 
insertion  in  the  text  of  this  book,  which  had  then  gone 
to  press,  the  change  is  noted  in  the  Preface. 

F.  V. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


NATURALIZATION    IN    PURSUANCE    OF    THE    STATUTES   OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  BY  TAKING  OUT  FORMAL  PAPERS. 

Page. 

Definition 5 

Power  to  regulate 6 

Naturalization  a  judicial  function 9 

Courts  authorized  to  naturalize 11 

— Courts  of  record .  13 

— Common  law  jurisdiction 14 

—Act  of  June  29,  1906 17 

— State  courts 17 

— Judges 19 

—Clerks 22 

—Duties 22 

As  to  declaration  of  intention 22 

As  to   petition 24 

As  to  notice  of  petition 25 

As  to  witnesses 26 

As  to  docketing  petitions 26 

As  to  duplicates  of  petitions 26 

As  to  final  hearing 26 

As  to  aliens  denied  naturalization 26 

As  to  certificates  of  citizenship 26 

Blank  certificates 26 

Defaced  or  injured  certificates 28 

Accountability  for  certificates 28 

Duplicates 29 

Stub 29 

Canceled  certificates 29 

Certified  copies 30 

(ix) 


X  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Courts  authorized  to  naturalize — Continued:  Page. 

Records 31 

Fees 31 

United  States  District  Attorneys 34 

— Appearance  in  opposition  to  naturalization.  ...  34 

— Proceedings  to  set  aside  or  cancel  certificates.  .  34 

Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization 36 

— Functions  of  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor  36 

— Functions  of  Bureau 38 

— Commissioners  of  Immigration 39 

— Disbursing  clerk,  Department  of  Commerce  and 

Labor 40 

Who  are  capable  of  naturalization 40 

— Chinese 42 

— Japanese 43 

— Burmese 44 

— Hawaiians 45 

— Indians 45 

— Mexicans 46 

— Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos 48 

— Alien  enemies 49 

— Women 51 

— Anarchists  and  Polygamists 53 

Usual  Legal  Conditions 54 

Declaration  of  Intention 54 

Time  of  making 55 

Before  whom  made 55 

Form 57 

Difference  between  Act  of   1906  and  Rev.  Stat. 

2165 59 

Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos 60 

Exceptions  to  usual  requirement 61 

Army 61 

Navy  and  Marine  Corps 62 

Widow  and  Children  of  Deceased  Declarant.  .  62 

Minor  Residents 62 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XI 

Declaration  of  Intention — Continued:  Page. 

In  Hawaii 63 

In  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico 63 

Rights  conferred  by  Declaration  of  Intention.  .      64 

Under  Federal  laws 64 

Under  State  laws 64 

Citizenship  not  conferred  by 64 

Burnato's  case 67 

Koszta's  case 68 

Declaration  of  Intention  and  Residence 73 

Declaration  of  Intention  and  Three  Years  Resi- 
dence       74 

Declaration  of  Intention  and   Service  as  Mer- 
chant Seaman 74 

Status  conferred   on   Minors  by  Declaration  of 

Intention  of  Parent 76 

Petition  for  Naturalization 84 

— Time  of  filing 85 

— To  whom  made 85 

—Form 85 

Description  of  applicant 88 

Allegations  of  petition 88 

Signature  of  petitioner 90 

Verification  of   petition 90 

Witnesses 90 

Notice  of  petition 92 

Certificate  of  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor     93 

Residence 94 

— Meaning  of  ''  residence  " 95 

— "  Continued  residence  " 95 

— Constructive  residence 105 

Merchant  seamen 105 

In  countries  in  which  United  States   has  ex- 
traterritorial rights 105 

— Residence  within  State 106 

— In  the  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico 107 


Xll  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Residence — Continued:  Page. 

— In   Hawaii 107 

— Proof  of  residence 108 

— Exceptions 109 

Army 109 

Navy  and  Marine  Corps 110 

Merchant  seamen 110 

Qualifications  as  to  Age,  Education  and  Moral 

Character Ill 

Final  Hearing 119 

—Time  of 119 

—Place 120 

— Procedure 120 

Appearance  and  examination  of  applicant  and 

witnesses 120 

Appearance  of  United  States 120 

Proof  of  residence  and  behavior  as  of  good 

moral  character 121 

Renunciation  of  foreign  allegiance 121 

Renunciation  of  title  or  order  of  nobility.  .  .  122 

Oath  of  allegiance  to  United  States 123 

Change  of  name 124 

Certificate 124 

—Under  Act  of  March  3,  1903 125 

—Under  Act  of  June  29,  1906 126 

—Form 126 

—Duplicate 128 

—Stub 128 

— Blank   certificates 129 

— Proof  of  naturalization 129 

The    record 129 

Where  record  has  been  destroyed  or  lost.  . .  .  132 

Certificate  of  naturalization 133 

— Naturalization  not  retroactive 134 

Impeachment  of  Naturalization 134 

— Before  municipal  courts 134 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  Xlll 

Impeachment  of  Naturalization — Continued :  Page. 

Under  Act  of  1906 135 

Under  prior  laws 138 

— International  practice 141 

Executive  Department  of  Government 141 

Power  to  treat  certificate  as  invalid 141 

Right  of  foreign  governments  to  impeach 
American  certificate  of  naturalization 

denied 142 

International  claims  commissions 142 

Spanish  Claims  Commission  of  1871 142 

Costa  Rican  Claims  Commission  of  1860.  .  143 

Venezuelan  Claims  Commission  of  1903.  .  .  143 

Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission,  1905.  .  144 

Crimes  and  offenses  against  naturalization  laws.  ,  189 

Limitation    of   actions 195 

CHAPTER  II. 

NATURALIZATION  BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT. 

Section  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes 197 

Meaning  of  phrase  "dwelling  in  the  United  States"  198 
— Where  children  are  dwelling  in  United  States  at 

time  of  parent's  naturalization 198 

— Where  children  are  dwelling  abroad   at  time  of 

parent's  naturalization 200 

Act  of  March  2,  1907 218 

Mode  of  parent's  naturalization  immaterial 220 

— By  naturalization  of  father  by  treaty 220 

— By  naturalization  of  mother  by  marriage 220 

Illegitimate  children 223 

Adoption 223 

Effect  of  declaration  of  intention  of  parent  during 

minority  of    child 224 

Naturalization    not   effective    internationally  as  to 

absent   children 224 


Xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  III. 

Naturalization  by  Marriage.  Page. 

In  general 227 

Women  who  may  be  naturalized  by  marriage 229 

Time  of  marriage 231 

Necessity  of  residence  in  United  States 233 

— Residence  in  United  States  held  not  to  be  nec- 
essary     234 

— Residence  in  United  States  held  to  be  necessary  234 

Nature  of  citizenship  acquired 238 

Effect  of  death  of  husband  on  citizenship  of  alien 

woman  married  to  an  American 240 

— Instructions  of  Department  of  State 241 

Citizenship  of  American  woman  married  to  an  alien  243 

—Under  law  prior  to  1907 243 

—Under  Act  of  March   2,  1907 256 

Instructions  of  Department  of  State 257 

Case  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris 258 

Effect  of  divorce 260 

Declaration  of  intention  of  husband 262 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Collective  Naturalization. 

Naturalization  by  Conquest 266 

Allegiance  of  inhabitants  of  conquered  state.  . .  .  266 

Citizenship  of  inhabitants  of  conquered  state.  .  .  .  267 

American  ante-nati 272 

Naturalization  by  Treaty 273 

In  general 273 

Power   of    United  States  to  acquire  territory  by 
treaty    and  to    prescribe  terms   on    which  it 

will  receive  inhabitants 273 

Treaties  of  Cession   to   which  United  States   has 

been  a  party 275 

— In  general 275 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XV 

Naturalization  hy  Treaty — Continued:  Page. 

—Treaty  of  1794  with  Great  Britain 276 

—Treaty  of  1803  with  France 276 

Case  of  Egle  Aubry 276 

Case  of  Foucher 279 

Case  of  De  Baca 281 

—Treaty  of   1819  with  Spain 283 

—Treaty  of  1848  with  Mexico 284 

—Treaty  with  Mexico  of  1853  (Gadsden  Treaty)  291 

—Treaty  with  Russia  of  1867 291 

—Treaty  with  Spain  of  1898 293 

Insular   cases 296 

Status  of  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos 309 

Treaties   with  Indians 316 

Naturalization  by  Special  Act  of  Congress 317 

In  general 317 

On  the  acquisition  of  the  Territory  of  Oregon.  .  317 

On  the  annexation  of  Hawaii 318 

Readmission  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris  to  citizen- 
ship    318 

Naturalization  of  Indians 319 

Naturalization    by    Admission    of    Territory    to 

Statehood 321 

In  general 321 

Louisiana 321 

States  carved  out  of  Northwest  Territory 324 

Florida 327 

Texas 329 

Nebraska 331 

Power  of  Congress  over  Territories 330 

CHAPTER  V. 

Expatriation. 

Definition 333 

Right  of  expatriation 333 

How   effected 336 


XVI  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Expatriation — Continued:  Page. 

Modes  of  expatriation 336 

—Act  of  1907 336 

By  Naturalization  in  a  foreign  State 337 

By  taking  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  foreign  State  338 

By  residence  in  a  foreign  country 340 

Exceptions :  Expatriation  not  accomplished.  .  355 
— When  residence  abroad  is  due  to  ill  health 

or  financial  condition 355 

— Agents  of  American  enterprises 355 

— Missionaries 356 

— By  desertion 357 

— Military  and  naval  service  in  foreign  country.  .  .  358 
— Accepting  public  office  under  foreign  govern- 
ment    360 

Engaging  in  diplomatic   service 360 

Engaging  in  consular  service 360 

Entrance    into     civil    service     of    foreign 

country 361 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Passports. 

In  general 363 

Statutes 363 

Rules  and  regulations 365 

—In  the  United   States 365 

— In  Insular  Possessions 373 

—Executive  order  of  April  6,   1907 380 

Forms 384 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Attitude     of    Foreign    Governments    Toward    Their 

Citizens   Who   Have  Become  Naturalized   in  the 

United  States. 

Information    relative    to    rules   and   regulations    of 

foreign  countries  compiled  by  Department  of  State  389 

— Austria-Hungary 389 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XVI 1 

Attitude  of  Foreign  Governments,  etc. — Continued :    Page. 

—Belgium .  390 

—Denmark 391 

—France 392 

— Germany = 394 

— Greece 395 

—Italy 396 

—Netherlands 397 

—Norway 398 

—Persia 399 

—Portugal 399 

— Roumania 401 

— Russia 401 

— Servia 402 

—Sweden 403 

— Switzerland 404 

—Turkey 405 

APPENDIX. 
Laws  of  United  States  relating  to  Naturalization 

AND  Expatriation 409 

— Sections  of  the  Revised  Statutes 409 

— Later  acts  of  Congress 416 

Act  of  June  29,  1906,  establishing  a  bureau  of 

naturalization 417 

Act  of  March  2, 1907,  in  reference  to  expatria- 
tion and  protection 438 

Naturalization  Conventions  to  which  the  United 

States  is  a  party 441 

— With  Austria  Hungary 441 

—With  Baden 444 

— With  Bavaria 447 

—With  Belgium 451 

,     —With  Denmark 453 

—With  Great  Britain 456 

— With  Haiti 461 


XVm  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Naturalization  Conventions,  etc. — Continued:  Page. 

—With  Hesse 463 

— With  North  German  Confederation 466 

— With  Sweden  and  Norway 468 

—With  Wiirttemberg 472 

Executive  orders 475 

Naturalization  regulations 485 

List  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize 

ALIENS 493 

List  of  foreign  countries  and  rulers 507 


NATURALIZATION. 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATURALIZATION  IN  PURSUANCE  OF  THE  STATUTES  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  BY  TAKING  OUT  FORMAL  PAPERS. 

A.  Definition. 

B.  Power  to  regulate. 

C.  Naturalization  a  judicial  function. 

D.  What  courts  are  authorized  to  naturalize. 

1.  Courts  of  record. 

2.  Common  law  jurisdiction. 

3.  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

4.  State  courts. 

5.  Judges. 

Functions  of 

6.  Clerks  of  courts. 

Duties: 

a.  As  to  declaration  of  intention. 

b.  As  to  petition  for  naturalization. 

c.  As  to  notice  of  petition. 

d.  As  to  witnesses. 

e.  As  to  docketing. 

f.  As  to  duplicates. 

g.  As  to  final  hearing. 

h.  As  to  aliens  denied  naturalization, 
i.    As  to  certificates  of  citizenship. 

(A)  Blank  certificates. 

(B)  Defaced  or  injured  certificates. 

(C)  Accountability  for  certificates. 

(D)  Duplicates. 

(E)  Stub. 

(F)  Cancelled  certificates, 
j.  Certified  copies. 

k.  Record, 
1.  Fees. 

E.  United  States  District  Attorneys. 

Duties: 

1.  Appearance  in  opposition  to  naturalization. 

2.  Proceedings  to  set  aside  or  cancel  certificates. 
5233—1 


I  NATURALIZATION 

F.  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization. 

1.  In  general. 

2.  Functions  of  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

a.  Direction  and  control  of  Bureau. 

b.  Rules  and  regulations. 

c.  Blank  certificates  of  citizenship. 

d.  Certificate  of  registry  of  alien. 

e.  Allowance  of  additional  compensation  to  clerks  of  courts. 

3.  Functions  of  Bureau. 

a.  Supervision  of  naturalization. 

b.  Registry  of  aliens  arriving  in  United  States. 

c.  Blank  certificates  of  citizenship. 

d.  As  to  naturalization  fees. 

4.  Commissioners  of  Immigration, 

5.  Disbursing  clerk,  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

a.  Duties  as  to  naturalization  fees. 

b.  Bond. 

G.  Who  are  capable  of  naturalization. 

1.  In  general. 

2.  Chinese. 

3.  Japanese. 

4.  Burmese. 

5.  Hawiians. 

6.  Indians. 

7.  Mexicans. 

8.  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 

9.  Alien  enemies, 
to.  Women: 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Married  women. 

11.  Anarchists  and  polygamists. 
H.  Usual  legal  conditions. 

1.  Declaration  of  intention. 

a.  Time  of  making. 

b.  Before  whom  made. 

c.  Form  of  declaration. 

d.  Difference  between  Act  of  1905  and  prior  law. 

e.  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 

f .  Exceptions  to  usual  requirement  of  declaration. 

(A)  Army. 

(B)  Navy  and  Marine  Corps. 

(C)  Widow  and  children  of  deceased  declarant. 

(D)  Minor  residents. 

Repeal  of  Minor's  Clause. 

(E)  In  Hawaii. 

(F)  In  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  6 

H.   Usual  legal  conditions. — Continued. 

g.  Rights  conferred  by  declaration  of  intention. 

(A)  Under  State  laws. 

(B)  Under  Federal  laws. 

(C)  Citizenship  not  conferred  by. 
(i)  Burnato's  case. 

(ii)  Koszta's  case, 
h.  Declaration  of  intention  and  residence. 

(A)  In  general. 

(B)  Declaration  and  three  years'  residence. 

i.  Declaration  of  intention  and  service  as  merchant  seaman, 
j.  Status  conferred  on   minors  by  declaration  of    intention  of 
parents. 
2.  Petition  for  naturalization. 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Time  of  filing. 

c.  To  whom  made. 

d.  Form  of  petition. 

(A)  Description  of  applicant. 

(B)  Allegations  of  petition. 

(a)  Disbelief  in  anarchy  and  polygamy. 

(b)  Of  intention  to  become  a  citizen,  to  reside  perman- 

ently in  United  States,  and  to  renounce  allegiance 
to  foreign  sovereign. 

(c)  Of  previous  denial  of  naturalization. 

(d)  As  to  residence. 

(e)  As  to  ability  to  speak  English. 

(C)  Signature  of  petitioner. 

(D)  Verification  of  petition. 

(E)  Witnesses. 

(i)  Citizenship  of. 

(ii)  Personal  acquaintance  with  applicant. 

(iii)  Form  of  affidavit. 

(iv)  Fees. 

e.  Notice. 

(A)  In  general. 

(B)  Form. 

f.  Certificate  from  Department  of  Commerce  and   Labor,   and 

declaration  of  intention. 
3-  Residence. 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Meaning  of  "residence." 

c.  "Continued  residence." 

d.  Constructive  residence. 

(A)  Merchant  Seamen. 

(B)  In   countries   in  which  the  United  States  has  extraterri- 
torial rights. 


4  NATURALIZATION 

H.   Usual  legal  conditions. — Continued. 

e.  Residence  within  State. 

f.  In  the  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico. 

g.  In  Hawaii. 

h.  Proof  of  residence. 

(A)  Under  Act  of  1906. 

(B)  Under  prior  laws. 
i.  Exceptions: 

(A)  Army. 

(B)  Navy  and  Marine  Corps. 

(C)  Merchant  Seamen. 

4.  Qualifications  as  to  age,  education,  and  moral  character. 

a.  Age. 

b.  Education. 

(A)  Under  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

(B)  Exceptions. 

(i)  Physical  inability. 

(ii)  Declaration  under  prior  law. 

(iii)  Where  declarant  makes  homestead  entry. 

(C)  Under  prior  law. 

c.  Moral  character. 

(A)  In  general. 

(B)  What  acts  are  immoral. 

(C)  Anarchists  and  polygamists. 

(D)  Proof  of  moral  character, 
(i.)  Oath  of  applicant, 
(ii.)  Witnesses. 

5.  Final  Hearing. 

a.  Time  of 

b.  Place. 

c.  Procedure. 

(A)  Appearance  and  examination  of  applicant  and  wit- 

nesses before  the  court. 

(B)  Appearance  of  United  States. 

(C)  Proof   of   residence   and  behavior   as   man  of  good 

moral  character. 

(D)  Renunciation  of  foreign  allegiance, 
(i.)  In  general. 

(ii. )  Filipinos  and  Porto  Ricans. 

(E)  Renunciation  of  title  or  order  of  nobility. 

(F)  Oath  of  allegiance  to  United  States. 

(G)  Change  of  name. 

6.  Certificate. 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Under  Act  of  March  3,  1903. 

c.  Under  Act  of  June  29,  19O6. 

d.  Form. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  O 

H.  Usual  legal  conditions . —Continued . 

e.  Duplicates. 

f.  Stub. 

g.  Blank  certificates. 

h.  Proof  of  naturalization: 

(i.)  The  record. 

(ii.)  Where  records  have  been  lost  or  destroyed. 

(iii.)  Certificate  of  naturalization. 
i.  Naturalization  not  retroactive. 
I.  Impeachment  of  naturalization. 

1.  Before  municipal  courts. 

a.  Under  Act  of  1906. 

b.  Under  prior  laws. 

2.  International  practice. 

a.  Executive  Departments  of  Government. 

(A)  Power  to  treat  certificate  as  invalid. 

(B)  Right  of  foreign  governments  to  impeach  denied. 

b.  International  claims  commissions. 

(A)  In  general. 

(B)  Spanish  Claims  Commission  of  1871. 

(C)  Costa  Rican  Claims  Commission  of  i860. 

(D)  Venezuelan  Claims  Commission  of  1903. 

(E)  Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission,  1905- 
J.  Crimes  and  offenses  against  naturalization  laws. 

1.  In  general. 

2.  By  clerks. 

3.  Limitation  of  actions. 

1.    NATURALIZATION     IN     PURSUANCE     OF     THE    STATUTES     OF 
THE  UNITED    STATES  BY    TAKING   OUT   FORMAL    PAPERS. 

A.  Definition. 

Naturalization  is  the  act  of  adopting  a  foreigner  and 
clothing  him  with  the  privileges  of  a  citizen.  9  Ops.  Atty. 
Gen.  359;  Boyd  v.  Nebraska,  143  U.  S.  135. 

A  naturalized  citizen  becomes  a  member  of  the  society, 
possessing  all  the  rights  of  a  native  citizen  and  standing, 
in  the  view  of  the  Constitution,  on  the  footing  of  a  native. 
Chief  Justice  Marshall,  in  Spratt  v.  Spratt,  1  Pet.  343. 

All  persons  born  or  naturalized  in  the  United  States, 
and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof,  are  citizens  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  state  wherein  they  reside. 
Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution,  Sec.  1. 


b  NATURALIZATION 

B.  Power  to  Regulate  Naturalization  Vested  Exclusively  in 
Congress. 

In  the  United  States  the  naturalization  of  foreigners 
is  within  the  exclusive  control  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment. It  is  one  of  the  powers  expressly  granted  to  the 
National  Government. 

Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  government  under 
the  Constitution,  the  different  colonies  and  states  had 
enacted  laws  regulating  the  naturalization  of  aliens.  They 
had  manifested  very  diverse  views  in  their  legislation  on 
the  subject.  One  state,  desiring  to  foster  immigration, 
conferred  on  foreigners  all  the  rights  of  citizenship  on 
their  landing  on  its  shores,  while  another  required  a  pro- 
bation of  many  years  before  conferring  those  privileges 
upon  the  immigrant.  It  was  feared  that  if  the  states 
were  to  be  left  to  themselves,  the  same  diversity  would 
continue  under  the  Constitution.  As  early  as  1782,  Mr. 
Madison  strenuously  urged  the  adoption  of  a  uniform 
rule  of  naturalization  hy  the  states. 

The  Constitution  (Art.  1,  Sec.  8)  provides  that  "the 
Congress  shall  have  power  to  establish  a  uniform  rule  of 
naturalization."  The  Constitution  went  into  operation 
on  the  4th  of  March,  1789.  The  first  Congress  that  as- 
sembled under  it,  at  its  second  session,  exercised  the 
power  vested  in  it  by  the  Constitution,  and  passed  an 
act  to  establish  a  uniform  system  of  naturalization.  Act 
of  March  26,  1790,  1  Stat,  at  L.  103. 

The  question  arose  whether,  after  this  act  went  into 
effect,  any  authority  existed  for  the  naturalization  of 
foreigners  under  state  laws.  The  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  in  Collet  v.  Collet  (1792),  2  Dallas,  294,  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  states  still  individuallyenjoyed  a  con- 
current authority  upon  the  subject,  but  that  this  au- 
thority could  not  be  exercised  so  as  to  contravene  the 
rule  established  by  the  authority  of  the  Union. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  7 

But  in  United  States  t^.Villato  (1797),  2  Dallas,  370,  it  was 
decided  that  a  Spaniard  by  origin  who  had  complied  with 
the  requirements  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  State  of 
Pennsylvania  in  relation  to  naturalization  was  not  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States.  While  the  decision  in  this 
case  was  based  on  the  ground  that  the  naturalization 
laws  of  the  state  had  been  repealed  by  the  new  constitu- 
tion of  that  state,  doubt  was  expressed  by  one  of  the 
judges  of  the  court  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  view 
expressed  in  Collet  v.  Collet,  and  he  indicated  his  belief 
that  the  power  of  naturalization  operated  exclusively  as 
soon  as  it  was  exercised  by  Congress. 

And  in  Chirac  v.  Chirac  (1817),  2  Wheaton,  259,  Chief 
Justice  Marshall  said:  "That  the  power  of  naturalization 
is  exclusively  in  Congress  does  not  seem  to  be  and  cer- 
tainly ought  not  to  be  controverted." 

Matthews'  Lessee  v.  Rae  (1829),  3  Cranch  C.  C.  699,  in- 
volved the  question  of  the  status  of  the  naturalization 
law  of  Maryland  of  1779  and  that  of  Pennsylvania  of 
1789.  The  court  held  that  one  who,  after  the  Act  of 
Congress  of  1790,  had  gone  through  the  forms  of  nat- 
uralization prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  states,  had  not 
been  naturalized,  "the  state  naturalization  laws  being 
superseded  and  annulled  by  the  Act  of  Congress  whose 
jurisdiction  upon  that  subject  is,  under  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  exclusive." 

Chief  Justice  Taney  in  Dred  Scott  v.  Sandford,  19 
Howard,  393,  said:  "Previous  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  every  state  had  the 
undoubted  right  to  confer  on  whomsoever  it  pleased  the 
character  of  citizen,  and  to  endow  him  with  all  its  rights. 
But  this  character,  of  course,  was  confined  to  the  bound- 
aries of  the  state  and  gave  him  no  rights  or  privileges  in 
other  states  beyond  those  secured  to  him  by  the  laws  of 
nations  and  the  comity  of  states,  .  .  .  Each  state  may 
still  confer  "  these  rights  and  privileges  "  upon  an  alien,  or 


8  NATURALIZATION 

any  one  it  thinks  proper,  or  upon  any  class  or  descrip- 
tion of  persons;  yet  he  would  not  be  a  citizen  in  the  sense 
in  which  that  word  is  used  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  .  .  .  The  rights  which  he  would  ac- 
quire would  be  restricted  to  the  state  which  gave  them. 
The  Constitution  has  conferred  on  Congress  the  right  to 
establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  this 
right  is  evidently  exclusive  and  has  always  been  held  by 
this  court  to  be  so.  Consequently  no  state,  since  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  can  by  naturalizing  an  alien 
invest  him  with  the  rights  and  privileges  secured  to  a 
citizen  of  a  state  under  the  Federal  Government,  al- 
though, so  far  as  the  state  alone  was  concerned,  he  would 
undoubtedly  be  entitled  to  the  rights  of  a  citizen  and 
clothed  with  all  the  rights  and  immunities  which  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  state  attached  to  that  char- 
acter. It  is  very  clear,  therefore,  that  no  state  can,  by 
any  act  or  law  of  its  own,  passed  since  the  adoption  of 
the  Constitution,  introduce  a  new  member  into  the  po- 
litical community  created  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  It  can  not  make  him  a  member  of  this 
community  by  making  him  a  member  of  its  own;  and  for 
the  same  reason  it  can  not  introduce  any  person,  or  de- 
scription of  persons,  who  were  not  intended  to  be  em- 
braced in  this  new  political  family,  which  the  Constitu- 
tion brought  into  existence,  but  were  intended  to  be 
excluded  from  it." 

Mr.  Justice  Gray,  in  United  States  v.  Wong  Kim 
Ark,  169  U.  S.  649,  said:  "The  power  granted  to 
Congress  by  the  Constitution,  'to  establish  an  uniform 
rule  of  naturalization,'  was  long  ago  adjudged  by  this 
court  to  be  vested  exclusively  in  Congress." 

In  Minneapolis  v.  Reum,  56  Fed.  576,  the  court  said,  re- 
ferring to  the  power  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Constitu- 
tion in  relation  to  naturalization :  "Congress  has  exercised 
this  power,  established  the  rule,  and   expressly  declared 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  9 

that  foreign-born  residents  may  be  naturalized  by  a  com- 
pliance with  it,  and  not  otherwise.  This  power,  like  the 
power  to  regulate  commerce  among  the  states,  was  carved 
out  of  the  general  sovereign  power  held  by  the  states 
when  this  nation  was  formed  and  granted  by  the  Consti- 
tution to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  It  thus 
vested  exclusively  in  Congress,  and  no  power  remained 
in  the  states  to  change  or  vary  the  rule  of  naturalization 
Congress  established,  or  to  authorize  any  foreign  subject 
to  denationalize  himself  and  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  without  a  compliance  with  the  conditions 
Congress  had  prescribed."  See,  also,  Lanz  v.  Randall,  4 
Dill.  425. 

The  history  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention,  and  the  speeches  of  Charles  Pinckney  who 
drafted  this  clause  of  the  Constitution, clearly  show  that  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  framers  to  confer  on  the  Federal 
Government  the  exclusive  power  to  declare  on  what 
terms  naturalization  should  be  extended  to  foreigners. 

The  State  courts  have  adopted  the  view  taken  of  the 
subject  by  the  Federal  courts.  Lynch  v.  Clark,  1  Sandf. 
Ch.  641;  Davis  v.  Hall,  1  Nott  &  McCord,  292;  In  re 
Wehlitz,  16  Wis.  443;  In  re  Stephens,  4  Gray,  559;  In  re 
Ramsden,  13  How.  Pr.  429. 

By  the  Act  of  April  14,  1802  (2  Stat,  at  L.  153),  Con- 
gress declared  that  the  children  of  persons  who,  previous 
to  the  passage  of  any  law  on  the  subject  of  naturalization 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  had  been 
naturalized  under  the  laws  of  one  of  the  States,  should, 
if  dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens 
of  the  United  States. 

C.  Naturalization  a  Judicial  Function. 

In  the  United  States  naturalization  is  a  judicial  func- 
tion, having  been  committed  by  Congress  to   the  courts. 
A    naturalization    proceeding  is    a   judgment.     Chief 


10  NATURALIZATION 

Justice  Marshall,  in  Spratt  v.  Spratt  (4  Peters,  393),  said: 
"  The  various  acts  upon  the  subject  submit  the  decision  on 
the  right  of  aliens  to  admission  as  citizens  to  courts  of  rec- 
ord. They  are  to  receive  testimony,  to  compare  it  with 
the  law,  and  to  judge  on  both  law  and  fact.  This  judg- 
ment is  entered  on  record  as  the  judgment  of  the  court." 
See,  also,  Campbell  v.  Gordon,  6  Cranch,  175;  Mut.  Bene- 
fit Ins.  Co.  V.  Tisdale,  91  U.  S.  238;  Ritchie  v.  Putnam,  13 
Wend.  524;  State  v.  McDonald,  24  Minn.  48. 

An  interesting  discussion  of  the  question  whether  the 
final  order  of  a  court  admitting  an  alien  to  citizenship  is 
a  judgment,  is  found  in  the  opinion  of  the  Spanish  Treaty 
Claims  Commission  in  the  case  of  Ruiz  v.  United  States, 
from  which  full  quotation  is  made  under  "  Impeachment 
of  Naturalization,"  page  141,  post.  The  Commission  said: 

"  In  the  refinements  of  legal  phraseology  we  may  find 
some  other  word  that  suits  us  better  than  judgment  by 
which  to  call  the  final  determining  act  of  a  court  in  pass- 
ing upon  such  proceedings — order,  adjudication,  decree, 
decision,  conclusion — but  the  effect  is  just  the  same. 
The  thing  done  and  not  the  technical  name  one  chooses 
to  give  it  is  of  importance  only.  The  validity  and  legality 
of  an  act  done,  whether  by  an  officer  or  a  tribunal, 
depends  upon  the  jurisdiction  over  the  subject-matter, 
and  the  exercise  of  its  delegated  power  by  a  judicial 
body  in  reaching  a  conclusion  is,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes,  a  judgment,  whether  technically  so  called  or 
not;  and  it  is  a  matter  of  legal  insignificance  what  other 
term  or  name  is  employed  to  express  it.  The  authorities 
make  no  distinction  between  the  orders  of  officers  and 
the  judgments  of  tribunals,  where  the  exercise  of 
jurisdiction  is  confided  to  their  discretion,  and  they 
employ  the  same  within  the  authority  and  power  con- 
ferred. Neither  do  we  find  authorities  to  sustain  the 
proposition  that  a  judgment  in  uncontested  proceedings, 
by  default  or  confession,  is  excluded  from  the  terms  of 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  11 

Article  IV,  Section  l,of  the  Constitution,  which  provides 
that  'full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each  state 
to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceedings  of 
every  other  state '  and  of  the  Act  of  Congress,  Revised 
Statutes,  Section  905,  which  declares  that  such  records 
and  .judicial  proceedings,  when  properly  authenticated, 
'shall  have  such  faith  and  credit  given  to  them  in  every 
court  within  the  United  States  as  they  have  by  law  or 
usage  in  the  courts  of  the  state  from  which  they  are 
taken.'  The  authorities  appear  to  make  no  distinction 
whatever  between  different  kinds  of  judgments.  They 
are  all  entitled  to  the  same  faith  and  credit,  whether 
entered  by  default,  confession,  or  in  a  contested  litiga- 
tion, and  may  be  impeached  on  the  same  grounds  as  other 
judgments  are  impeachable  upon.  Freeman  on  Judg- 
ments, Section  588;  Bunn  v.  Ahl,  29  Pa.  St.  387;  72  Am. 
Dec.  639;  Sipes  v.  Whitney,  30  Ohio,  69;  Kingman  v. 
Paulson,  126  Ind.  507.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this 
connection  that  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the  statute 
refers  specifically  to  a  judgment,  and  it  is  equally  true 
that  the  Acts  of  Congress  relating  to  naturalization  and 
conferring  jurisdiction  upon  certain  courts  never  speak 
of  a  judgment,  and  yet  the  courts  of  the  country,  from 
the  earliest  decisions  to  the  present  time,  in  innumerable 
cases,  have  uniformly  treated  them  as  judgments.  Un- 
doubtedly the  decision  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdic- 
tion to  grant  a  naturalization  certificate  based  upon 
facts  made  to  appear  to  its  satisfaction,  is  comprehended 
in  the  expression  'public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  pro- 
ceedings, and  must  be  a  judgment.'  " 

D.  What  Courts  Are  Authorized  to  Naturalize. 

The  first  law  enacted  by  Congress  concerning  naturali- 
zation (Act  of  1790),  authorized  "  any  common  law 
court  of  record  in  any  one  of  the  states  "  to  admit 
aliens  to  citizenship. 


12  NATURALIZATION 

The  Act  of  1795,  which  repealed  the  Act  of  1790,  con- 
ferred jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings  upon 
"  the  supreme,  superior,  district,  or  circuit  court  of  some 
one  of  the  states,  or  of  the  territories  northwest  or  south 
of  the  river  Ohio,  or  a  circuit  or  district  court  of  the 
United  States." 

The  Act  of  April  14,  1802  (2  Stat,  at  L.  153),  which, 
in  turn,  repealed  the  Act  of  1795,  authorized  "the  su- 
preme, superior,  district  or  circuit  court  of  some  one  of  the 
states  or  of  the  territorial  districts  of  the  United  States,  or 
a  circuit  or  district  court  of  the  United  States,"  to 
act  in  naturalization  proceedings,  and  aeclared  that 
"every  court  of  record  in  any  individual  state  having 
common  law  jurisdiction  and  a  seal  and  clerk  or  prothon- 
otary,  shall  be  considered  as  a  district  court  within  the 
meaning  of  this  act."  As  carried  into  the  Revised  Stat- 
utes of  the  United  States  (1878) ,  Section  2165,  which  re- 
mained the  law  on  the  subject  until  the  passage  of  the 
Act  of  June  27,  1906,  34  Stat,  at  L.  596,  the  provision 
read :  "A  circuit  or  district  court  of  the  United  States,  or 
a  district  or  supreme  court  of  the  territories,  or  a  court 
of  record  of  any  of  the  states  having  common  law  juris- 
diction and  a  seal  and  clerk." 

The  Act  of  June  27,  1906 — the  existing  law — provides 
that  "exclusive  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens  as  citizens 
of  the  United  States  is  hereby  conferred  upon  the  follow- 
ing specified  courts:  United  States  circuit  and  district 
courts  now  existing,  or  which  may  hereafter  be  established 
by  Congress  in  any  state,  United  States  district  courts 
for  the  Territories  of  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma, 
Hawaii,  and  Alaska,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  and  the  United  States  courts  for  the  Indian 
Territory;  also  all  courts  of  record  in  any  state  or  ter- 
ritory now  existing,  or  which  may  hereafter  be  created, 
having  a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  13 

or  equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in   which  the   amount   in 
controversy  is  unlimited." 

1.  Courts  of  Record. 

The  language  of  the  Statute  is  "  courts  of  record 
having  a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law 
or  equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in  which  the  amount  in 
controversy  is  unlimited." 

There  have  been  no  judicial  decisions  under  the  Act  of 
1906,  but  the  courts  have  frequently  passed  upon  the 
question  of  jurisdiction  of  courts  under  prior  laws.  As 
cases  may  arise  concerning  naturalization  conferred  under 
prior  laws,  and  as  the  language  of  the  existing  law  is,  in 
part,  similar  to  that  of  previous  acts,  references  to  earlier 
decisions  of  the  courts  are  given. 

In  ex  parte  Cregg,  2  Curtis,  C.  C.  98,  the  Court  said: 
"When  the  Act  speaks  of  courts  of  record  it  speaks  of 
courts  whose  proceedings  are  duly  recorded  by  author- 
ized persons;  and  when  it  says  'having  a  clerk  or  pro- 
thonotary,'  it  superadds  the  requirement  that  those 
proceedings  shall  be  recorded  by  one  of  those  officers." 

In  Mills  V.  McCabe,  44  111.  194,  the  question  involved 
was  whether  the  Marine  Court  of  the  City  of  New  York, 
which  was  created  by  Act  of  the  State  Legislature  and 
had  a  clerk  and  seal  and  a  limited  common  law  jurisdic- 
tion, was  a  court  of  record  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Act  of  Congress.  The  New  York  courts  had  decided  that 
the  marine  court  was  a  court  of  record  only  to  the  extent 
to  which  it  was  declared  so  by  statute,  and  not  in  the 
strict  legal  sense  of  the  term.  The  Illinois  court  said: 
"A  fair  and  reasonable  construction  of  the  Act  of  Con- 
gress requires  us  to  hold  that  only  a  court  of  record  for 
general,  and  not  special,  purposes  was  intended  to  be 
embraced.  The  Act  has  not  declared  that  a  court  of 
record   for  some   purposes   only  shall   be  invested   with 


14  NATURALIZATION 

such  jurisdiction.  Nor  do  we  think  such  can  be  held  to  be 
the  legislative  intention." 

A  court  with  no  clerk  or  recording  officer  other  than 
the  judge,  has  been  held  to  have  no  jurisdiction  of 
applications  for  naturalization.  Mills  v.  McCabe,  44  111., 
194;  State  ex  rel.  Fossler  v.  Webster,  7  Neb.  469;  Re 
Dean,  83  Me.  489. 

In  ex  parte  Gladhill,  8  Met.  168,  the  question  being 
whether  the  police  court  of  Lowell,  Mass.,  was  a  court 
of  record,  the  court  said: 

"It  possesses  all  the  characteristics  of  a  court  of  rec- 
ord. It  is  to  be  holden  by  a  learned,  able,  and  discreet 
person  to  be  appointed  and  commissioned  by  the  gov- 
ernor pursuant  to  the  constitution.  In  general,  all 
judicial  officers  by  the  constitution  hold  their  offices 
during  good  behavior,  except  justices  of  the  peace,  whose 
office  is  limited  to  the  term  of  seven  years.  There  is  also  a 
provision.  Section  8,  for  the  appointment  of  special  jus- 
tices to  hold  the  court  whenever  the  standing  justice 
shall  be  interested  in  any  suit  or  prosecution,  or  shall 
be  unable,  from  any  cause,  to  hear  and  determine  any 
matter  pending  in  said  court.  This  indicates  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  court,  or  judicial  organized  tribunal,  hav- 
ing attributes  and  exercising  functions,  independently  of 
the  person  of  the  magistrate  designated  generally  to 
hold  it,  and  distinguishes  it  from  the  case  of  a  justice  of 
the  peace  on  whom,  personally,  certain  judicial  powers 
are  conferred  by  the  law. 

"We  have  no  doubt  it  is  a  court  of  record.  Section  6 
directs  the  keeping  of  a  fair  record  and  a  subsequent 
act,  cited  hereafter,  authorizes  the  appointment  of  a 
clerk  for  the  same  purpose." 

2.  Common  Law  Jurisdiction. 

The  courts  have  frequently  construed  the  phrase: 
^'common  law  jurisdiction,"  in  the  naturalization  statutes. 
The  constructions  have  not  been  uniform. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  15 

Mr.  Justice  Story,  in  Parsons  vs.  Bedford,  3  Pet.  433, 
said:  "The  phrase  'common  law'  found  in  this  clause,  is 
used  in  contradistinction  to  equity  and  admiralty  and 
maritime  jurisprudence." 

In  the  case  of  In  re  Conner,  39  Cal.  98,  the  court  said 
that  the  term  "common  law  jurisdiction"  is  capable  of 
no  other  meaning  than  jurisdiction  to  try  and  decide 
causes  which  were  cognizable  by  the  courts  of  law  under 
what  is  known  as  the  common  law  of  England;  that,  as 
our  judicial  system  was  modeled  chiefly  after  that  of 
England,  when  we  speak  through  our  statutes  and  courts 
of  common  law  actions,  proceedings  at  common  law,  and 
common  law  jurisdiction,  we  mean  such  actions,  proceed- 
ings, and  jurisdiction  as  appertain  to  the  common  law  of 
England  as  administered  through  her  courts.  The  court 
held,  however,  that  the  statute  did  not  require  that  the 
courts  have  all  the  common  law  jurisdiction  which  per- 
tains to  all  classes  of  actions,  but  that  it  was  enough 
that  it  had  "common  law  jurisdiction." 

In  United  States  vs.  Power,  14  Blatch.  223,  it  was  de- 
cided that  the  City  Court  of  Yonkers,  which  by  statute 
had  civil  jurisdiction  in  all  actions  for  the  recovery  of 
money  when  the  amount  recovered  did  not  exceed  one 
thousand  dollars,  had  jurisdiction  in  naturalization  pro- 
ceedings. The  court  said  that  it  was  manifest  that  by 
the  statutory  provisions  the  court  was  "authorized  to 
exercise  some  common  law  jurisdiction — that  is,  it  has 
jurisdiction  to  hear  and  determine  causes  which  were 
cognizable  by  the  courts  of  law  under  what  is  known  as 
the  common  law  of  England,  although  it  has  not  juris- 
diction of  all  such  causes."  The  court  added,  that  the 
statute  of  the  United  States  did  not  require  of  courts 
authorized  to  entertain  applications  for  naturalization 
that  they  should  have  all  the  jurisdiction  possessed  by 
any  court  of  law;  that  if  the  court  might  exercise  any 
part  of   that  jurisdiction  it  was  within  the  language  of 


16  NATURALIZATION 

the  statute  and  within  its  meaning  as  well.  See,  also,  8 
Met.  168;  2  Curt.  98;  50  N.  H.  245;  39  Cal.  98. 

In  accordance  with  this  view,  a  county  court  which 
had  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  common  law  actions  of 
trespass  commenced  in  a  justice's  court,  was  held  to 
come  within  the  terms  of  the  statute.  People  v.  Sweet- 
man,  3  Park.  Crim.  Rep.  358. 

And,  in  People  v.  Pease,  30  Barb.  588,  it  was  decided 
that  a  county  court,  shown  to  have  jurisdiction  of  suits 
commenced  in  a  justice's  court,  where  it  appeared  by  the 
answer  of  the  defendant  that  the  title  to  lands  had  come 
in  question,  also  in  matters  of  partition  and  admeasure- 
ment of  dower,  "with  other  powers  not  enumerated," 
satisfied  the  statutory  requirements. 

The  court,  in  In  re  Conner,  supra,  held  that  the  fact 
that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  was  restricted  as  to 
the  amount  involved  did  not  deprive  it  of  authority  to 
act  in  naturalization  proceedings. 

In  United  States  v.  Lehman,  39  Fed.  49,  it  was  held 
that  a  court  of  criminal  correction  whose  jurisdiction 
was  statutory,  "having  power  to  punish  offenses  that 
existed  at  common  law,  and  to  enforce  private  rights 
and  to  redress  private  wrongs  recognized  by  the  common 
law,"  and  whose  action  in  the  exercise  of  that  power  "is 
governed  by  the  principles,  rules,  and  usages  of  the 
common  law  in  so  far  as  they  have  not  been  modified  or 
abolished  by  statute,"  had  power  to  naturalize  aliens. 
The  court  said:  "Congress  intended  to  confer  the  power 
of  naturalization  on  all  courts  of  record  of  the  several 
states  that  have  power  to  administer  justice  under  and 
in  accordance  with  that  system  of  jurisprudence  known 
as  the  common  law."  See,  also.  Levin  v.  United  States, 
128  Fed.  826. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  decisions  holding  that 
courts  empowered  by  statute  to  exercise  common  law 
jurisdiction  for  certain   purposes,  but,  not   having  com- 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  17 

mon  law  jurisdiction  in  all  cases,  did  not  come  within 
the  terms  of  the  act  of  Congress.  Ex  parte  McKenzie,  51 
S.  C.  244;  Ex  parte  Tweedy,  22  Fed.  84. 

3.  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

The  Act  of  Congress  of  June  29,  1906,  substitutes  for 
the  phrase  "common  law  jurisdiction"  the  words  "juris- 
diction in  actions  at  law  or  equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in 
which  the  amount  in  controversy  is  unlimited."  The  dif- 
ficulty indicated  in  the  diverse  decisions  we  have  just 
been  considering  is  not  obviated  by  the  change  in  phrase- 
ology of  the  law.  It  expressly  provides  that  a  court  may 
naturalize  which  has  jurisdiction  of  actions  both  at  law  and 
in  equity,  or  of  actions  either  at  law  or  in  equity.  This 
language  confers  jurisdiction  on  courts  of  equity. 

The  law  contains  the  qualification,  however,  that  the 
amount  in  controversy  shall  be  unlimited. 

4.  State  Courts. 

It  is  apparent  that  the  majority  of  naturalizations  are 
by  state  courts. 

Before  a  state  court  acts  in  a  naturalization  proceeding, 
under  the  act  of  1906,  the  clerk  of  the  court  is  required 
by  a  regulation  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor,  to  furnish  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization  with 
authoritative  evidence  (preferably  the  certificate  of  the 
Attorney-General  of  the  state)  that  the  court  has  "  a 
seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law  or  equity, 
or  law  and  equity,  in  which  the  amount  in  controversy  is 
unlimited."     Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 

There  is  a  line  of  decisions  holding  that  state  courts 
in  admitting  aliens  to  citizenship,  act  as  United  States 
courts.  An  opposite  view  is  held  by  another  line  of 
cases. 

In  People  v.  Sweetman,  3  Park.  Crim.  358,  the  court 
said:  "The  Act  of  Congress  (relating  to  naturalization) 

5233—2 


18  NATURALIZATION 

adopts  every  state  court  as  its  agent  to  do  this  service 
that  is  a  court  of  record,  and  has  common  law  jurisdic- 
tion and  a  seal  and  clerk.  ,  .  .  Without  attempting 
to  examine  the  question  in  regard  to  the  power  of  the 
Federal  Government  to  confer  such  jurisdiction  upon 
state  courts  and  magistrates,  it  seems  .  .  .  quite 
clear  that,  in  entertaining  such  proceedings  they  are  ex- 
clusively under  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  should 
be  deemed  quoad  hoc  courts  of  the  United  States."  See, 
also.  Re  Christern,  11  Jones  and  S.  523;  and  In  re  Rams- 
den,  13  How.  Pr.  429. 

The  leading  case  holding  an  opposite  view  is  United 
States  V.  Severino,  125  Fed.  949,  in  which  the  authorities 
on  both  sides  are  collected  and  reviewed  and  the  conclu- 
sion reached  that:  "State  courts  while  entertaining  ju- 
risdiction in  naturalization  proceedings  remain  state 
courts."  See,  also.  Rump  v.  Commonwealth,  30  Pa.  St. 475. 

It  was  also  held  in  United  States  v.  Severino  that  per- 
jury committed  by  a  witness  in  a  naturalization  proceed- 
ing in  a  state  court  is  punishable  by  the  sovereignty 
whose  justice  it  offends,  and  that  the  Federal  court  can 
not  entertain  jurisdiction  in  the  absence  of  a  Federal 
statute  conferring  it. 

In  In  re  Naturalization,  5  Pa.  Dist.  R.  597,  it  was  held 
that  state  courts  are  not  obliged  to  exercise  the  power 
conferred  by  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2165. 

In  Stephens,  Petitioner,  4  Gray,  559,  it  was  declared 
that  the  power  to  naturalize  given  to  state  courts  is  a 
naked  power  which  imposes  no  legal  obligation  on  courts 
to  assume  and  exercise  it,  and  that  such  exercise  is  not 
within  their  official  duty  or  their  oath  to  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  The  court  added: 
"But  whatever  may  be  the  authority  of  Congress  to  re- 
quire the  performance  of  duties  by  state  courts,  magis- 
trates and  officers  not  affecting  the  organization  of  the 
national  government  or   not  expressly  provided  for  by 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  19 

the  Constitution  .  .  .  it  is  well  established  that  such 
courts  and  magistrates  may,  if  they  choose,  exercise  the 
powers  thus  conferred  by  Congress  unless  prohibited  by 
state  legislation."  See,  also,  Rushworth  v.  Judges,  58  N.  J. 
Law,  97;  Morgan  v.  Dudley,  18  B.  Mon..  693;  State  v. 
Penney,  10  Ark.  621. 

In  State  v.  Whittemore,  50  N.  H.  245,  the  view  was  ex- 
pressed that  the  state  legislature  may  prohibit  a  state 
court  which  comes  within  the  class  of  tribunals  described 
in  the  United  States  Act,  from  exercising  jurisdiction  in 
naturalization  cases.  But  "  the  state  can  not  confer  that 
jurisdiction  on  any  tribunal  which  does  not  come  within 
the  terms  of  the  United  States  Statute."  Id.  See,  also. 
In  re  Ramsden,  supra. 

The  state  may  indicate  which  of  its  courts  coming 
within  the  class  of  tribunals  described  in  the  United 
States  Act,  shall  exercise  the  jurisdiction,  and  it  may  fix 
the  time  within  which  such  jurisdiction  may  be  exer- 
cised. Rushworth  v.  Judges,  supra.  See,  also.  In  re  Gil- 
roy,  88  Me.  199;  Ryan  v.  Egan,  156  111.  224. 

5.  Judges. 

Functions. 

Naturalization  is  a  function  of  the  court,  not  of  the 
clerk. 

While  the  preliminary  declaration  of  intention  may  be 
made  before  the  clerk,  the  petition  for  naturalization 
must  be  addressed  to  the  court  (Sec.  27);  the  facts  as 
to  the  requisite  residence  of  the  applicant,  his  behavior 
as  a  man  of  good  moral  character  and  attachment  to  the 
principles  of  the  Constitution,  must  "be  made  to  appear 
to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court.''  These  facts  shall  be 
proved  by  the  oath  of  the  applicant  and  the  testimony 
of  at  least  two  witnesses,  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
Sec.  4,  par.  4. 


20  NATURALIZATION 

And  the  law  expressly  provides  that  "every  final  hear- 
ing upon  such  petition  shall  be  had  in  open  court  before 
a  judge  or  judges  thereof,  and  every  final  order  which 
may  be  made  upon  such  petition  shall  he  under  the  hand 
of  the  court*  and  entered  in  full  upon  a  record  kept  for 
that  purpose,  and  upon  such  final  hearing  of  such  peti- 
tion the  applicant  and  witnesses  shall  be  examined  under 
oath  before  the  court  and  in  the  presence  of  the  court.'' 
Sec.  9. 

The  applicant  is  required,  before  he  is  admitted  to 
citizenship  to  declare  on  oath,  in  open  court,  that  he  will 
support  the  Constitution  and  defend  it  and  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  against  all  enemies  and  bear  truth  faith 
and  allegiance  to  the  same. 

He  shall  also  declare  on  oath,  in  open  court,  that  he 
absolutely  and  entirely  renounces  and  abjures  all  alle- 
giance and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state, 
or  sovereignty  of  which  he  was  before  a  citizen  or  sub- 
ject.    Sec.  4,  par.  3. 

In  case  the  applicant  has  borne  any  hereditary  title  or 
has  been  of  any  of  the  orders  of  nobility,  he  shall  make 
an  express  renunciation  thereof  in  the  court  to  which  his 
application  is  made.     Sec  4,  par.  5. 

The  days  upon  which  final  action  shall  be  had  on  pe- 
titions of  naturalization  shall  he  fixed  by  7'ule  of  court. 
Sec.  6. 

The  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  upon  petition  of  the 
applicant  and  as  a  part  of  his  naturalization,  make  a 
decree  changing  the  name  of  said  alien.  Sec.  6. 

Any  court  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens  has 
jurisdiction  of  a  suit  instituted  by  the  United  States 
District  Attorney  for  the  purpose  of  setting  aside  and 

*  No  certificate  of  naturalization  shall  be  issued  to  a  petitioner  until 
after  the  judge  of  the  court  granting  naturalization  has  signed  the  order 
to  that  effect.     Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  21 

canceling  a  certificate  of  citizenship  on  the  ground  of 
fraud  or  that  it  was  illegally  procured.  Sec.  15. 

Whenever  any  certificate  of  citizenship  shall  be  set 
aside  or  canceled,  as  herein  provided,  the  court  in  which 
such  judgment  or  decree  is  rendered  shall  make  an  order 
canceling  such  certificate  of  citizenship  and  shall  send  a 
certified  copy  of  such  order  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization;  and  in  case  such  certificate  was 
not  originally  issued  hy  the  court  making  such  order  it 
shall  direct  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  transmit  a  copy  of 
such  order  and  judgment  to  the  court  out  of  which 
such  certificate  of  citizenship  shall  have  been  originally 
issued.  And  it  shall  thereupon  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk 
of  the  court  receiving  such  certified  copy  of  the  order 
and  judgment  of  the  court  to  enter  the  same  of  record 
and  to  cancel  such  original  certificate  of  citizenship  upon 
the  records  and  to  notify  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  of  such  cancellation. 

The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  apply  not  only  to 
certificates  of  citizenship  issued  under  the  provisions  of 
this  act,buttoall  certificates  of  citizenship  whichmay  have 
been  issued  heretofore  by  any  court  exercising  jurisdic- 
tion in  naturalization  proceedings  under  prior  laws. 

Courts  having  jurisdiction  of  the  offense  of  procuring 
naturalization  in  violation  of  the  Act  of  1906  are  au- 
thorized to  adjudge  and  declare  void  the  final  order  ad- 
mitting to  citizenship  a  person  convicted  of  such  offense. 
Sec.  23. 

Renunciation    of    Citizenship   by    Foreign-born  Widow  of 
American  Citizen. 

A  new  function  of  courts  of  naturalization  is  conferred 
by  the  Act  of  March  2, 1907,  which  authorizes  such  courts 
to  receive  the  renunciation  made    by  the  foreign-born 


22  NATURALIZATION 

Widow  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of    he  citizenship 
acquired  by  her  marriage.     The  law  reads: 

"  Sec.  4.  That  any  foreign  woman  who  acquires  Ameri- 
can citizenship  by  marriage  to  an  American  shall  be  as- 
sumed to  retain  the  same  after  the  termination  of  the 
marital  relation  if  she  continue  to  reside  in  the  United 
States,  unless  she  makes  formal  re7iunciatio7i  thereof 
before  a  court  having  jurisdiction  to  7iaturalize  aliens, 
or  if  she  resides  abroad  she  may  retain  her  citizenship 
by  registering  as  such  before  a  United  States  consul 
within  one  year  after  the  termination  of  such  mar  tal 
relation." 

6.  Clerks  of  Courts. 

Duties: 
a.  As  to  Declaration  of  Intention. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  any  court  author- 
ized to  naturalize  aliens  to  receive  declarations  of  inten- 
tions of  aliens.*  Sec.  4,  par.  1,  and  to  keep  and  file  a 
duplicate  of  each  declaration  made  before  him.     Sec.  12. 

By  the  express  terms  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  an 
alien's  declaration  of  intention  may  be  made  before  the 
"  authorized  deputy  "  of  the  clerk.  Sec.  4,  par.  1.  And 
prior  to  the  passage  of  that  act  it  was  held  that  the 

*The  declarations  of  intention  shall  be  bound  in  chronological  order  in 
separate  volumes,  indexed,  consecutively  numbered,  and  made  a  part  of 
the  reconis  of  the  court.  Sec.  14,  Act  of  June  29,  1906.  Declarations 
of  intention  will  be  furnished  in  bound  volumes,  as  a  court  record,  vary- 
ing in  size  according  to  the  amount  of  such  business  transacted  by  the 
court.  In  addition  to  the  bound  records,  the  duplicate  and  triplicate 
declarations  of  intention  will  be  furnished  as  loose  sheets  attached 
together  and  perforated,  so  that  they  can  be  readily  torn  apart,  the 
triplicate  to  be  given  to  the  petitioner  and  the  duplicate  to  be  forwarded 
to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturali- 
zation). Each  bound  record  will  consist  of  the  original  declarations  of 
intention,  paged  in  consecutive  order  and  indexed.  These  volumes  are 
to  be  numbered  and  will  form  a  permanent  record  of  the  court.  Nat. 
Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  23 

actual  work  of  the  clerk  might  be  performed  by  a  deputy 
acting  for  the  clerk.  State  v.  Hoeflinger,  35  Wis.  393. 
See,  also,  Sec.  21,  Act  of  1906,  which  specifically  refers 
to   the  "authorized   deputy  or  assistant"  of  the  clerk. 

In  In  re  Dean,  83  Me.  489,  the  court  decided  that  the 
recorder  of  a  municipal  court  was  a  clerk  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  naturalization  statute  (R.  S.  2165).  The  court 
said: 

"The  court  must  have  a  clerk  distinct  from  the  judge, 
not  necessarily  an  officer  denominated  clerk,  but  a  perma- 
nent 'recording  officer  charged  with  the  duty  of  keeping 
a  true  record  of  its  doings  and  afterwards  of  authenti- 
cating them.'  .  .  .  The  court  contemplated  by  the 
Act  of  Congress  has  an  organized  existence;  it  is  imper- 
sonal; the  judge  is  one  of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  or- 
ganization; the  clerk  is  another  and  a  separate  and  an 
independent  element.  The  essential  function  of  the  clerk 
is  to  make  and  keep  the  records  and  give  them  legal  veri- 
fication by  his  attestation  and  the  use  of  the  seal. 

"By  those  sections  of  the  Act  establishing  the  municipal 
court  of  Biddeford  above  quoted  the  responsible  duty 
of  making  and  keeping  the  records  of  the  court  is  im- 
posed upon  the  judge  and  not  upon  the  recorder.  There 
is  no  duty  of  making  and  keeping  the  records  imposed 
upon  the  recorder  by  law.  He  is  to  keep  the  records  of 
the  court  only  when  requested  so  to  do  by  the  judge. 
Furthermore,  the  recorder  of  this  court  can  not  authen- 
ticate by  his  attestation  any  copies  of  records  'made 
and  kept'  by  the  judge,  or  kept  by  himself  at  the  request 
of  the  judge.  Only  such  copies  of  the  records  as  are 
'duly  certified  by  the  judge  shall  be  legal  evidence  in  all 
courts.'  The  authority  to  appoint  a  recorder  was  con- 
ferred upon  the  judge,  not  for  the  purpose  of  creating  a 
fixed  and  permanent  clerical  office  distinct  and  separate 
from  that  of  the  judge,  but  primarily  to  provide  for  the 
judge  a  substitute  who   should  be  empowered  to  act  in 


24  NATURALIZATION 

his  stead  in  the  contingencies  named  in  the  act.  'His 
signature  as  recorder  is  sufficient  evidence  of  his  right  to 
act  instead  of  the  judge.'  When  thus  acting  in  a  judi- 
cial capacity,  exercising  the  powers  and  performing  the 
duties  of  the  judge,  the  recorder  is  the  court,  and  must 
personally  make,  keep,  and  authenticate  the  records  of 
the  court.  The  recorder's  court  has  no  clerk  other  than 
the  recorder  himself." 

The  declaration  of  intention  must  be  made  in  the 
clerk's  office,  or  in  open  court. 

b.  As  to  Petition  for  Naturalization. 

The  petition  of  an  applicant  for  naturalization  must 
be  subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  the  clerk  of  the  court 
to  which  it  is  addressed.     Sec.  27,  Act  of  1906. 

The  petitions  for  naturalization  shall  be  bound  in  chron- 
ological order  in  separate  volumes,  indexed,  consecu- 
tively numbered,  and  made  part  of  the  records  of  the 
court.  Each  certificate  of  naturalization  issued  shall  bear 
upon  its  face,  in  a  place  prepared  therefor,  the  volume 
number  and  page  number  of  the  petition  whereon  such 
certificate  was  issued,  and  the  volume  number  and  page 
number  of  the  stub  of  such  certificate.*  Sec.  14,  Act  of 
June  29,  1906. 

The  clerk  of  any  court  exercising  jurisdiction  in  natu- 
ralization   proceedings,    or    any    person    acting    under 

*The  original  of  the  petitions  for  naturalization  will  be  furnished  in 
bound  volumes  of  varying  size,  paged  in  consecutive  order  and  indexed. 
The  duplicate  petitions  will  be  furnished  as  loose  sheets  and  must  be 
forwarded  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  ot 
Naturalization)  within  thirty  days  after  execution.  The  original  petitions 
for  naturalization  must  be  filled  out  and  signed  in  the  bound  volumes, 
and  remain  as  a  part  of  the  permanent  records  of  the  office  in  which 
filed. 

If  an  alien  is  physically  unable  to  speak,  that  fact  should  be  stated  in 
his  petition  for  naturalization  in  lieu  of  the  statement,  "I  am  able  to 
speak  the  English  language." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  25 

authority  of  this  act,  who  shall  knowingly  certify  that 
a  petitioner,  affiant,  or  witness  named  in  an  affidavit, 
petition,  or  certificate  of  citizenship,  or  other  paper  or 
writing  required  to  be  executed  under  the  provisions  of 
this  act,  personally  appeared  before  him  and  was  sworn 
thereto,  or  acknowledged  the  execution  thereof  or  signed 
the  same,  when  in  fact  such  petitioner,  affiant,  or  witness 
did  not  personally  appear  before  him,  or  was  not  sworn 
thereto,  or  did  not  execute  the  same,  or  did  not  acknowl- 
edge the  execution  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine 
not  exceeding  five  thousand  dollars,  or  by  imprisonment 
not  to  exceed  five  years.  Sec.  22,  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 
The  clerk  shall  receive  and  file  at  the  time  the  petition 
for  naturalization  is  filed  a  certificate  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor  (if  the  petitioner  arrives 
in  the  United  States  after  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  June 
29,  1906),  stating  the  date,  place  and  manner  of  his 
arrival  in  this  country,  and  the  declaration  of  intention, 
which  certificate  and  declaration  shall  be  attached  to  and 
made  a  part  of  the  petition. 

c.  As  to  Notice  of  Petition. 

Immediately  after  filing  the  petition  the  clerk  of  the 
court  shall  give  notice  thereof  by  posting  in  a  public 
and  conspicuous  place  in  his  office,  or  in  the  building  in 
which  his  office  is  situated,  under  an  appropriate  head- 
ing, the  name,  nativity  and  residence  of  the  alien,  the 
date  and  place  of  his  arrival  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  date  as  nearly  as  may  be,  for  the  final  hearing  of  his 
petition,  and  the  names  of  the  witnesses  whom  the  ap- 
plicant expects  to  summon  in  his  behalf.  Sec.  5,  Act  of 
1906.* 

See  Notice  p.  92,  post. 

*Witliin  thirty  days  after  posting  the  notice  required  by  Sec.  5,  the  clerk 
shall  inform  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  of  the  date, 
as  near  as  may  be,  for  the  final  hearing  of  each  and  every  petition  for 
naturalization.     Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


26  NATURALIZATION 

d.  Witnesses. 

The  clerk  shall,  if  the  applicant  requests  it,  issue  a 
subpoena  for  the  witnesses  named  by  the  applicant  to 
appear  upon  the  day  set  for  the  final  hearing.  Sec.  5. 

e.  As  to  Docketing  Petitions. 

Petitions  for  naturalization  may  be  made  and  filed 
during  term  time  or  vacation  of  the  court,  and  shall  be 
docketed  the  same  day  as  filed.  Sec.  6. 

f .  As  to  Duplicates  of  Petitions. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  fur- 
nish to  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization  duplicates  of  all 
petitions  within  thirty  days  after  the  filing  of  the  same. 
Sec.  12. 

g.  As  to  Final  Hearing. 

The  clerk  shall  enter  in  full  upon  a  record  kept  for 
that  purpose  every  final  order  which  may  be  made  upon 
a  petition  for  naturalization.  Sec.  9. 

h.   As  to  Aliens  Denied  Naturalization. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  to  report  to  the 
Bureau  of  Naturalization  within  thirty  days  after  the 
final  hearing  and  decision  of  the  court  the  name  of  each 
and  every  alien  who  shall  be  denied  naturalization.  Sec. 
12,  Act  of  1906.* 

i.   As  to  Certificates  of  Citizenship. 

(A)  Blank  Certificates.  Upon  the  requisition  of  clerks 
of  courts  authorized  to  naturalize  aliens,  the  courts  shall 
be    furnished    from  time    to    time    by    the    Bureau    of 

*Within  thirty  days  after  the  sitting  of  a  court  in  naturalization  cases, 
the  clerk  of  such  court  shall  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization,  a  list  containing  the  name  of  each  and  every  alien  who, 
during  such  sitting  of  court,  has  been  denied  naturalization,  and  the 
reason  or  reasons  for  such  denial.     Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  27 

Naturalization  with  such  blank  forms  as  may  be  required 
in  the  naturalization  of  aliens,  and  all  certificates  of 
naturalization  shall  be  consecutively  numbered  and 
printed  on  safety  paper  furnished  by  said  bureau.  Sec. 
3,  par.  4. 

The  first  supply  of  blank  forms  will  be  furnished  upon 
the  written  application  of  the  clerks  of  courts  having 
jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  accompanied,  in  the  case 
of  clerks  of  state  courts,  by  authoritative  evidence 
(preferably  the  certificate  of  the  attorney-general  of  the 
state)  that  the  courts  of  which  such  clerks  are  officers 
have  "a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  iurisdiction  inactions  at  law 
or  equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in  which  the  amount  in 
controversy  is  unlimited."  Subsequent  supplies  of  such 
blank  forms  will  be  furnished  the  clerks  of  courts  having 
jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens  upon  the  receipt  by  the 
Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of 
Naturalization)  of  requisitions.  Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2, 
1906. 

Clerks  of  courts  will  be  furnished  with  requisition 
blanks  on  which  are  listed,  by  number  and  title,  all  blank 
forms,  including  record  and  order  books,  to  be  used  in 
the  naturalization  of  aliens,  and  these  forms  must  be 
obtained  exclusively  from  the  Department  of  Commerce 
and  Labor  (Division  of  Naturalization),  none  other  being 
official.  Manila  envelopes  or  jackets  will  be  furnished 
to  clerks  in  which  to  place  the  triplicate  declaration  of 
intention  or  the  original  certificate  of  naturalization  be- 
fore delivering  them  to  the  person  making  the  declaration 
or  to  the  person  naturalized.     Nat.  Reg.  Oct.  2,  1906. 

All  applications  for  supplies  of  certificates  of  naturali- 
zation should  be  accompanied  by  a  statement  of  the 
number,  if  any,  of  certificates  of  naturalization  issued 
by  the  clerks  of  courts  making  such  applications  since 
June  1,  1903,  if   such  certificates  failed   to  comply  with 


28  NATURALIZATION 

the  requirements  of  the  immigration  act  of  March  3, 
1903.     Id. 

Certificates  of  naturalization  will  be  supplied  in  bound 
volumes  consisting  of  original  and  duplicate  certificates 
and  stubs.  Each  original  and  duplicate  certificate  and 
the  stub  will  be  given  the  same  serial  number,  the  stub 
to  the  original  certificate  bearing  a  page  number  in  addi- 
tion to  its  serial  number.  Each  book  will  bear  a  volume 
number,  and  the  volume  number  and  page  of  the  stub 
must  be  given  on  the  face  of  the  certificate.  The  original 
certificate  will  be  given  to  the  petitioner  in  accordance 
with  the  final  order  of  the  court,  and  the  duplicate  shall 
be  forwarded  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Natural- 
ization (Division  of  Naturalization)  by  registered  mail 
within  thirty  days  after  the  issuance  of  the  original,  the 
stub  to  the  original  constituting  a  part  of  the  permanent 
records  of  the  court.     Nat.  Reg.  Oct.  2,  1906. 

Clerks  of  courts  having  and  exercising  jurisdiction  in 
naturalization  matters  shall  be  responsible  for  all  blank 
certificates  of  citizenship  received  by  them  from  time 
to  time  from  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization,  and  shall 
account  for  the  same  to  the  said  Bureau  whenever  re- 
quired so  to  do  by  the  Bureau.     Sec.  12,  par.  3. 

(B)  Defaced  or  Injured  Certificates.  No  certificate  of 
citizenship  received  by  any  clerk  which  may  be  defaced 
or  injured  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  its  use  as  pro- 
vided in  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  shall  in  any  case  be 
destroyed,  but  such  certificate  shall  be  returned  to  the 
said  bureau. 

(C)  Accountability  for  Certificates.  In  case  any  clerk  shall 
fail  to  return  or  properly  account  for  any  certificate  fur- 
nished by  the  said  bureau  as  provided  by  law,  he  shall 
be  liable  to  the  United  States  in  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars 
to  be  recovered  in  an  action  of  debt  for  each  and  every 
certificate  not  properly  accounted  for  or  returned.  Sec. 
12,  par.  3. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  29 

(D)  Duplicates.  It  is  made  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of 
every  court  exercising  jurisdiction  in  naturalization  mat- 
ters under  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  to  send  to  the 
Bureau  of  Naturalization  at  Washington,  within  thirty 
days  after  the  issuance  of  a  certificate  of  citizenship,  a 
duplicate  of  such  certificate.  Sec  12,  par.  1. 

Beginning  with  October  1,  1906,  and  on  the  first  work- 
ing day  of  each  and  every  month  thereafter,  clerks  of 
courts  shall  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturalization)  duplicate 
declarations  of  intention  and  petitions  for  naturalization 
filed,  and  all  duplicates  of  certificates  of  naturalization 
issued,  during  the  preceding  month.  Duplicate  petitions 
for  naturalization  and  duplicate  certificates  of  naturali- 
zation shall  be  forwarded  by  registered  mail;  and  dupli- 
cate declarations  of  intention  shall  be  sent  therewith, 
provided  the  combined  weight  of  the  documents  does 
not  exceed  4  pounds,  otherwise  they  shall  be  forwarded 
in  a  separate  package  by  unregistered  mail.  The  clerks 
making  such  shipments  are  required  to  notify  the  Chief 
of  the  Division  of  Naturalization  of  the  date  thereof,  by 
unregistered  mail.  In  transmitting  petitions  clerks  of 
courts  are  directed  to  state  that  the  names  of  the  peti- 
tioners and  their  witnesses  have  been  conspicuously 
posted,  as  required  by  law.  Nat.  Reg.  Oct.  2,  1906. 

(E)  Stub.  Each  clerk  shall  keep  on  file  in  his  office  a 
stub  for  each  certificate  so  issued  by  him,  whereon  shall 
be  entered  a  memorandum  of  all  the  essential  facts  set 
forth  in  such  certificate.  Sec.  12. 

(F)  Canceled  Certificates.  Whenever  any  certificate  of 
citizenship  shall  be  set  aside  or  canceled,  as  herein  pro- 
vided, the  court  in  which  such  judgment  or  decree  is  ren- 
dered shall  make  an  order  canceling  such  certificate  of 
citizenship  and  shall  send  a  certified  copy  of  such  order 
to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization;  and  in 
case   such   certificate    was  not    originally  issued   by  the 


30  NATURALIZATION 

court  making  such  order  it  shall  direct  the  clerk  of  the 
court  to  transmit  a  copy  of  such  order  and  judgment  to 
the  court  out  of  which  such  certificate  of  citizenship 
shall  have  been  originally  issued.  And  it  shall  thereupon 
be  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  the  court  receiving  such 
certified  copy  of  the  order  and  judgment  of  the  court  to 
enter  the  same  of  record  and  to  cancel  such  original 
certificate  of  citizenship  upon  the  records  and  to  notify 
the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  of  such 
cancellation. 

The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  apply  not  only  to 
certificates  of  citizenship  issued  under  the  provisions  of 
this  act,  but  to  all  certificates  of  citizenship,  which  may 
have  been  issued  heretofore  by  any  court  exercising  jur- 
isdiction in  naturalization  proceedings  under  prior  laws. 
Sec.  15,  Act  of  1906. 

j.  Certified  Copies. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  clerks  of  courts  to  furnish 
to  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization  certified  copies  of  such 
proceedings  and  orders  instituted  in  or  issued  out  of  the 
courts  affecting  or  relating  to  the  naturalization  of  aliens 
as  may  be  required  by  said  Bureau.     Sec.  12. 

In  case  any  clerk  or  officer  acting  under  his  direction 
shall  refuse  or  neglect  to  comply  with  any  of  the  forego- 
ing provisions  he  shall  forfeit  and  pay  to  the  United 
States  the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars  in  each  and  every 
case  in  which  such  violation  or  omission  occurs,  and  the 
amount  of  such  forfeiture  may  be  recovered  by  the 
United  States  in  an  action  of  debt  against  such  clerk. 
Sec.  12,  Act  of  1906. 

Certified  copies  of  all  papers,  documents,  certificates, 
and  records  required  to  be  used,  filed,  recorded  or  kept 
under  any  and  all  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  June 
29,  1906,  shall  be  admitted  in  evidence  equally  with  the 
originals  in  any  and  all  proceedings  under  this  act,  and  in 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  31 

all  cases  in  which  the  original  thereof  might  be  admissible 
as  evidence.  Sec.  28. 

k.  Records. 

A  duplicate  of  each  declaration  of  intention  shall  be 
kept  and  filed  by  the  clerk  before  whom  the  declaration 
is  made.  Sec.  12. 

Declarations  of  intention  and  the  petitions  for  natur- 
alization shall  be  bound  in  chronological  order  in  sepa- 
rate volumes,  indexed,  consecutively  numbered  and  made 
part  of  the  records  of  the  court.  Sec.  14. 

Petitions  for  naturalization  shall  be  docketed  the  day 
they  are  filed.  Sec.  6. 

Every  final  order  which  may  be  made  upon  a  petition 
for  naturalization  shall  be  under  the  hand  of  the  court 
and  entered  in  full  upon  a  record  kept  for  that  purpose. 
Sec.  9. 

Each  certificate  of  naturalization  issued  shall  bear 
upon  its  face,  in  a  place  prepared  therefor,  the  volume 
number  and  page  number  of  the  petition  whereon  such 
certificate  was  issued,  and  the  volume  number  and  page 
number  of  the  stub  of  such  certificate.  Sec.  14. 

The  name,  place  of  residence,  and  occupation  of  each 
witness  whose  testimony  is  required  by  law  as  to  the 
facts  of  residence,  moral  character,  and  attachment  of 
the  applicant  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  shall 
be  set  forth  in  the  record. 

The  renunciation  by  the  applicant  of  hereditary  title 
or  order  of  nobility,  if  any,  shall  be  recorded  in  the  court. 

For  "cancellation  of  certificate,"  see  "United  States 
District  Attorneys,"  page  34,  post. 

1.  Fees. 

Act  of  June  29,  1906. 
"Sec.  13.  The  clerk  of  each  and  every  court  exercising 
jurisdiction  in  naturalization  cases  shall   charge,  collect. 


32  XATURALIZATIOX 

and    account    for  the  following  fees  in  each    proceeding: 

"For  receiving  and  filing  a  declaration  of  intention  and 
issuing  a  duplicate  thereof,  one  dollar. 

"For  making,  filing,  and  docketing  the  petition  of  an 
alien  for  admission  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and 
for  the  final  hearing  thereon,  two  dollars;  and  for  entering 
the  final  order  and  the  issuance  of  the  certificate  of  citi- 
zenship thereunder,  if  granted,  two  dollars. 

"The  clerk  of  any  court  collecting  such  fees  is  hereby 
authorized  to  retain  one-half  of  the  fees  collected  by 
him  in  such  naturalization  proceeding;  the  remaining 
one-half  of  the  naturalization  fees  in  each  case  collected 
by  uch  clerks,  respectively,  shall  be  accounted  for  in 
their  quarterly  accounts,  w^hich  they  are  hereby  required 
to  render  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization, 
and  paid  over  to  such  Bureau  within  thirty  days  from 
the  close  of  each  quarter  in  each  and  every  fiscal  year, 
and  the  moneys  so  received  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  dis- 
bursing clerk  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
who  shall  thereupon  deposit  them  in  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States,  rendering  an  account  therefor  quarterly 
to  the  Auditor  for  the  State  and  other  Departments, and 
the  said  disbursing  clerk  shall  be  held  responsible  under 
his  bond  for  said  fees  so  received. 

"In  addition  to  the  fees  herein  required,  the  petitioner 
shall,  upon  the  filing  of  his  petition  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  deposit  with  and  pay  to  the  clerk 
of  the  court  a  sum  of  money  sufficient  to  cover  the  ex- 
penses of  subpoenaing  and  paying  the  legal  fees  of  any 
witnesses  for  whom  he  may  request  a  subpoena,  and  upon 
the  final  discharge  of  such  witnesses  they  shall  receive,  if 
they  demand  the  same  from  the  clerk,  the  customary  and 
usual  witness  fees  from  the  moneys  which  the  petitioner 
shall  have  paid  to  such  clerk  for  such  purpose,  and  the 
residue,  if  any,  shall  be  returned  by  the  clerk  to  the 
petitioner:  Provided,  That  the  clerks  of  courts  exercis- 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  33 

ing  jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings  shall  be 
permitted  to  retain  one-half  of  the  fees  in  any  fiscal  year 
up  to  the  sum  of  three  thousand  dollars,  and  that  all 
fees  received  by  such  clerks  in  naturalization  proceed- 
ings in  excess  of  such  amount  shall  be  accounted  for  and 
paid  over  to  said  Bureau  as  in  case  of  other  fees  to  which 
the  United  States  may  be  entitled  under  the  provisions 
of  this  Act-  The  clerks  of  the  various  courts  exercising 
jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings  shall  pay  all 
additional  clerical  force  that  may  be  required  in  perform- 
ing the  duties  imposed  by  this  Act  upon  the  clerks  of 
courts  from  fees  received  by  such  clerks  in  naturaliza- 
tion proceedings.  And  in  case  the  clerk  of  any  court 
collects  fees  in  excess  of  the  sum  of  six  thousand  dollars 
in  any  one  year,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
may  allow  to  such  clerk  from  the  money  which  the  United 
States  shall  receive  additional  compensation  for  the  em- 
ployment of  additional  clerical  assistance,  but  for  no 
other  purpose,  if  in  the  opinion  of  the  said  Secretary  the 
business  of  such  clerk  warrants  such  allowance."* 

"Sec.  20.  That  any  clerk  or  other  officer  of  a  court 
having  power  under  this  Act  to  naturalize  aliens,  who 
wilfully  neglects  to  render  true  accounts  of  moneys  re- 
ceived by  him  for  naturalization  proceedings  or  who  wil- 
fully neglects  to  pay  over  any  balance  of  such  moneys 
due  to  the  United  States  within  thirty  days  after  said 
payment  shall  become  due  and  demand  therefor  has  been 
made  and  refused,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  embezzle- 
ment of  the  public  moneys,  and  shall  be  punishable  by 

*A11  fees  provided  for  in  Section  13  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  col- 
lected by  clerks  of  courts  during  any  quarter  of  a  fiscal  year,  shall  be 
accounted  for  within  thirty  days  after  the  close  of  such  quarter,  on 
Form  2212.  provided  for  that  purpose;  and  one-half  of  all  moneys  so 
collected  shall  be  remitted  to  the  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Naturaliza- 
tion, Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization,  with  said  quarterly  ac- 
counts. In  cases  where  no  naturalization  business  is  transacted  during 
any  quarter,  said  blank  form  shall  be  forwarded  as  aforesaid,  with  the 
words  "No  transactions"  noted  thereon,  Nat.  Reg.,  Oct.  2,  1906. 
5233-3 


34  NATURALIZATION 

imprisonment  for  not  more  than  five  years,  or  by  a  fine 
of  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  both. 

"Sec.  21.  That  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  clerk  of 
any  court  or  his  authorized  deputy  or  assistant  exercis- 
ing jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings,  or*  to  de- 
mand, charge,  collect,  or  receive  any  other  or  additional 
fees  or  moneys  in  naturalization  proceedings  save  the 
fees  and  moneys  herein  specified;  and  a  violation  of  any 
of  the  provisions  of  this  section  or  any  part  thereof  is 
hereby  declared  to  be  a  misdemeanor  and  shall  be  pun- 
ished by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  two  years,  or 
by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by 
both  such  fine  and  imprisonment." 

E.  United  States  District  Attorneys. 
Duties. 

1.  Appearance  in  Opposition  to  Naturalization. 

The  United  States  shall  have  the  right  to  appear  be- 
fore any  court  or  courts  exercising  jurisdiction  in  natu- 
ralization proceedings  for  the  purpose  of  cross-examining 
the  petitioner  and  the  witnesses  produced  in  support  of 
his  petition  concerning  any  matter  touching  or  in  any 
way  affecting  his  right  to  citizenship,  and  shall  have  the 
right  to  call  witnesses,  produce  evidence,  and  be  heard  in 
opposition  to  the  granting  of  any  petition  in  naturaliza- 
tion proceedings. 

2.  Proceedings  to  Set  Aside  or  Cancel  Certificates  of  Citi- 

zenship. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  district 
attorneys  for  the  respective  districts,  upon  affidavit 
showing  good  cause  therefor,  to  institute  proceedings  in 
any  court  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens  in  the 
judicial  district  in  which  the  naturalized    citizen    may 

*  Error  in  original  net.  The  word  "  or  "  should  be  omitted. — AUTHOR. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  35 

reside  at  the  time  of  bringing  the  suit,  for  the  purpose 
of  setting  aside  and  canceling  the  certificate  of  citizen- 
ship on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  on  the  ground  that  such 
certificate  of  citizenship  was  illegally  procured.  In  any 
such  proceedings  the  party  holding  the  certificate  of 
citizenship  alleged  to  have  been  fraudulently  or  illegally 
procured  shall  have  sixty  days'  personal  notice  in  which 
to  make  answer  to  the  petition  of  the  United  States; 
and  if  the  holder  of  such  certificate  be  absent  from  the 
United  States  or  from  the  district  in  which  he  last  had 
his  residence,  such  notice  shall  be  given  by  publication 
in  the  manner  provided  for  the  service  of  summons  by 
publication  or  upon  absentees  by  the  laws  of  the  state 
or  the  place  where  such  suit  is  brought. 

The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  apply  not  only  to 
certificates  of  citizenship  issued  under  the  provisions  of 
this  act,  but  to  all  certificates  of  citizenship  which 
may  have  been  issued  heretofore  by  any  court  exercising 
jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings  under  prior 
laws.  Sec.  15,  Act  June  29, 1906. 

Section  15,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Act  provides  that  if  any 
alien  who  shall  have  secured  a  certificate  under  the  provis- 
ions of  the  law  shall,  within  five  years  after  the  issuance  of 
such  certificate,  return  to  the  country  of  his  nativity,  or 
go  to  any  other  foreign  country,  and  take  permanent 
residence  therein,  it  shall  be  considered  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  a  lack  of  intention  on  the  part  of  such  alien  to 
become  a  permanent  citizen  of  the  United  States  at  the 
time  of  filing  his  application  for  citizenship,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  countervailing  evidence,  it  shall  be  sufficient 
in  the  proper  proceeding  to  authorize  the  cancellation 
of  his  certificate  of  citizenship  as  fraudulent,  and  the 
diplomatic  and  consular  officers  of  the  United  States  in 
foreign  countries  shall  from  time  to  time,  through  the 
Department  of  State,  furnish  the  Department  of  Justice 


36  NATURALIZATION 

with  the  names  of  those  within  their  respective  jurisdic- 
tions who  have  such  certificates  of  citizenship  and  who 
have  taken  permanent  residence  in  the  country  of  their 
nativity,  or  in  any  other  foreign  country,  and  such  state- 
ments, duly  certified,  shall  be  admissible  in  evidence  in 
all  courts  in  proceedings  to  cancel  certificates  of  citizen- 
ship. 


F.  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization. 
1.  In  General. 

While  the  constitutional  provision  expressly  conferring 
on  Congress  "  Power  to  establish  a  uniform  rule  of  natu- 
ralization," clearly  authorized  Congress  to  provide  for 
the  effective  supervision  and  control  of  naturalization 
by  the  Federal  Government,  there  was  no  legislation 
effecting  that  object  until  the  enactment  of  the  law  of 
June  29,  1906,  34  Stat,  at  L.  596. 

This  law  changes  the  designation  of  the  Bureau  of 
Immigration  in  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
to  the  "Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization," 
and  provides  that  said  Bureau,  under  the  direction  and 
control  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  ''shall 
have  charge  of  all  matters  concerning  the  naturalization 
of  aliens." 


2.  Functions  of  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

a.  Direction  and  Control  of  Bureau. 

The  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor  is  charged  by 
this  law  with  "the  direction  and  control"  of  the  Bureau 
of  Immigration  and  Naturalization.     Sec.  1. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  37 

The  statute  (Sec.  2)  authorizes  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  "to  provide  the  Bureau  of  Immi- 
gration and  Naturalization  with  such  additional  furnished 
offices  within  the  city  of  Washington,  such  books  of 
record  and  facilities,  and  such  additional  assistants, 
clerks,  stenographers,  typewriters,  and  other  employees 
as  may  be  necessary  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the 
duties  imposed  by  this  Act  upon  such  Bureau." 

b.  Rules  and  Regulations. 

Section  28  of  the  Act  authorizes  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce and  Labor  "to  make  such  rules  and  regulations  as 
may  be  necessary  for  properly  carrying  into  execution 
the  various  provisions  of  the  Act." 

c.  Blank  Certificates  of  Citizenship. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
to  cause  to  be  engraved,  on  distinctive  paper,  blank 
certificates  of  citizenship  (Sec.  17),  which  shall  be  fur- 
nished clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  in  naturaliza- 
tion matters.     Sec.  12,  par.  3. 

d.  Certificate  of  Registry  of  Alien. 

The  law  (Sec.  1)  makes  it  the  duty  of  commissioners 
of  immigration  to  cause  to  be  granted  to  every  alien 
arriving  in  the  United  States  after  the  passage  of  the 
Act  of  June  29,  1906,  a  certificate  of  registry  giving  par- 
ticulars as  to  name,  age,  occupation,  personal  description, 
place  of  birth  and  residence  of  such  alien,  and  the  name 
of  the  vessel  in  which  he  comes. 

Section  4,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Act  provides  that  the 
applicant  for  naturalization  shall  at  the  time  of  filing  his 


38  NATURALIZATION 

petition  file  with  the  clerk  a  "  certificate  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor,"  stating  the  date  and  man- 
ner of  his  arrival  in  this  country. 

e.  Allowance   of   Additional    Compensation    to 
Clerks. 

The  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor  is  authorized  in 
cases  where  the  clerk  of  any  court  collects  fees  in  excess 
of  the  sum  of  six  thousand  dollars  in  any  one  year  to  al- 
low to  such  clerk  from  the  money  which  the  United  States 
shall  receive  additional  compensation  for  the  employ- 
ment of  additional  clerical  assistance,  if,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Secretary,  the  business  of  such  clerk  warrants 
such  allowance.     Sec.  13,  par.  5. 

3.  Functions  of  Bureau. 

a.  Supervision  of  Naturalization. 

The  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization,  under 
the  direction  and  control  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce 
and  Labor,  has  "charge  of  all  matters  concerning  the 
naturalization  of  aliens."  Sec.  1. 

h.  Registry  of  Aliens  Arriving  in  United  States. 

The  law  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  Bureau  to  provide, 
for  use  at  the  various  immigration  stations  throughout 
the  United  States,  books  of  record,  wherein  the  commis- 
sioners of  immigration  shall  cause  a  registry  to  be  made 
in  the  case  of  each  alien  arriving  in  the  United  States 
from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act  of  the  name,  age, 
occupation,  personal  description  (including  height,  com- 
plexion, color  of  hair,  and  eyes),  the  place  of  birth,  the 
last  residence,  the  intended  place  of  residence  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  date  of  arrival  of  said  alien,  and, 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  39 

if   entered    through  a  port,  the    name'  of    the   vessel  in 
which  he  comes. 

c.  Blank  Certificates  of  Citizenship. 

The  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  is  to 
furnish  clerks  of  courts  having  and  exercising  jurisdiction 
in  naturalization  matters,  blank  certificates  of  citizen- 
ship, and  to  require  said  clerks  to  account  for  all  such 
blank  certificates.  Sec.  12,  par.  3. 

d.  Naturalization  Fees. 

The  law  (Sec.  13,  par.  4)  makes  it  the  duty  of 
the  Bureau  to  pay  over  to  the  disbursing  clerk  of  the 
Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  naturalization 
fees,  which,  under  the  law,  clerks  of  courts  are  required 
to  account  for,  and  pay  over  to  said  Bureau. 

4.  Commissioners  of  Immigration. 

The  Act  (Sec.  1)  makes  it  the  duty  of  commissioners  of 
immigration  to  cause  a  registry  to  be  made  in  the  case  of 
each  alien  arriving  in  the  United  States  from  and  after  the 
passage  of  the  act,  of  the  name,  age,  occupation,  personal 
description  (including  height,  complexion,  color  of  hair 
and  eyes),  the  place  of  birth,  the  last  residence,  the  in- 
tended place  of  residence  in  the  United  States,  and  the 
date  of  arrival  of  said  alien,  and,  if  entered  through  a 
port,  the  name  of  the  vessel  in  which  he  comes. 

The  law  also  makes  it  the  duty  of  commissioners  of 
immigration  to  cause  to  be  granted  to  such  alien  a  cer- 
tificate of  such  registry,  with  the  particulars  thereof. 

The  certificate  of  registry  here  described  is  to  be  signed 
by  the  head  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
for  the  time  being;  and  is  the  certificate  referred  to  in  Sec- 
tion 4,  paragraph  2  of  the  Act  as  "a  certificate  from  the 


40  NATURALIZATION 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,"  which  the  appli- 
cant for  naturalization  is  required  to  file  with  the  clerk 
of  the  court  at  the  time  of  filing  his  petition. 

5.  Disbursing  Clerk,  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor. 

a.  Duty  as  to  Nattiralization  Fees. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  disbursing  clerk  of  the  Department 
of  Commerce  and  Labor  to  receive  from  the  Bureau  of 
Naturalization  and  deposit  in  the  Treasury  of  the  United 
States,  rendering  an  account  therefor  quarterly  to  the 
auditor  for  the  state  and  other  departments,  naturaliza- 
tion fees  which,  under  the  law,  clerks  of  courts  are  re- 
quired to  account  for  and  pay  over  to  said  Bureau. 

h.  Bond. 

The  said  disbursing  clerk  shall  be  held  responsible 
under  his  bond  for  the  fees  so  received.      Sec.  13. 

(G)  Who  are  capable  of  naturalization. 
1.  In  General. 

All  aliens  are  not  eligible  to  citizenship  under  our 
naturalization  laws.  What  persons  are  capable  of  natu- 
ralization? 

In  all  the  acts  of  Congress  on  the  subject,  from  that 
of  1790  down  to  the  Revised  Statutes  (Sec.  2169),  the 
language  is  "that  any  alien,  being  a  free  white  person, 
may  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen."  After  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  to  the  Constitution, 
prohibiting  slavery,  and  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  de- 
claring who  shall  be  citizens,  Congress,  by  the  Act  of 
July  14,  1870  (16  Stat,  at  L.  254),  amending  the  naturali- 
zation laws,  extended  the  privilege  of  naturalization  to 
the  negro.  The  language  of  the  Act  of  1870,  was:  "The 
naturalization  laws  are  hereby  extended  to  aliens  of 
African  nativity,  and  to  persons  of  African  descent." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  41 

This  was  subsequently  revised  and  placed  in  the  Re- 
vised Statutes,Section  2169(U.S.Comp.Stat.  1901,1333) 
so  as  to  read:  "The  provisions  of  this  title  shall  apply- 
to  aliens  [being  free  white  persons,  and  to  aliens]  of 
African  nativity,  and  to  persons  of  African  descent." 
This  is  the  law  now  in  force. 

Who  are  excluded  from  the  privilege  of  naturalization 
by  the  language  of  the  statute?  The  words  of  a  statute 
are  to  be  taken  in  their  ordinary  sense,  unless  it  can  be 
shown  that  they  are  used  in  a  technical  sense.  Taken  in 
their  ordinary  meaning,  the  words  of  the  law  exclude  all 
but  persons  of  the  Caucasian  and  African  races.  From  a 
common,  popular  standpoint,  the  races  of  mankind  have 
been  distinguished  by  difference  of  color,  and  they  have 
been  classified  as  the  white,  black,  yellow,  and  brown. 
As  ordinarily  used  everywhere  in  the  United  States,  the 
words  "white  person"  mean  a  person  of  the  Caucasian 
race. 

Ethnologists  also  consider  the  color  of  skin  the  most 
important  criterion  for  the  distinction  of  race.  Blumen- 
bach  divided  mankind  into  five  principal  types — the 
Caucasian,  or  white,  Mongolian  or  yellow,  Ethiopian  or 
black,  American  or  red,  and  Malay  or  brown.  Cuvier  sim- 
plified this  classification  into  Caucasian,  Mongol,  and 
Negro,  or  white,  yellow,  and  black  races. 

When  the  words  "white  persons"  were  incorporated 
in  the  naturalization  laws,  in  1802,  the  country  was  in- 
habited by  three  races — the  Caucasian  or  white  race, 
the  Negro  or  black  race,  and  the  American  or  red  race. 
It  is  reasonable  to  infer,  therefore,  that  Congress  in  desig- 
nating the  classes  of  persons  who  could  be  naturalized, 
intended  to  exclude  from  the  privilege  of  citizenship  all 
alien  races  except  the  Caucasian. 

Again,  in  the  first  revision  of  the  statutes,  in  1873, 
the  words    "being  a  free  white  person"  were  omitted, 


42  NATURALIZATION 

probably  through  inadvertence, so  that  the  section  read: 
"An  alien  may  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen,"  etc. 
Under  the  act  of  February  18,  1875  (18  Stat,  at  L.  318, 
chap.  80,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1333),  to  correct  errors 
and  supply  omissions  in  the  first  revision,  this  section 
was  amended  by  restoring  these  words.  In  moving  the 
adoption  of  this  amendment  in  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives it  was  stated  that  this  omission  operated  to 
extend  naturalization  to  all  classes  of  aliens,  and  that  it 
was  only  proposed,  by  restoring  these  words,  to  place  the 
law  where  it  stood  at  the  time  of  the  revision.  3  Cong. 
Record,  pt.  2,  1081. 

Whether  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  popular  or  of  the 
scientific  meaning,  or  of  Congressional  intent,  therefore, 
the  words  "white  persons"  seem  to  include  only  indi- 
viduals of  the  Caucasian  race.  Under  the  statute,  there- 
fore, only  members  of  this  race  and  of  the  Ethiopian 
race  can  be  naturalized. 

The  courts  have  at  different  times  held  that  neither 
Chinese,  Japanese,  Hawaiians,  Burmese,  nor  Indians  can 
be  naturalized. 

2.  Chinese. 

The  question  of  the  right  of  a  court  to  naturalize  a 
Chinaman  came  before  the  circuit  court  of  the  United 
States  in  1878,  in  Re  Ah  Yup,  5  Sawy.  155,  Fed.  Cas.No. 
104,  and  the  court  denied  the  application,  on  the  ground 
that  a  Mongolian  is  not  a  "white  person"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  term  as  used  in  the  naturalization  laws 
of  the  United  States. 

In  an  instruction,  October  29,  1878,  to  Mr.  Holcombe^ 
United  States  minister  to  China,  Mr.  Evarts,  adverting  to 
this  case,  said:  "Although  not  accepting  as  a  final  de- 
cision (not   having  yet  been   affirmed   by  the  Supreme 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  43 

Court  of  the  United  States),  the  Department  is  con- 
strained, on  examination  of  the  laws,  to  believe  that  the 
decision  is  based  on  a  sound  appreciation  of  the  law." 
MSS.  Inst,  to  China. 

Some  courts  having  admitted  Chinese  to  citizenship, 
the  Act  of  May  6, 1882  (22  Stat,  at  L.  61,  Chap.  126,  Sec- 
tion 14,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1333),  in  order  to  prevent 
such  naturalization,  and  to  remove  all  doubt,  provided 
"that  hereafter  no  state  court  or  court  of  the  United 
States,  shall  admit  Chinese  to  'citizenship;  and  all  laws 
in  conflict  with  this  Act  are  hereby  repealed." 

In  the  case  of  Re  Hong  Yen  Chang,  84  Cal.  163,  24 
Pac.  156,  it  was  held  that  a  certificate  of  naturalization 
showing  the  naturalization  of  a  person  of  Mongolian 
nativity  by  the  judgment  of  a  court  is  void.  To  the  same 
effect  is  Re  Gee  Hop,  71  Fed.  274.  In  the  first  case,  a 
naturalization  certificate  had  been  granted  by  a  New 
York  court,  and  in  the  latter  a  New  Jersey  court  had 
issued  the  certificate. 

In  Fong  Yue  Ting  v.  United  States,  149  U.  S.  716,  37  L. 
ed.  914, 13  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1016,  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  said:  "Chinese  persons  not  born  in  this  country 
have  never  been  recognized  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  nor  authorized  to  become  such  under  the  natur- 
alization laws." 

And  in  United  States  v.  Wong  Kim  Ark,  169  U.  S.  649, 
42  L.  ed.  890,  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  456,  Chief  Justice  Fuller 
said:  "They  (the  Chinese)  have  never  been  allowed,  by 
our  laws,  to  acquire  our  nationality." 

3.  Japanese. 

In  the  case  of  Re  Saito,  62  Fed.  126,  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court  held  that  a  native  of  Japan  (of  the  Mon- 
golian race)  is  not  included  within  the  term  "white  per- 
sons," in  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2169  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1333),  and  hence  is  not  entitled  to  naturalization. 


44  NATURALIZATION 

In  In  re  Yamashita  (Wash.),  59  L.  R.  A.  671,  70  Pac. 
482,  a  native  of  Japan  applied  for  admission,  as  an 
attorney,  in  the  courts  of  the  State  of  Washington, 
whose  laws  preclude  the  admission  of  any  person  who  is 
not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Yamashita  had  ob- 
tained from  the  superior  court  of  Pierce  County,  Wash- 
ington, an  order  admitting  him  to  citizenship.  It  was 
held  that  the  judgment  upon  its  face  showed  that  Yama- 
shita was  of  the  Japanese  race;  that  Japanese  are  not 
entitled  to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States;  that, 
as  the  court  was  without  authority  to  pronounce  the 
judgment,  its  determination  was  void,  and  must  be  dis- 
regarded. It  was  decided  that  he  could  not  be  admitted. 

It  was  claimed  in  the  recent  controversy  caused  by 
the  exclusion  of  Japanese  from  San  Francisco  schools 
that  Japanese  are  not  Mongolians.  But  as  it  does  not 
appear  to  be  claimed  that  they  belong  to  either  the 
Caucasian  or  African  race  it  is  not  seen  that  they  are 
placed  in  any  better  position  under  our  statute. 

4.  Burmese. 

The  city  court  of  Albany,  New  York,  decided  against 
the  naturalization  of  a  dark  yellow  native  of  Burmah, 
although  he  was  an  educated  physician.  Re  San  C.  Po, 
7  Misc.  471,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  383.  In  the  opinion  the 
court  said: 

"Burmese  are  Malays  and  under  modern  ethnological 
subdivisions  are  Mongolians,  .  .  .  and  are  not,  therefore, 
within  the  strict  letter  of  the  Act  of  1882,  which  pro- 
hibited the  admission  of  Chinese  to  citizenship,  for  one 
can  be  a  Mongolian  and  yet  not  be  a  Chinaman;  but  the 
petitioner  falls  squarely  within  the  provision  of  Section 
2169  of  the  United  States  Revised  Statutes  which  limits 
naturalization  to  free  white  persons  and  to  persons  of 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  45 

African  nativity  and  of  African  descent,  for  he  is   cer- 
tainly neither." 

5.  Hawaiians. 

In  Re  Kanaka  Nian,  6  Utah,  259,  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Utah  denied  the  application  of  a  native  Hawaiian  for 
admission  to  citizenship,  holding  that  the  applicant  was 
neither  a  ivhite  person  nor  a  person  of  the  African  race. 
The  court  said:  "We  are  of  opinion  that  the  law  author- 
izes the  naturalization  of  aliens  of  the  Caucasian"or  white 
race  and  of  the  African  race  only,  and  all  other  races, 
among  which  are  the  Hawaiians,  are  excluded." 

This  was  prior  to  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  to  the 
United  States.  Congress,  by  the  Act  of  April  ;^30,  1900, 
providing  a  government  for  the  territory  of  Hawaii,  de- 
clared that  "all  persons  who  were  citizens  of  the  Repub- 
lic of  Hawaii,  on  August  12,  1898,  are  citizens  of  the 
United  States." 

6.  Indians. 

The  general  statutes  of  naturalization  do  not  apply  to 
American  Indians.     7  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  746. 

The  Civil  Rights  Act,  in  defining  citizens,  expressly 
excluded  "Indians  not  taxed."  And  while  the  citizen- 
ship clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  omits  this 
phrase,  an  examination  of  the  debates  in  Congress  when 
the  Amendment  was  under  consideration  shows  that  the 
words  were  omitted  as  unnecessary,  such  persons  not 
being  deemed  to  be  "subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States." 

In  In  re  Burton,  1  Alaska,  111,  it  was  decided  that  an 
Indian,  a  native  of  British  Columbia,  was  not  a  "free 
white  person  or  an  alien  of  ^African  nativity  or  of  African 
descent,"  and  hence  was  not  capable  of  naturalization 
under  the  statute. 

It  has  also  been  decided   that  a  person   of  half  white 


46  NATURALIZATION 

and  half  Indian  blood  is  not  entitled  to  admission  to 
citizenship  under  our  general  naturalization  statutes, 
such  person  not  being  a  "white  person"  within  the  pur- 
view of  the  law.     In  re  Camille,  6  Sawyer,  541. 

Indians  are  capable  of  naturalization  by  treaty  and  by 
special  law,  however,  and  citizenship  has  been  frequently 
bestowed  upon  them  in  these  ways.  Elk  v.  Wilkins,  112 
U.  S.  94;  Boyd  v.  Thayer,  143  U.  S.  135. 

7.  Mexicans. 

In  the  case  of  Re  Rodriguez,  81  Fed.  337,  the  United 
States  District  Court  for  the  Western  District  of  Texas 
held  that  a  native  citizen  of  Mexico,  whatever  might  be 
his  status  viewed  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
ethnologist,  is  embraced  within  the  spirit  and  intent  of 
our  naturalization  laws.  In  this  case  it  was  contended 
that  Rodriguez  was  excluded  from  the  privilege  of  natu- 
ralization under  Rev.  Stat.  2169  because  of  his  color,  the 
authorities  relied  upon  being:  Re  Ah  Yup,  5  Sawy.  155, 
Fed.  Cas.  No.  104;  Re  Camille,  6  Sawy.  541,  6  Fed.  256; 
Re  Kanaka  Nian,  6  Utah,  259,  4  L.  R.  A.  726,  21  Pac.  993, 
and  Re  Saito,  62  Fed.  126. 

The  court  analyzed  the  decision  in  Ah  Yup's  case, 
which  is  termed  the  leading  one.  It  says  that  the  opinion 
of  Judge  Sawyer  is  by  no  means  decisive  of  the  present 
question,  as  his  language  may  well  convey  the  meaning 
that  the  amendment  of  the  naturalization  statutes  re- 
ferred to  by  him  (the  amendment  striking  the  word 
"white"  therefrom)  was  intended  solely  as  a  prohibition 
against  the  naturalization  of  members  of  the  Mongolian 
race.  The  court  refers  to  the  Act  of  May  6,  1882  (22 
Stat,  at  L.  61,  Chap.  126,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1333), 
expressly  forbidding  the  naturalization  of  Chinese,  and 
asks  why,  if  the  Chinese  were  denied  the  right  to  become 
naturalized  citizens,  under  laws  existing  when  Re  Ah  Yup 
was  decided,  did  Congress  enact  this  prohibitory  statute? 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  47 

Says  the  court:  "Indeed,  it  is  a  debatable  question 
whether  the  term  'free  white  person,'  as  used  in  the 
original  Act  of  1790,  was  not  employed  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  withholding  the  right  of  citizenship  from  the 
black  or  African  race  and  the  Indians  then  inhabiting  this 
country."  Continuing,  the  court  says:  "  Nor  is  it  deemed 
material  to  inquire  into  what  race  ethnological  writers 
would  assign  the  present  applicant.  If  the  strict  scien- 
tific classification  of  the  anthropologist  should  be 
adopted,  he  would  probably  not  be  classed  as  white. 
It  is  certain  he  is  not  an  African  nor  a  person  of  African 
descent.  According  to  his  own  statement  he  is  a  'pure- 
blooded  Mexican,'  bearing  no  relation  to  the  Aztecs  or 
original  races  of  Mexico.  Being,  then,  a  citizen  of  Mexico, 
may  he  be  naturalized  pursuant  to  the  laws  of  Congress  ? 
If  debarred  by  the  strict  letter  of  the  law  from  re- 
ceiving letters  of  citizenship,  is  he  embraced  within 
the  intent  and  meaning  of  the  statute  ?  If  he  falls 
within  the  intent  and  meaning  of  the  law,  his  appli- 
cation should  be  granted  notwithstanding  the  letter 
of  the  statute  may  be  against  him."  The  court  then 
quoted  from  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Texas 
and  the  Constitution,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United 
States,  which,  it  is  said,  disclose  that  both  that  Repub- 
lic and  the  United  States  have  freely,  during  the  past 
sixty  years,  conferred  upon  Mexicans  the  rights  and 
privileges  of  American  citizenship — not  individually, but 
by  various  collective  acts  of  naturalization.  He  also 
quotes  Rev.  Stat.,  Section  1999  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1269),  recognizing  the  right  of  expatriation,  and  reciting 
that  this  government  has  freely  received  emigrants  from 
all  nations,  and  invested  them  with  the  rights  of  citizen- 
ship. He  concludes:  "When  all  the  foregoing  laws, 
treaties,  and  constitutional  provisions  are  considered, 
which  either  affirmatively  confer  the  rights  of  citizen- 
ship upon  Mexicans,  or  tacitly  recognize  in  them  the  right 


48  NATURALIZATION. 

of  individual  naturalization,  the  conclusion  forces  itself 
upon  the  mind  that  citizens  of  Mexico  are  eligible  to 
American  citizenship,  and  may  be  individually  natural- 
ized by  complying  with  the  provisions  of  our  [naturali- 
zation] laws."  The  applicant  was  admitted  to  naturali- 
zation. 

The  fact  that  the  United  States  has  by  collective  acts 
conferred  upon  Mexicans  the  rights  and  privileges  of 
American  citizenship  affords  no  basis  for  the  argument 
that  Mexicans  are  eligible  to  naturalization  under  our 
general  naturalization  statutes.  See  Re  Yamashita 
(Wash.),  59  L.  R.  A.  671,  70  Pac.  482.  In  this  case  the 
applicant  was  ignorant,  and  was  unable  to  read  or  write, 
and  did  not  understand  the  principles  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, yet  the  court  held,  in  the  face  of  several  decisions 
to  the  contrary,  that  he  was  entitled  to  be  naturalized, 
inasmuch  as  it  appeared  that  he  was  peaceable,  industri- 
ous, of  a  good  moral  character,  and  law-abiding.  The 
existing  law,  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  expressly  requires 
that  the  applicant  shall  be  able  to  write  his  name  and 
speak  the  English  language. 


8.  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 

In  In  re  Gonzales,  118  Fed.  941,  the  Circuit  Court  of 
the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York, 
in  1902,  held  that  a  native  Porto  Rican  woman  was  an 
alien,  within  the  meaning  of  our  laws  regulating  the  ad- 
mission of  aliens  who  come  to  the  United  States.  But, 
on  appeal,  the  Supreme  Court  reversed  this  decision  and 
decided  that  the  woman,  who  was  a  citizen  of  Porto 
Rico,  was  not  an  alien,  within  the  sense  of  the  immigra- 
tion laws.  Gonzales  vs.  Williams,  192  U.  S.,  1. 

Under  this  decision,  citizens  of  Porto  Rico  and  citi- 
zens of  the  Philippine  Islands,  while  not  citizens  of    the 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  49 

United  States,  were  not  aliens,  and  were  not  capable  of 
becoming  naturalized,  for  two  reasons:  1.  The  naturali- 
zation laws  of  the  United  States  apply  only  to  aliens. 
2.  The  naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States  require  a 
renunciation  of  former  allegiance.  As  citizens  of  Porto 
Rico  and  citizens  of  the  Philippine  Islands  owed  alle- 
giance only  to  the  United  States,  there  was  no  former 
allegiance  for  them  to  renounce. 

Under  these  circumstances  Congress  by  the  Act  of  June 
29,  1906  (34  Stat,  at  L.  596,  Sec.  30) ,  provided  for  the  ad- 
mission of  such  citizens  as  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
upon  compliance  with  our  naturalization  laws.  The  law 
reads  as  follows: 

"All  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  naturalization 
laws  of  the  United  States  shall  apply  to  and  be  held  to 
authorize  the  admission  to  citizenship  of  all  persons  not 
citizens  who  owe  permanent  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  who  may  become  residents  of  any  state  or 
organized  territory  of  the  United  States,  with  the  follow- 
ing modifications:  The  applicant  shall  not  be  required  to 
renounce  allegiance  to  any  foreign  sovereignty;  he  shall 
make  his  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  at  least  two  years  prior  to  his  admis- 
sion; and  residence  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States,  owing  such  permanent  allegiance,  shall  be  re- 
garded as  residence  within  the  United  States  within  the 
meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of  the  existing 
law." 

9.    Alien  Enemies. 

Alien  enemies  of  the  United  States  are  incapable  of 
naturalization.  Section  2171  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
declares  that  "No  alien  who  is  a  native  citizen  or  sub- 
ject, or  a  denizen  of  any  country,  state,  or  sovereignty 

5233-4 


50  NATURALIZATION 

with  which  the  United  States  are  at  war,  at  the  time  of 
his  application,  shall  be  then  admitted  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States." 

This  provision,  which  is  based  on  the  language  of  the 
Act  of  April  14,  1802,  was  before  the  courts  in  the  case 
of  Ex  parte  Overington  (1812),  5  Binney,  371.  Over- 
ington  applied  for  admission  to  citizenship  under  the 
Act  of  March  26,  1804,  which  provided  that  upon  the 
death  of  an  alien  who  had  declared  his  intention  to 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  but  had  not  com- 
pleted his  naturalization,  his  widow  and  children  should 
be  considered  as  citizens,  upon  taking  the  oaths  pre- 
scribed by  law.  Overington's  father,  a  subject  of  Great 
Britain,  had  been  residing  in  the  United  States,  with  his 
son,  from  October,  1807,  until  his  death  in  1809.  It  was 
held,  that  as  the  father  if  living,  would  have  come 
within  the  description  of  the  Act  of  1802,  "an  alien 
enemy,"  and  would  have  been  incapable  of  naturalization, 
the  son  could  not  be  given  rights  of  citizenship. 

The  Act  of  July  30,  1813,  provided  that  persons 
resident  within  the  United  States  on  June  18,  1812,  who 
had  previously  made  a  declaration  of  intention  to 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States,  or  were  then 
entitled  to  become  citizens,  might  be  admitted  to  become 
citizens,  notwithstanding  they  should  be  alien  enemies, 
at  the  times  and  manner  prescribed  by  the  laws 
previously  passed  on  that  subject. 

The  case  of  Ex  parte  Newman,  1813,  2  Gallison,  11, 
raised  the  question  whether  a  British  subject  could  file 
a  preliminary  declaration  of  intention  under  the  Act  of 
July  30, 1813.  The  court  said  that  the  "act  enables  per- 
sons who  before  the  war  had  made  the  preparatory 
declaration  to  become  citizens  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
war  had  not  intervened.  But  it  confers  no  privileges  on 
other  persons.  The  petitioner,  therefore,  can  not  ex- 
empt himself  from  the  general  disability." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  51 

10.  Women — The  Naturalization  Laws  Include  Females  as 
Well  as  Males. 

a.  In  General. 

In  the  case  of  Brown  v.  Shilling,  9  Md.  74,  where  a  woman 
had  been  naturalized  after  the  death  of  her  husband,  the 
court  declared  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  naturaliza- 
tion acts  that  should  be  construed  as  excluding  women 
from  the  right  of  citizenship  by  naturalization. 

Mr.  Evarts,when  Secretary  of  State,  declared  that  "an 
alien  woman  may  be  naturalized  under  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  in  the  same  manner  and  under  the  same 
conditions  that  pertain  to  the  naturalization  of  an  alien 
man.  Citizenship  does  not  involve  the  electoral  quali- 
fication. The  question  is  so  well  settled  and  the  instances 
of  women  having  been  naturalized  are  so  numerous  that 
it  is  deemed  unnecessary  to  cite  you  any  particular  cases." 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  331. 

In  Minor  v.  Happersett,  21  Wall.  162,  the  court  said 
that  "it  is  apparent  that  from  the  commencement  of 
legislation  upon  this  subject  alien  women  and  alien  min- 
ors could  be  made  citizens  by  naturalization." 

b.  Married  Women. 

It  has  also  been  decided  that  an  alien  wife  might  be 
naturalized,  and  there  are  numerous  recorded  instances 
of  such  naturalizations.  Ex  parte  Pic,  1  Cranch.  C.  C. 
372,  where  the  naturalization  was  in  the  United  States 
Circuit  Court  for  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  Priest  vs. 
Cummings,  16  Wend.  617. 

In  Priest  t;s.  Cummings,  which  was  decided  in  1839,  the 
wife,  a  British  subject,  married  to  a  native  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  took  out  naturalization  papers  as  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  during  the  life  of  her  husband 
and  while  living  with  him.  In  the  course  of  the  opinion, 
the  court  said:  "It  will  not  be  denied  that  Congress  pos- 
sesses the  power  to  naturalize  femes  covert,even  against 


62  NATURALIZATION 

the  consent  of  their  husbands;  and  the  language  used 
by  that  body  could  not  well  be  made  more  comprehen- 
sive— ^any  alien,  being  a  free  white  person,  may  be  ad- 
mitted    to    become   a   citizen    of   the    United    States.' 

.  .  .  The  practice,  I  believe,  has  been  universal  to 
admit  femes  covert  to  citizenship  upon  application." 
This  decision,  on  appeal,  was  affirmed  as  to  the  question 
of  citizenship,  though  reversed  on  other  grounds.  20 
Wend.  338. 

The  statement  of  the  court,  in  this  case,  that  a  mar- 
ried woman  can  be  naturalized,  even  against  the  consent 
of  her  husband,  is  dictum,  and  its  correctness,  from  a 
legal  standpoint,  is  doubted.*  Indeed,  it  seems  question- 
able whether,  in  view  of  the  almost  universal  doctrine 
that  the  citizenship  of  a  woman  during  marriage  is 
merged  in  that  of  her  husband,  a  married  woman  can, 
while  the  marriage  status  lasts,  independently  secure 
naturalization.  No  case  in  which  this  question  has 
squarely  been  presented  appears  to  have  come  before 
the  courts.  In  passing  upon  the  question  whether  a 
declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  could  be  made  before  the  clerk  of  the  court  at  the 
private  residence  of  the  applicant,  who  was  the  actress, 
Mrs.  Langtry,  Mr.  Justice  Field,  in  circuit,  made  this 
statement: 

"Note  by  the  court. — It  is  stated  in  the  public  journals 
that  Mrs.  Langtry  is  not   a  feme  sole,  and   that  her  hus- 

*  It  does  not  appear  in  this  case  that  the  husband  was  unwilling  for 
his  wife  to  become  naturalized.  When  the  decisions  in  Priest  v.  Cum- 
tnings  were  rendered  (1839  and  1840),  the  common  law  rule  that  the 
marriage  of  an  alien  woman  to  a  citizen  did  not  affect  her  citizenship 
still  generally  prevailed.  The  wife  in  this  case  simply  availed  herself  of 
our  naturalization  laws  to  adopt  her  husband's  American  citizenship. 
Such  a  proceeding  became  unnecessary  after  the  passage  of  the  statute 
of  1855,  which  enacted  that  an  alien  woman  married  to  a  citizen  herself 
becomes  a  citizen  if  she  was  herself  capable  of  naturalization.  Kelly  v. 
Owen,  7  Wall.  496. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  53 

band  is  living  in  England,  and  a  subject  of  the  Queen. 
If  this  be  so,  the  question  will  arise  on  her  application 
for  final  naturalization  papers,  whether  she  can  be  nat- 
uralized in  this  country.  No  person  can  be  a  citizen  of 
two  countries;  and  the  wife  is  by  law  a  citizen  of  her 
husband's  country."  In  re  Langtry,  1887,  31  Fed.  879,  880. 

And  to  the  inquiry  of  a  person  "whether  the  British 
Government  would  recognize  the  naturalization  papers 
of  a  former  British  subject,  an  English  woman,  who  was 
naturalized  in  the  United  States  without  the  consent  of 
her  husband,"  the  Department  of  State,  on  October  3, 
1896,  replied  that  the  writer  should  consult  private  coun- 
sel learned  in  the  law  of  Great  Britain.  3  Moore's  Int. 
Law  Digest,  454. 

It  was  said  in  the  case  of  Comitis  v.  Parkerson,  56 
Fed.  556,  however,  that  the  relation  of  husband  and  wife 
is  not  inconsistent  with  one  being  a  citizen  and  the  other 
being  an  alien. 

11.    Anarchists  and  Polygamists. 

Section  7  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  which,  with  the 
substitution  of  the  words  "or  who  is  a  polygamist,"  for 
the  phrase  "or  who  has  violated  any  of  the  provisions  of 
this  act,"  substantially  re-enacts  the  first  sentence  of 
Section  39  of  the  Act  of  March  3,  1903  (32  Statutes  at 
Large,  1222),  provides  that  "no  person  who  disbelieves 
in  or  who  is  opposed  to  organized  government,  or  who  is 
a  member  of,  or  affiliated  with  any  organization  enter- 
taining and  teaching  such  disbelief  in  or  opposition  to 
organized  government,  or  who  advocates  or  teaches  the 
duty,  necessity,  or  propriety  of  the  unlawful  assaulting 
or  killing  of  any  officer  or  officers,  either  of  specific 
individuals  or  of  officers  generally,  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States,  or  of  any  other  organized  govern- 
ment, because  of  his  or  their  official  character,  or  who  is 


54  NATURALIZATION 

a  polygamist,  shall  be  naturalized  or  be  made  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States." 

(H.)  Usual  Legal  Conditions. 

The  usual  conditions  of  naturalization  in  the  United 
States  are: 

1.  A  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen. 

2.  A  petition  for  naturalization. 

3.  Residence. 

4.  Qualifications  as  to  age,  education,  and  moral  char- 
acter. 

5.  Renunciation  of  order  of  nobility  or  hereditary 
title,  if  any. 

6.  Oath  of  allegiance,  and  renunciation  of  prior  alle- 
giance. 

1.  Declaration  of  Intention. 

The  first  step  in  the  process  of  naturalization  is  the 
declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen. 

The  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  34  Stat,  at  L.  596,  Sec.  4, 
par.  1,  provides  that  the  alien  "shall  declare  on  oath  be- 
fore the  clerk  of  any  court  authorized  by  this  Act  to 
naturalize  aliens,  or  his  authorized  deputy,  in  the  district 
in  which  such  alien  resides,  two  years  at  least  prior  to 
his  admission,  and  after  he  has  reached  the  age  of  eigh- 
teen years,  that  it  is  bona  fide  his  intention  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  to  renounce  forever  all 
allegiance  and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate, 
state,  or  sovereignty,  and  particularly,  by  name,  to  the 
prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty  of  which  the  alien 
may  be  at  the  time  a  citizen  or  subject.  And  such  declara- 
tion shall  set  forth  the  name,  age,  occupation,  personal 
description,  place  of  birth,  last  foreign  residence  and  alle- 
giance, the  date  of  arrival,  the  name  of  the  vessel,  if  any, 
in  which  he  came  to  the  United  States,  and  the  present 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  55 

place  of  residence  in  the  United  States  of  said  alien: 
Provided,  however,  That  no  alien  who,  in  conformity 
with  the  law  in  force  at  the  date  of  his  declaration,  has 
declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  required  to  renew  such  declaration." 

a.  Time  of  Making. 

As  to  the  time  of  making  the  declaration,  it  may  be 
made  immediately  after  the  arrival  of  the  alien  in  this 
country.  It  must  be  made  at  least  two  years  before  his 
admission  to  citizenship.     Sec.  4,  par.  1. 

The  declarant  must  be  at  least  eighteen  years  of  age. 
Id.  Until  the  enactment  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
application  to  be  admitted  to  citizenship  could  be  made 
at  any  time  after  the  lapse  of  two  years  from  the  date  of 
the  declaration  of  intention;  but  that  act  limits  the  life 
of  a  declaration  of  intention  to  seven  years.  The  theory 
of  the  law  is  that  one  who  does  not,  within  seven  years, 
carry  out  his  formally  expressed  intention,  must  be 
deemed  to  have  abandoned  such  intention,  and  should 
be  required  to  begin  his  probation  again.  The  provision 
was  designed  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  our  citizenship  by 
large  numbers  of  aliens  who  under  the  old  law  were  en- 
abled to  enjoy  most  of  the  rights  of  citizens,  including 
political  rights,  and  who  designedly  refrained  from  com- 
pleting their  naturalization  that  they  might  avoid  mili- 
tary duty  and  service  as  jurors. 

b.  Before  Whom  Made. 

The  declaration  of  intention  must  be  made  before  the 
clerk  of  a  court  authorized  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
to  naturalize  aliens,  or  his  authorized  deputy. 


* 


*On  and  after  September  27,  1906,  declarations  of  intention  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States  shall  be  filed  with  the  clerks  of  such  State 
courts  only  as  have  "a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at 
law  or  equity,  or  law  and  equity  in  which  the  amount  in  controversy  is 
unlimited."     Nat.  Reg.,  Oct.  2,  1906. 


56  NATURALIZATION 

As  to  what  courts  are  authorized  to  naturalize,  see 
Sec.  3,  par.  2  of  Act, and  page  11  ante,  where  that  subject  is 
fully  treated;  and  also  Appendix,  post,  wherein  is  con- 
tained a  complete  list  of  the  courts  having  jurisdiction 
to  naturalize  in  the  United  States. 

The  declaration  must  be  made  in  the  district  in  which 
the  alien  resides.  Sec.  4,  par.  1  of  Act.  This  means  the 
judicial  district  of  the  court. 

The  words  "before  the  clerk,"  mean  before  the  clerk 
either  in  the  clerk's  office  or  in  open  court.  In  re  Lang- 
try,  31  Fed.  879;  Sto.  Scola's  Case,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  344. 

As  to  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  ''before  the  clerk,"  in 
Andres  v.  Arnold,  77  Mich.,  85,  a  case  arising  under  the 
provision  of  Section  2165  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  it  was 
held  that  it  was  sufficient  if  the  declaration  was  made 
before  the  clerk  out  of  his  office,  and  became  a  part  of 
his  records  when  filed. 

But  in  the  case  of  Re  Langtry,  31  Fed.  879,  where  the 
clerk  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  had  taken  the 
necessary  records  and  seal  of  the  court  to  the  private 
residence  of  Mrs.  Langtry  and  received  her  declaration  of 
intention  there,  the  court  (Mr.  Justice  Field),  held  that 
the  declaration  must  be  made  either  in  the  clerk's  office 
or  in  open  court.  The  court  said  that  persons  seeking 
the  great  privilege  of  American  citizenship  ought  to  con- 
sider it  of  sufficient  value  to  attend  where  the  records  of 
the  court  are  held  in  proper  legal  custody.  The  justice 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  some  states  a  man  is 
allowed  to  vote  as  soon  as  he  makes  his  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  a  citizen,  and  said  that,  if  a  clerk  of 
the  court,  or  his  deputy,  could  go  around  the  country 
taking  declarations  of  intention  and  administering  oaths, 
dangerous  consequences  might  follow.  He  said  that 
Congress,  in  authorizing  the  declaration  to  be  made  be- 
fore the  clerk,  could  not  have  contemplated  the  granting 
of  authority  to  clerks  to  remove  records  from  the  proper 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  57 

place  of  their  custody  for  the  accommodation  of  parties. 

The  same  view  was  reached  in  Sto.  Scola's  Case,  8  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  344. 

The  declaration  can  not  be  made  before  a  court 
having  no  clerk;  Ex  parte  Cregg,  2  Curtis,  98. 

c.    Form  of  Declaration  of  Intention. 

The  statute  (Act  of  June  29,  1906),  Section  4, 
paragraph  1,  provides  that  the  declaration  shall  be  "on 
oath."  For  judicial  decisions  relative  to  the  taking  of 
oaths  upon  making  declaration  of  intention  under  the 
old  statutes,  see  McDaniel  v.  Richards,  1  McCord,  187; 
and  U.  S.  v.  Walsh,  22  Fed.,  644. 

The  declaration  shall  set  forth  the  name,  age,  occupa- 
tion, personal  description,  place  of  birth,  last  foreign 
residence  and  allegiance,  the  date  of  arrival,  the  name  of 
the  vessel,  if  any,  in  which  he  came  to  the  United 
States,  and  the  present  place  of  residence  in  the  United 
States  of  said  alien.     Id.  Sec.  4,  par.  1. 

The  applicant  shall  declare  that  it  is  bona  fide  his 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  renounce  forever  all  allegiance  and  fidelity  to  any 
foreign  prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty,  and 
particularly,  by  name,  to  the  prince,  potentate,  state,  or 
sovereignty  of  which  the  alien  may  be  at  the  time  a 
citizen  or  subject.     Id. 

None  of  the  prior  laws  prescribed  a  form,  but  the  Act 
of  1906,  Section  27,  prescribes  the  form  of  the  declaration 
of  intention,  which  must,  substantially,  be  used.  This 
form  is  as  follows: 

DECLARATION    OF    INTENTION.* 

(Invalid    for  all    purposes   seven    years    after    the    date 

hereof.) 
,  ss : 

I, ,   aged years,  occupation , 

do  declare  on  oath  (affirm)  that  my  personal  description 

*See  note,  next  page. 


58  NATURALIZATION 

is:  Color , complexion ,  height ,  weight 

,  color  of   hair ,  color  of  eyes ,  other 

visible  distinctive  marks ;  I  was  born  in on 

the day  of ,  anno  Domini ;  I  now  reside 

at. ;  I  emigrated  to  the  United  States  of  America 

from on  the  vessel ;  my  last  foreign  resi- 
dence was It  is  my  bona  fide  intention  to  renounce 

forever  all  allegiance  and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince, 
potentate,   state,    or   sovereignty,   and    particularly   to 

,  of  which  I  am  now  a  citizen  (subject);  I  arrived 

at  the  (port)  of... ,  in  the  State  (Territory  or  Dis- 
trict) of on  or  about  the day  of anno 

Domini ;  I  am  not  an  anarchist;  I  am  not  a  polyg- 

amist  nor  a  believer  in  the  practice  of  polygamy;  and  it 
is  my  intention  in  good  faith  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  to  permanently  reside 
therein.     So  help  me  God. 

(Original  signature  of  declarant)* 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  (affirmed)  before  me  this 
day  of ,  anno  Domini 

[L.  S.]  

(Official  character  of  attestor.) 

The  statute  (Sec.  4,  par.  1)  contains  a  proviso  relative 
to  those  who  have,  in  conformity  with  the  law  in  force 
when  they  made  their  declarations,  declared  their  inten- 
tion to  become  citizens,  in  this  language:  "Provided, 
however.  That  no  alien  who,  in  conformity  with  the  law 
in  force  at  the  date  of  his  declaration,  has  declared  his 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  shall 
be  required  to  renew  such  declaration." 

In  view  of  this  proviso,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce 
and  Labor,  in  pursuance  of  the  power  vested  in  him  by 

*The  names  of  aliens  making  declarations  of  intention,  or  filing  peti- 
tions for  naturalization,  must  be  entered  in  full  in  the  appropriate  places 
on  the  various  blank  forms,  without  abbreviation,  and  the  signatures  of 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  59 

Sec.  28  of  the  Act  of  1906,  made  the  following  naturali- 
zation regulations,  under  date  of  October  2,  1906: 

"Declarations  of  intention  made  prior  to  September 
27,  1906,  before  clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  to 
naturalize  aliens  under  the  provisions  of  the  law  existing 
at  the  time  such  declarations  were  made  may  be  used  in 
lieu  of  the  declarations  required  by  the  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  two  years  from 
the  date  when  made. 

"Aliens  who  have  made  declarations  of  intention  prior 
to  September  27,  1906,  under  the  provisions  of  law  in 
force  at  the  time  of  making  such  declarations,  can  not  be 
required,  as  a  preliminary  to  filing  their  petitions  for 
naturalization,  to  file  new  declarations  of  intention 
under  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906;  nor  are  such  aliens  re- 
quired, as  a  condition  precedent  to  naturalization,  to 
speak  the  English  language." 

d.  Difference  Between  Provisions  of  Act  of  1906  and  Sec. 
2165  of  the  Revised  Statutes  Relative  to  Declaration  of 
Intention. 

The  first  difference  to  be  noted  between  the  provisions 
of  Sec.  2165,  Rev.  Stat.,  and  the  existing  law,  is  in  the 
courts  which  may  receive  the  declaration.  Under  Section 
2165  the  declaration  could  be  made  before  any  court 
having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  without  reference 
to  the  place  of  residence  of  the  declarant.  Under  the 
Act  of  June  29,  1906,  it  can  be  made  only  before  a  court 
authorized  to  naturalize  aliens,  "in  the  district  in  which 
such  alien  resides.'' 

As  to  the  courts  authorized  to  naturalize,  under  the 
Act  of  1906,  see  p.  11  (supra),  "  What  courts  are  author- 
ized to  naturalize." 

The  second  difference  is  in  relation  to  the  age  of  the 
declarant.  Under  Section  2165  the  declaration  could  not 

such  aliens  must  also  be  written  out  without  abbreviation.  Great  care 
should  be  taken  to  get  in  every  case  the  correct  spelling  of  names.  Nat. 
Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


60  NATURALIZATION 

be  made  until  the  applicant  had  reached  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years.  Under  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  it 
may  be  made  at  any  time  after  the  alien  reaches  the  age 
of  eighteen. 

The  third  difference  is  in  relation  to  the  life  of  the 
declaration  of  intention.  Under  Section  2165  application 
for  final  naturalization  could  be  made  at  any  time  after 
the  two  year  period  from  the  date  of  the  declaration  had 
elapsed.  Under  the  existing  law  the  petition  for  admis- 
sion to  citizenship  must  be  made  "not  more  than  seven 
years  after  he  (the  alien)  has  made  such  declaration  of 
intention."  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

It  may  be  observed  that,  of  course,  only  aliens  who  are 
capable  of  naturalization  under  our  laws  can  make  formal 
declaration  of  intention  to  become  citizens. 

Clerks  of  courts  shall  not  receive  declarations  of  in- 
tention to  become  citizens  from  other  aliens  than  white 
persons  and  persons  of  African  nativity  or  of  African 
descent.  Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 

e.  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 

By  section  30  of  the  Act  of  1906,  however,  citizens  of 
Porto  Rico  and  citizens  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  though 
owing  permanent  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and 
hence  not  aliens,  are  authorized  to  become  naturalized 
and  to  make  their  declaration  of  intention  two  years  prior 
to  admission.     The  provision  is  as  follows: 

"All  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  naturalization 
laws  of  the  United  States  shall  apply  to  and  be  held  to 
authorize  the  admission  to  citizenship  of  all  persons  not 
citizens  who  owe  permanent  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  who  may  become  residents  of  any  state  or 
organized  territory  of  the  United  States,  with  the  fol- 
lowing modifications:  The  applicant  shall  not  be  required 
to  renounce  allegiance  to  any  foreign  sovereignty  ;  he 
shall  make  his  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  at  least  two  years  prior  to  his 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  61 

admission;  and  residence  within  tiie  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States,  owing  such  permanent  allegiance,  shall 
be  regarded  as  residence  within  the  United  States  within 
the  meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of  the 
existing  law." 

f .  Exceptions  to  the  Usual  Requirement  of  Declaration  of 
Intention. 

There  are  several  exceptions,  by  special   provision  of 
law,  to  the  requirement  of  declaration  of  intention. 

(A.)  Army. 

Section  2166  of  the  Revised  Statutes  reads  as  follows: 
"Any  alien,  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  and  up- 
ward, who  has  enlisted,  or  may  enlist,  in  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  either  the  regular  or  the  volunteer 
forces,  and  has  been,  or  may  be  hereafter,  honorably  dis- 
charged, shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  upon  his  petition,  without  any  previous 
declaration  of  his  intention  to  become  such;  and  he  shall 
not  be  required  to  prove  more  than  one  year's  residence 
within  the  United  States  previous  to  his  application  to 
become  such  citizen;  and  the  court  admitting  such  alien 
shall,  in  addition  to  such  proof  of  residence  and  good 
moral  character,  as  now  provided  by  law,  be  satisfied  by 
competent  proof  of  such  person's  having  been  honorably 
discharged  from  the  service  of  the  United  States."* 

*Under  section  2166  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  an  honorably  discharged 
soldier,  who  is  of  the  age  of  21  years  and  upward,  may  be  admitted  to 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  without  making  the  declaration  of 
intention  required  of  other  aliens.  Also,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  July  26,  1894,  chapter  l65,  any  alien,  of  the  age  of  21  years  and  up- 
ward, who  has  enlisted,  or  may  enlist,  in  the  United  States  Navy  or 
Marine  Corps,  having  been  honorably  discharged  therefrom,  after  a  resi- 
dence of  five  years  may  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  without  making  the  declaration  of  intention  required  of  other 
aliens.  Clerks  of  courts  are  therefore  instructed  to  appropriately  note 
upon  the  petition  of  such  discharged  alien  soldier  or  member  of  the  Navy 
or  Marine  Corps,  and  upon  the  stub  of  the  certificate  of  naturalization 


62  NATURALIZATION 

(B.)  ITavy  and  Marine  Corps. 

The  Act  of  July  26,  1894,  28  Stat,  at  L.  124,  provides 
that  any  alien  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  and  up- 
ward who  has  enlisted  or  may  enlist  in  the  United  States 
Navy  or  Marine  Corps,  and  has  served  or  may  hereafter 
serve  five  consecutive  years  in  the  United  States  Navy 
or  one  enlistment  in  the  United  States  Marine  Corps,  and 
has  been  or  may  hereafter  be  honorably  discharged,  shall 
be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
upon  his  petition,  without  any  previous  declaration  of 
his  intention  to  become  such;  and  the  court  admitting 
such  alien  shall,  in  addition  to  proof  of  good  moral  char- 
acter, be  satisfied  by  competent  proof  of  such  person's 
service  in  and  honorable  discharge  from  the  United 
States  Navy  or  Marine  Corps.* 

(C.)  Widow  and  Children  of  Deceased  Declarant. 

Sec.  4,  par.  6,  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  provides: 
When  any  alien  who  has  declared  his  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen  of  the  United  States  dies  before  he  is 
actually  naturalized  the  widow  and  minor  children  of 
such  alien  may,  by  complying  with  the  other  provisions 
of  this  Act,  be  naturalized  without  making  any  declara- 
tion of  intention. 

(D.)  Minor  Residents. 

Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1906,  minor  aliens 
coming  to  this  country  at  the  age  of  eighteen  years  or 
under,  were  allowed,  under  the  provisions  of  Section  2167 
of  the  Revised  Statutes,  to  be  admitted  to  naturaliza- 
tion after  reaching  majority  and  after  five  years'  residence 

issued  to  him,  in  lieu  of  the  information  required  thereon  as  to  the  filing 
of  the  declaration  of  intention,  that  the  petitioner  was  an  honorably  dis- 
charged alien  soldier,  or  member  of  the  Navy  or  Marine  Corps,  and  ap- 
plied for  citizenship  under  the  said  Section  2166,  or  the  Act  of  July  26, 
1894.  Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 
*See  note,  page  61. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  63 

here,  without  having  made  the  declaration  required  by- 
Rev.  Stat.  2165,  the  applicant  being  required  at  the  time 
of  his  admission  to  make  the  declaration,  and  to  further 
declare  on  oath  and  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court 
that  for  two  years  next  preceding,  it  had  been  his  bona 
fide  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

Repeal  of '' Minor's  Claused — But,  as  a  majority  of 
the  naturalization  frauds  perpetrated  were  committed 
under  the  provisions  of  this  section  of  the  statutes, 
which  was  known  as  the  "Minor's  Clause,"  the  section 
was  repealed  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  and  the  exist- 
ing law  provides  for  the  making  of  declaration  of  inten- 
tion by  minors  after  they  have  reached  the  age  of 
eighteen  years. 

(E.)  In  Hawaii. 

By  the  Act  of  April  30,  1900,  the  previous  declaration 
of  intention  was  dispensed  with  in  the  case  of  persons 
applying  to  be  naturalized  in  Hawaii,  who  had  resided 
there  at  least  five  years  prior  to  the  taking  effect  of 
the  Act. 

(F.)  In  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico. 

By  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906  (Sec.  30),  residence 
within  the  Philippines  or  Porto  Rico  is  to  be  regarded 
as  residence  within  the  United  States  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of  the  naturaliza- 
tion law,  with  respect  to  citizens  of  those  islands.  The 
language  of  the  law  is: 

"That  all  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  naturalization 
laws  of  the  United  States  shall  apply  to  and  be  held  to 
authorize  the  admission  to  citizenship  of  all  persons  not 
citizens  who  owe  permanent  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  who  may  become  residents  of  any  state  or 
organized  territory  of  the  United  States,  with  the  follow- 
ing modifications:    The  applicant  shall  not  be  required 


64  NATURALIZATION 

to  renounce  allegiance  to  any  foreign  sovereignty;  he 
shall  make  his  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  at  least  two  years  prior  to  his 
admission;  and  residence  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States,  owing  such  permanent  allegiance,  shall  be 
regarded  as  residence  within  the  United  States  within 
the  meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of  the 
existing  law," 

g.  Rights  Conferred  by  Declaration  of  Intention. 

(A.)  Under  Federal  laws. 

One  who  has  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen 
may,  under  the  preemption  and  homestead  laws  of  the 
United  States,  preempt  and  acquire  public  lands.  Rev. 
Stat.  2259,  2289. 

(B.)  Under  state  laws. 

He  may,  under  state  laws,  vote  at  all  elections,  state 
or  national,  in  Arkansas,  Indiana,  Kansas,  Missouri,  Ne- 
braska, South  Dakota,  Texas,  Oregon,  and  Wisconsin. 
Under  the  laws  of  Delaware,  Kentucky,  New  York,  and 
Washington  he  enjoys  rights  in  the  acquisition  of  real 
property  that  other  aliens  do  not  enjoy.  In  some  states 
he  may  be  employed  upon  public  works  and  other  aliens 
may  not. 

(C.)  Citizenship  not  conferred  by. 

Mere  declaration  of  intention  does  not  confer  citizen- 
ship upon  the  declarant.  The  declaration  is  merely  an 
expression  of  purpose,  and  has  not  the  effect,  either  of 
naturalization  or  expatriation.  By  it,  the  alien  simply 
records  his  intention  to  renounce  his  present  allegiance 
on  becoming  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  He  remains 
an  alien  until  naturalization  is  complete  according  to  our 
laws.  Lanz  v.  Randall,  4  Dill.  425;  Maloy  v.  Duden,  25 
Fed.  673;  Re  Moses,  83  Fed.  995. 


J 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  65 

The  law,  justly  regarding  a  change  in  his  allegiance  by 
a  foreigner  as  an  act  of  grave  importance,  wisely  pro- 
vides that  there  shall  be  two  steps  in  the  process.  By 
the  first,  the  purpose  of  change  is  announced.  Between 
this  and  actual  naturalization  the  lapse  of  a  considerable 
interval  is  required  in  order  that  the  final  step  may  be 
taken  with  due  deliberation.  For.  Rel.  1871,  253,  Sec'y 
Fish  to  Mr.  Wing,  Inst,  to  Ecuador. 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  government,  also,  it  is 
undesirable  that  persons  inexperienced  in  our  institu- 
tions should  take  part  in  matters  which  they  do  not 
understand.  The  period  of  probation  is  designed  to 
afford  them  an  opportunity  to  become  familiar  with  our 
mode  of  government,  and  to  fit  themselves  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  duties  of  citizenship.  Upon  final 
hearing,  the  court,  for  good  reasons,  may  refuse  to  com- 
plete the  naturalization. 

Does  the  declaration  of  intention  confer  the  rights  of 
citizenship  upon  an  alien  ?  While  the  laws  of  several  of 
the  states  of  the  Union  extend  the  right  of  suffrage  to 
aliens  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  a  state  can  not  make  the 
subject  of  a  foreign  government  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  or  confer  on  him  the  rights  and  privileges  apper- 
taining to  such  citizenship. 

As  is  said  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  in 
the  case  of  Minneapolis  v.  Reum,  6  C.  C.  A.  31,  12  U.  S. 
App.  446,  56  Fed.  580:  "A  state  may  confer  on  foreign 
citizens  or  subjects  all  the  rights  and  privileges  it  has 
the  power  to  bestow,  but  when  it  has  done  all  this,  it 
has  not  naturalized  them.  They  are  foreign  citizens  or 
subjects  still,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution 
and  laws  of  the  United  States."  See,  also,  Boyd  v. 
Nebraska,  143  U.  S.  135,  36  L.  ed.  103,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
375;  In  re  Moses,  83  Fed.  995;  White  v.  White,  2  Met. 
(Ky.)  185;  Dorsey  v.  Brigham,  177  III.  250. 

5233—5 


66  NATURALIZATION 

A  mere  "  declaration  of  intention  "  by  a  foreigner  to 
become  a  citizen  does  not  deprive  a  court  of  tlie  United 
States  of  jurisdiction  over  a  suit  to  whicli  lie  is  a  party — 
as  a  suit  against  a  foreign  citizen  or  subject.  The  final 
renunciation  of  his  foreign  allegiance  is  necessary, 
Baird  v.  Byrne,  3  Wall.  Jr.  1,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  757. 

Is  a  person  who  has  declared  his  intention  to  become 
a  citizen  clothed  with  the  rights  of  citizenship  while 
without  the  United  States?  Upon  principle,  it  seems 
clear  that  this  question  should  be  answered  in  the  nega- 
tive. As  he  is  not  a  citizen,  and  is  not  invested  with  the 
rights  of  Federal  citizenship  while  in  the  United  States, 
it  is  not  perceived  upon  what  ground  he  can  claim  the 
privileges  of  American  citizenship  while  in  a  foreign 
country.*  As  we  have  seen,  the  declarant  does  not  re- 
nounce his  original  allegiance,  but  remains  an  alien  until 
his  naturalization  is  completed.  If  he  goes  back  to  his 
native  country,  he  returns  as  a  subject  or  citizen  thereof. 

By  treaties  with  Austria,  Baden,  Bavaria,  Hesse,  North 
Germany,  Sweden  and  Norway,  and  Wiirttemberg,  it  is 
expressly  provided  that  a  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen  shall  not  have  the  effect  of  naturalization. 

It  has  been  repeatedly  held  by  the  Department  of 
State  that  the  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citi- 
zen does  not  so  clothe  the  individual  with  the  nationality 
of  this  country  as  to  enable  him  to  return  to  his  native 
land  without  being  subject  to  all  the  laws  thereof.  2 
Wharton's.  Int.  Law  Digest,  359. 

Where  declarant,  a  native  Turk,  contemplating  a  visit 
to  Turkey,  inquired  whether  he  could  count  upon  the 
intervention  of  this  government  in  his  behalf,  Mr.  Bayard 
held  that,  "  so  far  as  political  rights  are  concerned,  a  mere 
declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  would  give     .     .     .      [declarant]  no  title  to  claim 

*The  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  appears  to  contemplate  a  limited  protection 
for  these  persons  in  certain  exceptional  circumstances.  See  p.  74,  post. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  67 

the  intervention  of  the  United  States  should  he  return  to 
his  native  land."  2  Wharton,  International  Law  Dig.  360. 
And  in  a  similar  case  it  was  held:  "Until  the  declarant 
has  perfected  his  naturalization  by  due  course  of  law, 
and  obtained  his  final  papers,  he  can  not  claim  the  pro- 
tection of  this  government  in  case  of  his  voluntary  re- 
turn to  Turkey."  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Grain,  January  28, 
1886,  MSS.  Dom.  Let.  See  also,  Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Bell,  April 
7,  1899,  MSS.  Dom.  Let. 

(i.)    Burnato's  Case. 

With  the  exception  of  the  case  of  Burnato,  no  instance 
is  found  where  this  government  has  intervened,  in  the 
country  of  his  origin,  in  behalf  of  an  alien  who  has  merely 
declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen.  This  case  is 
sometimes  cited  as  a  precedent  for  extending  protection 
to  such  persons,  but  an  examination  of  the  correspond- 
ence shows  that  it  is  subject  to  considerable  qualifica- 
tion. Burnato,  a  native  of  Mexico,  came  to  Texas  in 
1866,  and  in  1872  declared  his  intention  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States.  In  1879  he  was  arrested  by 
the  Mexican  authorities  at  Piedras  Negras  for  smuggling 
liquor  across  the  border,  was  tried  and  sentenced  to  five 
years'  service  as  a  soldier  in  the  Mexican  Army,  In  Oc- 
tober, 1880,  the  impressment  of  Burnato  and  several 
others,  citizens  of  the  United  States,  having  come  to  the 
notice  of  our  government,  the  Department  of  State  di- 
rected the  United  States  Minister  to  demand  of  the  Mexi- 
can government  their  instant  release.  "If  the  fact  of 
Burnato's  not  being  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  should 
be  brought  up  by  the  Mexican  government"  (wrote  As- 
sistant Secretary  Hunter)  "you  will  suggest  that  for 
fourteen  years  he  has  been  a  permanent  resident  of  this 
country,  of  which  he  had  declared  his  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen,  and  has  thus  been  under  the  protection 
of  this  government,  its  laws   and  treaties,  and    it  would 


68  NATURALIZATION 

seem  very  ungracious  for  the  Mexican  government  to  in- 
sist, under  these  circumstances,  on  making  any  unfavor- 
able distinction  in  his  case."  Acting  Sec'y  Hunter  to 
Mr.  Morgan,  For.  Rel.  1880,  777. 

Mr.  Morgan  in  his  note  to  the  Mexican  government  re- 
fers to  the  men  as  "citizens  of  the  United  States,"  and 
it  does  not  appear  that  the  question  of  Burnato's  citizen- 
ship was  raised  at  all.  It  transpired  that  he  had  been 
dismissed  from  the  army  some  months  previous.  Sub- 
sequently Mr.  Morgan  wrote  the  Department  asking  in- 
structions in  regard  to  demanding  an  indemnity,  and  ex- 
pressing doubts  as  to  Burnato's  title  to  protection.  The 
Department,  under  date  of  September  14,  1881,  replied 
as  follows:  "Adverting to  your  inquiries  respecting  Felipe 
Burnato,  one  of  the  persons  impressed,  I  have  to  state 
that  he  will  not  be  entitled  to  the  protection  of  this  gov- 
ernment without  having  acquired  full  citizenship."  Act- 
ing Sec'y  Hitt  to  Mr.  Morgan,  MSS.  Dip.  Inst,  to  Mexico. 

Although  a  mere  declaration  of  intent  does  not  confer 
citizenship,  yet,  under  peculiar  circumstances  in  a  Mo- 
hammedan or  semi-barbarous  land,  it  may  sustain  an  ap- 
peal to  the  good  offices  of  a  diplomatic  officer  of  the 
United  States  in  such  land.  Sec'y  Cass  to  Mr.  De  Leon, 
U.  S.  Consul  General  at  Alexandria,  Egypt,  August  18, 
1858. 

(ii.)   Koszta's  Case. 

In  a  few  instances  the  Department  of  State  has  held 
that  the  declarant  acquires,  by  his  declaration  of  inten- 
tion, a  quasi  right  to  the  protection  of  this  government 
while  in  a  third  country.  Of  these  cases,  the  best  known 
is  that  of  Martin  Koszta,  in  which  an  extreme  position 
was  taken  by  this  Government.  This  case  has  been 
criticised,  and  has  been  explained  and  qualified  by  the 
Department  of  State.  Koszta  was  an  Austrian  subject, 
who  engaged  in  the  Hungarian  rebellion  of  1848-9.     At 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  69 

the  end  of  the  rebellion  he  escaped  to  Turkey,  whence 
he  came  to  the  United  States.  He  remained  in  this 
country  about  two  years,  during  which  time  he  made  the 
statutory  declaration  of  intention  to  become  an  American 
citizen.  He  then  returned  to  Turkey  on  business.  He 
obtained  from  the  United  States  consul  at  Smyrna  a 
traveling  pass,  stating  that  he  was  entitled  to  American 
protection.  While  at  Smyrna  he  was  arrested  by  Aus- 
trian authorities  and  put  on  board  an  Austrian  war  vessel 
for  conveyance  to  Trieste.  He  managed  to  communicate 
with  the  captain  of  an  American  war  vessel  which  was 
lying  in  the  same  port.  This  officer  demanded  the  release 
of  Koszta.  The  Austrian  commander  refused.  There- 
upon the  American  officer  trained  his  guns  upon  the 
Austrian  vessel,  and  declared  that  if  an  attempt  was 
made  to  leave  the  port  with  Koszta  on  board  he  would 
blow  the  vessel  to  pieces.  As  a  conflict  between  the  two 
ships  would  have  been  attended  with  great  danger  to  the 
shipping  in  the  port  and  to  the  town,  the  matter  was 
temporarily  settled  by  the  delivery  of  the  prisoner  to  the 
French  consul,  to  be  kept  until  the  governments  con- 
cerned should  have  an  opportunity  of  arriving  at  a  de- 
cision. The  Austrian  charge  d'affaires  at  Washington, 
Chevalier  Hulsemann,  presented  a  formal  remonstrance 
to  the  United  States  Government,  protesting  against  the 
claim  of  the  United  States  of  the  right  to  afford  protec- 
tion to  Koszta,  and  calling  on  them  to  disavow  the  con- 
duct of  their  agents,  and  to  grant  reparation  for  the 
insult  offered  to  the  Austrian  flag.  Secretary  Marcy 
replied,  contending  that,  although  Koszta  had  not  yet 
been  naturalized,  he  was  at  the  time  he  was  seized  and 
imprisoned  at  Smyrnaclothed  with  American  nationality, 
and  that  in  virtue  thereof  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  was  authorized  to  extend  to  him  its  protection  at 
home  and  abroad.  Mr.  Marcy  maintained  that  national 
character,  according    to   the    law  of    nations,  depended 


70  NATURALIZATION 

upon  domicil,  and  that,  as  Koszta  had  a  domicil  in 
the  United  States,  he  was  vested  with  American  nation- 
ality. The  matter  was  finally  compromised  by  an  ar- 
rangement between  the  American  and  Austrian  lega- 
tions at  Constantinople,  that  Koszta  should  be  shipped 
off  to  the  United  States,  the  Austrian  government  re- 
serving the  right  to  proceed  against  him  should  he  be 
again  found  in  Ottoman  territory. 

The  position  taken  by  Mr.  Marcy,  that  mere  domicil  in 
the  United  States  confers  citizenship  and  the  right  to 
protection  in  another  country,  is  held  by  such  eminent 
writers  on  international  law  as  Hall  and  Cockburn,  to  be 
untenable.  The  former  (Hall,  International  Law,  5th  ed., 
243,  244)  says:  "Domicil  no  doubt  imparts  national 
character  for  certain  purposes;  but  those  purposes,  so  far 
as  they  have  to  do  with  public  international  law,  are  con- 
nected with  the  rules  of  war  alone,  and  Mr.  Marcy's  con- 
tention was  wholly  destitute  of  legal  foundation."  And  in 
a  note  on  the  same  page  the  author  further  says  that  Mr. 
Marcy's  doctrine  was  strangely  inconsistent  with  the  law 
of  the  United  States  at  the  period  when  he  wrote,  as  at 
that  time  persons  of  foreign  nationality,  who  had  de- 
clared their  intention  of  becoming  citizens,  were  in- 
capable of  receiving  United  States  passports,  and 
consequently  could  not  have  been  regarded  as  subjects. 
He  refers  to  the  passport  given  Koszta  by  the  United 
States  consul  at  Smyrna  in  contravention  of  the  laws 
of  the  United  States  as  obviously  a  mere  piece  of  waste 
paper.  Cockburn  says:  "The  reasoning  of  Mr.  Marcy, 
which  is  remarkable  for  its  boldness  in  carrying  the  doc- 
trine of  acquired  nationality  further  than  it  ever  has 
been  carried,  and  in  which  the  effect  of  domicil  in  re- 
spect of  civil  consequences  is  confounded  with  its  effect 
as  to  political  consequences,  is  altogether  inadmissible. 
Domicil,  and  even  residence,  in  a  particular  country,  en- 
titles  the  party  to  the  protection  of  that  country  only 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  71 

SO  long  as  he  is  within  it;  and  the  effect  of  such  a  rule 
as  that  contended  for  by  Mr.  Marcy  would  be  to  intro- 
duce the  most  lamentable  confusion  into  this  branch  of 
the  public  law.  Naturalization  is  generally,  and  should 
be  always,  accompanied  by  some  authentic  act,  which 
can  be  referred  to,  and  which  speaks  authoritatively.  But 
if  mere  domicil  were  to  give  the  rights  of  citizenship, 
every  case  would  necessitate  a  judicial  inquiry  upon  a 
matter  which  every  lawyer  knows  to  be,  depending,  as  it 
does,  on  intention,  a  question  often  most  difficult  of 
solution."  Nationality,  122.  Mr.  Cockburn's  opinion  of 
the  Koszta  case  is  given  in  a  brief  note  at  the  bottom  of 
the  page  just  given,  as  follows:  "Both  parties  were 
equally  in  the  wrong.  The  Austrians  had  no  pretense  of 
right  for  seizing  Koszta  on  Turkish  territory.  .  . 
On  the  other  hand,  the  American  authorities  had  no 
right  to  claim  Koszta  as  an  American  subject,  as  he  had 
not  become  naturalized.  The  party  really  entitled  to 
complain  was  the  Ottoman  government,  which  refused 
the  application  of  the  Austrians  for  leave  to  arrest 
Koszta,  and  protested  against  the  outrage  offered  to 
their  authority,  but  whose  protest  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  heeded." 

Just  prior  to,  and  during  the  Cuban  insurrection  of 
1869,  many  Cubans  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  after  doing  so  returned 
to  Cuba.  The  United  States  consul  at  Trinidad  inter- 
fered in  behalf  of  several  of  these  persons,  claiming  that 
they  were  American  citizens,  and  asked  the  Department 
to  approve  his  action.  This  the  Department  declined  to 
do,  in  the  following  instruction,  dated  May  12,  1869,  in 
the  course  of  which  Mr.  Marcy's  note  in  the  Koszta  case 
was  explained  and  qualified:  "The  late  distinguished 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Marcy,  was  very  careful  in  his 
elaborate  letter  concerning  the  case  of  Martin  Koszta 
not  to  commit   this   government  to  the  obligation,  or  to 


72  NATURALIZATION 

the  propriety,  of  using  the  force  of  the  nation  for  the 
protection  of  foreign-born  persons  who,  after  declaring 
their  intention  to  become  at  some  future  time  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  leave  its  shores  to  return  to  their 
native  country.  .  .  .  He  took  special  care  to  insist 
that  the  case  was  to  be  judged,  not  by  the  municipal 
laws  of  the  United  States,  not  by  the  local  laws  of 
Turkey,  not  by  the  conventions  between  Turkey  and 
Austria,  but  by  the  great  principles  of  international  law. 
It  is  true  that  in  the  concluding  part  of  that  masterly 
despatch  he  did  say  that  a  nation  might,  at  its  pleasure, 
clothe  with  the  rights  of  its  nationality  persons  not 
citizens,  who  were  permanently  domiciled  in  its  borders. 
But  it  will  be  observed  by  the  careful  reader  of  that 
letter  that  this  portion  is  supplemental,  merely,  to  the 
main  line  of  the  great  argument.  ...  To  extend 
this  principle  beyond  the  careful  limitation  put  upon  it 
by  Secretary  Marcy  would  be  dangerous  to  the  peace  of 
the  country.  It  has  been  repeatedly  decided  by  this 
Department  that  the  declaration  of  intention  to  become 
a  citizen  does  not,  in  the  absence  of  treaty  stipulations, 
so  clothe  the  individual  with  the  nationality  of  this 
country  as  to  enable  him  to  return  to  his  native  land 
without  being  necessarily  subject  to  all  the  laws  thereof- 
In  the  present  unhappy  state  of  things  in  Cuba  the 
Secretary  of  State  can  see  no  reason  for  departing  from 
so  well-established  and  so  wise  a  rule.  .  .  .  He 
earnestly  exhorts  you,  and  all  other  consuls  of  the 
United  States,  to  spare  no  effort  to  protect  the  lives,  the 
property,  and  the  rights  of  American  citizens  in  this 
emergency,  and  he  will  see  with  satisfaction  any  unofficial 
efforts  you  may  make  to  shield  the  persons  of  those  who 
have  declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens  from 
the  barbarities  of  the  Spanish  Volunteers,  but  he  desires 
me  to  direct  you  hereafter  in  your  official  action  to 
observe   the   rule   laid   down   for  your  guidance  in  this 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  73 

instruction."  Mr.  Davis,  Asst.  Sec'y  to  Mr.  Fox,  U.  S. 
Consul  Trinidad,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  108,  41st  Cong.,  2d  Session, 
202,  203. 

Secretary  Olney  in  an  instruction  to  the  United  States 
minister  in  China,  January  13,  1897,  said:  "The  some- 
what extreme  position  taken  by  Mr.  Marcy  in  the  Koszta 
case,  that  the  declarant  is  followed,  during  sojourn  in  a 
third  country,  by  the  protection  of  this  government,  has 
since  been  necessarily  regarded  as  applying  particularly 
to  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  it  originated,  and 
to  relate  only  to  the  protection  of  such  a  declarant  in  a 
third  country  against  arbitrary  seizure  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country  of  his  origin.  .  .  .  It  is  estab- 
lished by  the  practical  interpretation  and  application  of 
domestic  statutes,  and  by  various  treaties  of  naturaliza- 
tion concluded  with  foreign  states,  that  a  mere  declara- 
tion of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  can  not  clothe  the 
declarant  with  any  of  the  international  rights  of 
citizenship."  Mr.  Olney  to  Mr.  Denby,  MSS.  Dip.  Inst, 
to  China,  For.  Rel.  1896,  92.  See,  also.  Secretary  Hay  to 
Mr.  McKinney,  March  20,  1899;  and  3  Moore's  Int.  Law 
Digest,  336  et  seq. 

h.  Declaration  of  Intention  and  Residence. 
(A.)  In  General. 

Declaration  of  intention  and  residence,  however  long 
continued,  do  not  operate  to  confer  citizenship  upon  an 
alien. 

In  Lanz  v.  Randall,  4  Dill.  425,  where  the  declarant  had 
resided  in  the  United  States  fifteen  years  after  making 
his  declaration,  it  was  decided  that  naturalization  had 
not  been  effected. 

And  in  Johnson  v.  United  States,  29  Court  of  Claims, 
1,  where  the  applicant  came  to  the  United  States  at  the 
age  of  thirteen  years  and  made  the  declaration  of  inten- 
tion after  arriving  at  majority,  it  was   held,  when  he  had 


74  NATURALIZATION 

resided  in  this  country  eighteen  years,  that  he   could  ac- 
quire citizenship  only  by  taking  out  his  final  papers. 

(B.)  Declaration  of  Intention  and  Three  Years'  Residence. 

But  the  Act  of  Congress  of  March  2,  1907,  authorizes  the 
Secretary  of  State,  "in  his  discretion,"  to  issue  passports 
to  persons  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  follows: 

"Where  any  person  has  made  a  declaration  of  inten- 
tion to  become  such  a  citizen  as  provided  by  law,  and 
has  resided  in  the  United  States  for  three  years,  a  pass- 
port may  be  issued  to  him  entitling  him  to  the  protection 
of  the  government  in  any  foreign  country:  Provided, 
that  such  passport  shall  not  be  valid  for  more  than  six 
months  and  shall  not  be  renewed,  and  that  such  passport 
shall  not  entitle  the  holder  to  the  protection  of  this 
Government  in  the  country  of  which  he  was  a  citizen 
prior  to  making  such  declaration  of  intention."* 

It  is  to  be  observed,  first,  that  the  issuance  of  a  pass- 
port to  such  person  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary 
of  State;  second,  that,  if  issued,  it  is  only  good  for  six 
months  and  is  not  renewable;  and,  third,  that  it  does  not 
entitle  the  holder  to  protection  in  the  country  of  origin 
or  previous  citizenship.  See  post,  rules  governing  the 
issuance  of  passports  to  those  who  have  declared  their 
intention  to  become  citizens. 

It  is  believed  that  the  occasions  for  the  issuance  of 
passports  under  this  law  should  be  very  rare. 

i.  Merchant  Seamen. 

An  exception  is  also  made  in  our  laws  in  the  case  of  a 
seaman  who  declares  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen 
and  serves  on  a  merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States.   Sec- 

*  Section  4076,  Revised  Statutes,  declared  that  "  No  passport  shall  be 
granted  or  issued  to,  or  verified  for,  any  other  persons  than  citizens  of 
the  United  States."  This  section  was  amended  by  Act  of  June  14,  1902 
(32  Stat,  at  I,.,  386),  so  as  to  permit  the  issuance  of  passports  to  the  loyal 
residents  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  75 

tion  2174,  Rev.  Stat.,  provides  that:  "Every  seaman, being 
a  foreigner,  who  declares  his  intention  of  becoming  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  in  any  competent  court,  and 
shall  have  served  three  years  on  board  of  a  merchant 
vessel  of  the  United  States  subsequent  to  the  date  of 
such  declaration,  may,  on  his  application  to  any  compe- 
tent court,  and  the  production  of  his  certificate  of  dis- 
charge and  good  conduct  during  that  time,  together  with 
the  certificate  of  his  declaration  of  intention  to  become 
a  citizen,  be  admitted  a  citizen  of  the  United  States;  and 
every  seaman,  being  a  foreigner,  shall,  after  his  declara- 
tion of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
and  after  he  shall  have  served  such  three  years,  be 
deemed  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of 
manning  and  serving  on  board  any  merchant  vessel  of 
the  United  States,  anything  to  the  contrary  in  any  Act  of 
Congress  notwithstanding;  but  such  seaman  shall,  for  all 
purposes  of  protection  as  an  American  citizen,  be  deemed 
such  after  the  filing  of  his  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come such  citizen." 

This  section  of  the  Revised  Statutes  is  Section  29  of  the 
Act  of  June  7,  1872  (17  Stat,  at  L.  268,  Chap.  322,  U.  S. 
Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334),  which  was  entitled  "An  Act  to 
authorize  the  appointment  of  shipping  commissioners 
.  .  .  to  superintend  the  shipping  and  discharge  of 
seamen  engaged  in  merchant  ships  belonging  to  the 
United  States,  and  for  the  further  protection  of  sea- 
men." 

In  the  case  of  Gustav  Richelieu,  a  native  of  France, 
who,  in  1872,  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  and  subsequently  served  as  seaman 
and  steward  on  American  merchant  vessels  for  more 
than  twenty  years,  it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled, 
under  the  provisions  of  Section  2174  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1334),  to  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  and 


76  NATURALIZATION 

a  claim  in  his  behalf  for  arbitrary  arrest  and  imprison- 
ment by  the  Spanish  authorities  in  Cuba  was  presented 
to  the  government  of  Spain  by  the  Department  of  State. 
Acting  Secretary  Rockhill  to  Mr.  Taylor,  August  31, 
1896,  MSS.  Dip.  Inst,  to  Spain.  The  Spanish  Treaty 
Claims  Commission,  before  which  this  claim  subsequently 
came,  made  an  award  of  $5,000  in  favor  of  Richelieu. 

This  does  not  extend  to  the  naval  service.  Ex  parte 
Gormly,  14  Phila.  211. 

The  Act  of  June  9,  1874  (18  Stat,  at  L.  64,  Chap.  260, 
U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3064),  provides  that  none  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  of  1872  (Sec.  2174  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1334)  "shall  apply  to  sail  or  steam  vessels  engaged 
in  the  coastwise  trade,  except  the  coastwise  trade  be- 
tween the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coasts,  or  in  the  lake- 
going  trade  touching  at  foreign  ports  or  otherwise,  or  in 
the  trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
North  American  possessions,  or  in  any  case  where  the 
seamen  are  by  custom  or  agreement  entitled  to  partici- 
pate in  the  profits  or  result  of  a  cruise  or  voyage." 

j.  Status  Conferred  upon  Minors  by  Declaration  of  Inten- 
tion of  Parents. 

What  is  the  status  of  minor  children  of  aliens  who 
declare  their  intention  to  become  citizens,  but  do  not 
perfect  their  naturalization?  Suppose  an  alien  emigrates 
to  the  United  States,  bringing  minor  children  with  him, 
and  in  due  time  declares  his  intention  to  become  a  citi- 
zen, but  fails  to  take  out  his  final  papers,  what  is  the 
status  of  the  children  when  they  reach  majority? 

President  Arthur,  in  his  annual  message  in  1884,  re- 
ferred to  this  question,  and  recommended  that  Congress 
should  "clearly  define  the  status  of  minor  children  of 
fathers  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens,  but  have  failed  to  perfect  their  naturalization." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  77 

The  question  was  presented  to  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court  in  the  ease  of  Boyd  vs.  Nebraska,  143  U.  S. 
135,  36  L.  ed.  103,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  375.  Boyd  was  born 
in  Ireland  in  1834,  of  Irish  parents,  and  brought  to  this 
country  in  1844  by  his  father,  who  settled  in  Ohio,  and, 
in  1849,  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States.  There  is  no  record  or  other  written  evi- 
dence that  he  ever  completed  his  naturalization  by  taking 
out  his  naturalization  certificate  after  the  expiration  of 
five  years.  For  many  years  after  the  expiration  of  that 
period,  however,  he  exercised  rights  and  claimed  privi- 
leges in  Ohio,  which  could  only  be  claimed  and  exercised 
by  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  state.  In 
1855  the  son  voted  in  Ohio  as  a  citizen,  under  the  belief 
that  his  father  had  taken  out  his  final  naturalization 
papers.  In  1856  he  removed  to  Nebraska.  In  1857  he 
was  elected  and  served  as  county  clerk  of  Douglass 
county;  in  1864  he  was  sworn  into  the  military  service, 
and  served  as  a  soldier  of  the  Federal  Government  to  de- 
fend the  frontier  from  an  attack  of  Indians;  in  1866  he 
was  elected  a  member  of  the  Nebraska  legislature  and 
served  one  session;  in  1871  he  was  elected  a  member  of 
the  convention  to  frame  a  state  constitution,  and  served 
as  such;  in  1875  he  was  again  elected  and  served  as  a 
member  of  the  convention  which  framed  the  present 
state  constitution;  in  1880  he  was  elected  and  acted  as 
president  of  the  city  council  of  Omaha;  and  in  1881  and 
1885,  respectively,  was  elected  mayor  of  that  city,  serv- 
ing in  all  four  years.  From  1856  until  Nebraska  was 
admitted  as  a  state,  he  voted  at  all  elections,  territorial, 
state,  municipal,  and  national.  He  took  the  oath  required 
by  law  in  entering  upon  the  duties  of  the  oflices  he  filled, 
and  swore  that  he  would  support  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States.  In  1888,  after  thirty  years  of  unques- 
tioned exercise  of  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities 
of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  territory  and 


78  NATURALIZATION 

state,  he  was  elected  governor  of  the  state.  He  took  the 
oath  of  office  and  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  its  duties. 
His  predecessor,  Thayer,  as  relator,  filed  an  information  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska,  setting  forth  the  facts 
as  to  the  declaration  of  intention  by  Bo5^d's  father,  aver- 
ring that  the  father  did  not  become  a  citizen  during  the 
son's  minority,  and  claiming  that  Boyd,  the  son,  never 
having  himself  been  naturalized,  was  not,  at  the  time  of 
his  election,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  was  not, 
under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  Nebraska,  eligible  to 
the  office  of  governor  of  the  state.  The  relator  prayed 
judgment  that  Boyd  be  ousted  from  that  office,  and  that 
the  relator  be  declared  entitled  to  it  until  a  successor 
could  be  elected.  The  state  court  having  decided  in 
favor  of  Thayer,  a  writ  of  error  was  sued  out  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  The  court,  in  dis- 
cussing the  question  of  the  status  of  minor  children  of 
persons  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens,  said:  "Clearly,  minors  acquire  an  inchoate  status 
by  the  declaration  of  intention  on  the  part  of  their 
parents.  If  they  attain  their  majority  before  the  parent 
completes  his  naturalization,  then  they  have  an  election 
to  repudiate  the  status  which  they  find  impressed  upon 
them,  and  determine  that  they  will  accept  allegiance  to 
some  foreign  potentate  or  power  rather  than  hold  fast  to 
the  citizenship  which  the  act  of  the  parent  has  initiated 
for  them.  Ordinarily  this  election  is  determined  by  ap- 
plication on  their  own  behalf,  but  it  does  not  follow  that 
an  actual  equivalent  may  not  be  accepted  in  lieu  of  a 
technical  compliance." 

Under  the  law  of  the  territory  of  Nebraska,  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  and  those  who  had  filed  their  declara- 
tion of  intention  to  become  such,  were  citizens  of  the 
territory.  The  court  said  that  Congress  so  regarded 
them,  and  in  Section  3  of  the  enabling  act  (13  Stat,  at  L. 
47),  referred  to  them  as  citizens.  The  court  declared  that 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  79 

all  those  who  were  citizens  of  the  original  states  became, 
upon  the  formation  of  the  Union,  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  upon  the  admission  of  Nebraska  into 
the  Union  "upon  an  equal  footing  with  the  original  states, 
in  all  respects  whatsoever,"  the  citizens  of  what  had  been 
the  territory  became  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of 
the  state.  The  court  concluded:  "We  are  of  opinion 
that  James  E.  Boyd  is  entitled  to  claim  that,  if  his  father 
did  not  complete  his  naturalization  before  his  son  had 
attained  majority,  the  son  can  not  be  held  to  have  lost 
the  inchoate  status  he  had  acquired  by  the  declaration 
of  intention,  and  to  have  elected  to  become  the  subject 
of  a  foreign  power,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  oaths 
he  took  and  his  action  as  a  citizen  entitled  him  to  insist 
upon  the  benefit  of  his  father's  act,  and  placed  him  in 
the  same  category  as  his  father  would  have  occupied  if 
he  had  emigrated  to  the  territory  of  Nebraska;  that,  in 
short,  he  was  within  the  intent  and  meaning,  effect  and 
operation  of  the  acts  of  Congress  in  relation  to  citizens 
of  the  territory,  and  was  made  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  State  of  Nebraska  under  the  organic 
and  enabling  acts  and  the  act  of  admission."   Id. 

In  the  somewhat  similar  case  of  Trabing  v.  United 
States,  32  Ct.  CI.  440,  the  court  said  that  the  status 
which  a  minor  acquires  by  the  declaration  of  intention 
of  his  parents  is  only  an  inchoate  status.  "If  he  attains 
his  majority,"  said  the  court,  "before  his  father  completes 
his  naturalization,  he  has  an  election  to  repudiate  the 
status  and  determine  whether  he  will  render  allegiance  to 
the  United  States  or  to  the  foreign  potentate  or  power 
of  the  country  where  he  was  born."  In  that  case  there 
was  nothing  to  evidence  the  election  of  American  citi- 
zenship by  the  claimant  upon  attaining  his  majority.  He 
did  not  vote,  but  remained  in  his  status  until  the  year 
1892  (when  he  was  fifty  years  of  age),  when  he  applied 
for    naturalization  and    obtained  a  decree.     "If  he    had 


80  NATURALIZATION 

voted  and  held  office  [said  the  court] ,  and  )3erformed  all 
the  duties  of  citizenship  in  the  active  and  unequivocal 
manner  of  the  respondent  in  Boyd  v.  Nebraska,  there 
would  be  good  reason  to  say,  as  his  counsel  says,  that 
obtaining  naturalization  in  1892  was  for  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  some  precise  evidence  of  naturalization  so  that 
his  status  as  a  citizen  could  not  be  questioned.  But, 
taken  with  the  negative  facts  of  this  case — the  facts  that 
he  was  not  born  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  that  his 
father  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  that  his 
father  is  not  shown  to  have  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  that  the  claimant  owed  no  natural  alle- 
giance to  the  United  States,  and  that  he  apparently 
chose  to  remain  a  subject  of  a  foreign  power  after  attain- 
ing his  majority — it  must  be  held  that  this  application 
for  naturalization  was  the  first  manifestation  of  an  intent 
to  become  a  citizen,  and  that  it  negatives  the  presump- 
tion of  an  earlier  election." 

In  the  case  of  In  re  Di  Simone,  108  Fed.  942,  an  Italian 
subject  came  to  the  United  States,  leaving  a  child  in 
Italy  with  relatives.  After  taking  out  his  first  citizen- 
ship papers,  the  father  sent  for  his  child  to  join  him. 
Upon  arrival  in  the  United  States  and  examination  by 
the  immigration  authorities  it  was  found  that  she  had 
trachoma,  and  an  order  for  her  deportation  was  issued. 
Application  was  made  on  her  behalf  to  the  circuit  court 
for  the  district  of  Louisiana  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  on 
the^ ground  that  she  was  illegally  detained.  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  her  father  had  made  his  declaration  of  inten- 
tion, it  was  contended  that  the  child,  under  the  policy  of 
our  naturalization  laws,  was  not  an  alien  immigrant.  The 
view  was  expressed  that  if  the  petitioner  on  coming  here 
had  found  her  father  a  naturalized  citizen,  she  could  not, 
under  the  policy  of  the  law,  have  been  treated  as  an  alien 
immigrant  so  as  to  prohibit  her  from  entering  this  country, 
however  loathsome,  dangerous  or  contagious  a  disease 


4 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  81 

her  sore  eyes  might  prove  to  be.  The  opinion  was  ad- 
vanced that,  under  the  policy  of  the^naturalization  laws, 
"alien  residential  citizens,"  though  not  naturalized,  may 
possess  an  "  inchoate  status"  of  citizenship, J'.which  may 
vest  such  rights  of  citizenship  in  this  petitioner  on  her 
arrival  in  the  United  States,  as  should  forbid  her  depor- 
tation as  an  alien  immigrant,  evenjjthough  she  may  be 
afflicted  with  a  dangerous,  contagious  disease.  The  court 
said  that  the  petitioner,  although  an  alien,  may  not  be 
"an  alien  immigrant"  under  the  statute.  The  court 
stated  that  the  facts  involved  "grave  questions  of  both 
domestic  and  international  law,  which  have  not  since  the 
organization  of  the  national  courts  been  free  therein  from 
plaguing  difficulties — that  is,  as  to  whether  the  peti- 
tioner, notwithstanding  the  'inchoate  status'  of  the 
father's  citizenship,  on  her  coming  to'this  port,  is  an  alien 
immigrant." 

There  was  no  evidence  introduced  by  the  immigration 
authorities  in  this  case  in  support  of  their  view  that  the 
petitioner  was  an  alien  immigrant  or  that  she  had  a 
"loathsome  or  dangerous  contagious  disease."  There 
were  certain  unverified  papers  pinned  to  the  answer  of 
the  immigration  authorities,  called  "annexes,"  but  it  was 
held  that  these  were  not  competent  as  evidence  in  a  court 
authorizing  the  deportation  of  the  petitioner,  and  the 
court  expressed  the  view  that  she  should  be  set  at 
liberty  to  join  and  live  with  her  parents,  who  were  "resi- 
dential citizens"  of  New  Orleans. 

In  United  States  ex  rel.  Abdoo  v.  Williams,  132  Fed. 
894,  the  facts  were  that  John  Abdoo,  a  native  Syrian, 
came  to  the  United  States  and  prior  to  July,  1904,  took 
out  his  first  papers.  On  July  31,  1904,  his  two  children, 
aged  8  and  14,  arrived  at  the  port  of  New  York.  Upon 
examination  it  was  found  that  they  both  had  trachoma, 
and  they  were  excluded  from  admission.  On  August  10, 
1904,  Abdoo  took  out  his  final  papers   and  applied  to 

5235—6 


82  NATURALIZATION 

the  immigration  authorities  for  a  rehearing,  which  was 
granted.  The  result  of  the  hearing  was  to  confirm  the 
view  reached  as  to  the  older  child,  but  on  the  ground 
that  it  did  not  satisfactorily  appear  from  the  evidence 
that  she  was  Abdoo's  daughter.  As  to  the  younger 
daughter,  although  the  board  who  passed  upon  the 
matter  was  satisfied  that  she  had  a  contagious  disease,  a 
majority  apparently  supposed  that  her  father's  naturali- 
zation had  changed  her  status,  and  voted  to  admit  her. 
The  third  member  of  the  board  appealed  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor,  and  that  Department 
held  that  both  children  were  aliens  and  should  be 
excluded. 

The  court  held  that  the  naturalization  of  the  father 
did  not  change  the  status  of  the  children.  Said  the 
court :  "  They  were  born  out  of  the  limits  and  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States,  their  father  at  the  time  of  their 
respective  births  not  being  a  citizen  thereof;  therefore, 
under  R.  S.  1993  they  were  born  aliens.  They  were 
aliens  when  they  arrived  here  on  July  31,  1904.  The 
effect  of  their  father's  naturalization  has  been  carefully 
restricted  by  Congress.  The  relevant  parts  of  R.  S.  2172 
are,  'the  children  of  persons  who  have  been  duly  nat- 
uralized under  any  law  of  the  United  States,  .  .  .  being 
under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  at  the  time  of 
naturalization  of  their  parents,  shall,  if  dwelling  in  the 
United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens  thereof.'  It  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  the  mere  being  at  Ellis  Island 
in  the  custody  of  the  immigration  authorities  is  not  a 
landing  within  the  meaning  of  any  provision  of  the 
Revised  Statutes,  and  that  no  landing  has  been  effected 
until  the  immigrnnt  has  been  passed  by  the  authorities 
at  Ellis  Island.  In  re  Palagano,  38  Fed.  580;  Nishimura 
Ekiu  V.  United  States,  142  U.S.  651;  In  re  Gayde  (C.  C), 
113  Fed.  588.  Therefore  these  children  were  not 
dwelling  in  the  United  States'  when  their  father  was 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  83 

naturalized,  and  his  act  did  not  require  the  authorities 
to  consider  them  as  citizens.  Being  aliens,  and  indis- 
putably immigrants,  the  provisions  of  the  exclusion 
acts  apply,  and  it  being  properly  determined  that  they 
are  within  one  of  the  excluded  classes,  the  respondent 
has  jurisdiction  to  hold  them  for  deportation.  The  re- 
lator relies  on  In  re  Di  Simone,  108  Fed.  942.  In  that 
case  the  court  held  that  a  minor  child  'coming  to  join 
her  father  and  finding  him  a  naturalized  citizen,  could 
not,  under  the  policy  of  the  law,  have  been  treated 
as  an  alien  immigrant,  so  as  to  prevent  her  from  en- 
tering, however  loathsome,  contagious  and  dangerous  a 
disease  her  sore  eyes  might  have  proven  to  be.'  And 
it  applied  the  same  rule  when  the  parent  had  only  taken 
out  first  papers.  Although  the  opinion  cited  is  a 
careful  and  elaborate  one,  it  is  unpersuasive  to  the 
conclusion  that  plain,  positive,  and  unambiguous  provis- 
ions of  statute  should  be  disregarded,  as  they  necessarily 
must  be,  to  reach  the  result  contended  for.  The  subjects 
of  naturalization  and  its  results  and  of  immigration  and 
its  restrictions  rest  wholly  with  Congress,  and  the  policy 
of  the  law  is  what  that  branch  of  the  government  chooses 
to  make  it.  If  the  law  which  it  enacts  works  hardship, 
application  should  be  made  to  amend  it.  Judicial  legis- 
lation under  the  guise  of  a  construction  of  unambiguous 
words  is  an  imperfect  remedy,  and  one  which  courts — 
certainly  courts  of  first  instance — should  be  slow  to 
adopt.  But  in  cases  like  the  one  at  bar,  there  is  no  in- 
justice in  the  legislation.  Upon  this  subject  Congress 
has  expressly  provided  for  just  such  a  case  as  this.  As 
to  aliens  generally,  it  is  provided  (Sec.  19,  Act  Mar.  3, 
1903,  32  Stat,  at  L.  1218),  that  'no  alien  suffering  from  a 
loathsome  or  with  a  dangerous  contagious  disease  other 
than  one  of  a  quarantinable  nature  shall  be  permitted  to 
land  for  medical  treatment  in  the  hospitals  of  the  United 
States.'     But  in    the    37th    Section  of    the  same  act  (32 


84  NATURALIZATION 

Stat.  1221),  is  found  this  provision:  'Whenever  an  alien 
shall  have  taken  up  his  permanent  residence  in  this 
country  and  shall  have  filed  his  preliminary  declaration 
to  become  a  citizen  and  thereafter  shall  send  for  his  wife 
or  minor  children  to  join  him,  if  said  wife  or  either  of 
said  children  shall  be  found  to  be  affected  with  any  con- 
tagious disorder,  and  if  it  be  proved  that  said  disorder 
was  contracted  on  board  the  ship  in  which  they  came, 
and  is  so  certified  by  the  examining  surgeon  at  the  port 
of  arrival,  such  wife  or  children  shall  be  held,  under  such 
regulations  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  shall  pre- 
scribe, until  it  shall  be  determined  whether  the  disorder 
will  be  easily  curable,  or  whether  they  can  be  permitted 
to  land  without  danger  to  other  persons;  and  they  shall 
not  be  deported  until  such  facts  have  been  ascertained.' 
Congress  has  thus  set  the  limits  within  which  the  rules 
excluding  aliens  shall  be  modified,  in  cases  where  the 
father  avails  of  his  opportunity  to  become  a  citizen;  and 
since  the  children  of  the  relator  do  not  come  within  the 
proviso  and  are  in  fact  aliens  suffering  from  a  contagious 
disease,  they  should  be  deported." 

2.  Petition  for  Naturalization, 
a.  In  General. 
The  next  step  in  the  process  of  naturalization  is  the 
petition  for  naturalization. 

The  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  provides  that: 
"Not  less  than  two  years  nor  more  than  seven  years 
after  he  has  made  such  declaration  of  intention  he  shall 
make  and  file,  in  duplicate,  a  petition  in  writing,  signed 
by  the  applicant  in  his  own  handwriting  and  duly  veri- 
fied, in  which  petition  such  applicant  shall  state  his  full 
name,  his  place  of  residence  (by  street  and  number,  if 
possible),  his  occupation,  and,  if  possible,  the  date  and 
place  of  his  birth;  the  place  from  which  he  emigrated, 
and  the  date  and  place  of  his  arrival  in  the  United 
States,  and,  if  he  entered  through  a  port,  the  name  of 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  85 

the  vessel  on  which  he  arrived;  the  time  when  and  the 
place  and  name  of  the  court  where  he  declared  his  in- 
tention to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States;  if  he 
is  married  he  shall  state  the  name  of  his  wife  and,  if  pos- 
sible, the  country  of  her  nativity  and  her  place  of  resi- 
dence at  the  time  of  filing  his  petition;  and  if  he  has 
children,  the  name,  date,  and  place  of  birth  and  place  of 
residence  of  each  child  living  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of 
his  petition:  Provided,  That  if  he  has  filed  his  declara- 
tion before  the  passage  of  this  Act  he  shall  not  be  re- 
quired to  sign  the  petition  in  his  own  handwriting." 
Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

b.  Time  of  Filing. 

If  the  applicant  has  resided  in  the  United  States  for 
the  statutory  period,  he  may,  when  two  years  have  elapsed 
after  making  formal  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a 
citizen,  make  and  file  his  petition  for  naturalization. 
The  petition  must  be  filed  not  more  than  seven  years 
after  the  applicant  has  made  the  declaration  of  inten- 
tion.    Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

Petitions  for  naturalization  may  be  made  and  filed 
either  during  term  time  or  vacation  of  the  court,  and 
shall  be  docketed  the  same  day  as  filed. 

c.  To  Whom  Made. 

The  petition  must  be  addressed  to  a  court  authorized 
to  naturalize  aliens,  and  in  the  judicial  district  in  which 
the  alien  resides.  Sec.  4,  par.  1.  See,  also,  In  re  Clark, 
18  Barb.  444. 

For  the  courts  authorized  to  naturalize,  see  p.  11, supra, 
and  Appendix,  post,  giving  list  of  courts. 

d.  Form  of  Petition. 

Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1906,  no  form  of 
petition  was  prescribed  by  law,  but  it  was  held  by  the 
courts  that  the  petition  must  "allege  the  existence  of  all 


86  NATURALIZATION 

facts  and  the  fulfilment  of  all  conditions  upon  the  exist- 
ence and  fulfilment  of  which  the  statutes  which  confer 
the  right  asserted  have  made  it  dependent."  In  re  Bodek, 
63  Fed.  Rep.  813;  In  re  An  Alien,  7  Hill.  137. 

The  Act  of  1906,  provides  that  the  petition  shall  set 
forth  "every  fact  material  to  his  (the  petitioner's) 
naturalization  and  required  to  be  proved  upon  the  final 
hearing  of  his  application."  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

The  Act  of  1906,  prescribes  the  following  form  of 
petition: 

PETITION   FOR  NATURALIZATION. 

Court  of 

In  the  matter  of  the  petition  of to  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
To  the Court: 

The  petition  of respectfully  shows: 

First.  My  full  name  is 

Second.  My  place  of  residence  is  number 

street,  city  of ,  State  (Territory  or  District)  of 

Third.  My  occupation  is 

Fourth.  I  was  born  on  the day  of at 

Fifth.  I  emigrated  to  the  United   States  from , 

on  or  about  the day  of ,  anno  Domini , 

and  arrived  at  the  port  of ,  in  the   United  States, 

on  the  vessel 

Sixth.  I  declared  my  intention   to  become  a  citizen  of 

the  United    States   on   the day  of at , 

in  the court  of 

Seventh.  I  am married.  My  wife's  name  is 

She  was  born  in and  now  resides  at „. 

I  have children,  and  the  name,  date,  and   place  of 

birth  and  place  of  residence  of  each  of  said  children  is  as 
follows: ;  ;  

Eighth.  I  am  not  a  disbeliever  in  or  opposed  to  or- 
ganized government  or  a  member  of  or  affiliated  with  any 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  87 

organization  or  body  of  persons  teaching  disbelief  in  or- 
ganized government.  I  am  not  a  polygamist  nor  a  be- 
liever in  the  practice  of  polygamy.  I  am  attached  to  the 
principles  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
it  is  my  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  and  to  renounce  absolutely  and  forever  all  alleg- 
iance and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state, 

or  sovereignty,  and  particularly  to ,   of   which  at 

this  time  I  am  a  citizen  (or  subject),  and  it  is  my  inten- 
tion to  reside  permanently  in  the  United  States. 

Ninth.  I  am  able  to  speak  the  English  language. 

Tenth.  I  have  resided  continuously  in  the  United 
States  of  America  for  a  term  of  five  years  at  least  im- 
mediately preceding  the  date  of  this  petition,  to  wit, 
since ,  anno  Domini ,  and  in  the  State  (Terri- 
tory or  District)  of for  one  year  at  least  next  pre- 
ceding the  date  of  this  petition,  to  wit,  since day 

of ,  anno  Domini 

Eleventh.  I  have  not  heretofore  made  petition  for 
citizenship  to  any  court.  (I  made  petition  for  citizenship 
to  the court  of at ,  and  the  said  peti- 
tion was  denied  by  the  said  court  for  the  following  rea- 
sons and  causes,  to  wit, ,  and  the  cause  of 

such  denial  has  since  been  cured  or  removed.) 

Attached  hereto  and  made  a  part  of  this  petition  are 
my  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  and  the  certificate  from  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  required  by  law.  Wherefore  your 
petitioner  prays  that  he  may  be  admitted  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  of  America. 

Dated 

(Signature  of  petitioner) 

,  ss: 

,  being  duly  sworn,   deposes  and    says 

that  he  is  the  petitioner  in  the  above-entitled  proceed- 
ing; that  he  has  read  the  foregoing  petition  and  knows 
the  contents  thereof;  that  the  same  is  true  of  his  own 


88  NATURALIZATION 

knowledge,  except  as  to  matters  therein  stated  to  be 
alleged  upon  information  and, belief,  and  that  as  to  those 
matters  he  believes  it  to  be  true. 

Subscribed  and  sworn    to    before    me    this day 

of ,  anno  Domini 

[l-  s.]  , 

(Sec.  27.)  Clerk  of  the Court. 

The  petition  must  be  made  in  duplicate.  This  is  to 
enable  the  clerk  to  furnish  one  to  the  Bureau  of  Natura- 
lization at  Washington,  the  other  to  remain  on  file  in  the 
court. 

(A)  Description  of  Applicant. 

The  petition  must  contain  a  description  of  the  appli- 
cant. It  shall  state  "his  full  name,  place  of  residence, 
occupation,  date  and  place  of  birth,  place  from  which  he 
emigrated,  date  and  place  of  arrival  in  the  United  States, 
and  if  entered  through  a  port,  the  name  of  vessel  in  which 
he  arrived;  the  time  when,  andjplace  and  name  of  court 
where  he  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen;  if 
married,  name  of  wife,  and  country  of  her  nativity  and 
place  of  residence  at  time  of  filing  petition;  and  if  he  has 
children,  name,  date,  and  place  of  birth  and  residence  of 
each  child  living  at  time  of  filing  petition." 

(B)  Allegations  of  Petition. 

{a)  Disbelief  in  Anarchy  and  Polygamy. 

The  petition  shall  state  that  the  petitioner  is  not  a  dis- 
believer in  or  opposed  to  organized  government  or  a 
member  of  or  affiliated  with  any  organization  or  body  of 
persons  teaching  disbelief  in  organized  government. 

It  shall  also  set  forth  that  the  petitioner  is  not  a 
polygamist  or  believer  in  the  practice  of  polygamy. 

(6)  Of  Intention  to  Become  a  Citizen,  to  Renounce 

Allegiance,  and  to  Reside  Permanently  in  the 

United  States. 

The  petition  must  state  that  it  is  the  intention  of  the 

applicant  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  89 

to  renounce  absolutely  and  forever  all  allegiance  and 
fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sover- 
eignty, and  particularly  byname  to  the  prince,  potentate, 
state,  or  sovereignty  of  which  at  the  time  of  filing  the 
petition  he  may  be  a  citizen  or  subject. 

To  prevent  mistake  in  the  name  or  title  of  the  partic- 
ular sovereign  or  state  whose  allegiance  is  to  be  re- 
nounced, a  list  of  foreign  countries  and  their  rulers  is 
furnished  clerks  of  courts  by  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization. 
See  Appendix,  post. 

Revised  lists  are  sent  out  from  the  Bureau  from  time 
to  time. 

The  petition  must  also  state  that  it  is  the  intention 
of  the  petitioner  to  reside  permanently  in  the  United 
States. 

(c)  Of  Previous  Denial  of  Naturalization. 

The  petitioner  shall  also  state  whether  he  has  been 
denied  admission  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and, 
if  denied,  the  ground  or  grounds  of  such  denial,  the 
court  or  courts  in  which  such  decision  was  rendered,  and 
that  the  cause  for  such  denial  has  since  been  cured  or 
removed. 

(d)  As  to  Residence. 

The  petition  must  state  that  the  applicant  has  resided 
continuously  in  the  United  States  of  America  for  a  term 
of  five  years  at  least  immediately  preceding  the  date  of 
his  petition,  and  in  the  state,  territory,  or  district  for 
one  year  at  least  next  preceding  the  date  of  the  petition. 

(e)  As  to  Ability  to  Speak  English. 

The  petition  should  state  that  the  applicant  is  able  to 
speak  the  English  language.  An  exception  is  made,  how- 
ever, in  the  case  of  persons  who  have  made  their  declara- 
tion of  intention  to  become  citizens  required  by  law 
prior  to  September  27,  1906.  Sec.  8. 

Naturalization  regulation  of  October  2,  1906: 

"Aliens  who  make  the  declaration  of  intention  required 


90  NATURALIZATION 

by  law  prior  to  September  27,  1906,  unless  they  can  be 
naturalized  before  that  date  under  the  laws  then  in  force, 
must  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  Act  of  June 
29, 1906,  in  regard  to  the  filing  of  petitions  for  naturaliza- 
tion and  furnishing  proof,  except  that  they  will  not  be 
required  to  speak  the  English  language  or  to  sign  peti- 
tions in  their  own  handwriting." 

(C.)  Signature  of  Petitioner. 

The  petition  must  be  signed  by  the  applicant.  Sec.  4, 
par.  2.*  And  unless  he  filed  his  declaration  of  intention 
before  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1906,  it  must  be  "in  his 
own  handwriting."  The  proviso  to  Section  4,  paragraph 
2,  declares  "that  if  he  has  filed  his  declaration  before 
the  passage  of  this  Act  he  shall  not  be  required  to  sign 
the  petition  in  his  own  handwriting." 

(D.)  Verification  of  Petition. 

The  petition  must  be  "duly  verified."  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

It  should  be  subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  the  clerk 
of  the  court  to  which  it  is  addressed.     Sec.  27. 

The  petition  shall  also  be  verified  by  the  affidavits  of 
at  least  two  credible  witnesses.     Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

(E.)  Witnesses. 

(^.)   Citizenship  of. 
The  witnesses  must  be  "citizens  of  the  United  States." 
Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

{ii.)   Personal  Acquaintance  with  Applicant. 

The  witnesses  shall  state  in  their  affidavits  that  they 
have  personally  known  the  applicant  to  be  a  resident  of 

*The  signature  must  be  written  out  without  abbreviation.    Nat.  Reg. , 
Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  91 

the  United  States  for  a  period  of  at  least  five  years  con- 
tinuously, and  of  the  state,  territory,  or  district  in  which 
the  application  is  made  for  a  period  of  at  least  one  year 
immediately  preceding  the  date  of  the  filing  of  his  peti- 
tion, and  that  they  have  personal  knowledge  that  the 
petitioner  is  a  person  of  good  moral  character,  and  that 
he  is  in  every  way  qualified,  in  their  opinion,  to  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.     Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

(in.)  Form  of  Affidavit. 

The  following  form  of    affidavit  of  witnesses  is  pre- 
scribed by  the  law:  Sec  27. 


AFFIDAVIT  OF  WITNESSES. 


-Court  of 


In  the  matter  of  the  petition  of to   be  admitted 

a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

,  ss : 

,  occupation ,  residing  at , 

and ,  occupation  ,  residing  at 

each  being  severally,  duly  andrespectively  sworn,  deposes 
and   says  that  he  is  a  citizen  of   the  United  States  of 

America;  that  he  has  personally  known  ,  the 

petitioner  above  mentioned,  to  be  a  resident  of  the 
United  States  for  a  period  of  at  least  five  years  con- 
tinuously immediately  preceding  the  date  of  filing  his 
petition,  and  of  the  state  (territory  or  district)  in  which 
the  above-entitled  application  is    made  for   a  period   of 

years  immediately    preceding   the    date  of   filing 

his  petition,  and  that  he  has  personal  knowledge  that 
the  said  petitioner  is  a  person  of  good  moral  character, 
attached  to   the  principles  of  the    Constitution  of    the 


92  NATURALIZATION 

United  States,  and  that  he  is  in  every  way  qualified,  in 
his  opinion,  to  be  admitted  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States. 


Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  day  of 

,  nineteen  hundred  and  

[l.  s.]  , 

(Official  character  of  attestor). 
(iv.)   Fees  of. 

Upon  the  filing  of  his  petition  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  the  petitioner  shall  deposit  with  and 
pay  to  the  clerk  of  the  court  a  sum  of  money  sufficient 
to  cover  the  expenses  of  subpoenaing  and  paying  the 
legal  fees  of  any  witnesses  for  whom  he  may  request  a 
subpoena,  and  upon  the  final  discharge  of  such  witnesses 
they  shall  receive,  if  they  demand  the  same  from  the 
clerk,  the  customary  and  usual  witness  fees  from  the 
moneys  which  the  petitioner  shall  have  paid  to  such 
clerk  for  such  purpose,  and  the  residue,  if  any,  shall  be 
returned  by  the  clerk  to  the  petitioner.     Sec.  13,  par.  5. 

e.  Notice. 

(A.)  In  General. 

Immediately  after  filing  the  petition,  the  clerk  shall 
give  notice  thereof  by  posting  in  a  public  and  conspicu- 
ous place  in  his  oflSce,  or  in  the  building  in  which  his 
office  is  situated,  under  an  appropriate  heading,  the 
name,  nativity  and  residence  of  the  alien,  the  date  and 
place  of  his  arrival  in  the  United  States,  and  the  date, 
as  nearly  as  may  be,  for  the  final  hearing  of  his  petition, 
and  the  names  of  the  witnesses  whom  the  applicant  ex- 
pects to  summon  in  his  behalf;  and  the  clerk  shall,  if 
the  applicant  requests  it,  issue  a  subpoena  for  the  wit- 
nesses so  named   by  the  said   applicant  to  appear   upon 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS. 


93 


the  day  set  for  the  final  hearing,  but  in  case  such  wit- 
nesses can  not  be  produced  upon  the  final  hearing,  other 
witnesses  may  be  summoned.  Sec.  5,  Act  of  June  29, 
1906. 

(B.)  Form. 

The  form  of  notice  prescribed  by  the  Bureau  of  Natu- 
ralization is  as  follows: 

NOTICE    OF    APPLICATION    FOR   ADMISSION    TO    CITIZENSHIP. 

Petitions  for  Naturalization  at  the Term  of 

Court,  to  be  held  at 


Name. 

Place  of 
Birth. 

Resi- 
dence. 

Date  of 
Arrival 
in  U.  S. 

Place  of 

Arrival. 

Approxi- 
mate Date 
of  Final 
Hearing. 

Witnesses. 

Name. 

Res. 

Clerk  of  the Court, 


f.  Certificate  from  Department  of  Commerce  and^Labor — 
Declaration  of  Intention. 

At  the  time  of  filing  his  petition  there  shall  be  filed 
with  the  clerk  of  the  court  a  certificate  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor,  if  the  petitioner  arrives  in 
the  United  States  after  the  passage  of  this  Act.  This  cer- 
tificate shall  state  the  date,  place,  and  manner  of  his 
arrival  in  the  United  States.  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

At  the  same  time,  the  declaration  of  intention  of  the 
petitioner  shall  be  filed  with  the  clerk.  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 


94  NATURALIZATION 

The  certificate  from  the  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor  and  the  declaration  of  intention  shall  be  attached 
to  and  made  a  part  of  the  petition.  Sec.  4,  par.  2. 

3.  Residence. 

a.  In  General. 

Before  an  alien  can  become  naturalized  under  the 
general  laws  of  the  United  States,  he  must  have  resided 
here  at  least  five  years. 

Section  2170  of  the  Revised  Statutes  provides  that 
"no  alien  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  who  has 
not  for  the  continued  term  of  five  years  next  preceding 
his  admission  resided  within  the  United  States." 

The  language  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  is  similar: 
"It  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court  admitting  any  alien  to  citizenship  that  immediately 
preceding  the  date  of  his  application  he  has  resided 
continuously  within  the  United  States  five  years  at  least, 
and  within  the  state  or  territory  where  such  court  is  at 
the  time  held  one  year  at  least." 

The  reason  for  the  requirement  of  such  preliminary 
residence  is  obvious.  It  enables  the  applicant  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  character  of  our  institutions.  It 
tests  the  sincerity  of  his  desire  for  citizenship. 

The  law,  justly  regarding  a  change  in  his  allegiance  by 
a  foreigner  as  an  act  of  grave  importance,  wisely  provides 
that  there  shall  be  two  steps  in  the  process.  By  the  first, 
the  purpose  of  change  is  announced.  Between  this  and 
actual  naturalization  the  lapse  of  a  considerable  interval 
is  required,  in  order  that  the  final  step  may  be  taken 
with  due  deliberation.  Persons  who  may  have  declared 
their  intention  to  become  citizens  often  change  their 
minds,  and  fail  to  carry  that  intention  into  effect.  They 
have    seen    occasion    to   avail    themselves  of    the    locus 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  95 

penitenticB  which  the   law  allows.     Sec'y  Fish,  For.  Rel. 
1871,  254. 

b.  Meaning  of  ** Residence." 

In  its  more  restricted  meaning  the  word  residence  de- 
notes a  person's  habitual  physical  presence  in  a  country 
or  place.  In  its  broad  sense  it  means  a  place  of  abode, 
selected  with  the  intention  of  remaining  permanently  or 
for  an  indefinite  period.  Van  Dyne,  Citizenship  of  the 
United  States,  83. 

In  its  legal  acceptation  residence  is  the  place  of  a 
party's  home  or  domicile.  Every  change  of  abode  is  not 
regarded  as  constituting  a  new  residence,  in  the  legal 
sense  of  the  word,  unless  it  is  accompanied  with  the  in- 
tention to  abandon  the  former  with  the  purpose  of  tak- 
ing up  another.  Residence,  in  its  legal  acceptation,  is 
the  party's  home  or  domicile,  and  not  merely  the  spot 
occupied  by  him  for  the  time  being.  In  re  An  Alien,  Fed. 
Cas.  201a. 

In  the  case  of  In  re  Hawley,  1  Daly,  531,  the  court 
said:  "There  are  few  questions  that  come  up  for  the  con- 
sideration of  judicial  tribunals  which  it  is  more  difficult 
to  define  than  what  will  constitute  a  residence.  The 
best  definition  that  I  have  ever  been  able  to  find,  or 
which  my  own  experience  could  suggest — and  I  have 
had  a  great  deal — is  that  to  be  deduced  from  the  Roman 
law — that  a  man's  residence  is  the  place  where  his  family 
dwells,  or  which  he  makes  the  chief  seat  of  his  affairs 
and  interests." 

0.   "Continued  Residence."* 

The  residence  must  be  continuous.  The  language  of 
Section  2170  is  "continued  term  of  five  years."  In  the 
Act  of  1906  it  is  "resided  continuously  .  .  .  five 
years  at  least." 

*See  article  by  author  on  "  Continued  Residence  of  Applicant  for  Na- 
turalization," 29  American  Law  Review,  52. 


96  NATURALIZATION 

What  is  meant  by  continued  residence?  Can  a  foreigner 
after  making  the  formal  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen,  leave  the  United  States  for  any  purpose, 
or  for  any  period,  without  interrupting  the  continuity 
of  his  residence  and  forfeiting  the  benefits  acquired 
thereby?  Little  light  is  thrown  upon  this  inquiry  by  the 
decisions  of  our  courts,  and  text  writers  seem  to  give  the 
matter  little  attention. 

Taken  in  the  legal  sense,*  temporary  absence  from  the 
United  States,  upon  business  or  pleasure,  would  not  be 
incompatible  with  continued  residence  here.  The  sole 
criterion  would  be  the  intention  of  the  party.  To  deter- 
mine this  it  would  be  proper  to  take  into  consideration 
the  length  of  the  absence,  its  purpose,  and  the  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  case.  In  a  case  arising  under  the 
treaty  of  1868  (15  Stat,  at  L.  615)  between  the  United 
States  and  the  North  German  Confederation,  the  opinion 
was  expressed  by  the  Attorney  General  that  the  residence 
of  an  applicant  for  naturalization  would  not  be  inter- 
rupted by  "a  transient  absence  for  business,  pleasure,  or 
other  occasion,  with  the  intention  of  returning."  Stern's 
Case,  13  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  376.  On  the  other  hand,  one 
who,  immediately  after  declaring  his  intention  to  become 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  removed  to  Mexico  and 
there  engaged  in  business,  was  deemed  to  have  abandoned 
his  declared  intention  to  become  an  American  citizen. 
2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  360. 

And  in  the  case  of  a  native  Russian  who  declared  his 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  in  1893,  and  then  returned 
to  Russia  where  he  still  remained  in  1896,  Secretary 
Olney  said  his  sojourn  in  Russia  would  doubtless  beheld 
by  a  naturalizing  court  to  interrupt  the  continuous  resi- 
dence required  by   law  as  a  condition  precedent  to  his 

*"The  phrase  '  continued  term  of  five  years' means  residence  in  the 
general  legal  sense."  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Bancroft,  Sept.  20,  1870,  3  Moore's 
Int.  Law  Digest,  354. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  97 

naturalization.  Mr.  Olney  to  Mr.  Breckinridge,  January 
27,  1896,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  356. 

The  logical  and  rational  construction  of  the  language 
of  the  law  would  admit  a  brief  temporary  absence  from 
the  United  States  during  the  period  of  probation  with- 
out interruption  of  the  continued  residence  required  by 
the  statute.  A  study  of  the  history  of  our  naturaliza- 
tion legislation,  however,  does  not  clearly  show  this  to 
have  been  the  intention  of  Congress.  The  earliest  Fed- 
eral law  relative  to  the  naturalization  of  aliens,  the  Act 
of  March  26,  1790  (1  Stat,  at  L.  103,  Chap.  3),  provided 
that  "any  alien  .  .  .  who  shall  have  resided  within 
the  limits  and  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States 
for  the  term  of  two  years,  may  be  admitted  to  become  a 
citizen  thereof."  By  Act  of  January  29,  1795  (1  Stat,  at 
L.  414,  Chap.  20),  a  preliminary  declaration  of  intention 
was  provided  for,  and  the  applicant  was  required  to  de- 
clare "  that  he  has  resided  within  the  United  States  five 
years  at  least."  The  act  of  June  18,  1798  (1  Stat,  at  L. 
566,  Chap.  54),  required  the  applicant  to  prove  "that  he 
has  resided  within  the  United  States  fourteen  years  at 
least."  This  law  was  repealed  by  the  Act  of  April  14, 
1802  (2  Stat,  at  L.  153,  Chap  28,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1329),  which  made  it  the  duty  of  the  court  admitting 
the  applicant  to  satisfy  itself  "  that  he  has  resided  within 
the  United  States  five  years  at  least."  This  Act  also  pro- 
vided that  the  oath  of  the  applicant  should,  in  no  case, 
be  allowed  to  prove  his  residence. 

In  November,  1804,  while  the  law  of  1802  was  in  force, 
one  Walton  applied  to  the  United  States  Circuit  Court 
at  Alexandria,  Virginia,  for  naturalization.  Affidavits 
were  submitted  showing  that  Walton  had  resided  in  the 
United  States  more  than  six  years;  that  during  that 
period  he  was  absent  a  short  time  on  business,  but  left 
his  family  in  this  country.  The  application  was  rejected 
by  the  court  because  the  residence  did  not  appear  to  be 

5233-7 


98  NATURALIZATION 

a  continued  residence,  and  the  term  of  absence  was  in- 
definite. Ex  parte  Walton,  1  Crancli,  C.  C.  186,  Fed.  Cas. 
No.  17,127. 

In  December,  1804,  in  the  case  of  James  Saunderson, 
who  applied  to  the  same  court,  an  affidavit  was  presented 
showing  that  Saunderson  came  to  the  United  States  in 
October,  1797,  and  continued  to  reside  here  until  1800, 
when  he  went  to  England,  returning  in  April,  1801.  In 
the  fall  of  1801  he  again  went  to  England,  and  in  1802 
returned  to  this  country,  where  he  continued  to  live  to 
the  date  of  his  application.  Although  he  had  actually 
resided  in  the  United  States  more  than  five  years,  the 
court  refused  to  admit  him  because  he  had  not  continued 
to  reside,  according  to  the  requirement  of  the  law. 
Ex  parte  Saunderson,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  219,  Fed.  Cas.  No. 
12,378. 

In  the  case  of  Hawley  (In  re  Hawley,  1  Daly,  531), 
naturalization  was  refused  because  the  applicant  after 
residing  in  the  United  States  ten  years  and  declaring 
his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  went  to  his  native  coun- 
try (Ireland)  on  account  of  his  father's  illness  and  re- 
mained there  seven  years.  After  returning  to  the  United 
States  and  dwelling  here  more  than  a  year  longer,  he 
made  application  for  admission  to  citizenship,  and  the 
evidence  showed  that  before  leaving  for  Ireland  he  had 
expressed  to  his  friends  his  intention  to  return  and  reside 
in  the  United  States.  The  court  in  rejecting  his  appli- 
cation based  its  action  largely  upon  the  fact  that  while 
he  was  in  Ireland  he  worked  at  his  trade  of  mechanic. 
This,  coupled  with  his  long  absence,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  effected  a  change  of  residence. 

Up  to  this  time  the  law  had  not  expressly  required  a 
continuous  residence.  It  appears  to  have  been  the  opin- 
ion of  the  court,  however,  in  the  cases  just  cited,  that 
the  law  contemplated  continuous  physical  presence  in 
the  country.  This  seems  to   be  an  extreme  construction. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  99 

March  3,  1813,  Congress  passed  "An  Act  for  the  regula- 
tion of  seamen  on  board  the  public  and  private  vessels  of 
the  United  States  "  (2  Stat,  at  L.  809,  chap.  42,  U.  S. 
Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1333),  the  12th  section  of  which 
provided  that "  no  person  who  shall  arrive  in  the  United 
States  from  and  after  the  time  when  this  act  shall  take 
effect  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  who  shall  not,  for  the  continued  term  of  five 
years  next  preceding  his  admission,  as  aforesaid,  have 
resided  within  the  United  States,  without  being  at  any 
time  during  the  said  five  years  out  of  the  territory  of 
the  United  States." 

In  Ex  parte  Paul,  7  Hill,  56,  the  facts  were  that  Paul, 
a  native  of  Ireland,  came  to  the  United  States  in  1836. 
In  1843  he  left  the  city  of  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  to  go  to 
Ogdensburg  by  way  of  Lake  Ontario.  The  steamboat  in 
which  he  traveled  stopped  about  ten  minutes  at  Kings- 
ton, Canada,  to  take  in  passengers,  during  which  time 
Paul  stepped  upon  the  dock  where  he  remained  two  or 
three  minutes  and  then  returned  to  the  boat  and  pro- 
ceeded to  Ogdensburg.  In  1844  he  applied  for  naturali- 
zation, having  resided  in  the  United  States  since  1836. 
The  court  denied  his  application.  Referring  to  the  lan- 
guage of  the  statute,  the  court  said: 

"The  leading  object  of  the  provision  was  undoubtedly 
to  make  the  alien's  right  depend  upon  the  simple  en- 
quiry whether  he  has  in  fact  remained  within  the  United 
States  during  the  whole  five  years  next  preceding  his  ap- 
plication, and  thus  exclude  all  enquiry  as  to  the  inten- 
tion and  purpose  of  his  departure.  In  the  present  case 
the  applicant  has  not  complied  with  the  condition  upon 
which  his  right  to  become  a  citizen  depends,  and  his  ap- 
plication must,  therefore,  be  rejected." 

While  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  this  law 
was  intended  to  apply  to  seamen  alone,  its  terms  em- 
braced all  aliens,  and  precluded  even  momentary  absence 


100  NATURALIZATION 

from  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  for  any  purpose 
whatever,  without  the  forfeiture  of  the  benefits  acquired 
by  previous  residence.  This  remained  the  law  until  the 
year  1848.  In  1846  an  effort  was  made  to  repeal  the  last 
clause  of  the  12th  section,  and  a  bill  was  introduced  in 
the  Senate  to  accomplish  that  purpose.  It  was  referred 
to  the  judiciary  committee,  and  a  favorable  report  was 
submitted  thereon  by  Senator  Breese.  The  bill  did  not 
become  a  law  at  that  time,  but  the  following  extract 
from  the  report  referred  to  is  of  interest  as  showing  the 
sentiment  of  the  committee:  "The  hardship  complained 
of  by  this  law  as  it  now  reads  is  that  persons  other  than 
seamen,  for  whose  regulation  and  naturalization,  alone, 
the  law  may  well  be  supposed  to  have  been  enacted, 
have,  by  the  courts  of  the  country,  adhering  to  the 
letter  of  the  law,  been  deprived  of  certificates  of  citizen- 
ship, who  had  made  their  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come citizens  of  the  United  States  in  conformity  with 
the  general  naturalization  law,  whose  residence,  business 
pursuits,  and  property  are  wholly  within  the  United 
States;  it  being  shown  on  final  examination  that  after 
five  years  had  commenced  to  run,  and  during  their  pro- 
gress, they  had  been  temporarily  out  of  the  territory  and 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  sometimes 
with  their  own  consent,  in  pursuit  of  their  business,  at 
other  times  accidentally,  in  the  course  of  voyages  upon 
the  northern  lakes,  where  a  divided  jurisdiction  obtains, 
the  line  and  limit  of  which  is  imaginary  only.  Cases  are 
stated  of  persons  engaged  in  large  commercial  operations, 
who,  with  their  families,  permanently  reside  in  some  of 
our  large  cities,  after  making  their  declarations  of  their 
bona  fide  intention  to  become  citizens,  are  compelled  to 
visit  foreign  countries  for  purposes  connected  with  their 
business,  but  immediately  returning  to  their  homes  in 
the  United  States,  who  are  unable,  by  reason  of  this 
temporary  absence,  to  show  upon  the  final  examination 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  101 

that  they  have  been  continually  during  the  five  years 
within  our  territory,  and  are  thus  refused  their  certifi- 
cates of  naturalization.  .  .  .  All  such  persons  could 
conscientiously  depose  that  they  have,  at  no  time 
within  the  five  years,  been  out  of  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  with  the  intention  of  remaining  out;  that 
the  animus  revertendi  always  continued.  The  committee 
think  that  the  rigor  of  the  law,  if  originally  intended  to 
apply  to  such  persons,  and  not  to  seamen  only,  might 
with  propriety  be  relaxed,  leaving  it  to  the  courts  to  de- 
termine upon  each  application  for  a  certificate  of  natu- 
ralization, if  the  residence  set  up  has  been  bona  fide 
with  the  intention  of  remaining,  only  interrupted  by 
such  and  kindred  circumstances  to  which  the  committee 
have  referred.  To  accomplish  this,  enough  of  the  section 
will  remain  after  the  clause  in  question  is  repealed;  for 
a  momentary  absence,  to  be  judged  of  by  all  the  circum- 
stances attending  it,  may  not  be  found  inconsistent  with 
a  correct  legal  idea  of  a  continued  residence  as  required." 
Two  years  later  the  matter  again  came  up  in  Congress, 
and  June  26,  1848,  an  act  (9  Stat,  at  L.  240,  chap.  72)  was 
passed  striking  from  the  law  the  clause  in  question,  viz., 
"without  being  at  any  time  during  the  said  five  years  out 
of  the  territory  of  the  United  States."  The  natural  infer- 
ence from  this  action  of  Congress  would  seem  to  be  that 
it  intended  to  relieve  the  applicant  for  naturalization 
from  the  forfeiture  caused  by  necessary  temporary  ab- 
sence, unaccompanied  by  change  of  intention.*  But  a 
perusal  of  the  record  of  the  debate  in  Congress  at  the 
time  of  the  repeal  of  the  clause  does  not  fully  confirm 
this  view.  Mr.  Dickinson,  having  the  bill  in  charge  in 
the  Senate,  stated  its  object  to  be  "to  enable  those  indi- 
viduals who  had  not  been  able  to  perfect  their  letters  of 
naturalization,  in  consequence  of  being  compelled  to  be 
absent  from   the   United  States  since  the  notification  of 

*See  In  re  Clark,  18  Barb.  444. 


102  NATURALIZATION 

their  intention,  to  obtain  relief."  Cong.  Globe,  1st  Ses- 
sion, 30th  Congress,  854. 

"Mr.  Underwood  asked  whether  the  bill  proposed  that 
the  time  an  individual  might  be  absent  from  the  United 
States  was  to  be  made  up  by  subsequent  residence,  prior 
to  the  granting  of  the  certificate.  Mr.  Dickinson  replied 
in  the  affirmative.  Mr.  Breese  said  that  if  the  applicant 
for  naturalization  should  be  called  out  of  the  United 
States,  and  remain  abroad  four  years  and  eleven  months, 
that  time  would  not  be  counted.  Mr.  Berrien  explained 
the  law  as  it  would  stand  after  the  passage  of  the  bill, 
which  required  that  the  five  years'  residence  should  be 
completed.  If  the  applicant  for  a  certificate  were  absent 
any  part  of  that  time,  it  would  remain  for  the  court  to 
decide  whether  that  absence  was  sufl&cient  to  prevent 
the  issuing  of  the  certificate.  As  the  law  now  stands  if 
any  person  after  notifying  his  intention  to  become  a 
citizen,  sets  his  foot  out  of  the  United  States,  he  must 
go  through  the  full  term  of  five  years'  residence  again. 
Under  this  bill  he  may  be  called  away  for  a  short  period 
by  business,  but  having  filed  his  desire  to  become  natu- 
ralized, the  court  may  decide  that  there  is  no  sufficient 
reason  for  his  going  again  over  the  whole  term  of  proba- 
tion. The  bill  was  then  considered  and  read  a  third  time 
and  passed."     Id. 

In  the  House,  Mr.  Birdsall,  in  explaining  the  object  of 
the  bill,  stated  that  persons  who  had  left  the  United 
States  as  volunteers  for  Mexico,  after  declaring  their  in- 
tention to  become  naturalized,  had  been  thus  prevented 
from  obtaining  the  residence  required  by  law.  "Mr.  Mc- 
Clernand  said  that  those  who  had  enlisted  in  the  service 
of  their  country,  and  had  been  sent  beyond  its  limits  in 
the  prosecution  of  the  war,  fell  within  the  wording  of 
the  present  law,  and  were  forced  to  lose  all  the  time  they 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  103 

were  thus  absent,  though  they  had  previously  notified 
their  intention  of  being  naturalized.  The  bill  was  then 
passed."     Id.  864. 

So  far  as  it  can  be  gathered  from  the  foregoing,  the 
intention  of  Congress  in  repealing  the  clause  in  question 
seems  to  have  been  to  conserve  to  the  applicant  for  natu- 
ralization, who,  in  good  faith,  temporarily  absents  him- 
self from  the  United  States  after  declaring  his  intention, 
only  the  benefit  of  the  time  which  he  has  actually  spent 
in  this  country. 

But  it  is  not  believed  that  this  apparent  intention 
would  justify  the  courts  in  disregarding  what  seems  to 
be  the  plain  and  reasonable  meaning  of  the  language  of 
the  law.  The  great  injustice  of  such  a  construction  is 
well  shown  by  the  statement  of  Mr.  McClernand,  quoted 
above,  that  persons  who  had  volunteered  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  been  sent  beyond  its  limits  in 
prosecution  of  war  against  a  foreign  nation,  would  be 
"forced  to  lose  all  the  time  they  were  thus  absent,  though 
they  had  previously  notified  their  intention  of  being 
naturalized." 

Moreover,  if  the  residence  is  interrupted  by  temporary 
absence,  without  change  of  intention  on  the  part  of  the 
applicant,  the  logical  consequence  would  be  that  he 
should  be  required,  not  merely  to  make  up  the  time  thus 
lost,  but  to  begin  cle  7iovo.  For  a  residence  which  is 
once  broken  can  not  be  said  to  be  a  continued  residence, 
such  as  the  law  requires. 

The  just  rule,  it  is  apprehended,  is  that  suggested  by 
Senator  Berrien,  supra:  "If  the  applicant  is  absent  any 
part  of  the  time,  it  remains  for  the  court  to  decide 
whether  that  absence  is  sufficient  to  prevent  the  issuing 
of  the  certificate."  In  other  words,  if  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  absence,  as  shown  in  the  particular 
case,  indicate  no  change  of  intention  on  the  part  of  the 


104  NATURALIZATION 

applicant,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  issue  the  certifi- 
cate, without  requiring  such  time  to  be  made  up.  If 
there  is  evidence  showing  abandonment  of  intention,  the 
application  should  be  refused,  and  the  party  should  be 
required  to  begin  de  novo.  This  is  believed  to  be  the 
only  construction  consistent  with  the  spirit  of  the  law 
and  with  the  plain  import  of  the  language  employed. 

It  is  interesting,  in  this  connection,  to  note  the  con- 
struction given  very  similar  language  used  in  naturaliza- 
tion treaties.  Our  treaties  of  naturalization  with  Bava- 
ria (15  Stat,  at  L.  661),  and  Wiirttemberg  (16  Stat,  at  L. 
735),  concluded  in  1868,  require  that  citizens  of  the  one 
country  shall  have  "resided  uninterruptedly"  within  the 
territory  of  the  other  for  five  years.  This  language  is 
certainly  as  strong  as  "continued  residence"  in  our  nat- 
uralization law.  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  2170  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901, 1333).  Yet  in  the  protocol  of  each  of  these  treaties, 
more  exactly  defining  and  explaining  the  contents  of  the 
treaties,  it  is  declared:  "The  words  'resided  uninter- 
ruptedly' are  obviously  to  be  understood,  not  of  a  con- 
tinued bodily  presence,  but  in  the  legal  sense,  and  there- 
fore a  transient  absence,  a  journey,  or  the  like,  by  no 
means  interrupts  the  period  of  five  years  contemplated 
by  the  1st  article."  15  Stat,  at  L.  664.  See,  also.  For. 
Rel.  1901,  520. 

Section  15  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  declares  that 
"  if  any  alien  who  shall  have  secured  a  certificate  of  citi- 
zenship under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  within  five 
years  after  the  issuance  of  such  certificate  return  to  the 
country  of  his  nativity  or  go  to  any  other  foreign  coun- 
try, and  take  permanent  residence  therein,  it  shall  be 
considered  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  lack  of  intention 
on  the  part  of  such  alien  to  become  a  permanent  citizen 
of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  filing  his  application 
for  citizenship,  and  in  the  absence  of  countervailing  evi- 
dence it  shall  be  sufficient  in  the  proper  proceeding  to 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  105 

authorize  the  cancellation  of  his  certificate  of  citizenship 
as  fraudulent." 

d.  Constructive  Residence. 
(A.)  Merchant  Seamen. 

Alien  seamen,  while  serving  on  board  a  merchant  vessel 
of  the  United  States,  are  deemed  to  be  constructively 
within  the  United  States. 

In  the  case  of  In  re  Scott,  1  Daly,  534,  the  applicant 
came  to  the  United  States  at  the  age  of  three  years,  and 
lived  in  New  York  until  he  reached  the  age  of  seventeen, 
when  he  shipped  as  a  seaman  on  board  an  American  vessel 
and  was  continuously  employed  as  a  sailor  on  American 
merchant  vessels  for  seven  years  and  until  he  applied  for 
naturalization.  The  court  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  residence  of  a  seaman,  if  married,  is  the  place  where 
his  family  dwells;  if  unmarried,  it  is  the  place  where  his 
domicile  was  fixed  when  he  first  went  to  sea  as  a  mariner, 
and  that  his  service  as  a  mariner  exclusively  in  American 
vessels  did  not  operate  as  an  abandonment  of  his  domi- 
cile. The  conclusion  of  the  court  was,  that  the  applicant 
had  resided  within  the  United  States  during  the  five  years 
preceding  his  application,  and  admitted  him  to  citizen- 
ship. See  In  re  Shaw,  2  Pa.  Dist.  Ct.  250. 

(B.)  In  Countries  in  Which  the  United  States  has  Extra- 
Territorial  Rights. 

In  the  case  of  Gargiulo,  a  dragoman  of  the  American 
Legation  at  Constantinople,  who  had  made  his  declaration 
of  intention  in  the  United  States  and  afterwards  returned 
to  his  official  duties  in  Turkey,  Secretary  Gresham  held 
that  the  five  years'  residence  required  by  the  statutes 
means  actual  residence,  and  that  a  person  can  not  be 
considered  "as  having  been  constructively  in  this  coun- 
try during   the   past   five  years   merely  because   he  has 


106  NATURALIZATION 

been  in  the  employment  of  this  government "  as  inter- 
preter or  dragoman  of  the  American  Legation  in  Turkey 
during  that  time.  The  fiction  of  extraterritoriality  can 
not  be  carried  to  that  extent.  Mr.  Gresham  to  Mr.  Ter- 
rell, Nov.  2,  1893,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  353. 

A  constructive  residence  is  held  not  to  answer  the 
requirement  of  the  statute.  Proposed  residence  in  Japan 
can  not,  therefore,  be  made  available  for  naturalization 
purposes.  Mr.  Evarts  to  Mr.  de  la  Camp,  July  25,  1877, 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  353. 

The  process  of  naturalization  must  be  performed  in 
the  United  States.  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  to  Mr.  Kasson, 
Jan.  15,  1885,  For.  Rel.  1885,  394. 

e.  Residence  within  State. 

In  addition  to  residence  within  the  United  States  for 
the  continued  term  of  five  years,  the  applicant  must 
have  resided  within  the  state  or  territory  where  the 
court  is  at  the  time  held,  one  year  at  least.  Sec.  4,  par.  4. 

In  Chandler  v.  Wartman,  6  N.  J.  L.  J.  301,  it  was  held 
that  R.  S.  2165,  providing  that  the  court  naturalizing 
an  alien  must  be  satisfied  that  he  has  resided  in  the 
United  States  for  five  years  and  within  the  state  where 
the  court  is  held  for  one  year,  did  not  require  the  last 
year  of  residence  to  be  in  the  state  where  the  applica- 
tion is  made,  but  that  it  was  sufficient  that  applicant 
had  lived  for  any  one  year  in  that  state. 

And,  in  Cummings'  Petition,  41  N.  H.  270,  arising 
under  the  same  statute,  the  court  declared  that:  "In an 
application  for  naturalization  under  the  Act  of  April  14, 
1802,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  applicant  to  allege  or 
prove  his  residence  for  the  year  immediately  preceding 
his  application  in  the  state  or  territory  where  the  court 
is  holden;  but  it  is  sufficient  for  him  to  allege  and  prove 
such  residence  for  any  one  of  the  five  years  of  his  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States." 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  107 

The  existing  law,  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906  (Sec.  10), 
provides:  "That  in  case  the  petitioner  has  not  resided 
in  the  state,  territory,  or  district  for  a  period  of  five 
years  continuously  and  immediately  preceding  the  filing 
of  his  petition  he  may  establish  by  two  witnesses,  both 
in  his  petition  and  at  the  hearing,  the  time  of  his  resi- 
dence within  the  state,  provided  that  it  has  been  for 
more  than  one  year,  and  the  remaining  portion  of  his  five 
years'  residence  within  the  United  States  required  by 
law  to  be  established  may  be  proved  by  the  depositions 
of  two  or  more  witnesses  who  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  upon  notice  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization  and  the  United  States  attorney  for  the 
iistrict  in  which  said  witnesses  may  reside." 

f.  In  the  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico. 

Residence  in  the  Philippine  Islands  or  Porto  Rico,  is 
deemed  "residence  within  the  United  States"  within  the 
meaning  of  the  naturalization  law.  The  Act  of  June  29, 
1906,  provides  that  "residence  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  United  States,  owing  such  permanent  allegiance,  shall 
be  regarded  as  residence  within  the  United  States  within 
the  meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of  the 
existing  law."  (Sec.  30.) 

g.  In  Hawaii. 

The  Act  of  April  30,  1900,  31.  Stat.  161,  dispensed  with 
the  previous  declaration  of  intention  in  the  case  of  per- 
sons applying  to  be  naturalized  in  Hawaii,  who  had  re- 
sided there  at  least  five  years  prior  to  June  14,  1900. 
The  language  of  the  Act  (Sec.  100)  is:  "For  the  purposes 
of  naturalization  under  the  laws  of  the^  United  States, 
residence  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  prior  to  the  taking 
effect  of  this  Act  shall  be  deemed  equivalent  to  residence 
in   the  United   States   and  in  the   Territory  of  Hawaii; 


108  NATURALIZATION 

and  the  requirement  of  a  previous  declaration  of  inten- 
tion to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and  to  re- 
nounce former  allegiance  shall  not  apply  to  persons  who 
have  resided  in  said  islands  at  least  five  years  prior  to 
the  taking  effect  of  this  Act,  but  all  other  provisions  of 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  relating  to  naturalization 
shall,  so  far  as  applicable,  apply  to  persons  in  the  said 
islands." 

h.  Proof  of  Residence. 

(A.)  Under  Act  of  1906. 

The  statute  (Act  of  June  29,  1906,  Sec.  4,  par.  4)  pro- 
vides that  "it  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  court"  that  the  alien  has  resided,  etc. 

(B)  Under  Prior  Laws. 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1906,  Rev.  Stat.  2165, 
provided  that  "the  oath  of  the  applicant  shall  in  no  case 
be  allowed  to  prove  his  residence."  And  it  was  held  that 
this  not  merely  rendered  the  oath  of  the  applicant  in- 
sufficient, but  that  it  amounted  to  a  prohibition  against 
taking  his  oath  as  proof  of  his  residence,  and  that  such 
oath  if  taken  was  extra-judicial. 

The  statute  did  not  prescribe  how  the  residence  was  to 
be  proved,  but  the  usual  method  was  for  the  courts  to 
require  testimony  under  oath  of  at  least  two  citizens  of 
good  standing  who  were  able  to  testify  of  their  own 
knowledge  that  the  applicant  had  been  a  resident  of  the 
United  States  for  five  years  at  least,  and  within  the  state 
or  territory  wherein  the  court  was  held  for  one  year.* 

*Ia  re  An  Alien,  7  Hill,  137,  it  was  held  that  in  proceedings  for 
naturalization  an  alien's  residence  could  not  be  established  by  affidavit, 
but  must  be  proved  in  court  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses. 

In  Com.  V.  Paper,  1  Brewster  (Pa.),  263,  it  was  held  that  an  alien  could 
not  vouch  for  a  person  petitioning  for  naturalization. 

The  law  requires  that  some  of  the  essential  facts  shall  be  made  to 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  109 

The  Act  of  1906,  which  repeals  Section  2165  R.  S.  ex- 
pressly provides: 

"In  addition  to  the  oath  of  the  applicant,  the  testi- 
mony of  at  least  two  witnesses,  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  to  the  facts  of  residence  .  .  .  shall  be  re- 
quired, and  the  name,  place  of  residence  and  occupation 
of  each  witness  shall  be  set  forth  in  the  record."  Sec. 
4,  par,  4, 

i.  Exceptions. 

There  are  several  exceptions  by  special  provision  of 
law  to  the  requirement  as  to  residence. 

(A.)  Army. 

Soldiers  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States  who  have 
enlisted  and  are  honorably  discharged,  may  be  admitted 
as  citizens  of  the  United  States  after  one  year's  residence 
within  the  United  States  previous  to  the  application. 
The  law  reads: 

Rev.  St.,  Sec.  2166  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.,  1901.  1331): 
"Any  alien  of  the  age  of  21  years  and  upward,  who 
has  enlisted,  or  may  enlist,  in  the  armies  of  the  United 
States,  either  the  regular  or  the  volunteer  forces,  and 
has  been,  or  may  be  hereafter,  honorably  discharged, 
shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  upon  his  petition,  without  any  previous  declara- 
tion of  his  intention  to  become  such;  and  he  shall  not  he 
required  to  prove  more  than  one  yeai^'s  residence  within 

appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  by  evidence  other  than  the  testi- 
mony of  the  applicant  himself,  and,  to  meet  this  requirement,  a  witness 
is  usually  produced,  commonly  called  a  "voucher. "  In  the  case  of  Re 
Lipshitz,  97  Fed.  584,  where  it  appeared  that  the  "voucher"  presenting 
himself  had  been  in  the  habit  of  appearing  in  the  same  capacity  in  such 
cases,  and  of  making  a  charge  for  appearing  and  giving  his  testimony, 
the  court  held  that  an  applicant  for  naturalization  should  produce  a 
voucher  other  than  one  who  habitually,  and  for  compensation,  appears 
as  such.     See,  also,  People  v.  Sweetman,  3Park.  C,  R.  358. 


110  NATURALIZATION 

the  United  States  previous  to  his  application  to  become 
such  citizen;  and  the  court  admitting  such  alien  shall,  in 
addition  to  such  proof  of  residence  and  good  moral  char- 
acter, as  now  provided  bylaw,  be  satisfied  by  competent 
proof  of  such  person's  having  been  honorably  discharged 
from  the  service  of  the  United  States." 

"Armies  "  does  not  cover  enlistments  in  the  Navy.  In 
re  Bailey,  2  Sawyer  C.  C.  200;  In  re  Chamavas,  21  N.  Y.  S. 
104. 

(B. )  Navy  and  Marine  Corps. 

Aliens  enlisting  in  the  Navy  or  Marine  Corps  of  the 
United  States,  and  serving  five  consecutive  years  in  the 
Navy,  or  one  enlistment  in  the  Marine  Corps,  after  honor- 
able discharge,  may  be  admitted  as  citizens  without  other 
proof  of  residence.  The  law.  Act  of  July  26,  1894,  28  Stat, 
at  L.  124,  Chap.  165,  reads:  "Any  alien  of  the  age  of 
21  years  and  upward,  who  has  enlisted  or  may  enlist 
in  the  United  States  Navy  or  Marine  Corps,  and  has 
served,  or  may  hereafter  serve,  five  consecutive  years  in 
the  United  States  Navy,  or  one  enlistment  in  the  United 
States  Marine  Corps,  and  has  been  or  may  hereafter  be 
honorably  discharged,  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  upon  his  petition  without  any 
previous  declaration  of  his  intention  to  become  such." 

Mere  service  as  a  soldier,  or  residence  in  the  country 
in  that  capacity,  does  not  make  one  a  citizen,  however. 
People  ex  rel.  Orman  v.  Riley,  15  Cal.  48. 

The  soldier,  sailor  or  marine  must  personally  petition 
the  court  and  be  formally  admitted  to  citizenship.  Van 
Dyne,  Citizenship  of  the  United  States,  96. 

(C.)  Merchant  Seamen. 

While  serving  on  board  a  merchant  vessel  of  the  United 
States,  a  seaman  is  deemed  to  be  constructively  within 
the  United  States. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  Ill 

As  has  been  stated  heretofore  (supra),  under  Sec. 
2174,  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334),  a  sea- 
man being  a  foreigner,  after  declaring  his  intention  of 
becoming  a  citizen,  and  serving  three  years  on  board  of  a 
merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States,  may  be  admitted 
to  citizenship.  He  is  required  to  make  application  to  a 
competent  court,  and  to  produce  a  certificate  of  his 
declaration  of  intention,  and  his  certificate  of  discharge 
and  good  conduct  during  his  service  on  such  vessel. 

For  the  purpose  of  manning  and  serving  on  board  any 
merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States,  he  is  to  be  deemed 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States  after  making  his  declara- 
tion of  intention,  and  after  he  shall  have  served  such 
three  years;  and  for  all  purposes  of  protection  as  an 
American  citizen,  he  shall  be  deemed  such  after  filing  his 
declaration  of  intention. 


4.  Qualifications  as  to  Age,  Education,  and  Moral  Character, 
(a.)  Age. 

While  there  is  no  express  declaration  of  the  law  to 
that  effect,  no  person  can  become  naturalized  under  the 
general  statutes  of  the  United  States  who  has  not 
attained  the  age  of  twenty-one  years. 

Until  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  went  into  effect,  an 
alien  minor  was  not  competent  to  declare  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  but  Section  4, 
paragraph  1,  of  that  Act  provides  that  an  alien  shall 
make  his  declaration  of  intention  "after  he  has  reached 
the  age  of  eighteen  years." 

Section  2166  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  providing  for 
the  naturalization  of  soldiers  of  the  Army  of  the  United 
States,  expressly  limits  the  benefits  of  the  law  to  aliens 
"of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  and  upward." 


112  NATURALIZATION 

And  the  Act  of  July  26,  1894,  relating  to  the  naturali- 
zation of  men  of  the  Navy  or  Marine  Corps  of  the  United 
States,  contains  a  like  limitation. 

(b.)  Education. 

(A.)   Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

Under  the  existing  law,  Act  June  29,  1906,  ability  to 
speak  English  and  to  write  is  one  of  the  qualifications  of 
an  applicant  for  naturalization.  The  language  of  the  law 
is  "  that  no  alien  shall  hereafter  be  naturalized  or  ad- 
mitted as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  can  not 
speak  the  English  language."     Sec.  8. 

And  the  law,  in  providing  for  the  making  and  filing  of 
a  petition  for  naturalization  requires  the  applicant  to 
make  such  petition  in  writing  "signed  by  the  applicant 
in  his  own  handwriting."     Sec.  4,  par,  2. 

This  section  contains  a  proviso,  however,  dispensing 
with  the  requirement  that  the  petitioner  shall  sign  the 
petition  in  his  own  handwriting  in  cases  where  the  ap- 
plicant has  filed  his  declaration  of  intention  before  the 
passage  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  the  provision  read- 
ing: "Provided  that  if  he  has  filed  his  declaration 
before  the  passage  of  this  Act,  he  shall  not  be  required 
to  sign  the  petition  in  his  own  handwriting."  Sec. 4,  par.  2. 

(B.)  Exceptions. 

There  are  also  three  exceptions  to  the  provision  of 
the  law  declaring  that  no  alien  who  can  not  speak  Eng- 
lish shall  be  naturalized: 

(i)  Where  the  alien  is  physically  unable  to  comply 
with  the  requirement.* 

*If  an  alien  is  physically  unable  to  speak,  that  fact  should  be  stated 
in  his  petition  for  naturalization  in  lieu  of  the  statement,  "  I  am  able  to 
speak  the  English  language."     Nat.  Reg.,  Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  113 

(ii)  Where  the  alien  has  before  the  passage  of  the  Act 
of  June  29,  1906,  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  in  conformity  with  the  law  in 
force  at  the  date  of  making  such  declaration.* 

(iii)  In  the  case  of  aliens  who  shall  hereafter  declare 
their  intention  to  become  citizens  and  who  shall  make 
homestead  entries  upon  the  public  lands  of  the  United 
States  and  comply  in  all  respects  with  the  laws  provid- 
ing for  homestead  entries  on  such  lands.     Sec.  8. 

The  text  of  the  proviso  is:  "Provided,  That  this 
requirement  shall  not  apply  to  aliens  who  are  physically 
unable  to  comply  therewith,  if  they  are  otherwise  quali- 
fied to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States:  And  pro- 
vided further,  That  the  requirements  of  this  section 
shall  not  apply  to  any  alien  who  has  prior  to  the  passage 
of  this  act  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  in  conformity  with  the  law  in  force  at 
the  date  of  making  such  declaration:  Provided  further, 
That  the  requirements  of  section  eight  shall  not  apply 
to  aliens  who  shall  hereafter  declare  their  intention  to 
become  citizens  and  who  shall  make  homestead  entries 
upon  the  public  lands  of  the  United  States  and  comply 
in  all  respects  with  the  laws  providing  for  homestead 
entries  on  such  lands."     Sec.  8,  Act  June  29,  1906. 

(C.)  Under  Prior  Law. 

Under  the  provisions  of  Section  2165  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  repealed  by  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  there  was 
no  requirement  that  the  applicant  should  be  able  to 
read  or  write.  The  law  provided,  however,  that  it  should 
appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  naturalizing  court 
that  the   applicant  was   "  attached  to  the  principles  of 

*Aliens  who  have  made  declarations  of  intention  prior  to  September 
27,  1906,  under  the  provisions  of  law  in  force  at  the  time  of  making  such 
declarations,  can  not  be  required,  as  a  preliminary  to  filing  their 
petitions  for  naturalization,  to  file  new  declarations  of  intention  under 
the  Act  of  June  29,  1906;  nor  are  such  aliens  required,  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  naturalization,  to  speak  the  English  language.  Id. 
5233—8 


114  NATURALIZATION 

the  Constitution  of  the  United  States;  "  and  required 
him  to  declare  on  oath  that  he  would  support  the 
Constitution. 

In  the  case  of  Re  Kanaka  Nian,  6  Utah,  259,  which 
arose  under  the  provisions  of  Section  2165  of  the  Revised 
Statutes,  it  was  held  that  one  who  could  not  read  or 
write  English  but  had  read  the  Constitution  in  a  foreign 
language,  and  knew  that  the  United  States  had  a  President 
but  could  not  mention  his  name,  did  not  understand  the 
principles  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
or  its  institutions  sufficiently  to  become  a  citizen.  See, 
also,  In  re  Bodek,  63  Fed.  813;  Rushworth  v.  Judges,  58 
N.  J.  L.  97;  In  re  Conway,  9  Misc.  652;  In  re  Lab's 
Petition,  3  Pa.  Dist.  R.  728;  5  Id.  597;  18  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  270. 

But  in  the  case  of  Re  Rodriguez,  81  Fed.  337,  it  was 
held  that  an  alien  who  was  ignorant  and  unable  to  read 
and  write  and  who  could  not  explain  the  principles  of 
the  Constitution  was  entitled  to  be  naturalized,  it  ap- 
pearing that  he  was  peaceable,  industrious,  of  a  good 
moral  character,  and  law  abiding.  See,  also,  Ex  parte 
Johnson,  79  Miss.  637. 

c.  Moral  Character. 
(A.)  In  General. 

The  law  (Act  of  June  29,  1906)  provides  that  "  it  shall 
be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  ad- 
mitting any  alien  to  citizenship  that  he  has  resided  con- 
tinuously within  the  United  States  five  years  at  least 
.  .  .  and  that,  during  that  time,  he  has  behaved  as 
a  man  of  good  moral  character,  attached  to  the  princi- 
ples of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  well 
disposed  to  the  good  order  and  happinesss  of  the  same." 
Sec.  4,  par,  4. 

Our  law  contemplates  the  naturalization  of  aliens  of 
good  moral  character  only.  As  was  well  stated  in  the  case 
of  In  re  Clark,  18  Barb.  444: 

"It  was  never  intended  by  those  who  enacted  the  act  for 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  115 

the  naturalization  of  aliens  that  persons  who  had  been 
transported  for  crime — that  those  who  came  over  here 
merely  because  Europe  was  too  full  for  them — but  who 
retained  their  loyalty  of  feeling  for  the  monarchies  they 
had  left,  should,  because  they  remained  here  for  the 
period  of  five  years,  be  entitled  to  admission  to  citizen- 
ship. The  intention  was  to  permit  those  who  came  here 
from  abroad  seeking  a  permanent  home,  who,  by  five 
years  of  continuous  residence,  manifested  that  intention, 
and  by  good  behavior  during  all  that  time  and  an  attach- 
ment to  republican  principles — a  good  behavior  and  an 
attachment  to  republican  principles,  which  could  be 
proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  court — had  shown  them- 
selves worthy  recipients  of  the  benefits  to  be  derived 
from  citizenship,  and  safe  depositories  of  the  powers  it 
confers,  to  be  admitted  to  these  rights  and  the  exercise 
of  these  powers,  by  an  order  entered  in  open  court  after 
an  examination  into  the  facts  of  each  case — and  a  judi- 
cial decision  upon  the  application — an  examination  which 
should  be  conducted  with  the  same  care,  and  a  decision 
which  should  be  made  with  the  same  deliberation  and 
solemnity  as  that  which  should  accompany  every  other 
judicial  act." 

(B.)  What  Acts  are  Immoral. 

As  to  what  acts  are  immoral  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law,  it  was  held  in  the  case  of  Re  Spenser,  5  Sawyer,  195, 
which  arose  when  Section  2165  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
was  in  force  containing  identically  the  same  language  on 
the  subject  as  the  existing  law,  that  an  alien  who  has 
been  guilty  of  murder,  robbery,  theft,  bribery,  or  perjury 
is  barred  from  admission  to  citizenship. 

An  alien  who  lives  in  a  state  of  polygamy  or  believes 
that  polygamy  may  be  rightfully  practiced  in  defiance 
to  the  laws  of  the  country  to  the  contrary  is  not  entitled 
to  citizenship.  Ex  parte  Douglass,  and  Ex  parte  Sand- 
burg, 5  West.  Jur.  171. 


116  NATURALIZATION 

It  has  also  been  held  that  habitual  gaming  or  selling 
of  liquors,  when  forbidden  by  statute,  would  be  a  bar  to 
admission.  Re  Spenser,  supra.  The  court  said  that: 

"Upon  general  principles  it  would  seem  that  whatever 
is  forbidden  by  the  law  of  the  land  ought  to  be  consid- 
ered for  the  time  being  immoral  within  the  purview  of 
this  statute.  And  it  may  be  said  with  good  reason  that 
a  person  who  violates  the  law  thereby  manifests,  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree,  that  he  is  not  'well  disposed  to  the 
good  order  and  happiness'  of  the  country.  Good  be- 
havior— that  behavior  for  which  a  person  reasonably 
suspected  of  an  intention  to  misbehave  may  be  required 
to  give  surety — is  defined  to  be  conduct  authorized  by 
law,  and  bad  behavior  such  as  the  law  punishes." 

In  this  case  the  applicant  had  been  convicted  of  per- 
jury before  making  his  application,  but  had  been  par- 
doned. It  was  contended  that  the  pardon  wiped  out  the 
offense  and  that  he  was  eligible  to  naturalization  just  as 
if  the  offense  had  never  been  committed.  But  the  court 
declared  that,  while  the  pardon  operated  to  purge  the 
offender  of  his  guilt  and  that  thenceforth  he  was  an  inno- 
cent man,  it  did  not  obliterate  the  past,  nor  the  fact 
that  he  had  committed  the  crime  wiped  out.  The  effect 
of  the  decision  was  that  an  alien  convicted  of  perjury 
while  residing  here  though  pardoned  is  not  "of  good 
moral  character,"  entitled  to  admission  to  citizenship; 
and  that  an  alien  who  has  behaved  as  a  man  of  good 
moral  character  during  the  five  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding his  application,  but  who  had  not  so  behaved  dur- 
ing his  residence  in  the  United  States  prior  thereto  is 
not  entitled  to  admission. 

(C.)  Anarchists;  Polygamists. 

Section  7  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  provides: 
"That  no  person  who  disbelieves  in  or  who  is  opposed 
to    organized  government,  or   who    is   a   member  of   or 
affiliated  with  any  organization  entertaining  and  teach- 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  117 

ing  such  disbelief  in  or  opposition  to  organized  govern- 
ment, or  who  advocates  or  teaches  the  duty,  necessity, 
or  propriety  of  the  unlawful  assaulting  or  killing  of  any 
officer  or  officers,  either  of  specific  individuals  or  of 
officers  generally,  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
or  of  any  other  organized  government,  because  of  his  or 
their  official  character,  or  who  is  a  polygamist,  shall  be 
naturalized  or  be  made  a  citizen  of  the  United  States." 

While  the  law  in  force  prior  to  the  date  of  the  passage 
of  the  Act  of  1906,  contains  no  express  provision  in  rela- 
tion to  anarchists,  in  Ex  parte  Sauer,  81  Fed.  355,  where 
the  applicant  declared  himself  to  be  a  socialist  and  a  be- 
liever in  the  doctrines  of  socialism,  the  court  decided 
that  he  was  not  entitled  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.     In  the  course  of  the  opinion  the  court  said: 

"Thereupon  I  stated  that,  in  the  judgment  of  the  court, 
the  principles  of  socialism  are  directly  at  war  with  and 
antagonistical  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  of  America  and  absolutely  inconsistent 
with  his  being  'well  disposed  to  the  good  order  and  hap- 
piness' of  the  people  and  government  of  this  country. 
I  then  asked  him  to  state  some  of  its  leading  principles. 
He  replied  that  they  contemplated  the  ownership  and 
operation  of  all  railroads  and  transportation  lines  of  the 
country  by  the  Government,  and  that,  as  land  was  as  free 
as  air  and  water,  socialists  demanded  the  forced  sale  of 
all  lands  owned  by  the  citizens  in  excess  of  that  which 
was  actually  necessary  to  make  a  living  upon  (estimated 
by  him  at  200  acres)  to  the  government  for  the  purpose 
of  giving  it  to  those  who  owned  none.  I  sought  to  point 
out  to  him  how  such  ideas  were  un-American,  impracti- 
cable, and  dangerous  in  the  extreme  to  society  as  or- 
ganized throughout  the  civilized  world,  and  particularly 
in  this  free  country.  I  furthermore  explained  to  him 
that  private  property  could  not,  under  the  Constitution, 
be  taken   by  the  government  for   private  use,  and  that 


118  NATURALIZATION 

this  was  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  government,  and 
one  of  the  most  sacred  and  jealously  guarded  rights  of 
the  citizen.  He  repelled  these  suggestions  with  deris- 
ion and  scorn,  maintaining  his  right  to  his  views.  I  in- 
formed him  that  while  it  was  true  that  he  or  any  nat- 
uralized citii^en  had  an  indisputable  right  to  such  senti- 
ments and  to  their  free  utterance,  as  well  as  to  any  other 
views  they  might  entertain  upon  government,  yet  when 
a  foreigner  openly  confesses  to  have  such  opinions,  and, 
declaring  his  intentions  to  promulgate  and  carry  them 
out,  seeks  to  be  admitted  to  American  citizenship,  it 
would  be  contrary  to  his  oath  of  naturalization  and  vio- 
lative of  the  spirit  and  principles  on  which  this  govern- 
ment is  founded  and  depends  for  its  welfare  to  admit  him 
to  citizenship. 

"For  these  reasons,  and  because  I  am  of  opinion  that 
the  time  is  upon  us  when  the  safety  and  perpetuity  of 
our  free  institutions  and  of  constitutional  government  in 
the  land,  as  well  as  the  good  order  and  happiness  of  the 
people,  demand  that  those  who  apply  for  the  privilege, 
honor,  and  distinction  of  becoming  American  citizens 
should  be  free  from  doctrines  which  are  not  only  sub- 
versive of  constitutional  government  and  our  free  insti- 
tutions, but  of  organized  society  itself,  have  I  deemed  it 
wise  and  meet  to  deny  the  application  of  Richard  V. 
Sauer,  while  he  harbors  such  views,  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  of  America." 

(D.)  Proof  of  Moral  Character. 

The  good  moral  character  of  the  applicant  is  to  be 
proved  (1)  by  the  oath  of  the  applicant;  (2)  by  the  tes- 
timony of  at  least  two  witnesses,  citizens  of  the  United 
States. 

Section  4,  paragraph  2,  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
providing  for  the  verification  of  the  applicant's  petition 
for  naturalization  by  the  affidavits  of  at  least  two  cred- 
ible witnesses,  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  shall 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  119 

state  in  their  affidavits  that  they  have  personally  known 
the  applicant  to  be  a  resident  of  the  United  States  for  a 
period  of  at  least  five  years,  and  of  the  state,  territory, 
or  district  for  a  period  of  at  least  one  year,  provides  also 
that  they  shall  state  in  their  affidavits  "that  they  each 
have  personal  knowledge  that  the  petitioner  is  a  person 
of  good  moral  character,  and  that  he  is  in  every  way 
qualified  in  their  opinion  to  be  admitted  as  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States." 

And  paragraph  4  of  the  same  section,  providing  that 
"it  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court  "  that  the  applicant  for  naturalization  has  behaved 
as  a  man  of  good  moral  character  during  his  residence  in 
the  United  States  and  the  state,  territory,  or  district  for 
the  period  prescribed  by  the  statute,  also  provides  that 
"in  addition  to  the  oath  of  the  applicant  the  testimony 
of  at  least  two  witnesses,  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
as  to  the  facts  of  .  .  .  moral  character  and  attach- 
ment to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  shall  be  re- 
quired; "  and  the  name,  place  of  residence,  and  occupa- 
tion of  each  witness  shall  be  set  forth  in  the  record. 

To  recapitulate:  The  applicant  is  required  to  verify 
his  petition  for  naturalization  by  the  affidavits  of  at  least 
two  witnesses,  stating  that  they  each  have  personal 
knowledge  that  he  is  a  person  of  good  moral  character; 
and  at  the  final  hearing  the  petitioner  is  examined  under 
oath,  and,  in  addition,  the  testimony  of  at  least  two  wit- 
nesses is  required  as  to  his  moral  character. 

The  law  (Sec.  9)  provides  that  upon  the  final  hearing 
"the  applicant  and  his  witnesses  shall  be  examined  under 
oath  before  the  court  and  in  the  presence  of  the  court." 

5.  Final  Hearing, 
a.  Time  of. 

Final  action  on  petitions  for  naturalization  shall  be 
had  only  on  stated  days,  to  be  fixed  by  rule  of  the  court. 
In  no  case  shall  final  action  be  had  upon  a  petition  until 


120  NATURALIZATION 

at  least  ninety  days  have  elapsed  after  filing  and  posting 
of  notice  of  such  petition.  Sec.  6,  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 
The  Act  further  provides  that  "no  person  shall  be 
naturalized,  nor  shall  any  certificate  of  naturalization  be 
issued  by  any  court  within  thirty  days  preceding  the 
holding  of  any  general  election  within  its  territorial  jur- 
isdiction. Id. 

b.  Place. 

Every  final  hearing  upon  petition  for  naturalization 
shall  be  had  in  open  court  before  a  judge  or  judges  thereof. 
Sec.  9. 

c.  Procedure. 

(A.)  Appearance  and  Examination  of   Applicant  and  Wit- 
nesses. 

Upon  the  day  fixed  for  final  hearing  the  applicant  and 
his  witnesses  shall  appear  before  the  court  and  be  ex- 
amined under  oath  in  the  presence  of  the  court.  Sec.  9. 
The  language  of  the  law  is  "  upon  such  final  hearing  of 
such  petition  the  applicant  and  witnesses  shall  be  ex- 
amined under  oath  before  the  court  and  in  the  presence 
of  the  court." 

In  case  the  witnesses  which  the  applicant  when  filing 
his  petition  for  naturalization  has  named  to  be  summoned 
in  his  behalf  at  the  final  hearing  can  not  be  produced 
upon  the  final  hearing,  other  witnesses  may  be  sum- 
moned. Sec.  5. 

(B.)  Appearance  of  United  States. 

The  United  States  shall  have  the  right  to  appear  be- 
fore any  court  exercising  jurisdiction  in  naturalization 
proceedings  for  the  purpose  of  cross-examining  the 
petitioner  and  the  witnesses  produced  in  support  of  his 
petition  concerning  any  matter  touching  or  affecting  his 
right   to   admission   to   citizenship,  and  shall  have    the 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  121 

right  to  call  witnesses,  produce  evidence,  and  be  heard 
in  opposition  to  the  granting  of  any  petition  in 
naturalization  proceedings.  Sec.  11. 

(C.)   Proof  of  Residence  and   Behavior   as   Man   of  Good 
Moral  Character. 

The  law  provides  that  certain  facts  "shall  be  made  to 
appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court,"  viz:  (1)  That, 
immediately  preceding  the  date  of  his  application,  the 
alien  has  resided  continuously  within  the  United  States 
five  years  at  least,  and  within  the  state  or  territory 
where  the  court  is  held  one  year.  (2)  That  he  has  be- 
haved as  a  man  of  good  moral  character,  attached  to  the 
principles  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  well 
disposed  to  the  good  order  and  happiness  of  the  same. 

These  matters  are  to  be  proved  (1)  by  the  oath  of  the 
applicant,  (2)  by  the  testimony  of  at  least  two  witnesses, 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  Sec.  4,  par.  4. 

(D.)  Renunciation  of  Foreign  Allegiance, 
(i.)  In  General. 

The  applicant  is  also  required,  before  he  is  admitted 
to  citizenship,  to  "declare  on  oath  in  open  court  that  he 
.  .  .  absolutely  and  entirely  renounces  and  abjures 
all  allegiance  and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  poten- 
tate, state,  or  sovereignty,  and  particularly  by  name  to  the 
prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty  of  which  he  was 
before  a  citizen  or  subject."    Sec.  4,  par.  3. 

To  preclude  errors  in  the  name  or  title  of  the  sovereign 
or  state  whose  allegiance  is  renounced,  the  Bureau  of 
Naturalization  furnishes  clerks  of  courts  with  a  list  of 
foreign  countries  and  their  rulers.     See  Appendix. 

In  Ex  parte  Smith,  8  Blackf.  395,  where,  in  the  oath  of 


122  NATURALIZATION 

renunciation,  the  sovereign  was  not  specified  by  name, 
the  omission  was  held  not  to  be  fatal. 

(ii.)  Filipinos  and  Porto  Ricans. 

Under  the  judicial  interpretation  of  the  law  in  force 
prior  to  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906  (Gonzales  v.  Williams, 
192  U.  S.  1),  citizens  of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto 
Rico  were  debarred  from  citizenship  of  the  United  States, 
as  they  were  not  aliens,  and  the  naturalization  laws  of 
the  United  States  only  applied  to  aliens.  To  remedy 
this  situation  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906  (Sec.  30),  pro- 
vides: 

"That  all  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  naturalization 
laws  of  the  United  States  shall  apply  to  and  be  held  to 
authorize  the  admission  to  citizenship  of  all  persons  not 
citizens  who  owe  permanent  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  and  who  may  become  residents  of  any  state  or 
organized  territory  of  the  United  States,  with  the  fol- 
lowing modifications:  The  applicant  shall  not  be  re- 
quired to  renounce  allegiance  to  any  foreign  sovereignty; 
he  shall  make  his  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  at  least  two  years  prior  to 
his  admission;  and  residence  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  United  States,  owing  such  permanent  allegiance, 
shall  be  regarded  as  residence  within  the  United  States 
within  the  meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence  clause  of 
the  existing  law." 

As  citizens  of  the  Philippines  and  Porto  Rico  owe  al- 
legiance to  the  United  States,  they  are  not  required  to 
renounce  former  allegiance. 

(E.)  Renunciation  of  Title  or  Order  of  Nobility. 

In  case  the  alien  has  borne  any  hereditary  title,  or  has 
been  of  any  of  the  orders  of  nobility  in  the  kingdom  or 
state  from  which  he  came,  he  is  required  to  make  an  ex- 
press renunciation  of  his  title  or  order  of  nobility  in  the 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  123 

court  to  which  his  application  is  made,  and  his  renunci- 
ation shall  be  recorded  in  the  court.  Sec.  4,  par.  5. 

(F.)  Oath  of  Allegiance  to  the  United  States. 

Before  the  applicant  is  admitted  to  citizenship  "he 
shall  declare  on  oath  in  open  court  that  he  will  support 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  .  .  .  and  that 
he  will  support  and  defend  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  United  States  against  all  enemies,  foreign,  and 
domestic,  and  bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  same." 
Sec.  4,  par.  3. 

The  applicant  for  admission  to  citizenship  must  be 
acquainted  with  the  provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion and  in  sympathy  with  its  principles,  otherwise  he 
can  not  intelligently  and  truthfully  declare  that  he  will 
support  it.  Evans'  American  Citizenship,  27. 

Where  it  appears,  upon  examination,  that  an  applicant 
for  naturalization  is  without  such  knowledge  of  the  Con- 
stitution as  is  essential  to  the  rational  assumption  of  an 
undertaking  avouched  by  oath  to  support  it,  his  oath  to 
support  the  Constitution  should  not  be  accepted,  nor 
should  the  court  admit  an  alien  to  citizenship  without 
being  satisfied  that  he  has  at  least  some  general  com- 
prehension of  what  the  Constitution  is,  and  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  it  affirms.  Re  Bodek,  63  Fed.  813. 

One  who  can  not  read  or  write  English,  but  has  read 
the  Constitution  in  a  foreign  language,  and  knows  that 
the  United  States  has  a  President,  but  can  not  mention 
his  name,  does  not  understand  the  principles  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  or  its  institutions  suf- 
ficiently to  become  a  citizen.  Re  Kanaka  Nian,  6  Utah, 
259,  4  L.  R.  A.  726,  21  Pac.  993. 

But  in  the  case  of  Re  Rodriguez,  81  Fed.  337,  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  held  that  an  alien  who  was 
ignorant  and  unable  to  read  and  write,  and  who  could 


124  NATURALIZATION 

not  explain  the  principles  of  the  Constitution,  was  enti- 
tled to  be  naturalized,  where  it  was  shown  that  he  was 
peaceable,  industrious,  of  a  good  moral  character,  and 
law-abiding. 

(G.)  Change  of  Name. 

At  the  time  and  as  a  part  of  the  naturalization  of  any 
alien  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  court  in  its  discretion 
upon  the  petition  of  such  alien  to  make  a  decree  chang- 
ing his  name,  and  his  certificate  of  naturalization  shall 
be  issued  to  him  in  accordance  therewith.     Sec.  6.* 

Prior  to  the  passage  of  the  law  of  1906,  it  was  held 
in  In  re  Nigri,  32  Misc.  392,  66  N.  Y.  S.  182,  that  a  person 
who  obtains  a  legal  change  of  name  was  not  entitled  to 
have  his  certificate  or  record  of  naturalization  changed 
accordingly. 

Where  the  name  is  misstated  in  the  certificate  the  true 
name  may  be  proved  by  parol.  Behrensmeyer  v.  Kreitz, 
135  111.  591. 

Every  final  order  which  may  be  made  upon  the  peti- 
tion for  naturalization  shall  be  under  the  hand  of  the 
court  and  entered  in  full  upon  a  record  kept  for  that 
purpose. 

6.  Certificate. 

(a.)  In  General. 

Prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  Law  of  June  29,  1906,  no 
form  of  naturalization  certificate  was  prescribed  by  law 
and  there  was  great  variety  in  the  certificates  issued. 
Some  were  long  with  a  full  recital.  Others  were  short, 
with  a  bare  statement  that  the  holder  was   admitted  to 

*  In  every  case  in  which  the  name  of  a  naturalized  alien  is  changed  by 
order  of  court,  as  provided  in  Section  6,  the  clerks  of  courts  are  required 
to  report  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization,  when  trans- 
mitting to  it  the  duplicate  of  the  certificate  of  naturalization  of  the  alien 
whose  name  is  changed,  both  the  original  and  the  new  name  of  the  said 
person.     Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  125 

citizenship  on  a  certain  day.  The  certificates  contained 
no  description  of  the  person  naturalized,  and  were,  in 
consequence,  readily  transferable.  They  were  printed 
from  type  on  ordinary  paper,  and  it  was  easy  to  manu- 
facture spurious  certificates. 

(b.)  Certificates  Under  the  Act  of  March  3,  1903. 

The  Act  of  March  3,  1903,  32  Stat,  at  L.  1222,  in  its 
39th  section,  known  as  the  "anarchist  clause,"  provided 
that  in  order  to  render  a  naturalization  certificate  valid 
the  naturalizing  court  should  cause  to  be  entered  of 
record  the  affidavit  of  the  applicant  and  his  witnesses,  so 
far  as  applicable,  reciting  and  affirming  a  compliance  with 
the  terms  of  that  act  and  previous  acts  relating  to 
naturalization,  and  that  each  final  order  and  certificate 
thereafter  made  should  show  on  the  face  thereof  that 
the  aflBdavits  required  of  the  applicant  and  his  witnesses 
were  duly  made  and  recorded. 

Many  courts,  through  ignorance  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Act,  or  for  other  reason,  issued  invalid  certificates  of 
naturalization.  Thousands  of  such  invalid  certificates 
were  issued — and  many  were  issued  to  persons  entitled 
to  receive  valid  certificates.  To  remedy  this  injustice, 
on  the  same  day  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  establish- 
ing a  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization,  and  pro- 
viding for  a  uniform  rule  for  the  naturalization  of  aliens, 
was  passed,  which  repealed  Section  39  of  the  Act  of 
March  3,  1903,  the  following  law  was  passed: 

"Naturalization  certificates  issued  after  the  Act  ap- 
proved March  third,  nineteen  hundred  and  three, entitled 
'An  Act  to  regulate  the  immigration  of  aliens  into  the 
United  States,'  went  into  effect,  which  fail  to  show  that 
the  courts  issuing  said  certificates  complied  with  the  re- 
quirements of  section  thirty-nine  of  said  Act,  but  which 
were  otherwise  lawfully  issued,  are  hereby  declared  to  be 


126  NATURALIZATION 

as  valid  as  though  said  certificates  complied  with  said  sec- 
tion: Provided,  That  in  all  such  cases  applications  shall 
be  made  for  new  naturalization  certificates,  and  when  the 
same  are  granted,  upon  compliance  with  the  provisions  of 
said  Act  of  nineteen  hundred  and  three,  they  shall  relate 
back  to  the  defective  certificates,  and  citizenship  shall 
be  deemed  to  have  been  perfected  at  the  date  of  the  de- 
fective certificate. 

"Section  2.  That  all  the  records  relating  to  naturaliza- 
tion, all  declarations  of  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  all  certificates  of  naturalization  filed, 
recorded,  or  issued  prior  to  the  time  when  this  Act  takes 
effect  in  or  from  the  criminal  court  of  Cook  County, 
Illinois,  shall  for  all  purposes  be  deemed  to  be  and  to  have 
been  made,  filed,  recorded,  or  issued  by  a  court  with 
jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  but  shall  not  be  by  this 
Act  further  validated  or  legalized."  Act  of  June  29, 1906. 

(c.)  Under  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

The  Act  of  1906,  makes  it  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  to  cause  to  be  engraved  on  dis- 
tinctive paper  blank  certificates  of  citizenship  (Sec.  17), 
to  be  furnished  clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  in 
naturalization  matters.  Sec.  12,  par.  3.  All  blank  cer- 
tificates are  consecutively  numbered,  and  clerks  are  re- 
quired to  account  for  them  to  the  Bureau  of  Naturali- 
zation. 

(d.)  Form. 

The  Act  prescribes  the  form  of  certificates  as  follows: 

CERTIFICATE    OF    NATURALIZATION. 

Number 

Petition,  volume ,  page 

Stub,  volume ,  page 

(Signature  of  holder) 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  127 

Description  of  holder:  Age ;  height ;  color 

;  complexion ;  color  of  eyes ;  color  of 

hair ;  visible  distinguishing  marks Name, 

age,  and  place  of  residence  of  wife ,  , 

Names,  ages,  and  places  of    residence  of  minor  children 


,  ss : 

Be  it  remembered,  that  at  a term  of  the 

court  of ,  held  at on  the day  of , 

in  the  year  of   our  Lord   nineteen  hundred   and  , 

,  who    previous  to    his    (her)    naturalization   was 

a   citizen    or   subject  of ,  at   present  residing   at 

number street city  (town) state 

(territory  or  district),  having  applied  to  be  admitted  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America  pursuant  to  law, 
and  the  court  having  found  that  the  petitioner  had  re- 
sided continuously  within  the  United  States 'for  at  least 
five  years  and  in  this  State  for  one  year  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  date  of  the  hearing  of  his  (her)  petition,  and 
that  said  petitioner  intends  to  reside  permanently  in  the 
United  States,  had  in  all  respects  complied  with  the  law 
in  relation  thereto,  and  that  ...he  was  entitled  to  be  so 
admitted,  it  was  thereupon  ordered  by  the  said  court 
that  ...he  be  admitted  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

In  testimony  whereof  the  seal  of  said  court  is  here- 
unto affixed  on  the... day  of ,  in  the  year  of  our 

Lord  nineteen  hundred  and ,  and  of  our  independ- 
ence the 

[L.  S.]  , 

(Official  character  of  attestor.) 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  certificate  includes  a  per- 
sonal description  of  the  holder,  and  he  is  required  to 
sign  his  name  on  the  face  of  the  certificate.  This  pre- 
cludes false  personation. 


128  NATURALIZATION 

The  prescribed  form  is  brief  and  simple,  as  well  as  com- 
prehensive. It  attests  that  the  person  therein  named 
and  described,  having  made  application  pursuant  to  law, 
and  the  court  having  found  that  he  had  complied  in  all 
respects  with  the  law  in  relation  to  naturalization  and 
was  entitled  to  be  naturalized,  it  was  ordered  by  the 
court  that  he  be  admitted  as  a  citizen. 

The  seal  of  the  court  is  affixed  to  the  certificate. 

Each  certificate  of  naturalization  shall  bear  upon  its 
face  in  a  place  prepared  therefor  the  volume  number  and 
page  number  of  the  petition  whereon  such  certificate  was 
issued,  and  the  volume  number  and  the  stub  number 
of  such  certificate.     Sec.  14. 

(e.)  Duplicate  of  Certificate. 

It  is  made  the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  every  court  exer- 
cising jurisdiction  in  naturalization  matters  under  the 
Act  of  1906  to  send  to  the  Bureau  of  Naturalization  at 
Washington  within  thirty  days  after  the  issuance  of  a 
certificate  of  citizenship  a  duplicate  of  such  certificate. 
Sec.  12. 

(f.)   Stub. 

The  Act  also  requires  the  clerk  to  make  and  keep  on 
file  in  his  office  a  stub  for  each  certificate  issued  by  him 
whereon  shall  be  entered  a  memorandum  of  all  the  essen- 
tial facts  set  forth  in  such  certificate.  Sec.  12. 

The  prescribed  form  of  the  stub  of  certificate  is  as 
follows: 

STUB   OF   CERTIFICATE   OF    NATURALIZATION. 

No.  of  certificate, 

Name, ;  age, 

Declaration  of  intention,  volume ,  page  

Petition,  volume ,  page 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  129 

Name,  age,  and    place    of    residence    of    wife, ^ 

, Names,  ages,  and  places  of  residence  of 

minor  children,  ,  , ;  , ^ 


Date  of  order,  volume  ,  page, 

(Signature  of  holder) .... 


(g.)  Blank  Certificates. 

Section  12  of  the  Act  provides  that: 

"Clerks  of  courts  having  and  exercising  jurisdiction  in 
naturalization  matters  shall  be  responsible  for  all  blank 
certificates  of  citizenship  received  by  them  from  time  to 
time  from  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization 
and  shall  account  for  the  same  to  the  said  Bureau  when- 
ever required  so  to  do  by  such  Bureau.  No  certificate  of 
citizenship  received  by  any  such  clerk  which  may  be  de- 
faced or  injured  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  its  use  as 
herein  provided  shall  in  any  case  be  destroyed,  but  such 
certificate  shall  be  returned  to  the  said  Bureau;  and  in 
case  any  such  clerk  shall  fail  to  return  or  properly  ac- 
count for  any  certificate  furnished  by  the  said  Bureau, 
as  herein  provided,  he  shall  be  liable  to  the  United 
States  in  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars,  to  be  recovered  in  an 
action  of  debt,  for  each  and  every  certificate  not  prop- 
erly accounted  for  or  returned." 

(h.)  Proof  of  Naturalization. 

(i.)  The  Record. 

The  judicial  record,  or  a  certified  copy  thereof,  is  the 
usual  evidence  of  naturalization.  Naturalization  can  be 
proved  by  parol  only  when  the  record  has  been  lost  or 
destroyed.  Green  v.  Salas,  31  Fed.  106.  In  this  case  the 
court  said  that  it  found  nowhere  a  departure  from  the 

5233—9 


130  NATURALIZATION 

rule  that  "the  record  must  be  produced  or  accounted 
for." 

This  rule  applies  to  a  woman  who  alleges  citizenship 
through  the  naturalization  of  her  husband.  Belcher  v. 
JFarren,  26  Pac.  791. 

The  mere  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  the  court,  stating 
that  the  applicant  had  been  naturalized,  is  not  compe- 
tent proof.  Green  v.  Salas,  supra. 

A  passport  issued  by  the  Department  of  State  is  not 
competent  judicial  proof  of  citizenship.  In  re  Gee  Hop, 
71  Fed.  274. 

Where  the  name  of  a  person  is  misstated  in  a  certifi- 
cate of  naturalization,  the  true  name  may  be  proved  by 
parol.    Behrensmeyer  v.  Kreitz,  135  111.  591. 

It  was  held  in  In  re  McCoppin,  5  Sawyer,  630,  that  an 
inaccurate  statement  of  facts  in  the  recital  of  a  judgment 
of  naturalization  did  not  impair  the  judgment  where  it 
appeared  that  the  conditions  of  law  had  been  fulfilled. 
See,  also,  In  re  Coleman,  15  Blatch.  406. 

In  Boyd  v.  Thayer,  143  U.  S.  135,  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  held  that  "where  no  record  of  naturaliza- 
tion can  be  produced,  evidence  that  a  person  having  the 
requisite  qualifications  to  become  a  citizen  did  in  fact 
and  for  a  long  time  vote  and  hold  office  and  exercise 
rights  belonging  to  citizens,  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a 
jury  in  inferring  that  he  had  been  duly  naturalized  as  a 
citizen." 

In  the  absence  of  a  record,  a  jury  may  be  allowed  to 
infer  that  a  person  having  the  requisite  qualifications  to 
become  a  citizen  had  been  fully  naturalized.  Contzen 
V.  United  States,  179  U.  S.  191. 

Evidence  that  a  man  had  lived  in  the  United  States 
for  forty  years,  that  he  had  voted  for  twenty-five  years, 
and  that  a  person  of  his  name  had  been  naturalized,  is 
sufficient  to  show  that  he  was  a  naturalized  citizen. 
Ryan  vs.  Egan,  156  111.,  224. 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  131 

Where  it  appeared  that  an  alien  was  residing  in  South 
Carolina  on  July  4,  1776;  that  he  fought  as  a  Whig  officer 
during  the  Revolution;  that  he  acquired  and  sold  real 
estate;  that  he  was  always  reputed  as  a  citizen,  and  that 
his  children  born  in  France  while  he  and  his  wife  were 
there  had  always  claimed  to  be  American  citizens,  it  was 
held  that  he  and  his  children  were  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  Sasportas  v.  De  La  Motta,  10  Rich.  Eq.  38; 
People  V.  McNally,  59  How.  Pr.  500. 

Where  an  alien  came  to  the  United  States  in  1865  and 
lived  here  until  his  death  in  1899,  having  participated  in 
state  and  national  elections,  and  held  at  his  death  a 
liquor  tax  certificate  which  could  be  issued  lawfully  only 
to  a  citizen,  it  was  held  that  this  was  sufficient  to  show 
that  he  had  been  in  fact  naturalized  and  was  a  citizen  at 
his  death.  Fay  v.  Taylor,  63  N.  Y.  S.  572,  31  Misc.  Rep. 
32. 

Where  it  is  alleged  that  a  record  of  naturalization  has 
been  lost  or  destroyed,  the  Department  of  State  leaves 
it  to  the  courts  to  hear  the  evidence  of  such  loss  and 
remedy  it.  Secretary  Bayard,  Feb.  2,  1887,  3  Moore's 
Int.  Law  Digest,  498. 

The  proper  course  for  a  person  seeking  to  establish 
his  naturalization  by  other  than  ordinary  proofs  is  to 
resort  to  the  judicial  branch  of  the  government,  which  is 
charged  with  the  duty  of  naturalizing  aliens,  and  which 
is  invested  with  appropriate  powers  for  investigating 
and  determining  matters  of  fact  which  are  essential  to 
the  decision  of  the  question  of  acquired  citizenship. 
Secretary  Blaine,  May  9,  1889,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest, 
498. 

Record  evidence  of  naturalization  of  the  fathers  (of  the 
applicants  for  protection)  is,  of  course,  the  best  evidence 
but  it  is  not  the  only  evidence.  If  it  can  be  proved  "  by 
the  testimony  of  witnesses  who  know  the  fact  that  their 
fathers  were    naturalized,  such  evidence   will  be  received 


132  NATURALIZATION 

and  considered."  Secretary  Olney,  April  14, 1896;  3  Moore's 
Int.  Law  Digest,  499. 

The  record  may  be  amended  nunc  pro  tunc.  In  re 
Christern,  11  Jones  &  S.  523. 

It  has  been  held  that  the  record  of  the  declaration  of 
intention  may  be  amended  to  include  omissions  even 
after  a  proceeding  to  impeach  the  record  has  been 
begun.  State  v.  McDonald,  24  Minn.  48. 

The  record  can  not  be  amended,  however,  where  it 
does  not  show  that  the  necessary  proceedings  were  taken 
under  the  naturalization  law.  Matter  of  Desty,  8  Abb. 
(N.  Y.),  N.  Cas.  250;  Green  v.  Salas,  31  Fed.  106. 

In  Gagnon  v.  United  States,  193  U.  S.  451,  where  a 
judgment  of  naturalization  was  entered  by  way  of 
amendment  of  the  record  7iunc  pro  tunc  thirty-three 
years  after  judgment  was  alleged  to  have  been  rendered, 
there  being  no  entry  or  memorandum  of  any  kind  of  the 
alleged  original  decree,  it  was  held  that  the  order  was 
invalid,  the  power  to  amend  not  involving  the  power  to 
create. 

(ii.)  Where  Records  Have  Been  Lost  or  Destroyed. 

Where  a  record  has  been  lost  or  destroyed,  or  where  it 
can  not  be  produced  owing  to  lapse  of  time  or  death  of 
the  person  naturalized,  secondary  evidence  is  admissible 
to  prove  naturalization.  Strickley  v.  Hill,  22  Utah,  257; 
People  V.  McNally,  59  How.  Pr.  500;  Hogan  v.  Kurtz,  94 
U.  S.  773;  Kreitz  v.  Behrensmeyer,  125  111.  141. 

Applications  for  the  issuance  of  declarations  of  inten- 
tion, or  certificates  of  naturalization,  in  lieu  of  declarations 
of  intention  or  certificates  of  naturalization  claimed  to 
have  been  lost  or  destroyed,  shall  be  made  under  oath  to 
the  clerk  of  the  court  by  which  any  such  declarations  of 
intention  or  certificates  of  naturalization  were  originally 
issued,  and  shall  contain  full  information  in  regard  to 
the  lost  or  destroyed  papers,  and  as  to    the    time,  place, 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  133 

and  circumstances  of  such  alleged  loss  or  destruction. 
The  clerk  shall  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  the  above-mentioned  applications, 
together  with  such  information  as  he  may  have  bearing 
upon  the  merits  thereof,  for  investigation,  and  no  such 
paper  so  applied  for  shall  be  issued  until  the  Bureau  of 
Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturaliza- 
tion) reports  the  results  of  its  investigation  as  to  the 
merits  of  the  application.  Nat.  Reg.  of  Oct.  2,  1906. 

In  every  case  in  which  the  clerk  of  a  court  issues,  in 
accordance  with  the  preceding  rule,  a  declaration  of  in- 
tention (Form  2203)  or  a  certificate  of  naturalization 
(Form  2207),  upon  proof  of  the  loss  or  destruction  of 
the  original,  he  shall  make  an  entry  on  the  original 
declaration,  or  on  the  stub  of  the  original  certificate  of 
naturalization,  as  the  case  may  require,  showing  the  issu- 
ance of  a  new  paper  and  the  number  thereof,  and  shall 
immediately  thereafter  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immi- 
gration and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturalization) 
the  duplicate  of  any  such  paper  so  issued.  Nat.  Reg.  of 
Oct.  2,  1906. 

(iii.)  Certificate  of  Naturalization. 

Some  courts  have  held  that  a  certificate  of  naturaliza- 
tion is  legal  evidence  of  the  naturalization  of  a  person. 
Vaux  V.  Nesbit,  1  McCord  Ch.  352;  People  v.  Pease,  30 
Barb.  588;  Brown  v.  Shilling,  9  Md.  74. 

Other  courts  have  held  that  the  certificate  in  particu- 
lar cases  was  insufficient  evidence  of  naturalization.  See 
Miller  v.  Reinhart,  18  Ga.  239,  and  cases  cited. 

In  Green  v.  Salas,  31  Fed.  106,  it  was  held  that  a  mere 
certificate  of  the  clerk  of  the  court,  stating  that  the  ap- 
plicant had  been  naturalized,  is  not  competent  proof, 
and  can  not  be  aided  by  parol  evidence. 

Certified  copies  of  all  papers,  documents,  certificates, 
and  records  required  to  be  used,  filed,  recorded,  or  kept 


134  NATURALIZATION 

under  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906, 
shall  be  admitted  in  evidence  equally  with  the  originals 
in  any  proceedings  under  the  Act  and  in  all  cases  in 
which  the  originals  thereof  might  be  admissible  as  evi- 
dence. Sec.  28. 

The  statements  of  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  of 
the  United  States,  duly  certified,  required  by  Section  15, 
paragraph  2,  of  the  Act,  to  be  furnished  from  time  to  time 
to  the  Department  of  Justice,  through  the  Department  of 
State,  in  relation  to  aliens  who  shall  have  secured  cer- 
tificates of  citizenship  under  the  provisions  of  that  Act, 
and  who  shall  within  five  years  after  the  issuance  of  such 
certificates,  return  to  the  country  of  their  nativity,  and 
take  permanent  residence  therein,  shall  be  admissible  in 
evidence  in  all  courts  in  proceedings  to  cancel  certifi- 
cates of  citizenship. 

i.  Naturalization  Not  Retroactive. 

The  decree  of  naturalization  does  not  operate  retro- 
actively. Ex  parte  Kyle,  67  Fed.  306;  Dryden  v.  Swin- 
burne, 20  W.  Va.  89;  State  v.  Boyd,  48  N.  W.  739.  See 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  423  et  seq. 

I.  Impeachment  of  Naturalization. 
1.  Before  Municipal  Courts. 

A  decree  of  naturalization  can  not  be  impeached  col- 
laterally. Spratt  V.  Spratt,  4  Pet.  392;  Campbell  v. 
Gordon,  6  Cranch,  175. 

A  judgment  of  naturalization  rendered  by  a  compe- 
tent court  is  conclusive  as  between  the  person  natural- 
ized and  private  individuals.* 

*A  private  individual  has  no  standing  in  court  to  institute  a  proceed- 
ing to  set  aside  an  order  admitting  an  alien  to  citizenship.  Re  McCarran, 
8  Misc.  482,  23  L.  R.  A.  835;  United  States  v.  Norsch,  42  Fed.  417; 
United  States  v.  Gleason,  73  Fed.  396;  Pintsch  Compressing  Company  v. 
Bergin,  84  Fed.  140.     In  the  latter  case  the  court  said:  "The  record  thus 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  135 

a.  Under  Act  of  1906. 

It  is  not  conclusive  upon  the  United  States,  however. 
The  existing  law  (Act  of  June  29,  1906)  specifically  pro- 
vides for  the  appearance  of  the  United  States  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  admission  of  an  applicant  to  naturalization 
(Sec.  11)  and  for  the  institution  of  proceedings  by  the 
United  States  district  attorney  for  setting  aside  or  can- 
celing the  certificate  of  citizenship  on  the  ground  of  fraud 
or  that  it  was  illegally  procured.     Sec.  15. 

Reports  of  Fraudulent  Naturalization. 
The  second  paragraph  of  Section    15  of   the   Act  pro- 
vides for  the  cooperation  of  American   diplomatic  and 

ordered  on  the  application  of  the  respondent  evidenced  a  solemn  judicial 
judgment  that  she  was  entitled  to  receive  and  did  thereby  receive  from 
the  United  States  the  franchise  of  citizenship.  Is  anyone  entitled  to  pro- 
ceed for  its  rescission  unless  the  United  States  themselves,  or  by  their 
authorization  ?  No  precedent,  no  text  writer,  and  no  rule  of  law  is  cited 
which  justifies  us  in  answering  this  question  aflSrmatively.  The  funda- 
mental principle  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  of  authorization,  only 
the  United  States  can  proceed  judicially  to  recall  or  rescind  franchises 
granted  by  them,  has  peculiar  force  with  reference  to  citizenship,  as  to 
which  so  great  a  variety  of  interests,  political  and  individual  of  high  im- 
portance is  concerned,  that  the  jurisdiction  of  inquiry  should  be  espe- 
cially fixed  and  limited." 

In  Scott  V.  Strobach,  49  Ala.  477,  it  was  held  that  a  certificate  of  natu- 
ralization valid  on  its  face  could  not  be  impeached  collaterally  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  and  false  recitals;  and  it  has  been  held  that  naturaliza- 
tion proceedings  can  not  be  impeached  for  a  false  oath  which  is  extra- 
judicial.    United  States  v.  Grottkau,  30  Fed.  672. 

Naturalization  has  been  impeached  where  defects  in  the  naturalization 
proceedings  were  shown  on  the  face  of  the  record  (Banks  v.  Walker),  3 
Barb.  Ch.  438);  and  for  improper  vouching  (Commonwealth  v.  Paper,  1 
Brewster,  263). 

In  re  Yamashita  (Wash.),  59  L.  R.  A.  671,  however,  where  a  Japanese 
was  denied  admission  as  an  attorney  at  law  (although  he  had  a  certificate 
of  naturalization)  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  the  court  held  that  the  judgment  admitting  him  to  citizenship 
could  be  collaterally  attacked  because  it  showed  on  its  face  that  Yama- 
shita was  of  the  Japanese  race  and  not  entitled  to  citizenship. 

Certificates  of  naturalization  granted  to  Chinese  against  the  prohibi- 
tion of  the  Act  of  1882  have  been  treated  as  void.  In  re  Gee  Hop,  71 
Fed.  274;  In  re  Hong  Yen  Chang,  84  Cal.  163;  21  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  581. 


136  NATURALIZATION 

consular  officers  in  the  detection  and  prosecution  of 
naturalization  frauds.  The  provisions  of  this  paragraph 
have  been  called  to  their  attention  by  a  circular  instruc- 
tion from  the  Department  of  State,  dated  April  19,  1907, 
which  reads  as  follows: 

''To  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers  of  the  United 
States. 

"Gentlemen:  Under  the  provisions  of  the  executive 
order  of  April  6,  1907,  the  following  paragraph  is  added 
to  the  diplomatic  instructions  and  consular  regulations 
after  paragraph  170: 

"'Reports  of  Fraudulent  Naturalization. — When  any 
alien  who  has  secured  naturalization  of  the  United 
States  shall  proceed  abroad  within  five  years  after  his 
naturalization  and  shall  take  up  his  permanent  residence 
in  any  foreign  country  within  five  years  after  the  date 
of  his  naturalization,  it  shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  evi- 
dence that  he  did  not  intend  in  good  faith  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  when  he  applied  for  natural- 
ization, and  in  the  absence  of  countervailing  evidence 
it  shall  be  sufficient  in  the  proper  proceedings  to  author- 
ize the  cancellation  of  his  certificate  of  citizenship  as 
fraudulent.  Diplomatic  and  consular  officers  shall  fur- 
nish the  Department  of  State,  to  be  transmitted  to  the 
Department  of  Justice,  the  names  of  those  within  their 
jurisdictions,  respectivel3%  who  are  subject  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  requirement,  and  such  statements  from 
diplomatic  and  consular  officers  shall  be  certified  to  by 
such  officers  under  their  official  seals,  and  are  under  the 
law  admissible  in  evidence  in  all  courts  to  cancel  certifi- 
cates of  naturalization.'  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  Sec.  15. 

"The  text  of  the  law  upon  which  this  paragraph  is  based 
is  appended  to  this  instruction.* 

"You    are    instructed,  accordingly,    that  whenever   a 

*  For  the  text  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  see  Appendix,  Laws  of  the 
United  States,  relating  to  Naturalization  and  Expatriation. 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  137 

naturalized  citizen  goes  abroad  and  takes  up  a  perma- 
nent residence  in  a  foreign  country  within  five  years 
after  his  naturalization,  it  may  be  assumed  that  his 
naturalization  was  not  obtained  in  good  faith,  and  upon 
certification  by  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  of  the 
fact  of  the  foreign  residence  proceedings  may  be  taken 
through  the  Department  of  Justice  to  set  aside  the 
naturalization  on  the  ground  that  it  was  obtained  in  con- 
travention of  the  naturalization  laws. 

"Diplomatic  and  consular  officers  making  such  certifi- 
cation, must,  therefore,  state: 

"  First,  that  the  person  is  a  permanent  resident  in  a 
foreign  country;  and 

"Second,  that  the  permanent  residence  was  taken  up 
within  five  years  after  naturalization  was  conferred,  and 
must  certify  not  only  to  the  facts  but  to  their  means  of 
knowledge. 

"  No  specified  form  of  certification  is  prescribed,  as  the 
circumstances  surrounding  each  case  vary  materially.  It 
is  not  necessary  that  the  residence  shall  have  been 
acquired  during  the  incumbency  of  the  certifying  officer, 
but  he  may,  if  he  is  in  possession  of  sufficient  evidence, 
certify  to  a  residence  which  was  acquired  prior  to  his 
having  had  opportunity  to  have  personal  knowledge  on 
the  subject. 

"Certifications  under  this  instruction  should  be  sent 
forthwith  to  this  Department,  together  with  the  certifi- 
cate of  naturalization  of  the  person  in  interest;  and, 
pending  instructions  from  the  Department,  such  person's 
citizenship  shall  be  considered  as  awaiting  adjudication, 
and  he  may  be  refused  a  passport  or  registration  as  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States.  In  the  event  of  actual  in- 
terposition being  required  in  his  behalf  with  the  authori- 
ties of  a  foreign  country,  the  facts  should,  if  possible, 
be  telegraphed  to  the  Department  and  its  instructions 
awaited,  and  the  foreign  authorities  should  be  requested 


138  NATURALIZATION 

to  suspend  any  proceedings  against  the  person  in  interest 
until  instructions  from  this  Government  shall  have  been 
received. 

"When  a  certification  under  this  instruction  is  made  by 

a  consul  he  should,  at  the  same  time  that  he  sends  the 

certification   to  this  Department,  notify  the  embassy  or 

legation  in  the  country  in  which  his  consulate  is  situated. 

"I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root." 
Affidavit. 

Before  any  United  States  attorney  is  authorized  to  in- 
stitute proceedings  for  the  cancellation  of  a  naturaliza- 
tion certificate,  he  must  be  furnished  with  a  proper 
affidavit  on  which  the  proceedings  may  be  based.  The 
Attorney  General  to  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  La- 
bor, March  26,  1907.  This  has  been  held  to  be  necessary 
in  view  of  the  text  of  paragraph  one,  Section  15  of  the 
law,  which  provides  for  the  institution  of  such  proceed- 
ings "upon  affidavit  showing  good  cause  therefor."  It  is 
held  to  apply  with  equal  force  in  cases  where  the  infor- 
mation is  furnished  by  diplomatic  or  consular  officers. 
In  such  cases  the  officer  of  the  Department  of  State  whose 
duty  it  is  to  examine  and  make  proper  disposition  of 
the  reports  concerning  fraudulent  naturalizations  re- 
ceived from  the  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  has  been 
designated  as  the  proper  person  to  make  the  affidavit. 
This  officer  is  the  chief  of  the  Passport  Bureau.  The 
affidavit  states  that  "the  papers  hereto  appended  are  the 
genuine  documents  received  by"  the  Department  of 
State,  "and  they  are  forwarded  to  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  to  be  used  in  proceedings  to  set 
aside  as  unlawfully  obtained  the  naturalization  of"  X.  Y. 

b.  Under  Prior  Laws. 

But  before  the  passage  of  the  law  of  1906,  it  was  held 
that  the  United  States  could  sue  for  the  cancellation  of 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  139 

a  decree  of  naturalization  where  it  had  been  fraudulently 
obtained.     United  States  v.  Norsch,  42  Fed.  417. 

In  Pintsch  Compressing  Co.  v.  Bergin,  84  Fed.  140, 
where  a  woman  had  been  admitted  to  citizenship,  and 
there  was  no  irregularity  or  defect  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record,  while  the  court  refused  the  petition  of  a 
private  party  to  cancel  the  decree  at  a  subsequent  term 
on  the  ground  that  for  the  greater  part  of  the  two  years 
immediately  preceding  her  admission  she  had  been  under 
the  disability  of  marriage,  and  held  that  this  proposi- 
tion involved  mixed  questions  of  law  and  fact,  which 
were  presumably  passed  on  by  the  court  before  it 
admitted  her  to  citizenship,  the  view  was  expressed  that 
only  the  United  States,  or  some  person  acting  by  their 
authorization,  can  institute  proceedings  to  set  aside  a 
judgment  of  naturalization. 

In  United  States  v.  Kornmehl,  89  Fed.  10,  where  it 
was  made  to  appear  to  the  court  that  the  court  issuing  a 
naturalization  certificate  had  been  deceived  by  material 
false  statements  of  the  applicant  as  to  his  age  and 
length  of  residence  in  this  country,  the  court  directed 
that  the  letters  of  naturalization  be  revoked  as  having 
been  improvidently  issued.  The  proceedings  in  this  case 
were  instituted  by  the  immigration  commissioners,  in 
behalf  of  the  United  States. 

See,  also,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  500. 
But,  in  United  States  v.  Gleason,  78  Fed.  396,  the  court 
declined  to  cancel  the  certificate  upon  the  ground  that 
it  had  been  obtained  by  false  representations.  In  refer- 
ring to  the  case  of  U.  S.  v.  Norsch,  the  court  said: 
"Thayer,  J.,  in  U.S.  V.  Norsch,  42  Fed.  417,  .  .  .  seems  to 
treat  the  liability  of  a  judgment  of  naturalization  to  be 
set  aside  for  fraud,  like  a  patent,  as  conceded,  and  to 
have  considered  only  the  power  of  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  to  set  aside  such  judgments  of  state  courts 
and  to  intimate   that   the  relief  would   be  accomplished 


140  NATURALIZATION 

by  setting  aside  the  certificate  or  by  injunction  against 
exercising  the  right.  Such  would  seem  to  be  the  only 
modes  of  relief,  if  any  could  be  granted,  for,  technically, 
no  court  not  authorized  by  law  to  review  a  judgment 
could  directly  set  it  aside.  Barrow  v.  Hunton,  99  U.  S. 
80,  25  L.  ed.  407.  And  a  court  of  equity  can  affect  a 
judgment  only  by  decree  to  prevent  carrying  it  out  or 
enforcing  it.  2  Story  Eq.  Sec.  885.  The  surrender  of 
the  certificate,  which  is  only  evidence  of  the  judgment, 
would  not  affect  the  citizenship  established  by  the  judg- 
ment; and  an  injunction  which  could  only  run  against 
further  exercise  of  the  rights  of  citizenship  would  not 
affect  past  acts." 

The  court  said  that  an  attempt  to  carry  out  such  a 
decree  against  the  defendant  would  produce  great  con- 
fusion and  mischief.  "The  defendant  became,"  said  the 
court,  "a  citizen  of  the  State  of  New  York,  as  well  as  of 
the  United  States.  Other  citizens  became  entitled  to 
vote  for  him  for  such  offices  as  citizens  could  hold,  as 
well  as  he  became  entitled  to  vote,  hold  office,  hold  lands, 
or  do  what  else  citizens  can  do.  Neither  the  state,  nor 
any  citizen  of  New  York  or  of  the  United  States,  is  a 
party  to  this  suit;  nor  do  they  hold  their  right  to  vote 
for  him  or  to  have  him  hold  office,  under  him,  and  no 
decree  against  him  here  could  affect  their  right." 

Upon  the  question  whether  a  judgment  of  naturaliza- 
tion is  conclusive  upon  a  state,  there  has  not  been  entire 
unanimity  of  opinion.  The  Act  of  1906  contains  no  pro- 
vision relating  to  the  matter.  In  Commonwealth  v. 
Paper,  1  Brewster,  263,  while  the  court  ordered  the  set- 
ting aside  of  certain  certificates  of  naturalization,  it  was 
stated  that  this  was  done  on  the  condition  that  the  At- 
torney-General of  the  state  should  appear  in  the  case. 
The  court  said:  "One  citizen  can  not  impugn  the  action 
of  a  court  in  naturalization  cases  so  far  as  to  require  the 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  141 

cancellation  of  naturalization  papers.  Some  public  au- 
thority must  do  this;  and  I  understood  when  this  peti- 
tion was  handed  up  that  the  Attorney-General  was  to  be 
the  official  party  to  the  proceeding." 

In  re  Shaw,  2  Pa.  Dist.  C.  250,  is  to  the  same  effect. 
See,  also.  Re  McCarran,  8  Misc.  482,  and  16  App.  Div.  311. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  held  in  Peterson  v.  State,  89 
S.  W.  81,  that  a  state  can  not  impeach  naturalization 
proceedings. 

2.  International  Practice. 

a.  Executive  Department  of  Government. 
(A.)  Power  to  Treat  Certificate  as  Invalid. 

The  Department  of  State  possesses  no  power  to  vacate 
decrees  of  naturalization;  but  it  exercises,  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  President,  plenary  jurisdiction  over  the 
conduct  of  foreign  relations.  In  the  exercise  of  this  ju- 
risdiction, the  Department,  as  has  often  been  held,  will, 
so  far  as  any  action  of  its  own  is  concerned,  treat  as  in- 
valid a  certificate  of  naturalization  that  has  been  im- 
properly obtained.  John  Bassett  Moore,  3  Moore's  Int. 
Law  Digest,  501. 

Secretary  Hay  in  an  instruction  to  the  American 
Minister  to  Ecuador,  June  21,  1902,  said:  "As  you  are 
aware,  the  Department's  regulations  require  every 
naturalized  citizen  when  he  applies  for  a  passport  to 
make  a  sworn  statement  concerning  his  own  or  his 
parents'  immigration,  residence,  and  naturalization;  and 
whenever  the  naturalization  appears  to  have  been  im- 
properly or  improvidently  granted  it  is  not  recognized 
under  the  Department's  rules.  For.  Rel.  1902,  389.  See 
also,  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  501  et  seq. 

Recitations  in  the  record  of  matters  of  fact  are  bind- 
ing only  upon  parties  to  the  proceedings  and  their 
privies.  The  Government  of  the  United  States  was  no 
party  and  stands  in  privity  with  no  party  to  these  pro- 


142  NATURALIZATION 

ceedings  of  naturalization.  And  it  is  not  in  the  power 
of  Mr.  Stern  by  erroneous  recitations  in  ex  parte  pro- 
ceedings to  conclude  the  government  as  to  matters  of 
fact.     Case  of  Moses  Stern,  13  Op.  Atty.  Gen.  376- 

(B.)   Right  of   Foreign  Governments  to  Impeach  American 
Certificate  of  Naturalization  Denied. 

While  the  Department  of  State  declines  to  recognize 
the  validity  of  a  certificate  of  naturalization  when  it 
appears  that  it  was  obtained  by  fraud  or  granted  by 
mistake,  this  government  denies  the  right  of  a  foreign 
government  to  impeach  a  certificate  of  naturalization 
issued  by  an  American  court.  American  Passport,  156. 

It  has  been  uniformly  held  by  the  Department  of 
State  that  while,  on  the  application  of  a  foreign  govern- 
ment, it  will  cause  inquiries  to  be  made  as  to  whether  a 
judgment  of  naturalization  was  improvidently  granted, 
and  while  it  will  never  permit  itself  to  grant  protection 
based  upon  a  naturalization  decree  which  is  shown  to  it  to 
be  fraudulent,  it  will  not  recognize  a  foreign  government's 
right  to  impeach  such  decrees.  When  set  up  by  it  as  a 
basis  of  its  action  towards  a  foreign  state,  it  can  not 
recognize  the  right  of  any  foreign  executive  or  court  to 
determine  as  to  their  validity.  That  determination  must 
be  made,  so  far  as  concerns  foreign  governments,  exclu- 
sively by  itself.  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  McLane,  February  15, 
1888,  For.  Rel.  1888,  pt.  1,  511.  See  3  Moore's  Int.  Law 
Digest,  513,  et  seq. 

b.  International  Claims  Commissions. 
(A.)  In  General. 
It   has   been   repeatedly  held   by  international   claims 
commissions  that  certificates   of   naturalization  may  be 
impeached  in  proceedings  before  such  tribunals. 

(B.)  Spanish  Claims  Commission  of  1871. 

In  a  communication  relating  to  the  United  States  and 
Spanish  Claims   Commission   of   1871,  Secretary  Evarts 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  143 

said  that  that  Commission  was  "an  independent  judicial 
tribunal  possessed  of  all  the  powers  and  endowed  with 
all  the  properties  which  should  distinguish  a  court  of  high 
international  jurisdiction,  alike  competent  in  the  juris- 
diction conferred  upon  it  to  bring  under  judgment  the 
decisions  of  the  local  courts  of  both  nations  and  beyond 
the  competence  of  either  government  to  interfere  with, 
direct,  or  obstruct  its  deliberations."  3  Moore's  Interna- 
tional Arbitrations,  2599. 

(C.)  Costa  Rican  Claims  Commission  of  1860. 

The  umpire,  Bertinatti,  in  Medina's  case,  before  the 
United  States  and  Costa  Rican  Commission  of  1860,  said: 

"An  act  of  naturalization,  be  it  made  by  a  judge  ex 
parte  in  the  exercise  of  his  voluntaria  jurisdictio,  or  be  it 
the  result  of  a  decree  of  a  king  bearing  an  administrative 
character;  in  either  case  its  value,  on  the  point  of  evi- 
dence before  an  international  commission,  can  only  be 
that  of  an  element  of  proof,  subject  to  be  examined 
according  to  the  principle  locus  regit  actum,  both  intrin- 
sically and  extrinsically,  in  order  to  be  admitted  or  re- 
jected according  to  the  general  principles  in  such  a 
matter.     .     .     . 

"  The  certificates  exhibited  by  them  (the  claimants) 
being  made  in  due  form,  have  for  themselves  the  pre- 
sumption of  truth;  but  when  it  becomes  evident  that 
the  statements  therein  contained  are  incorrect,  the  pre- 
sumption of  truth  must  yield  to  truth  itself."  3  Moore's 
Arbitrations,  2587. 

(D.)  Venezuelan  Claims  Commission  of  1903. 

In  the  Flutie  cases,  which  came  before  the  United 
States  and  Venezuelan  Claims  Commission  of  1903,  Mr. 
Bainbridge,  commissioner  for  the  United  States,  in  de- 
livering the  opinion  of  the  Commission — an  opinion  re- 
markable for  its  clearness  and  comprehensiveness,  giving 


144  NATURALIZATION 

as  it  does  an  exhaustive  rgsum^  of  judicial  decisions, 
rulings  of  the  executive,  and  adjudications  of  inter- 
national tribunals — said: 

"  Whatever  may  be  the  conclusive  force  of  judgments  of 
naturalization  under  the  municipal  laws  of  the  country 
in  which  they  are  granted,  international  tribunals,  such 
as  this  Commission,  have  claimed  and  exercised  the  right 
to  determine  for  themselves  the  citizenship  of  claimants 
from  all  the  facts  presented." 

In  this  case  the  Commission  were  convinced  that  the 
claimant  ''had  not  resided  "  in  the  United  States  for  the 
continued  term  of  five  years  nor  for  any  considerable 
portion  thereof  prior  to  the  date  on  which  a  naturaliza- 
tion certificate  was  granted  to  him;  that  the  facts  neces- 
sary to  give  the  court  jurisdiction  did  not  exist,  and 
therefore  that  the  certificate  of  naturalization  was  im- 
properly granted.  The  claim  was  dismissed.  Ralston's 
Report,  38.  See,  also,  numerous  cases  in  which  inter- 
national claims  commissions  have  declined  to  recognize 
judgments  of  naturalization  as  conclusive,  in  3  Moore's 
International  Arbitrations,  2583  to  2655. 

(E.)   Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission  (1905). 

In  the  case  of  Rita  L.  Ruiz  et  al.  v.  The  United 
States,  which  came  before  the  Spanish  Treaty  Claims 
Commission,  established  pursuant  to  the  treaty  of  1898 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  under  the  Act  of 
March  3,  1901,*  the  defendant,  in  its  answer  to  the  peti- 

*The  7th  Article  of  the  Treaty  reads  as  follows: 

"The  United  States  and  Spain  mutually  relinquish  all  claims  for 
indemnity,  national  and  individual,  of  every  kind,  of  either  Govern- 
ment, or  of  its  citizens  or  subjects,  against  the  other  Government,  that 
may  have  arisen  since  the  beginning  of  the  late  insurrection  in  Cuba 
and  prior  to  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty,  includ- 
ing all  claims  for  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  v^'ar.  The  United  States 
-will  adjudicate  and  settle  the  claims  of  its  citizens  against  Spain  relin- 
quished in  this  article." 

It  is  provided  in  the  first  section  of  the  organic  Act  that  it  shall  be 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  145 

tion  of  the  plaintiffs,  who  claimed  as  the  widow  and 
children  of  Ricardo  Ruiz,  asserted  that  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  said  Ricardo  Ruiz,  if  obtained  at  all,  was  pro- 
cured by  false  and  fraudulent  representations  as  to  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States  immediately  preceding  his 
application,  and  by  the  procuring  of  an  affidavit  to  the 
same  effect  from  a  witness  called  by  him,  and  that  the 
claimants  ought  not  to  maintain  their  action. 

The  claimants  demurred  to  the  answer  on  the  ground 
that  the  certificate  of  naturalization  which  defendant 
sought  to  impeach  was  a  judgment  of  a  court  having 
competent  jurisdiction  and  not  subject  to  impeachment 
or  review  by  the  Commission. 

Upon  the  demurrer  oral  arguments  were  made  and 
briefs  were  filed,  not  only  by  counsel  on  both  sides  but 
by  numerous  attorneys  for  other  claimants  before  the 
Commission. 

As  preliminary  to  the  question  of  the  conclusiveness 
of  the  certificate  of  naturalization,  counsel  discussed  at 
great  length  the  question  as  to  whether  the  Commission 
was  a  municipal  court  or  an  international  tribunal,  and 
it  was  urged  that  the  Commission  was  a  court  of  the 
United  States  and  not  an  international  tribunal,  and 
therefore  that  it  must  give  full  faith  and  credit  to  the 
judgments  of  all  other  courts,  state  or  Federal,  and  must 
impute  absolute  verity  and  conclusiveness  to  a  certifi- 
cate of  naturalization. 

In  passing  on  the  preliminary  question,  the  Commision 
said:  "In  a  strictly  technical  sense  the  Commission  is  a 
national  court,  but  in  a  broader  sense  is  also  international. 
In  a  very  unique  sense  it  is  intimately  related  to  both. 


the  duty  of  the  Commission  and  that  "  it  shall  have  jurisdiction  to  re- 
ceive, examine  and  adjudicate  all  claims  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
against  Spain  which  the  United  States  agreed  to  adjudicate  and  settle 
by  the  7th  Article  of  the  Treaty,"  .  .  .  and  that  the  Commission 
"shall  adjudicate  said  claims  according  to  the  merits  of  the  several 
cases,  the  principles  of  equity,  and  of  international  law." 
5233—10 


146  NATURALIZATION 

If  not  distinctly  incorporated  into  the  Federal  judiciary 
system,  it  will  not  be  denied  that  the  organic  Act  (March 
3,  1901)  and  the  amendatory  Act  (June  30,  1902)  confer 
upon  the  Commission  all  the  powers  of  a  Federal  court 
necessary  to  the  investigation  and  adjudication  of  the 
claims  arising  under  the  treaty  of  December  10,  1898. 
Being  the  creature  of  an  Act  of  Congress,  it  is  neces- 
sarily domestic  in  origin,  and,  being  constituted  exclu- 
sively of  individuals  of  one  nationality,  it  is  certainly  not 
international  in  composition,  and  its  decisions  affect 
only  the  government  of  its  creation  and  composition. 
Back  of  the  Act  of  Congress  which  gave  it  life,  however, 
we  find  its  conception  in  a  treaty  between  two  nations, 
and  thus  it  came  into  being  as  a  domestic  creature 
stamped  with  the  features  of  internationality. 

"After  a  close  study  of  the  act  and  giving  to  its  words 
the  broad  interpretation  which  the  generous  motive  be- 
hind them  authorizes,  we  find  it  impossible  to  separate 
the  domestic  character  of  the  Commission  as  derived 
through  its  origin  and  composition  from  the  international 
character  imposed  upon  it  by  the  treaty,  and  the  precise 
words  of  the  Act  of  Congress  requiring  the  adjudication 
of  claims  "according  to  the  principles  of  international 
law."  Other  domestic  tribunals,  such  as  prize  courts,  for 
illustration,  administer  international  law  in  the  absence 
of  statutory  mandate,  because  the  nature  of  their  busi- 
ness requires  them  to  apply  the  law  of  nations;  but  this 
Commission  is  differentiated  from  all  other  municipal 
courts  in  that  it  is  a  domestic  judicial  tribunal  definitely 
required,  by  the  statute  of  its  creation,  to  administer  in- 
ternational law  wherever  that  law  may  be  fairly  applied. 
The  language  of  the  statute,  'it  shall  adjudicate  said 
claims  according  to  the  merits  of  the  several  cases,  the 
principles  of  equity,  and  of  international  law,'  is  a 
mandate  to  the  Commission  to  apply  the  principles  of 
international  law  in  a  spirit  of  equity   to    the  merits  of 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  147 

the  cases  whenever  there  are  any  such  principles  appli- 
cable. The  exact  status  of  the  Comnoiission,  therefore, 
in  jurisprudence,  whether  domestic  or  international,  is 
by  no  means  so  important  a  question  as  the  one  of  its 
powers.  What  can  it  do,  rather  than  what  we  may  call 
it,  is  the  question  of  vital  interest  and  consequence. 

"If,  by  the  act  of  its  creation,  admittedly  domestic,  it 
is  required  to  do  the  very  things  for  which  international 
tribunals  are  established,  it  must  be  assumed  that  the 
Commission,  as  an  equity  tribunal,  will  endeavor  to  ap- 
ply the  principles  of  international  law  to  the  several 
cases  as  they  arise.  Relief  can  not  be  expected,  therefore, 
in  a  case  that  is  without  merits — the  first  essential  stipu- 
lation of  the  statute — and  a  case  can  not  be  meritorious 
that  is  dishonest  or  founded  upon  fraud.  A  case  may, 
however,  develop  merits  and  yet  this  tribunal  can  not 
rightly  adjudicate  the  same,  in  the  light  of  the  treaty 
and  the  Act  of  Congress,  if  it  falls  within  the  principles 
of  international  law,  without  applying  them  just  as  a 
mixed  tribunal  should  do. 

"Congress  in  its  wisdom  apprehended  and  unquestion- 
ably appreciated  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  adjudicat- 
ing the  various  classes  of  claims  by  a  tribunal  restricted 
in  its  operation  to  the  settled  rules  of  law,  and  conse- 
quently decided  to  clothe  it  with  greater  power  and  more 
discretion  than  are  properly  exercised  by  the  ordinary 
courts  of  law.  It  was  not  alone  because  the  Government 
had  solemnly  assumed,  but  because  it  desired  to  pay  all 
the  valid  claims  of  its  citizens  against  Spain,  that  Con- 
gress created  a  tribunal  with  equitable  powers  so  elastic 
that  no  complexity  of  facts  or  circumstances  could  or 
should  prevent  it  from  rendering  such  an  award  as  the 
merits  of  the  claim,  the  principles  of  justice  and  of  inter- 
national law  require.  The  purpose  of  Congress  in  enact- 
ing this  beneficial  statute  could  not  be  better  expressed 


148  NATURALIZATION 

than  in  the  impressive  words  of  Chief  Justice  Waite  in 
Freylinghuysen  v.  Key  (110  U.  S.  63): 

"  'No  technical  rules  of  pleading,  as  applied  in  municipal 
courts,  ought  ever  to  be  allowed  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
the  national  power  to  do  what  is  right  under  all  circum- 
stances.' 

"Finally,  on  the  question  as  to  the  character  of  this 
Commission,  the  argument  that  it  is  only  a  domestic  tri- 
bunal limited  in  some  unexplained  way  in  its  powers  as 
compared  with  an  international  tribunal,  because,  under 
certain  conditions,  the  Supreme  Court  can  review  a  case 
pending  before  it,  is  not  a  conclusive  proposition.  It 
will  hardly  be  denied  that  the  district  courts  of  the 
United  States  are  domestic  tribunals,  and  yet  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Story,  in  the  case  of  the  Adeline  (9  Cranch,  244), 
speaking  of  district  courts  sitting  as  courts  of  prize, 
said: 

" '  In  the  prize  courts,  in  an  especial  manner,  the  allega- 
tions, the  briefs,  and  the  proceedings  are  in  general 
modeled  upon  the  civil  law,  with  such  additions  and 
alterations  as  the  practice  of  nations  and  the  rights  of 
belligerents  and  neutrals  inevitably  impose.  A  court  of 
prize  is  emphatically  a  court  of  nations,  and  it  takes 
neither  its  character  nor  its  rules  from  the  mere  munici- 
pal regulations  of  any  country.' 

"It  is  no  answer  to  say  that  this  was  spoken  with  ref- 
erence to  a  prize  court,  because  a  district  court  of  the 
United  States,  when  sitting  in  prize  cases,  is  no  less 
domestic  in  its  creation  and  composition  than  when  sit- 
ting in  bankruptcy,  and  appeals  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court 
from  a  court  of  prize,  which  Justice  Story  says  is  'em- 
phatically a  court  of  nations,'  under  precisely  the  same 
conditions  as  from  a  court  of  bankruptcy.  Here  we  see 
the  Supreme  Court  calling  a  purely  municipal  court  a 
'court  of  natio7is.' 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  149 

"  While  we  have  never  gone  so  far  as  to  call  this  Com- 
mission a  'court  of  nations,'  it  is  quite  clear  that  we 
might  do  so,  with  the  sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
without  in  any  wise  affecting  its  municipal  character. 
We  have  rather  been  inclined  to  adopt  the  view  of  the 
Court  of  Claims,  as  so  well  expressed  by  Judge  Weldon 
in  the  case  of  The  Ship  Rose  v.  The  United  States  (36  Ct. 
CI.  R.  290,  302).  That  was  a  case  arising  under  the 
Act  of  Congress  of  January  20,  1885,  giving  the  Court  of 
Claims  jurisdiction  to  ascertain  the  claims  of  American 
citizens  for  spoliations  committed  by  the  French  prior 
to  the  31st  of  July,  1801,  wherein  it  was  provided  that 
'  they  (the  Court  of  Claims)  shall  decide  upon  the  validity 
of  said  claims  according  to  the  rules  of  law,  municipal 
and  international,  and  the  treaties  of  the  United  States 
applicable  to  the  same.'  The  able  jurist  in  that  case 
said:  'This  court  in  making  the  investigation  contem- 
plated by  the  act  of  our  jurisdiction  is  sitting  in  the 
chcwacter  of  an  international  trihunal.' 

"Now,  the  act  of  this  Commission's  jurisdiction  provides 
that  '  it  shall  adjudicate  said  claims  (those  provided  for 
by  the  treaty)  according  to  the  merits  of  the  several 
cases,  the  principles  of  equity  and  of  international  law,' 
and  the  claims  all  arise  out  of  alleged  injury  to  the 
persons  and  property  of  people  claiming  American  citi- 
zenship, by  Spanish  authorities  and  subjects,  contrary 
to  their  rights  under  international  law.  This  Commission, 
therefore,  while  in  every  essential  a  municipal  judicial 
body,  in  making  the  investigations  and  adjudications 
'contemplated  by  the  act  of  our  jurisdiction  is  sitting 
in  the  character  of  an  international  tribunal.'     .     .     . 

"It  is  the  opinion  of  the  Commission  that  the  court 
which  issued  the  naturalization  certificate  to  Ruiz  is  one 
of  competent  jurisdiction;  that  its  decision  upon  facts 
'  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court '  is  con- 
clusive that  it  exercised  the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon 


150  NATURALIZATION 

it  by  the  statute,  and  its  conclusion  entered  upon  the 
record,  whether  we  call  it  an  order,  decision,  or  judg- 
ment, is  entitled  to  the  same  degree  of  faith  and  credit 
generally  accorded  to  the  judgments  of  courts  exercising 
undisputed  jurisdiction.  But  it  remains  to  be  consid- 
ered whether  such  an  order  or  judgment  is  conclusive 
upon  and  precludes  inquiry  into  the  facts  which  were 
made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court  render- 
ing it,  by  another  forum  of  competent  jurisdiction  to 
hear  and  determine  a  cause  in  a  proceeding  wherein  that 
judgment  is  pleaded  as  a  basis  for  equitable  relief,  and 
the  defense  interposed  is  that  the  court  was  deceived  by 
false  and  fraudulent  representations  knowingly  and  in- 
tentionally made  by  claimant  to  grant  the  certificate  of 
naturalization. 

"In  considering  their  conclusiveness  upon  this  court  we 
will  treat  certificates  of  naturalization  as  judgments 
entitled  to  have  such  faith  and  credit  given  to  them  as 
by  law  or  usage  they  have  in  the  courts  of  the  state 
where  rendered,  subject  to  the  principles  of  international 
law,  as  applied  by  courts  charged  (as  this  one)  with  the 
administration  of  the  law  of  nations. 

"Counsel  for  claimants  contend  broadly  that  a  judg- 
ment of  naturalization  is  a  judgment  in  rem,  and  for  that 
reason  is  conclusive  upon  all  the  world  as  to  the  facts 
and  things  adjudged.  Therefore,  they  argue,  it  is  im- 
material whether  or  not  the  judgment  of  naturalization 
is,  as  to  Spain  (in  whose  shoes  the  United  States  now 
stands),  a  foreign  judgment,  and  that  whether  domestic  or 
foreign  it  is  equally  conclusive  in  this  tribunal,  irre- 
spective of  the  question  as  to  whether  it  is  administer- 
ing municipal  or  international  law.  Admitting,  however, 
that  even  a  judgment  in  rem  is  not  under  all  circum- 
stances conclusive  and  may  be  collaterally  attacked,  not 
only  for  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  that  rendered 
it,  but  for  some  kinds  of  fraud,  it  is  urged  by  claimants 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  151 

that  the  fraud  alleged  in  the  case  at  bar  is  not  of  the 
kind  that  would  render  the  judgment  subject  to  a  col- 
lateral attack,  because  the  fraud  charged  is  not  extrinsic. 

"Counsel  for  defendant  deny  that  a  certificate  of  natu- 
ralization is  a  judgment  in  rem,  contending  that  at  best 
it  is  only  quasi  in  rem,  but  insist  that  in  either  aspect 
the  proceedings  which  'made  it  appear  to  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  court '  may  be  inquired  into  in  a  subsequent 
action  based  upon  that  judgment  when  it  is  alleged  that 
it  was  procured  by  fraud. 

"Why  counsel  should  distinguish  a  judgment  of  natu- 
ralization from  a  judgment  in  rem,  and  call  it  a  judg- 
ment quasi  in  rem,  does  not  clearly  appear,  for  it  is  not 
pointed  out  in  what  respects  the  legal  consequences  of 
the  one  differ  from  the  other.  Being  like  a  judgment  in 
rem,  similar  attributes  and  consequences  necessarily  fol- 
low. 

"Where  fraud,  in  its  procurement,  is  the  defense  against 
the  conclusiveness  of  a  judgment,  we  fail  to  discover  any 
difference  between  a  judgment  in  personam  and  a  judg- 
ment in  rem.  The  same  is  true  if  want  of  jurisdiction  is  the 
defense.  These,  however,  are  the  only  defenses  that  can  be 
made  to  judgments  in  rem,  since  they  are  conclusive  in 
all  other  respects  upon  all  the  world.  But  judgments  in 
personam,  being  conclusive  only  as  to  parties  and  their 
privies,  may  be  attacked  by  strangers  upon  any  ground 
that  would  have  been  a  valid  defense  in  the  original 
action. 

"The  only  difference,  therefore,  between  the  two  classes 
of  judgments  when  pleaded  in  a  subsequent  action  is 
that  the  sources  of  impeachment  are  materially  less  re- 
stricted in  the  case  of  an  in  personam  judgment  than 
when  the  judgment  is  w  rem.  The  one,  however,  enjoys 
no  greater  immunity  than  the  other  when  founded  in 
fraud.  Law  can  not  be  'the  perfection  of  human  wis- 
dom' if  one   mav  so  debase  its  instrumentalities  as  to 


152  NATURALIZATION 

make  it  the  servant  of  his  fraudulent  designs  and  thereby 
secure  for  himself  rights  and  privileges  which  would 
otherwise  be  denied  him.  The  law  that  would  make  false- 
hood incontestable  and  fraud  impregnable  is  not  the  law 
that  makes  and  protects  American  citizenship. 

"In  the  administration  of  the  laws  of  Congress  the 
courts  are  called  upon  to  perform  few  more  important 
functions  than  the  conversion  of  an  alien  into  American 
citizenship,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  how  they 
could  be  more  ignobly  employed  than  in  conferring  this 
boon  upon  men  who  intentionally  and  criminally  induce 
their  favorable  action  through  false  and  fraudulent 
representations.  Shall  an  alien  who  thus  abuses  the  juris- 
diction of  one  of  our  courts  in  ex  parte  proceedings  be 
permitted,  unchallenged,  to  make  the  judgment  of 
naturalization,  obtained  through  fraud  and  perjury,  the 
basis  of  a  suit  for  damages  against  the  country  of  his 
nativity,  and  for  that  purpose  to  invoke  the  assistance 
of  another  judicial  tribunal  of  the  country  upon  which 
he  committed  the  fraud  ?  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  there 
can  be  but  one  answer  to  the  question. 

"Admitting  all  that  counsel  have  said  and  all  the  books 
say  on  the  subject  of  estoppel  by  a  former  judgment, 
and  even  that  '  the  doctrine  of  estoppels  in  judgments, 
instead  of  being  odious,  is  one  of  the  most  conservative 
and  salutary  doctrines  of  the  law  '  (Freeman  on  Judg- 
ments, sec.  247;  Gray  v.  Pingry,  17  Vt.,  419,  44  Am. 
Dec.  345),  we  can  not  be  unmindful  of  the  principle, 
underlying  and  safeguarding  all  judicial  proceedings, 
that  whatever  is  settled  thereby  must  be  the  result  of 
an  investigation  conducted  under  the  most  favorable 
rules  that  mankind  have  been  able  to  devise  for  the  ex- 
posure of  falsehood  and  the  ascertainment  of  truth. 
Estoppel  has  become  a  revered  doctrine  in  our  jurispru- 
dence, not  because  it  protects  fraud,  but  prohibits  a 
party  from  disputing  the  truth. 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  153 

"In  ex partepToceedings  the  court  necessarily  acts  upon 
a  state  of  facts,  and  not  infrequently  upon  constructions 
of  law,  presented  alone  by  the  petitioner,  and  the  judg- 
ment rendered  upon  a  one-sided  presentation  of  the  case 
is  predicated  largely  upon  the  principle  of  truthfulness, 
honesty,  and  absence  of  fraud  in  the  party  invoking  its 
jurisdiction.  This  is  true  in  mandamus  and  injunction 
cases,  but  there  the  adverse  party  is  given  a  subsequent 
day  in  court,  when  full  opportunity  is  afforded  to  expose 
the  falsehood,  dishonesty,  and  fraud  in  the  first  proceed- 
ings. Not  so  in  naturalization  proceedings.  If  it  be  ad- 
mitted that  there  is  an  adverse  party  in  naturalization 
proceedings  the  adversary  in  reality  never  has  a  day  in 
court. 

"In  the  case  of  fraudulent  naturalization  there  are  ordi- 
narily but  two  remedies:  (1)  A  direct  attack  by  bill  in 
the  proper  court  to  set  aside  the  judgment;  (2)  injunc- 
tion restraining  the  party  from  exercising  rights  under 
the  judgment,  such  as  prosecuting  a  suit  when  valid  citi- 
zenship is  the  essential  prerequisite.  United  States  v. 
Norsch,  42  Fed.  Rep.  419;  United  States  v.  Gleason,  78 
Fed.  Rep.  396.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  either 
of  these  remedies  in  determining  the  questions  presented 
in  the  case  under  consideration,  for  it  is  conceded  that 
this  tribunal  is  without  power  to  annul  a  judgment  of 
naturalization  even  though  it  should  be  shown  that  it 
was  fraudulently  obtained;  and  the  remedy  by  injunc- 
tion would  at  least  be  of  doubtful  availability  in  the 
present  case,  because  of  the  adequate  facilities  offered 
defendant  for  equitable  defense  in  this  jurisdiction,  the 
only  one  having  cognizance  of  claimants'  case.  The  or- 
ganic act  provides  that  claims  before  this  tribunal  shall 
be  adjudicated  'according  to  the  principles  of  equity,' 
and  it  is  a  familiar  principle  of  equity  that  'he  who 
comes  into  equity  must  come  with  clean  hands.'  This 
maxim — or,  as  it  is  otherwise  expressed,  'He  that  hath 


154  NATURALIZATION 

committed  iniquity  shall  not  have  equity' — is  the  equi- 
table application  of  a  fundamental  principle  pervading 
the  entire  body  of  the  law,  'that  no  one  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  profit  by  his  own  fraud  or  take  advantage  of 
his  own  wrong,  or  to  found  any  claim  on  his  own  iniquity, 
or  to  acquire  property  by  his  own  crime.'  Riggs  v.  Pal- 
mer, 115  N.  Y.  506;  Fetter  on  Equity,  39. 

"This  is  an  undisputed  principle  and  needs  no  elabora- 
tion, in  the  present  case  especially,  since  the  defendant 
admits  that  the  Commission  can  not  go  behind  a  decree 
of  naturalization  in  the  sense  of  attempting  to  nullify  it, 
'even  upon  a  showing  of  the  most  palpable  and  bare- 
faced fraud.' 

"It  is  a  general  rule,  too  familiar  to  require  any  cita- 
tion of  authorities  in  its  support,  that  'a  judgment, 
either  of  a  legal  or  of  an  equitable  tribunal,  may  be,  in 
effect,  vacated  by  a  court  of  equity,  if  it  was  obtained 
by  fraud.'     2  Freeman  on  Judgments,  Sec.  489. 

"  'It  is  the  just  and  proper  pride  of  our  matured  system 
of  equity  jurisprudence  that  fraud  vitiates  every  trans- 
action; and  however  men  may  surround  it  with  forms, 
solemn  instruments,  proceedings  conforming  to  all  the  de- 
tails required  in  the  laws,  or  even  by  the  formal  judg- 
ment of  court,  a  court  of  equity  will  disregard  them  all 
if  necessary,  that  justice  and  equity  may  prevail.' 
Warner  v  Blakeman,  4  Keys,  507. 

"Having  invoked  the  jurisdiction  of  a  tribunal  specifi- 
cally charged  with  applying  the  principles  of  equity  in 
the  adjudication  of  cases  before  it  and  virtually  praying 
the  enforcement  of  a  judgment,  which  the  defendant 
alleges  was  obtained  by  fraud,  claimants  can  not  com- 
plain if  their  demurrer  admitting  the  truth  of  defend- 
ant's allegation  and  pleading  the  conclusiveness  of  the 
judgment  is  not  allowed  to  arrest  the  court  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  unquestionable  powers  of  equitable  prevention. 
The   defendant    not    only  has  the    right    to    invoke  the 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  155 

remedy  of  equitable  prevention,  to  tlie  end  that  fraud 
shall  not  taint  this  litigation,  but  the  peculiar  character 
of  the  claim,  being  in  reality  a  suit  for  damages  against 
a  foreign  government  whose  liability,  and  none  other,  the 
United  States  has  assumed,  .  .  .  imposes  an  obliga- 
tion upon  the  defendant  here  to  do  so,  to  the  end  that 
ultimate  justice  may  be  done  through  the  application 
of  the  principles  of  equity  and  of  international  law  to 
the  merits  of  the  case. 

"The  judicial  status  of  this  tribunal,  its  jurisdiction 
and  powers  being  thus  defined  and  understood,  it  be- 
comes unnecessary  to  discuss  extensively  the  question 
whether  the  United  States  can,  in  a  domestic  tribunal, 
administering  exclusively  municipal  law,  controvert  the 
judgment  of  another  of  its  domestic  tribunals  conferring 
citizenship  upon  an  alien,  for  we  shall  hold  that  in  the 
investigation  and  adjudication  of  the  questions  that  arise 
in  this  case  the  Commission  is  sitting  in  the  capacity  of 
an  international  tribunal.  When  domestic  tribunals  are 
thus  sitting,  it  is  the  established  principle  that  municipal 
law,  in  the  absence  of  a  treaty  stipulating  otherwise, 
must  be  subordinate  to  international  law  when  they  an- 
tagonize each  other,  as  that  is  the  law  common  to  both 
parties.  It  is  only  where  the  question  is  not  within  the 
domain  of  international  that  the  municipal  law  may  be 
invoked  to  determine  the  proper  solution  of  the  question. 

"Judgments  of  naturalization  rendered  by  courts  of 
competent  jurisdiction,  like  other  judgments  not  defect- 
ive on  their  face,  may  be  conclusive  as  between  the 
naturalized  alien  and  other  parties  raising  the  question 
before  a  domestic  court  administering  only  municipal 
law,  and  a  careful  exploration  of  the  authorities  relied 
upon  by  claimants  show  that  they  bear  with  substantial 
exclusiveness  upon  that  class  of  cases.  The  case  of 
Spratt  V.  Spratt  (4  Pet.  392),  is  a  leading  case  cited  by 
counsel  for  claimants    in   support  of  the  general  propo- 


156  NATURALIZATION 

sition  that  a  judgment  of  naturalization  is  conclusive 
upon  the  Commission,  '  whether  or  not  the  judgment  of 
naturalization  is  as  to  Spain  a  foreign  judgment.'  That 
was  a  case  involving  the  title  to  real  estate  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  and  by  no  sort  of  interpretation 
or  construction  involved  the  administration  of  inter- 
national law.  It  was  a  dispute  between  parties  in  their 
individual  capacities,  one  purely  of  local  domestic  law 
and  administration,  and  therefore  without  any  relevancy 
to  the  principles  of  international  law  administered  by 
an  international  tribunal  or  a  municipal  court  sitting  in 
the  capacity  of  an  international  tribunal. 

"The  case  of  Campbell  v.  Gordon  (6  Cranch,176)  involved 
the  question  of  title  to  land  in  Virginia.  The  question 
was,  what  effect  should  be  given  by  a  domestic  tribunal 
to  a  judgment  rendered  in  another  domestic  tribunal,  the 
settlement  of  which  required  the  application  of  municipal 
or  domestic  law  pure  and  simple?  No  international  ques- 
tion and  no  principle  of  international  law  arose  in  the 
case.  The  same  may  be  said  in  reference  to  the  case  of 
Stark  V.  Insurance  Co.  (7  Cranch,  420).  In  that  case  the 
question  of  American  citizenship  arose  on  the  objection 
of  defendant  to  the  record  of  naturalization  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  the  objection  went  simply  to  the  regularity 
of  the  proceedings  and  to  the  introduction  of  parol 
evidence  in  aid  of  the  record.  The  Supreme  Court  held 
that  it  need  not  appear  by  the  record  of  naturalization 
that  all  the  requisites  prescribed  bylaw  for  the  admission 
of  aliens  to  the  rights  of  citizenship  have  been  complied 
with.  It  involved  the  ownership  of  American  property 
by  an  American  citizen,  and  the  determination  of  that 
question  was  submitted  to  a  municipal  court  of  the 
United  States  administering  purely  domestic  law.  The 
fact  that  the  judgment  in  these  cases  was  a  judgment  of 
naturalization  presents  no  international  question,  because 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  157 

the  statutes  of  the  United  States  relating  to  naturaliza- 
tion are  no  more  international  in  their  character  than  the 
statutes  which  settle  the  rights  of  our  citizens  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  any  other  domestic  privilege,  and  a  judgment  of 
naturalization  pleaded  in  a  cause  involving  the  title  to 
property  in  the  United  States  before  a  domestic  tribunal 
administering  only  municipal  law  raises  no  more  of  an 
international  question  than  a  judgment  on  contract  or  on 
promissory  notes.  The  degree  of  conclusiveness  of  the 
judgment  would  be  just  the  same  in  either  case.  It  will 
be  seen,  therefore,  that  the  question  in  all  of  these  cases 
was  simply  the  force  and  effect  which  should  be  given  by 
a  domestic  tribunal  to  a  judgment  of  another  domestic 
tribunal  administering  purely  municipal  law.  It  is  ma- 
terial, however,  to  notice  that  in  none  of  these  cases  was 
the  question  of  jurisdiction  or  fraud  in  the  procurement 
of  the  judgment  raised,  and,  therefore,  that  it  does  not 
appear  what  the  decision  in  each  of  these  cases  might 
have  been  if  the  objection  to  the  naturalization  proceed- 
ings had  been,  as  alleged  in  the  case  now  under  con- 
sideration, obtained  through  fraud  practiced  upon  the 
court, 

"Bearing  in  mind  that  the  Commission  in  the  trial  of 
this  case  is  'sitting  in  the  capacity  of  an  international 
tribunal;'  that  in  a  former  case  it  has  been  decided  by 
the  Commission  'these  claims  remain  in  their  nature  in- 
ternational and  are  to  be  tried  by  the  principles  by  which 
the  liability  of  independent  nations,  one  to  another,  is 
governed,'  and  'that  the  sole  question  before  this  Com- 
mission is  that  of  the  primary  liability  of  Spain,  which 
is  not  in  any  way  enlarged  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  to  adjudicate  and  pay  such  claims,'  would 
it  be  impertinent  or  incompetent  for  Spain  to  challenge 
the  applicability  of  the  principles  announced  in  the  de- 
cisions referred  to,  and  all  others  of  similar  import,  upon 
the  ground  that  they  are  the  decisions  of  purely  domestic 


158  NATURALIZATION 

tribunals,  administering  the  municipal  law  of  the  United 
States  regarding  a  subject-matter  with  which  it  is  in  no 
wise  concerned,  namely,  the  settlement  of  titles  to  prop- 
erty which  is  always  and  everywhere  determinable  by  the 
lex  loci?  Manifestly  not.  But  suppose  the  response 
to  be  that  nevertheless  the  judgment  of  naturalization 
of  Ruiz,  so  far  as  the  right  of  his  heirs  to  maintain  this 
action  is  concerned,  is  valid  and  binding  in  every  juris- 
diction until  it  is  conclusively  shown  it  was  obtained  by 
fraud,  and  that  Spain  should  then  offer  in  evidence  the 
official  record  of  proceedings  before  a  Spanish  tribunal 
of  competent  jurisdiction,  wherein  Ruiz,  after  his  alleged 
naturalization  in  the  United  States,  being  at  the  time  a 
resident  of  Cuba,  in  a  case  involving  his  allegiance  to  the 
Sovereign  of  Spain,  had  been  adjudged  to  be  a  Spanish 
subject,  and  furthermore,  that  his  attempt  to  acquire 
American  citizenship  was  a  fraud  on  his  native  land, 
would  it  be  argued  that  this  Commission  must  give  full 
faith  and  credit  to  the  American  judgment  of  naturaliza- 
tion and  must  disregard  the  Spanish  adjudication  entirely? 
The  mere  asking  of  this  question  echoes  its  answer,  and 
is  an  illustration  of  the  unsoundness  of  the  position  that 
an  international  tribunal  is  to  be  bound  by  the  judgment 
of  the  domestic  tribunals  of  either  one  of  the  parties  to 
the  controversy. 

"It  is  nowuniversally  admitted  that  every  independent 
state  has,  as  one  of  the  incidents  of  its  sovereignty,  the 
power  not  only  to  regulate  the  local  obligations  of  aliens 
resident  in  its  territory,  but  to  confer  upon  them  national 
privileges  and  immunities,  even  the  full  rights  of  citizen- 
ship, by  the  proceeding  called  naturalization.  The  law 
for  this  proceeding,  by  which  the  nationality  of  a  foreign- 
born  citizen  or  subject  is  changed  from  that  of  birth  to 
one  of  adoption,  is  the  creature  of  modern  states  and 
necessarily  local,  and  is  a  distinct  invasion  of  the  rights 
of  the  country  of  nativity  over  its  subject  or  citizen,  in 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  159 

whatever  part  of  the  world,  as  maintained  until  within 
comparatively  recent  years.  Such  laws  are  made  and 
administered  without  reference  to  the  consent  of  the 
country  of  nativity  to  the  release  or  the  transfer  of  the 
allegiance  of  such  subjects  or  citizens.  The  municipal 
laws  of  the  States  whose  subjects  or  citizens  are  so  natu- 
ralized being  thus  disregarded  and  in  fact  set  at  defiance, 
it  must  follow  that  the  naturalization  proceedings  can 
not  have  conclusive  exterritorial  application. 

''The  exterritorial  force  of  a  judgment,  like  the  law 
authorizing  naturalization,  is  a  thing  of  modern  recogni- 
tion, and  therefore  we  must  look  to  the  more  recent 
writers  for  the  best  opinions  on  this  and  allied  subjects, 
and  we  find  them  in  practical  accord  with  the  doctrine 
just  stated.  Calvo  (Derecho  Internacional,  vol.  1,  295 
et  seq.),  while  laying  down  the  same  doctrine,  says: 

International  law  recognizes  the  power  (or  faculty)  in 
a  state  to  naturalize  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  another; 
but  naturalization  does  not  take  place  by  virtue  of  said 
international  law,  but  as  a  consequence  of  local  legisla- 
tion; so  that  the  new  citizen  or  subject  is  the  pure  and 
exclusive  creation  of  the  civil  and  political  laws  of  the 
country  of  adoption,  and  he  will  enjoy  solely  the  rights, 
privileges,  and  immunities  which  they  confer.  And  what 
has  been  said  of  naturalization  applies  to  expatriation, 
or  the  breaking  of  the  natural  bonds  of  citizenship,  which 
have  their  origin  and  are  preserved  forever  in  the  shadow 
of  local  legislation.  The  right  of  expatriation,  then,  like 
that  of  naturalization,  is  subordinated  under  the  point 
of  view  of  international  law  to  the  general  principle  that 
each  independent  state  is  sovereign  in  its  own  territory 
and  that  its  laws  are  binding  upon  all  persons  who  are 
within  its  jurisdiction,  but  that  they  have  no  force  be- 
yond its  territory.' 

"The  distinction  drawn  and  the  reasoning  invoked  by 
this  eminent  author  make  it  perfectly  clear  that  the  pro- 


160  NATURALIZATION 

ceedings  or  judgment  of  naturalization  can  be  conclusive 
only  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  country  through  whose 
laws  the  nationality  of  a  subject  or  citizen  is  changed 
from  the  country  of  nativity  to  the  country  of  the  court 
granting  the  judgment. 

"Conceding  that  it  might  be  held  by  a  domestic  tri- 
bunal, sitting  exclusively  in  its  capacity  of  a  municipal 
court  and  therefore  administering  only  domestic  law,  that 
a  judgment  of  naturalization  rendered  in  a  domestic  tri- 
bunal of  competent  jurisdiction  was  ipso  facto  conclu- 
sive, it  does  not  follow  that  it  would  hold  the  same  way 
when  sitting  in  the  capacity  of  an  international  tribunal. 

"The  Commission,  in  a  former  case,  has  decided — 

"  '  That  the  sole  question  before  this  Commission  is  that 
of  the  primary  liability  of  Spain,  which  is  not  in  any  way 
enlarged  by  the  agreement  of  the  United  States  to  adju- 
dicate and  pay  such  claims,'  (Op.  Commissioner  Wood, 
27),  which  is  the  equivalent  of  holding  that  Spain  is  the 
real  defendant,  and  therefore  entitled  to  make  any  defense 
which  she  could  make  before  an  international  or  mixed 
commission. 

"The  fundamental  question,  therefore,  for  present  con- 
sideration is  the  effect  given  by  international  tribunals 
to  judgments  of  a  domestic  tribunal  of  one  of  the  parties 
to  the  controversy. 

"Article  VII  of  the  treaty  of  1794,  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  provided  for  indemnification 
by  Great  Britain  to  American  creditors  by  reference  to  a 
mixed  commission,  and  directed  that  'the  Commission 
shall  decide  the  claims  in  question  according  to  the 
merits  of  the  several  cases  and  justice,  equity,  and 
the  law  of  nations,'  language  strikingly  similar  to  that 
in  the  treaty  under  which  this  Commission  is  sitting. 

"One  of  the  first  and  most  important  questions  that 
arose  before  the  board  of  commissioners  organized  to 
carry  the   treaty  of    1794    into  effect    was  whether  'the 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  161 

sentence  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  nation,'  which  it 
was  admitted  was  'binding  on  individual  persons  and 
things  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,'  was  'con- 
clusive as  to  the  law,  not  only  on  the  subjects  of  this 
government  but  on  foreign  nations.' 

"The  tribunal  decided  that  it  was  not  conclusive,  and 
Commissioners  Gore  and  Pinckney,  both  eminent  inter- 
national authorities,  rendered  elaborate  opinions  discuss- 
ing the  question  most  thoroughly.  Mr.  Commissioner 
Gore  said  (quoting  very  briefly  from  his  lengthy  opinion): 

'"That  the  decision  of  any  court,  however  respectable 
its  members,  is  conclusive  on  foreign  governments  as  to 
the  law  of  nations,  and  that  the  principles  on  which  it  is 
founded  may  not  be  rightfully  contested,  as  contrary  to 
that  law,  is  not,  in  my  belief,  warranted  by  just  ideas  of 
the  equal  independence  of  nations  or  by  their  practice. 

'"To  suppose  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  any  coun- 
try conclusive  evidence  of  the  law  of  nations  would  be  to 
suppose  that  nation  always  right  who  captures  and  con- 
demns the  effects  of  another,  and  that  always  wrong  who 
complains  of  and  on  failure  of  other  means  seeks  redress 
for  such  captures  and  condemnations  by  letters  of  marque 
and  reprisal;  and  yet  after  a  condemnation  of  effects 
taken  in  virtue  of  such  letters,  according  to  Mr.  Gost- 
ling's  position,  such  condemnation  would  be  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  law  of  nations. 

"  'It  does  not  coexist  with  the  equality  of  independent 
nations  to  regard  the  decision  of  one,  merely  because  it 
was  the  decision  of  that  nation,  as  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  law  of  nations;  and  other  nations  or  other  judicial 
courts  pronouncing  that  law  would  adopt  the  decisions 
of  no  court  only  so  far  as  such  appeared  to  them  to  cor- 
respond with  its  principles  and  rules. 

'"The  decision  of  a  judicial  court,  judging  on  the  law 
of  nations,  can  not  be  considered  more  conclusive  or 
binding  on   others   than  the    judgment   of    that    nation 

5233-n 


162  NATURALIZATION 

expressed  by  a  different  organ  of  its  government.  In 
the  practice  of  nations  there  are  many  instances  of  dif- 
ference of  opinion  as  to  what  acts  are,  or  are  not,  cor- 
respondent with  the  law  of  nations,  and  each  asserting 
and  maintaining  its  right  to  decide  for  itself  against  the 
express  opinion  of  the  other.'  3  Moore's  Int.  Arb. 
3162-3163. 

"The  opinion  of  Mr.  Pinckney  is  even  more  elaborate (3 
Moore's  International  Arbitrations,  3180,  3206).  It  will 
be  remembered  that  the  sentence  (judgment)  of  condem- 
nation in  an  admiralty  court  had,  upon  appeal  of  the 
claimants,  been  affirmed  by  the  lords  commissioners  of 
appeal,  the  supreme  judicature  in  the  Kingdom  in  mat- 
ters of  prize.  The  leading  question  was  whether  the 
international  tribunal  was  bound  and  concluded  by  that 
affirmance  so  as  to  be  prevented  from  examining  into  the 
case.  The  principal  objection  urged  by  the  agent  of  the 
British  government  was  that  the  judgment  was  conclus- 
ive because  it  had  'been  given  in  a  solemn  decision  of 
the  supreme  court  of  the  law  of  nations  in  the  kingdom 
which  other  authorities,  proceeding  by  the  same  law,  are 
bound  to  respect  and  confirm.'  A  brief  quotation  from 
the  opinion  of  the  distinguished  commissioner  will  suffice 
to  show  that  at  this  early  date  in  the  history  of  inter- 
national arbitration  the  conclusiveness  of  a  foreign  judg- 
ment was  disputed  in  a  discussion  of  the  subject  so 
elaborate  and  learned  that  the  views  then  expressed  were 
adopted  by  a  majority  of  his  colleagues  and  accepted  as 
correct  expositions  of  the  doctrine  by  both  governments, 
and  substantially  without  exception  have  been  followed 
by  every  international  tribunal  down  to  the  present 
time.  Says  Mr.  Pinckney: 

"'Upon  the  fullest  consideration  of  this  objection  I 
have  stated  it  to  be  my  opinion  "that  the  affirmance  of 
the  condemnation  by  the  lords  does  in  no  respect  bind  us 
as  commissioners  under  the  seventh  article  of  the  treaty, 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  163 

and  that  it  is  no  further  material  to  our  inquiries  in  the 
execution  of  the  trust  confided  to  us  than  as  it  goes  to 
prove  that  compensation  was  unattainable  by  the  claim- 
ants in  the  ordinary  course  of  justice." 

"'It  has  been  explicitly  understood  that  the  opinion  I 
have  thus  delivered  is  in  precise  conformity  with  that  of 
His  Majesty's  government;  but  as  the  objection  to  which 
it  is  opposed  has  been  repeated  by  the  agent  on  every 
occasion  that  has  since  occurred,  notwithstanding  the 
avowed  disapprobation  of  its  principles  by  those  from 
whom  his  authority  is  derived,  and  as  one  of  the  board 
has  not  only  sustained  the  objection  by  his  ultimate 
opinion,  but  recorded  the  reasons  which  have  induced 
him  to  do  so  in  the  nature  of  a  protest  against  the  de- 
cision of  the  majority,  I  feel  it  to  be  my  duty  to  reduce 
to  writing  and  to  file  the  reflections  which  have  led  me 
to  the  foregoing  conclusion.' 

"Denying  with  indignation  the  suggestion  of  the  British 
agent  that  the  King  was  a  party,  and  therefore  the  judg- 
ment was  more  especially  conclusive,  he  said: 

" '  But  even  if  the  allegation  were  true,  there  is  certainly 
more  novelty  than  correctness  in  the  argument  that  a 
judgment  of  His  Majesty's  own  court,  composed  of  the 
members  of  his  own  council,  is  the  more  especially 
entitled  to  a  conclusive  quality  .  .  .  because  His 
Majesty  was  himself  a  party  to  the  suit.  I  am  very  far 
from  being  disposed  to  insist  that  the  judgment  of  the 
lords  of  appeal  is  less  to  be  respected  on  that  account; 
but  it  is  neither  indecorous  toward  that  high  court  nor 
unreasonable  in  itself  to  say  that  the  extensive  binding 
force,  now  for  the  first  time  attributed  to  their  sen- 
tences, could  not  be  rested  on  a  foundation  so  little  cal- 
culated to  support  it. 

"'In  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  sentence  of  the 
lords  in  this  case  (however  unjust  it  may  be)  is  conclusive 
upon  this  board  under  the  treaty,  it  is  previously  to  be 


164  NATURALIZATION 

inquired  whether  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
independent  of  the  treaty,  would  upon  the  application 
of  the  claimants  for  redress  against  the  capture  and  con- 
demnation confirmed  by  it,  by  way  of  reprisals  or  other- 
wise, be  bound  by  the  law  of  nations  to  esteem  it  just, 
although  upon  the  face  of  it  it  was  manifestly  the  reverse.' 

"The  United  States  has  never  been  more  ably  repre- 
sented on  an  international  commission  than  in  this  initial 
instance  with  Great  Britain.  Mr.  Gore,  popularly  known 
as  the  legal  preceptor  of  Daniel  Webster,  was  one  of  the 
profoundest  lawyers  of  his  day,  filled  many  of  the  high 
places  aspired  to  by  the  profession,  including  the  gov- 
ernorship of  Massachusetts  and  Senator  in  Congress. 
But  his  most  distinguished  service  was  as  a  commissioner 
under  the  treaty  of  1794. 

"Among  the  brilliant  men  who  have  adorned  the  public 
service  of  this  country  William  Pinckney  deservedly 
stands  in  the  front  rank.  John  Bassett  Moore  says  of 
him:  'Never  a  seeker  after  preferment,  he  was  continu- 
ally chosen,  either  by  the  suffrages  of  his  fellow-citizens 
or  by  executive  favor,  to  positions  of  public  trust  and 
responsibility,  which  he  filled  with  distinction  to  himself 
and  advantage  to  his  country.'  At  home  and  abroad,  in 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  in  the  Cabinet,  as  min- 
ister to  Russia  and  the  court  of  Naples  he  was  equal  to 
every  demand.  But  his  distinguishing  preeminence  was 
as  a  lawyer.  No  lawyer  ever  received  a  stronger  tribute 
than  was  paid  to  him  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  a 
formal  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The  Nereide,  9 
Cranch,  388,430. 

"It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  the  opinions  deliv- 
ered by  Mr.  Gore,  and  more  especially  by  Mr.  Pinckney, 
as  members  of  the  board  of  commissioners  under  Article 
VII  of  the  treaty  of  1794,  should  have  been  accepted  by 
the  two  English  great  constitutional  nations  of  the 
world  a  century  ago  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  the 


BY   FORMAL    PAPERS.  165 

international  problems  discussed  by  them.  Nor  is  it  to 
be  marveled  at  that  down  through  our  developing  juris- 
prudence the  principles  enunciated  by  them  have  come 
to  us  as  established  doctrines.  Referring  to  Mr.  Pinck- 
ney's  opinions,  and  especially  the  one  in  the  case  of  the 
Betsey,  Mr.  Wheaton  said:  'They  are  finished  models  of 
judicial  eloquence,  uniting  powerful  and  comprehensive 
argument,  with  a  copious,  pure,   and   energetic  diction.' 

"Another  eminent  writer  on  international  law,  a  publi- 
cist of  world-wide  fame  and  authority,  discussing  this 
question,  says: 

"  'It  was  maintained  before  the  British  and  American 
Mixed  Commission,  sitting  in  London  under  the  treaty  of 
1794,  that  a  decision  of  a  British  prize  court  estopped 
the  party  against  whom  it  was  made  from  proceedings, 
when  a  foreigner,  through  his  own  government.  This  was 
contested  by  Mr.  Pinckney,  and  his  position  was  con- 
firmed by  the  arbitration,  acting  under  the  advice  of 
Lord  Chancellor  Loughborough,  and  is  now  accepted 
law.'    2  Wharton,  2d  ed..  Sec.  242. 

"And  in  3  Wharton  (2d  ed.,  198)  it  is  said: 

'"The  prevalent  opinion  now  is  that  in  international 
controversies  a  sovereign  can  no  more  protect  himself  by 
a  decision  in  his  favor  by  courts  established  by  him, 
even  though  they  be  prize  courts,  than  he  can  by  the 
action  of  any  other  department  of  his  government.' 

"The  doctrine  is  so  generally  approved  by  writers  on 
international  law  that  we  deem  it  unnecessary  to  refer 
any  further  to  that  vast  field  of  authority. 

"Perhaps  no  government  ever  appeared  to  greater  ad- 
vantage than  the  United  States  did  before  the  Geneva 
arbitration,  when  Hon.  Caleb  Cushing,  Hon.  William  M. 
Evarts,  and  Chief  Justice  Waite  maintained  the  doctrine 
of  the  inconclusiveness  of  a  judgment  rendered  in  a 
British  court  before  that  august  tribunal,  in  the  case  of 


166  NATURALIZATION 

The  Florida.  In  that  case  the  vice-admiralty  court  of 
the  Bahamas,  by  its  decree,  which  is  given  at  page  521 
of  the  fifth  volume  of  the  appendix  to  the  American  case, 
acquitted  the  Florida  of  every  charge,  but  the  great 
lawyers  above  named  contended  for  the    principle    that: 

"'As  between  the  claimants  of  the  vessel  and  Her 
Majesty's  government  seeking  to  enforce  a  forfeiture 
under  the  provisions  of  the  foreign  enlistment  act,  this 
decree  may  have  been  conclusive;  but  as  between  the 
United  States  and  Her  Majesty's  government  it  has  not 
that  effect.' 

"And  this  is  exactly  the  distinction  we  are  endeavoring 
here  to  point  out.  Regardless  of  whether  judgments  of 
naturalization  are  under  all  circumstances  conclusive  as 
between  the  naturalized  alien  and  any  other  person  rais- 
ing the  question  in  the  United  States,  Spain  was  no  party 
to  those  proceedings,  and  before  a  tribunal,  whether  in 
all  its  features  international,  or  a  municipal  court  sitting 
in  the  capacity  of  an  international  tribunal,  has  the  right 
to  inquire  into  the  facts  upon  which  those  proceedings 
were  based  and  the  judgment  rendered.  The  conclusive 
character  which  it  is  argued  attaches  to  domestic  judg- 
ments, where  sued  upon  in  another  state  of  the  United 
States,  is,  in  virtue  of  the  constitutional  provision  re- 
quiring that  'full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  in  each 
state  to  the  public  acts,  records,  and  judicial  proceed- 
ings of  every  other  state,'  and  of  the  act  of  Congress 
passed  in  effectuation  of  this  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. The  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  of  Christmas  v. 
Russell,  5  Wallace,  290,  has  adjudicated  this  very  ques- 
tion.    The  court  says: 

"  'Common  law  rules  placed  foreign  judgments  upon  a 
different  footing,  and  those  rules  remain,  as  a  general  re- 
mark, unchanged  to  the  present  time.  Under  these  rules 
a  foreign  judgment  was  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  debt, 
but  it  was  open  to  examination,  not  only  to  show  that 


BY    FORMAL  PAPERS.  167 

the  court  in  which  it  was  rendered  had  no  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter,  but  also  to  show  that  the  judgment 
was  fraudulently  obtained.' 

"It  is  not  denied  that  some  of  the  authorities  relied 
upon  in  support  of  the  conclusiveness  of  a  foreign  judg- 
ment seem  to  sustain  this  contention  and  therefore  may 
serve  to  raise  the  presumption  that  judgments  m  rem, 
under  some  extraordinary  conditions,  may  not  be  inquired 
into,  even  by  an  international  tribunal,  yet  a  close  scrutiny 
of  the  facts,  as  well  as  the  law  in  the  cases  referred  to, 
leave  it  to  be  indisputably  true  that  a  foreign  judgment 
is  universally  impeachable  for  fraud.  Black  states  the 
principle  thus : 

"'In  the  present  state  of  the  English  authorities  it 
seems  to  be  well  settled  that  fraud  may  always  be  set  up 
as  a  ground  of  impeachment  against  a  foreign  judgment, 
and  that  if  it  be  shown  that  fraud  was  successfully  prac- 
ticed in  the  concoction  or  procuring  of  the  judgment  the 
court  will  treat  it  as  of  no  effect  and  will  refuse  to  recog- 
nize or  enforce  it.  (2  Black  on  Judgments,  Sec.  844,  citing 
numerous  English  adjudications.)' 

"  Freeman  on  Judgments  (4th  ed..  Vol.  2,  Sec.  595)  is  to 
the  same  effect,  saying  that  a  foreign  judgment  to  be  con- 
clusive must  be  'free  from  the  taint  of  fraud  in  the  pro- 
curement.' 

"Story  on  Conflict  of  Laws  (Sec.  608),  says: 

"'The  general  doctrine  maintained  in  the  American 
courts  in  relation  to  foreign  judgments  is  that  they  are 
prima  facie  evidence,  but  that  they  are  impeachable; 
but  how  far  and  to  what  extent  this  doctrine  is  to  be 
carried  does  not  seem  to  be  definitely  settled.  It  has 
been  declared  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  and  its 
power  over  the  parties  and  the  things  in  controversy  may 
be  inquired  into,  and  that  the  judgment  may  be  im- 
peached for  fraud.  Beyond  this  no  definite  lines  have  as 
yet  been  drawn.' 


168  NATURALIZATIOX 

"The  inference  clearly  is  that  this  eminent  jurist, writ- 
ing half  a  century  ago,  held  the  opinion  that  foreign  judg- 
ments were  only  prima  facie  evidence,  and  that  they 
were  subject  to  impeachment  generally.  Black  on  Judg- 
ments, the  latest  work,  says: 

"'So  far  as  the  question  has  been  considered  by  our 
own  courts  this  (the  doctrine  of  the  English  authorities, 
supra)  may  be  said  to  be  also  the  prevailing  doctrine  in 
this  country,  citing  Rankin  r.  Goddard,54  Me.  28;  Fisher 
V.  Fielding,  67  Conn.  92;  Hilton  v.  Guyot,  159  U.  S.  113, 
and  many  others.' 

"It  has  very  recently  been  held  in  an  English  case, 
where  the  action  was  upon  a  judgment  recovered  by  the 
plaintiff  against  the  defendant  in  a  Russian  court,  and 
the  defendant  pleaded  that  the  judgment  was  procured 
by  fraud  and  deceit  of  the  plaintiff  and  by  false  repre- 
sentations and  false  evidence  given  to  the  court,  that  the 
defense  was  good  and  sufficient,  and  this  notwithstand- 
ing the  question  of  the  alleged  fraud  had  been  investi- 
gated and  negatived  in  the  foreign  court.  Abouloff  u. 
Oppenheimer,  10  Q.  B.  Div.,  295. 

"Singularly  enough,  Black,  who  refers  to  this  decision 
with  approbation,  follows  this  (see  Sec.  844)  with  the 
remark  that — 

"  'In  a  late  American  case  where  the  same  question  arose 
this  ruling  was  disapproved,  and  it  was  stated  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  English  decision  was  not  borne  out  by 
the  cases  cited  in  its  support,  and  the  opinion  was 
expressed  that  false  testimony  and  the  suppression  of 
the  truth  do  not  constitute  the  kind  of  fraud  by  which  a 
judgment  is  vitiated  and  may  be  nullified.' 

"He  was  referring  to  the  case  of  Hilton  r.  Guyot  (C.C, 
42  Fed.  252),  apparently  overlooking  the  fact  that  this 
case  had  been  reversed  by  the  Supreme  Court  (159  U.  S. 
113).      In    that    case,    on    appeal,    the    Supreme  Court 


BY    FORMAL    PAPERS.  169 

undoubtedly  sustain  the  English  doctrine,  as  stated  by 
Black: 

"'But  it  is  now  established  in  England,  by  well  con- 
sidered and  strongly  reasoned  decisions  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  that  foreign  judgments  may  be  impeached,  if 
procured  by  false  and  fraudulent  representations  and 
testimony  of  the  plaintiff,  even  if  the  same  question  of 
fraud  was  presented  to  and  decided  by  the  foreign  court.' 

"Mr.  Justice  Gray,  who  delivered  the  opinion  in  the 
Hilton  V.  Guyot  case,  and  from  which  the  paragraph  just 
above  quoted  is  taken,  discusses  extensively  the  decisions 
of  foreign  courts  generally  upon  that  question  and  con- 
cludes his  opinion  as  follows: 

"  'In  holding  such  a  judgment,  for  want  of  reciprocity, 
not  to  be  conclusive  evidence  of  the  merits  of  the  claim, 
we  do  not  proceed  upon  any  theory  of  retaliation  upon 
one  person  by  reason  of  injustice  done  to  another;  but 
upon  the  broad  ground  that  international  law  is  founded 
upon  mutuality  and  reciprocity,  and  that  by  the  princi- 
ples of  international  law  recognized  in  most  civilized 
nations,  and  by  the  comity  of  our  own  country,  which  it 
is  our  judicial  duty  to  know  and  to  declare,  the  judgment 
is  not  entitled  to  be  considered  conclusive. 

"  'By  our  law,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitution, a  foreign  judgment  was  considered  as  prima 
facie  evidence,  and  not  conclusive.  There  is  no  statute 
of  the  United  States,  and  no  treaty  of  the  United  States 
with  France,  or  with  any  other  nation,  which  has  changed 
that  law,  or  has  made  any  provision  upon  the  subject. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that,  if  any  statute  or  treaty 
had  been  or  should  be  made,  it  would  recognize  as  con- 
clusive the  judgments  of  any  country  which  did  not  give 
like  effect  to  our  own  judgments.  In  the  absence  of 
statute  or  treaty  it  appears  to  us  equally  unwarrantable 
to  assume  that  the  comity  of  the  United  States  requires 
anything  more. 


170  NATURALIZATION 

"  'If  we  should  hold  this  judgment  to  be  conclusive,  we 
should  allow  it  an  effect  to  which,  supposing  the  defend- 
ants' offers  to  be  sustained  by  actual  proof,  it  would,  in 
the  absence  of  a  special  treaty,  be  entitled  in  hardly  any 
other  country  in  Christendom,  except  the  country  in 
which  it  was  rendered.  If  the  judgment  had  been  ren- 
dered in  this  country,  or  in  any  other  outside  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  France,  the  French  courts  would  not  have 
executed  or  enforced  it,  except  after  examining  into  its 
merits.  The  very  judgment  now  sued  on  would  be  held 
inconclusive  in  almost  any  other  country  than  France. 
In  England,  and  in  the  colonies  subject  to  the  law  of 
England,  the  fraud  alleged  in  its  procurement  would  be 
a  sufficient  ground  for  disregarding  it.  In  the  courts  of 
nearly  every  other  nation  it  would  be  subject  to  reexam- 
ination, either  merely  because  it  was  a  foreign  judgment, 
or  because  judgments  of  that  nation  would  be  reexamin- 
able  in  the  courts  of  France., 

"The  principle  thus  impressively  announced  by  the 
highest  tribunal  in  the  United  States  has  been  announced 
in  many  state  decisions,  but  nowhere  with  more  precision 
and  force  than  in  the  case  of  Bryant  v.  Ela,  Smith  (N.  H.), 
396,  404: 

"  'The  respect  which  is  due  to  judgments,  sentences, 
and  decrees  of  courts  in  a  foreign  state,  by  the  law  of 
nations,  seems  to  be  the  same  which  is  due  to  those  of 
our  own  courts.  Hence  the  decree  of  an  admiralty  court 
abroad  is  equally  conclusive  with  decrees  of  our  admir- 
alty courts.  Indeed,  both  courts  proceed  by  the  same 
rule,  are  governed  by  the  same  law — the  maritime  law  of 
nations  (Coll.  Jurid.  100),  which  is  the  universal  law  of 
nations  except  where  treaties  alter  it. 

"  'The  same  comity  is  not  extended  to  judgments  or  de- 
crees which  may  be  founded  on  the  municipal  laws  of  the 
state  in  which  they  are  pronounced.  Independent  states 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  171 

do  not  choose  to  adopt  such  decisions  without  examina- 
tion. These  laws  and  regulations  may  be  unjust,  partial 
to  citizens,  and  against  foreigners;  they  may  operate  in- 
justice to  our  citizens,  whom  we  are  bound  to  protect; 
they  may  be,  and  the  decisions  of  courts  founded  on 
them,  just  cause  of  complaint  against  the  supreme  power 
of  the  state  where  rendered.  To  adopt  them  is  not  merely 
saying  that  the  courts  have  decided  correctly  on  the 
law,  but  it  is  approbating  the  law  itself.  Wherever,  then, 
the  court  may  have  proceeded  on  municipal  law  the  rule 
is  that  the  judgments  are  not  conclusive  evidence  of 
debt,  but  prima  facie  evidence  only.  The  proceedings 
have  not  the  conclusive  quality  which  is  annexed  to  the 
records  or  proceedings  of  our  own  courts,  where  we  ap- 
prove both  of  the  rule  and  of  the  judges  who  interpret 
and  apply  it.  A  foreign  judgment  may  be  impeached; 
defendant  may  show  that  it  is  unjust,  or  that  it  was 
irregularly  or  unduly  obtained.     Doug.  5,  note.' 

"Referring  to  all  the  treaties  and  the  decisions  of  inter- 
national tribunals  since  the  treaty  of  1794  with  Great 
Britain  down  to  the  arbitrations  just  concluded  with 
Venezuela,  we  have  been  unable  to  find  a  single  case  in 
which  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  case  of  the  Betsey, 
and  which  is  in  this  case  adhered  to,  where  the  contrary 
doctrine — the  one  contended  for  by  claimants  in  this 
case — has  been  maintained.  The  only  instance  in  which 
there  is  a  semblance  of  a  departure  from  this  doctrine 
was  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  and  Spanish  Com- 
mission of  1871.  Mr.  Blaine,  then  Secretary  of  State, 
instructed  the  agents  of  the  United  States,  in  regard  to 
the  powers  of  that  Commission  that  *a  certificate  of 
naturalization  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  can  not 
be  impeached  for  fraud  before  an  international  commis- 
sion.' It  is  clearly  shown  by  his  letter,  that,  as  the 
Commission  had  been  established  by  the  executive  act 


172  NATURALIZATION 

of  the  United  States  and  Spain,  and  as  tlie  executive 
departments  of  the  two  governments  had  no  power  to 
annul  or  impeach  a  judgment  of  the  other  country,  it  was 
his  opinion  that  the  Commission,  the  creature  of  the  two 
countries,  could  not.  Mr.  Evarts,  however,  Mr.  Blaine's 
predecessor  as  Secretary  of  State,  and  Mr.  Frelinghuysen, 
his  successor  in  office,  both  great  lawyers,  held  opinions 
contrary  to  Mr.  Blaine's.  Mr.  Evarts  said,  in  his  letter 
to  the  Spanish  minister,  March  4,  1880,  in  regard  to  the 
powers  of  the  Spanish-American  Commission  of  1871, 
that — 

"'The  Government  of  the  United  States  from  the  first 
considered,  and  it  is  still  maintained,  that  the  Commis- 
sion established  under  the  convention  of  1871  was  an 
independent  judicial  tribunal,  possessed  of  all  the  powers 
and  endowed  with  all  the  properties  which  should  dis- 
tinguish a  court  of  high  international  jurisdiction,  alike 
competent  in  the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  it  to  bring 
under  judgment  the  decisions  of  the  local  courts  of  both 
nations,  and  beyond  the  competence  of  either  govern- 
ment to  interfere  with,  direct,  or  obstruct  its  delibera- 
tions.' 

"And  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  wrote  to  Mr.  Suydam, counsel 
for  the  United  States  before  the  Commission,  September 
25,  1882,  as  follows: 

"'This  government,  while  holding,  as  before  stated, 
that  the  judgment  of  naturalization,  unimpeached  by 
fraud,  is  complete  evidence  of  its  own  validity,  can  not 
deny  that,  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  the  certifi- 
cate of  naturalization  may  be  proven  to  have  been  ob- 
tained fraudulently.  .  .  .  The  true  rule  to  govern 
the  Commission  is  that  when  an  allegation  of  naturaliza- 
tion is  traversed  and  the  allegation  is  established  prima 
facie  by  the  production  of  a  certificate  of  naturalization, 
or  by  other  competent  and  sufficient  proof,  it  can  only 
be  impeached  by  showing  that  the  court  which  granted 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  173 

it  was  without  jurisdiction,  or  by  showing,  in  conformity 
with  the  adjudications  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States 
on  that  topic,  that  fraud,  consisting  of  intentional  and 
dishonest  misrepresentation  or  suppression  of  material 
facts  by  the  party  obtaining  the  judgment,  was  practiced 
upon  it,  or  that  the  naturalization  was  granted  in  viola- 
tion of  a  treaty  stipulation  or  of  a  rule  of  international 
law.' 

"The  case  of  Ortega,  No.  91,  before  the  United  States 
and  Spanish  Commission  of  1871,  was  decided  before 
Secretary  Blaine  asserted  the  proposition  that  a  judg- 
ment of  naturalization  was  conclusive  of  every  question 
before  the  Commission.  In  that  case  the  judgment  was 
not  attacked  for  fraud  nor  for  any  want  of  jurisdiction 
in  the  court  which  granted  it,  but  merely  on  the  grounds 
that  the  proceedings  were  irregular,  and  that  the  facts 
before  the  court  granting  the  naturalization  were  untrue. 
The  only  question  before  the  Commission  was  its  right  to 
go  behind  the  judgment  and  ascertain  the  truth;  and 
upon  their  interpretation  of  international  law,  they  held 
that  the  judgment  of  naturalization  granted  by  a  court 
of  the  United  States  of  competent  jurisdiction  was  not 
conclusive.  It  was,  perhaps,  because  of  the  possible 
effect  of  this  decision  upon  future  cases  that  Secretary 
Blaine  took  the  emphatic  position  he  did,  which  tempor- 
arily arrested  the  progress  of  the  Commission  and  re- 
sulted in  a  modification  of  the  agreement  between  the 
two  governments  under  which  the  Commission  was  sit- 
ting. This  also  explains  Secretary  Frelinghuysen's 
diplomatic  reference  to  the  'terms  of  the  agreement'  in 
his  letter  of  September  25,  1882,  in  which  he  says:  'This 
government,  while  holding,  as  before  stated,  that  the 
judgment  of  naturalization,  unimpeached  by  fraud,  is 
complete  evidence  of  its  own  validity,  can  not  deny  that, 
under  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  the  certificate  of 
naturalization    may  be    proven  to    have  been  obtained 


174  NATURALIZATION 

fraudulently.'  A  close  study  of  Mr.  Blaine's  letter,  and 
the  argument  of  the  advocate  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Buzzi  case,  No.  22,  which  arose  subsequent  to  Mr.  Blaine's 
declaration,  leads  us  to  think  that  their  contention  was 
based  on  the  theory  that  the  agreement  itself  expressly 
limited  the  right  of  Spain  to  require  the  production  of 
the  naturalization  papers,  and  when  they  were  shown, 
the  right  to  question  the  naturalization  was  at  an  end. 
At  any  rate  all  the  cases  before  that  Commission  involv- 
ing this  question,  whether  before  or  after  Mr.  Blaine's 
declaration  and  the  modification  of  the  terms  of  the 
agreement,  were  decided  against  the  conclusiveness  of  a 
foreign  judgment.  (See  in  addition  to  cases  before  re- 
ferred to,  Angarica,  No.  17,  and  Criado,  No.  29.) 

"The  United  States  and  Mexican  Commission  of  1873,  in 
the  case  of  Rowlands  v.  Mexico,  which  was  a  customs 
case,  where  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mexico  ordered  the 
restoration  of  the  property,  the  Commission  held  that  it 
had  jurisdiction,  and  disregarded  the  judgment  of  the 
Mexican  court,  which  had  refused  damages  and  costs  and 
awarded  claimant  $18,000.  This  and  other  cases  fol- 
lowing show  that  the  decisions  on  this  subject  are  not 
peculiar  to  prize  judgments. 

"Before  the  United  States  and  Costa  Rica  Commission 
of  1860,  in  the  Medina  case,  it  was  held  that  the  Com- 
mission was  not  bound  by  a  judgment  of  naturalization 
in  the  United  States.  The  case  is  reported  at  length  in  3 
Moore's  International  Arbitrations,  page  2583,  et  seq. 
The  following  brief  extract,  however,  will  clearly  show 
the  opinion  of  that  Commission: 

"  'To  give  to  naturalization  certificates  in  a  foreign  land 
or  before  an  international  tribunal  an  absolute  value, 
which  they  have  not  in  the  United  States,  where  they 
may  eventually  be  set  aside,  while  Costa  Rica,  not  recog- 
nizing the  jurisdiction  of  any  tribunal  in  the  United 
States,  would  be   left  with  no  remedy.     Moreover,  this 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  175 

Commission  would  be  placed  in  an  inferior  position  and 
denied  a  faculty  which  is  said  to  belong  to  a  tribunal  in 
the  United  States.'* 

"The  United  States  and  MexicanCommission  of  1868,  in 
the  case  of  Mather  and  Glover,  No.  178,  referring  to  a 
judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mexico,  and  speaking 
by  Commissioner  Wadsworth,  says: 

"  '  Such  a  decision  by  the  Supreme  Court  may  be  binding 
upon  all  inferior  tribunals  in  Mexico,  and  while  it  is 
entitled  to  much  respect  here  it  is  not  conclusive  upon 
this  Commission.' 

"The  British  and  American  Mixed  Commission  of  1871 
held  that  it  had  power  to  review  judgments  in  prize  cases 
in  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  Hale's  report  of  that 
Commission,  on  page  88,  says: 

"  'The  question  was  early  raised,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  these  prize  cases 
by  the  Commission,  both  in  respect  to  cases  where  the  de- 
cision of  the  ultimate  appellate  tribunal  of  the  United 
States  had  been  had,  and  to  those  in  which  no  appeal  had 
been  prosecuted  on  the  part  of  the  claimants  to  such  ulti- 
mate tribunal.  As  to  the  former  class  of  cases,  the  under- 
signed may  properly  state  that  he  personally  entertained 
no  doubt  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commission  as  an 
international  tribunal  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  prize 
courts  of  the  United  States  where  the  parties  alleging 
themselves  aggrieved  had  prosecuted  their  claims  by  ap- 
peal to  the  court  of  last  resort.  As  this  jurisdiction, 
however,  had  been  sometimes  questioned,  he  deemed  it 

*NoTE — There  appears  to  be  a  slight  omission  in  this  citation.  The 
umpire's  words  at  this  point  of  his  decision,  as  reported  in  3  Moore's 
International  Arbitrations,  2587-8,  are  as  follows: 

"  It  has  been  alleged  in  behalf  of  the  claimants  that  even  admitting 
that  these  acts  of  naturalization  are  intrinsically  void,  it  is  not  in  the 
power  of  this  commission  to  reject  them  as  proof,  if  they  are  not  first 
set  aside  as  fraudulent  by  the  same  tribunal  from  which  they  were 
obtained. 

"  To  admit  this  would  give  those  certificates  in  a  foreign  land  or 
before  an  international  tribunal  an  absolute  value,  which  they  have  not 
in  the  United  States,"  etc. 


176  NATURALIZATION 

desirable  that  a  formal  adjudication  by  the  Commission 
should  be  had  upon  this  question.  The  Commission 
unanimously  sustained  their  jurisdiction  in  this  class  of 
of  cases,  and,  as  will  be  seen,  all  the  members  of  the 
Commission  at  some  time  joined  in  awards  against  the 
United  States  in  such  cases.' 

"The  United  States  and  French  Commission  of  1880,  in 
the  Kuhnagel  case,  as  reported  in  3  Moore's  International 
Arbitrations,  page  2649,  held  that  the  Commission  'had 
the  right  to  examine  the  original  proceedings  for  natu- 
ralization, and,  finding  that  the  certificate  of  naturaliza- 
tion was  obtained  by  misrepresentation  of  material  facts, 
we  hold  it  to  be  null  and  void.' 

"Before  the  Geneva  Tribunal  it  was  urged  by  Great 
Britain  that  the  [judgment  of  the]  Vice-Admiralty  Court 
in  the  Bahamas  acquitting  the  Florida  should  be  ac- 
cepted as  conclusive.  This  great  tribunal,  however,  held 
otherwise,  and  several  opinions  were  delivered  on  the 
subject.  The  opinion  of  Count  Sclopis,  speaking  for  the 
Commission,  says: 

"  'The  decision  of  the  vice-admiralty  court  may  then  be 
considered  as  conclusive,  even  if  not  perfectly  correct,  as 
between  those  who  claimed  the  vessel  and  the  British 
Government,  which  claimed  its  confiscation  under  the 
clauses  of  the  foreign-enlistment  act;  but  I  do  not  think 
it  is  sufficient  to  bar  the  claim  of  the  United  States 
against  Great  Britain.  The  United  States  were  not  par- 
ties to  the  suit;  everything  relating  to  it  is  for  them  res 
inter  alios  acta.' 

"Mr.  Staempfli  in  a  separate  opinion  in  the  same  matter 
says: 

"  'The  objection  that  the  judicial  decision  at  Nassau 
relieves  Great  Britain  of  all  responsibility  can  not  be 
maintained.  As  regards  the  internal  (or  municipal)  law, 
the  judgment  is  valid;  but  as  far  as  international  law  is 
concerned,  it  does  not  alter  the  position  of  Great  Britain.' 
Papers  Relating  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  Vol.  4,  92. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS,  177 

"  Before  the  very  recent  Commission  between  the  United 
States  and  Venezuela  of  1903  the  identical  question  that 
we  have  here  under  consideration  arose,  namely,  the  con- 
clusiveness of  a  judgment  of  naturalization  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  unanimous  decision  of  the  Commission 
was  that  such  a  judgment  is  not  'conclusive  upon  the 
United  States  or  upon  this  tribunal.'  The  opinion  was 
rendered  for  the  Commission  by  Mr.  Bainbridge,  Com- 
missioner for  the  United  States.  It  gives  an  exhaustive 
resume  of  the  adjudications  by  international  tribunals, 
the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  England  and  the  United 
States,  also  of  the  diplomatic  expressions  of  the  State 
Department,  and  expresses  its  own  conclusions  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  'The  present  Commission  is  charged  with  the  duty  of 
examining  and  deciding  all  claims  by  citizens  of  the 
United  States  against  the  Republic  of  Venezuela.  It  is 
absolutely  essential  to  its  jurisdiction  over  any  claim 
presented  to  it  to  determine  at  the  outset  the  American 
citizenship  of  the  claimant.  And  the  fact  of  such  citi- 
zenship, like  any  other  fact,  must  be  proved  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Commission,  or  jurisdiction  must  be 
held  wanting. 

"  'Whatever  may  be  the  conclusive  force  of  judgments 
of  naturalization  under  the  municipal  laws  of  the  country 
in  which  they  are  granted,  international  tribunals,  such 
as  this  Commission,  have  claimed  and  exercised  the  right 
to  determine  for  themselves  the  citizenship  of  claimants 
from  all  the  facts  presented.'  See  Ralston's  report, 
Venezuelan  Arbitrations,  1903,  42,  and  authorities  there 
cited. 

"No  case  has  come  under  our  observation  where  the 
question  arose  before  a  purely  domestic  tribunal  exer- 
cising international  powers  and  jurisdiction,  but  it  is  not 
perceived  that  the  rule  could  or  should  be  different  in 
such  a  case. 

"The  judgment  of  naturalization  is  pnma/ac^e  evidence 

5233—12 


178  NATURALIZATION 

of  its  regularity  and  will  be  given  'full  faith  and  credit ' 
until  the  defendant  overcomes  its  conclusiveness  by 
proof.  The  degree  of  proof  which  will  constitute  a  suf- 
ficient demonstration  by  the  defense  in  cases  of  fraudu- 
lent naturalization  must  necessarily  rest  in  the  discretion 
of  the  Commission,  there  being  no  adjudicated  cases,  so 
far  as  we  have  been  able  to  discover,  which  furnish  de- 
finitive guides  in  this  regard. 

"The  burden  upon  the  defendant  in  this  case  is  to  prove 
the  legal  fraud  perpetrated  by  claimant  in  the  procure- 
ment of  his  naturalization  certificate  and  can  not  be 
shifted  by  evidence  showing  errors  or  irregularities  in 
the  proceedings  or  by  raising  a  doubt  merely  in  the  mind 
of  the  Commission,  The  proof  can  not  stop  at  showing 
that  the  facts  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court  which  granted  naturalization  were  false.  It  must 
at  least  go  to  the  extent  of  satisfying  the  Commission 
that  the  claimant  knew  the  statements  and  representa- 
tions made  by  him  at  the  time  he  filed  his  original  declara- 
tion and  at  the  time  of  procuring  the  judgment  were  false, 
or  facts  must  be  proven  from  which  such  fraud  would  be 
implied,  and  it  must  appear  that  his  false  representations 
and  the  representations  procured  by  him  to  be  made  by 
the  other  witnesses  were  intentionally  used  by  him  for 
the  purpose  of  deceiving  the  court  and  thereby  securing 
his  certificate  of  naturalization. 

"The  demurrer  to  defendant's  amendment  to  the  answer 
is  overruled  without  arresting  the  further  progress  of  the 
case,  which  will  proceed  now  to  a  hearing  upon  evidence 
to  be  submitted  regarding  fraud." 

Commissioner  Maury,  in  an  able  dissenting  opinion, 
after  setting  forth  the  facts,  the  contentions  of  the  par- 
ties, and  the  status  of  the  case  before  the  Commission, 
said: 

"The  Commission,  without  any  claim  whatever  of  juris- 
diction to  cancel  or  compel  the  surrender  of  the  certifi- 
cate of  naturalization  issued  to  Ruiz,  has,  nevertheless, 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  179 

by  overruling  the  demurrer,  concluded  to  go  behind  the 
certificate  and  investigate  the  charge  of  fraud  in  its  pro- 
curement, and,  in  case  the  charge  is  established,  refuse 
to  give  the  certificate  effect  in  this  case,  leaving  it,  how- 
ever, to  be  treated  as  a  valid  and  operative  certificate 
for  all  other  purposes  in  the  hands  of  the  widow  and 
children  of  Ruiz.  In  other  words,  as  I  understand  the 
position  of  the  Commission,  it  amounts  to  this,  in  the 
last  analysis,  that  the  certificate  of  naturalization  held 
by  Ruiz  for  seventeen  years,  and  up  to  his  death,  is 
worthless  in  this  case  on  what  I  conceive  to  be  ethical 
grounds,  but  that  it  may  be,  at  the  same  time,  valid  and 
operative  elsewhere  on  juridical  groimds. 

"The  position  of  the  Commission  is  contradictory  to 
one  of  the  best  settled  and  most  useful  principles  of 
private  international  law;  which  is  remarkable,  consider- 
ing that  the  Commission  in  deciding  this  case  has  pro- 
ceeded on  the  idea  that  it  is  invested  with  the  powers 
of  an  international  tribunal  established  by  treaty  be- 
tween nations,  'among  which,  it  is  said,  is  the  power  of 
administering  justice  by  the  rules  of  the  law  of  nations, 
unhampered  by  those  of  municipal  law.  And  here  it 
should  be  understood  that  by  a  fiction  Spain,  without 
interest,  substantial  or  sentimental,  is  made  to  perform 
a  ghostly  part  in  the  purely  domestic  controversies  be- 
tween American  citizens  and  their  government  before 
this  Commission,  which,  by  this  forced  process,  is  sup- 
posed to  be  invested  with  an  international  character. 

"It  is  conceded  that  by  the  municipal  law,  as  laid  down 
in  the  federal  and  state  courts  of  the  United  States,  the 
Commission  could  not  have  overruled  petitioners'  de- 
murrer, and  I  hope  to  be  able  to  show  that  the  action  of 
the  Commission  on  the  demurrer  is  equally  unwarranted 
by  the  law  of  nations. 

"I  will  begin  by  quoting  a  remark  of  Lord  Hardwicke's 
which  is  characterized  by  great  good  sense  and  fre- 
quently referred  to.  His  Lordship,  speaking  with  regard 


180  NATURALIZATION 

to  the  alleged  validity  of  a  certain  foreign  marriage, 
said:  'It  has  been  argued  to  be  valid  from  being  estab- 
lished by  the  sentence  of  a  court  in  France  having  proper 
jurisdiction.  And  it  is  true,  that  if  so,  it  is  conclusive, 
whether  in  a  foreign  court  or  not,  from  the  law  of  na- 
tions in  such  cases;  otherwise  the  rights  of  inankind 
would  be  very  precarious  aiid  uncertain.^  Roach  v. 
Garvan,  1  Ves.  Sr.  159. 

"Upon  the  same  principle  of  general  international  con- 
venience the  Supreme  Court,  in  the  great  Kosciusko 
case,  allowed  in  evidence,  to  prove  kinship,  two  decrees 
of  Russian  Courts  of  Nobility,  treating  them  as  purely 
in  rem  and  good  '  against  all  the  world,'  having  been 
rendered  by  courts  of  competent  jurisdiction.  Ennis  v. 
Smith,  14  How.  400,  430. 

'"It  is  for  the  convenience  of  mankind  that  judgments 
in  rem  should  be  binding  on  all  the  world,  .  .  .'  said 
Mr.  Justice  Fry,  interrupting  counsel,  in  the  case  of  De 
Mora  V.  Concha  (29  Ch.  Div.  292),  where  the  effect  of 
judgments  in  rem  was  extremely  well  discussed  at  the 
bar. 

"There  is  commanding  authority  for  the  proposition 
that  judgments  in  rem  defining  permanent  personal 
status  are  not  open  to  attack  or  question  collaterally  for 
any  purpose.  The  convenience  of  the  nations  requires 
that  such  status  should  stand  effective  everywhere  until 
annulled  by  the  authority  that  defined  it.  And  the  same 
may  be  said  of  cases  of  permanent  status  not  originating 
in  a  judicial  act. 

"By  permanent  status  I  mean  a  personality  conferred 
by  law  without  limitation  as  to  time  or  place,  such  as 
naturalization,  legitimacy,  adoption,  and  marriage.  See 
Minor  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  Sec.  71,  note  5,  p.  143,  and 
Sec.  97,  p.  212,  ed.  1901;  Miller  v.  Miller,  91  N.  Y.  315,  319; 
Ross  V.  Ross,  129  Mass.  243;  Adams  v.  Adams,  154  Mass. 
290,  293. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  181 

"The  principle  as  stated  above  belongs  to  private  in- 
ternational law  and  not  to  municipal  law,  although,  of 
course,  recognized  by  it,  as  is  obvious  from  the  follow- 
ing authorities: 

"Story  says  that  this  rule,  so  widely  favored  by  the 
continental  jurists,  owes  its  beginning  to  'the  extreme 
inconvenience  which  would  otherwise  result  to  all  nations 
from  a  perpetual  fluctuation  of  capacity,  state,  and  con- 
dition upon  every  accidental  change  of  place  of  the 
person  or  of  his  movable  property.'  Conflict  of  Laws, 
Sec.  67. 

"The  rule  as  to  personal  status  is  the  result  of  the  tacit 
agreement  of  nations,  attested  by  the  almost  unanimous 
agreement  of  authors.  Foelix,  Droit  International,  par 
Demangeat,  Tome  1,  p.  64,  Paris,  1866. 

"Boullenois  says  that  the  rule  is  for  the  greatest  good 
of  commerce  and  of  intercourse  among  men.  Traite, 
etc.,  Tome  1,  152.  He  also  refers  to  the  fact  that  Bur- 
gundus,  who  denied  any  effect  to  a  judgment  outside 
the  country  where  rendered,  made  a  single  exception  in 
favor  of  judgments  that  determine  the  status  and  condi- 
tions of  persons.     Id.,  603. 

"Pardessus  says:  'The  general  consent  of  civilized 
nations  has  decreed  that  whatever  concerns  the  capacity 
of  an  individual  should  be  regulated  by  the  laws  of  the 
country  to  which  he  belongs.'     See  Foelix,  Tome  1,  62. 

"To  these  authorities  Foelix  and  Demangeat  add  a  long 
list  of  others,  to  the  same  effect.     Id.,  62. 

"From  this  universality  of  the  permanent  personal 
status,  we  have  the  necessary,  the  inevitable  deduction  of 
its  unity  and  indivisibility.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say 
that  it  clings  to  the  individual  as  the  leprosy  does  to  the 
skin,  to  borrow  the  forcible,  if  not  elegant,  illustration 
of  some  of  the  older  authorities.  Boullenois  says  the 
personal  status  pervades  the  whole  being  to  whom  it  be- 
longs. Others  illustrate  the  idea  thus:  Qualitas  per- 
sonam sicut  umhra  sequitur. 


182  NATURALIZATION 

"To  violate  this  principle  of  unity  and  indivisibility,  as 
the  Commission  appears  to  have  done  unconsciously 
in  this  case,  is  to  commit  a  legal  solecism;  for  how  can 
we  speak  of  a  person  as,  at  the  same  time,  legitimate  and 
illegitimate;  as  of  age  and  not  of  age;  as  capable  and 
incapable  of  managing  his  affairs,  and  as  being  a  citizen 
and  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States?  Such  is  the 
character  of  the  illustrations  used  by  the  Continental 
jurists.  Fcelix,  Tome  1,  61;  Proudhon,  Traite  des  Per- 
sonnes.  Tome  1,  82. 

"Indeed,  it  would  be  as  incongruous  to  speak  of  a  per- 
son as  a  leper  in  part  and  at  the  same  time  as  whole, 
or  as  illegitimate  in  some  respects  although  judicially 
found  to  be  legitimate  in  all  respects,  or  as  having  two 
mothers,  as  for  an  international  tribunal  to  declare  a 
man  an  alien  for  the  purposes  of  a  particular  case,  who 
is  at  the  same  time  admitted  to  be  a  citizen  in  all  re- 
spects by  a  judgment  of  naturalization  rendered  by  a 
competent  court. 

"In  the  face  of  these  great  names  I  am  unable  to  see 
how  this  Commission,  assuming,  as  it  does  in  this  case, 
to  have  the  power  that  belongs  to  an  international  tri- 
bunal established  by  treaty  between  nations,  can  con- 
sistently refuse  to  respect  the  principle  of  unity  and 
indivisibility  which  is  ascribed  to  personal  status  by  the 
private  law  of  nations.  This  is  the  more  remarkable 
when  we  consider  that  a  judgment  fixing  the  status  of  a 
mere  thing  is  unassailable  collaterally  anywhere,  although 
the  validity  of  the  reasons  for  such  judgment  may  he 
inquired  into,  a  distinction  which  does  not  appear  to 
have  excited  the  attention  of  the  majority.  De  Mora  v. 
Concha,  supra.  In  other  words,  a  judgment  fixing  the 
status  of  a  ship  stands  on  a  higher  plane  than  one  estab- 
lishing the  citizenship  or  legitimacy  of  an  individual, 
which  is  hardly  agreeable  to  reason. 

"In  a  recent  great  case  in  England  it  was  seriously 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  183 

doubted  whether  any  degree  of  fraud  in  a  foreign  sen- 
tence in  rem  would  affect  the  title  of  a  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser under  that  sentence.  Castrique  v.  Imbie,  L.  R.  4 
H.  L.  414,  433.  With  such  a  case  compare  that  of  the 
innocent  widow  and  children  of  Ruiz  standing  in  the 
presence  of  this  charge  of  fraud  against  the  husband 
and  the  father,  made  for  the  first  time  eight  years  after 
his  death  and  twenty-five  years  after  the  judgment  of 
naturalization  was  rendered.  Are  not  these  innocents 
entitled  to  as  much  protection  under  their  judgment  in 
rem  as  the  innocent  purchaser  in  the  case  supposed 
possibly  could  be  ?  Dismiss  them  from  the  Commission 
with  the  impress  of  American  nationality  still  on  them 
uneffaced,  and  we  give  Spain  unanswerable  ground  to 
repudiate  them  as  Spanish  claimants,  while  by  our  own 
act  we  make  them  outcasts  with  nowhere  to  turn  for 
redress. 

"Why  the  United  States  did  not  institute  a  direct 
proceeding  in  the  proper  court  to  cancel  the  certificate 
of  naturalization  issued  to  Ruiz  has  not  been  explained; 
and  my  voice  is  against  allowing  her  to  do  per  indirectum 
what  it  would,  perhaps,  better  become  her  dignity  to 
do  per  directum.  Indeed,  if  the  matter  pleaded  by  the 
defense  were  not  hopelessly  bad,  the  Commission  might 
now  by  analogy  to  the  practice  in  chancery,  order  the 
counsel  for  the  government  to  institute  a  direct  pro- 
ceeding in  the  proper  court  to  cancel  the  Ruiz  certifi- 
ficate,  holding  this  case,  meanwhile  in  abeyance. 

"But  whether  Ruiz  was  forsworn  or  not  in  obtaining 
naturalization,  I  do  not  think  the  government  should  be 
permitted  to  raise  a  contest  on  the  point  with  his  widow 
and  children  by  a  direct  proceeding  even. 

"Ruiz  having  held  unquestioned  the  s^a^i^s  of  citizen  of 
the  United  States  up  to  the  time  of  his  death,  some 
seventeen  years,  I  deem  it  too  late  to  spring  the 
issue  when  he,  the  only  witness  who,  presumably  could 


184  NATURALIZATION 

meet  it,  is  in  his  grave.  His  lips  being  sealed  the  govern- 
ment should  not  be  allowed  to  speak  either. 

"Such  a  proceeding  is  against  fair  play  everywhere,  and 
humanity  revolts  at  it.  I  take  pride  in  saying  that  the 
common  law  abhorred  it.  By  that  system,  where  a  man, 
born  out  of  wedlock  of  parents  who  afterwards  inter- 
married, was  treated  by  them  as  legitimate  all  his  life 
and  on  his  father's  death  allowed  to  enter  as  heir  and 
die  '  seized  in  peace  '  leaving  a  son,  for  instance,  that 
son  took  by  descent  to  the  exclusion  of  the  lawful  heir, 
whose  entry  and  action  were  taken  away  absolutely ,* 
because  to  allow  either  would  have  been  to  bastardize 
after  death  him  who  had  been  treated  as  legitimate 
all  his  life,  which  the  law  would  not  tolerate.  Justum 
non  est  aliquem  post  mortem  facere  bastardum  qui  toto 
tempore  vitce  suce  pro  legitimo  habebatur.  Co.  Litt. 
244a;  Sir  Richard   Lechford's  case,  8  Co.  Rep.  101a. 

"Can  Ruiz,  who  lived  and  died  a  lawful  citizen,  now  be 
made  a  bastard  citizen  in  his  grave,  as  it  were,  for  the 
purpose  of  defeating  the  claim  of  his  innocent  widow  and 
children? 

"In  the  recent  case  of  Clyde  Mattox  v.  The  United 
States  (156  U.  S.  237),  you  will  find  this  principle  of  fair 
play  strongly  upheld.  There  it  is  laid  down  that  a  wit- 
ness on  a  former  trial  who  had  died  could  not  be  discred- 

*  "Note — This  is  remarkable,  because  in  other  instances  descent  cast 
only  puts  the  real  owner  fo  his  action,  but  here  descent  cast  destroys  the 
right,  leaving  the  lawful  heir,  though  an  infant  at  the  time  of  descent  cast, 
neither  entry  nor  right.     Says  Lord  Coke: 

'"  Hereby  it  appeareth  that  this  discent  diflfereth  from  other  discents, 
for  this  discent  barreth  the  right  of  the  mulier  [the  lawful  heir], 
whereas  other  discents  do  take  away  the  entrie  only  of  him  that  right 
hath,  and  leaveth  him  to  his  action,  but  here  by  the  dying  seised  of  the 
bastard,  his  issue  is  become  lawfull  heire.  It  is  holden  that  if  the  mulier 
[the  lawful  heir]  bee  within  age  at  the  time  of  the  dying  seised,  that 
nevertheless  hee  shall  bee  barred,  because  the  issue  of  the  bastard  is  in 
judgment  of  law  become  lawfull  heire,  and  the  law  doth  prefer  legitima- 
tion before  the  privilege  of  infancie.'     Co.  Litt.  ubi  supra. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  185 

ited  on  the  second  trial  by  evidence  of  contradictory 
statements,  because  death  had  cut  him  off  from  an  op- 
portunity to  protect  his  character  and  explain  away  the 
supposed  contradiction;  and  this,  though  justice  itself 
should  thereby  fail. 

"Could  there  be  a  stronger  plea  for  the  application  of 
the  principle  of  fair  play  than  the  case  before  us  pre- 
sents? 

"But  assuming  it  to  be  of  moment,  which  in  in  my  judg- 
ment it  is  not,  to  determine  whether  this  Commission  is 
entitled  to  take  rank  with  international  tribunals  or  is 
only  a  domestic  municipal  court,  I  am  of  opinion  that  a 
tribunal  to  be  international  and,  therefore,  as  held  by 
the  majority,  unhampered  by  municipal  law,  must  in  the 
nature  of  things  be  created  by  treaty  between  independ- 
ent nations,  and  that  it  seems  repugnant  to  reason  to 
hold  that  Congress  had  power  to  invest  this  Commission 
with  authority  to  exercise  a  jurisdiction  above  and  be- 
yond the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  and 
the  jurisprudence  administered  by  the  Federal  courts. 

"It  is  true  Congress  has  power  to  establish  prize  courts 
whose  jurisdiction  is  to  administer  international  law  in 
time  of  war  in  connection  with  maritime  captures,  but 
the  authority  to  do  so  is  necessarily  implied  from  the 
power  conferred  by  the  Constitution  on  Congress  to  de- 
clare war.  So  with  the  jurisdiction  conferred  by  Con- 
gress on  consular  courts  established  in  oriental  coun- 
tries. Such  legislation  is  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out 
the  provisions  of  treaties  entered  into  between  the  United 
States  and  such  countries  and  is  not  necessarily  in  har- 
mony with  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  (Re- 
vised Statutes  of  the  United  States,  Sec.  4083,  and  the 
following  sections  to  the  end  of  Title  XLVII.) 

"Plainly,  there  is  nothing  in  the  treaty  of  peace  that 
calls  for  the  establishment  of  an  international  tribunal 


186  NATURALIZATION 

or,  indeed,  one  of  any  kind.  The  most  that  can  be  said  is 
that  by  Article  VII  of  the  treaty  the  United  States 
agreed  to  'adjudicate  and  settle'  the  claims  released  by 
the  article,  but  it  was  left  entirely  to  the  United  States 
to  determine  how  the  stipulation  should  be  carried  out. 
Indeed,  the  failure  of  the  treaty  to  designate  the  way  in 
which  the  adjudication  should  be  performed  is,  of  itself, 
conclusive  evidence  that  the  matter  was  left  entirely  to 
the  United  States^  Spain  having  no  longer  any  interest  in 
the  released  claims,  which  she  had  fully  satisfied  by  ces- 
sions of  territory,  although,  indeed,  her  spectre  is  being 
continually  raised  here  to  serve  some  special  purpose. 

"Of  course  this  Commission,  like  any  other  domestic 
court,  must  apply  the  rules  of  international  law  when 
applicable;  but,  at  the  same  time,  where  that  code  con- 
flicts with  municipal  law  the  latter  must  govern  as  the 
law  of  the  land.  When,  therefore,  Congress  legislates  in 
contravention  of  a  treaty,  the  courts  hold  that  such 
legislation  supersedes  the  treaty  as  a  rule  of  civil  con- 
duct; notwithstanding  the  treaty, by  the  law  of  nations, 
stands  unrepealed,  so  far  as  the  other  contracting  power 
is  concerned. 

"The  case  of  The  Ship  Rose  v.  The  United  States  (36 
Ct.  Cls.  290)  seems  to  be  much  relied  on  as  an  authority 
to  show  that  this  Commission,  in  doing  what  it  calls  in- 
ternational justice,  is  not  to  be  controlled  by  municipal 
law.  But  I  think  the  case  is  misconceived  and  not  at  all 
in  point.  * 

"It  was  a  French  spoliation  case  over  which  the  Court 
of  Claims  had  no  jurisdiction  as  a  court  with  power  to 
render  a  judgment.  Indeed,  there  was  nothing  conten- 
tious in  the  case,  inasmuch  as  Congress  had  never  con- 
sented that  the  United  States  should  be  sued  at  all  and 
there  was  consequently  no  real  plaintiff  or  real  defend- 
ant, but  merely  the  form  of  an  adversary  proceeding.  In 
truth,  the   Court   of  Claims  was   simply   performing  the 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  187 

function  of  a  committee  of  Congress  to  ascertain  and  re- 
port to  Congress  the  law  and  the  facts  of  the  case  with 
its  views  thereon,  that  Congress  might  the  better  judge 
whether  the  rules  of  international  law  in  force  at  the 
time  the  ship  Rose  was  captured  by  the  French  author- 
ized her  capture  and  condemnation. 

"It  is  very  plain,  therefore,  that  when  the  claimants  of 
the  ship  undertook  to  excuse  their  delinquency  under 
the  law  of  nations  by  an  act  of  Congress  the  court  had 
a  ready  answer;  that  in  the  controversy  in  the  foreign 
prize  court  between  the  ship  and  her  French  captor  the 
act  of  Congress  had  no  relevancy  whatever,  as  it  could 
not  possibly  change  the  law  of  nations  or  afford  any 
justification  or  excuse  for  the  conduct  of  the  ship  which 
took  place  on  the  high  seas,  where  the  act  of  Congress 
could  not  operate. 

"This  proceeding,  or  case,  if  you  please,  took  place  under 
the  act  of  Congress  of  January  20,  1885  (23  Stats.  283), 
which  expressly  says  (Sec.  6):  'Such  finding  and  report 
of  the  court  shall  be  taken  to  be  merely  advisory  as  to 
the  law  and  facts  found,  and  shall  not  conclude  either 
the  claimant  or  Congress.' 

"In  Gordon  v.  The  United  States  (117  U.S.,  Appendix, 
699)  the  Chief  Justice  comments  on  this  advisory 
function  of  the  Court  of  Claims  and  likens  it  to  that  of 
an  auditor  or  comptroller,  saying:  'The  circumstance 
that  one  is  called  a  court  and  its  decisions  called  judg- 
ments  can  not  alter  its  character  nor  enlarge  its  power.' 

"But  if  Congress  has  power  to  establish  tribunals  that 
are  at  liberty  to  disregard  the  decisions  of  the  courts 
that  are  the  repositories  of  the  judicial  power  of  the  Con- 
stitution, there  is  an  end  of  the  supposed  coordination 
between  the  legislative  and  judicial  departments  of  the 
government. 

"Of  course,  a  judgment  may  be  attacked  on  jurisdic- 
tional   grounds    under    all   circumstances.     Letters    of 


188  NATURALIZATION 

administration  and  of  guardianship  and  judgments  of 
naturalization,  for  example,  may  be  denied  exterritorial 
effect,  but  they  can  never  be  collaterally  assailed,  as  in 
this  case,  on  a  ground  that  admits  jurisdiction  in  the 
authority  from  which  they  emanated.  This  follows  from 
the  unity  and  indivisibility  of  status,  which,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  can  not  be  exposed  to  attack  or 
aspersion  save  in  the  jurisdiction  authorized  to  vacate 
the  act  by  which  the  particular  status  was  conferred. 
The  law  of  nations  has  settled  down  on  this  principle 
with  reference  to  judgments  establishing  status,  what- 
ever latitude  that  code  may  allow  the  courts  of  one 
country  when  called  upon  to  enforce  judgments  of  other 
kinds  rendered  in  foreign  countries — a  subject  much 
considered  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  but  which  I 
shall  not  go  into,  as,  in  my  view,  the  case  does  not  re- 
quire it. 

"It  is  on  the  ground  of  the  unity  and  indivisibility  of 
status  that  the  authority  of  a  personal  representative 
appointed  by  a  competent  court  can  not  be  questioned 
in  any  other  court.  But,  if  I  understand  the  reasoning 
of  the  majority,  the  attack  made  on  the  judgment  of 
naturalization  would  have  been  equally  permissible  if 
the  petition  here  had  been  filed  by  the  administrator  of 
Ruiz,  and  the  government  had  made  defense  on  the 
ground  that  the  letters  of  administration  were  obtained 
by  petitioner's  false  swearing.  Indeed,  a  question  based 
on  this  hypothesis  was  put  to  one  of  the  learned  coun- 
sel for  the  government  during  the  argument,  but  it  failed 
to  elicit  discussion. 

"It  is  perfectly  clear,  therefore,  that  whether  a  judg- 
ment conferring  status  be  limited  in  operation  to  a  par- 
ticular country,  as  letters  of  administration,  or  be  without 
such  restriction,  as  where  permanent  and  universal,  it 
must,  from  the  principle  of  unity  and  indivisibility  that 
inheres  in  it,  be  exempt  from  collateral  attack  or  ques- 
tion of  any  kind. 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  189 

"As  to  the  decisions  of  international  commissions,  re- 
lied on  in  the  majority  opinion  as  upholding  the  position 
taken  in  this  case  with  regard  to  the  demurrer,  I  must  de- 
cline to  give  them  precedence  over  the  opinions  of  jurists 
of  world-wide  authority,  and  especially  so  when  I  fail  to 
discover  in  the  decisions  of  those  commissions  evidence 
that  the  question  now  in  hand  was  philosophically  con- 
sidered." 

J.  Crimes  and  Offenses  against  Naturalization  Laws. 
False  Swearing. 

Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  5395  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3654] : 
"In  all  cases  where  any  oath  or  affidavit  is  made  or  taken 
under  or  by  virtue  of  any  law  relating  to  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  aliens,  or  in  any  proceedings  under  such  laws, 
any  person  taking  or  making  such  oath  or  affidavit,  who 
knowingly  swears  falsely,  shall  be  punished  by  imprison- 
ment not  more  than  five  years,  nor  less  than  one  year, 
and  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  one  thousand  dollars." 

Sec.  23,  Act  of  June  29,  1906:  "Any  person  who  .  .  . 
in  any  naturalization  proceeding  knowingly  procures  or 
gives  false  testimony  as  to  any  material  fact,  or  who 
knowingly  makes  an  affidavit  false  as  to  any  material 
fact  required  to  be  proved  in  such  proceeding,  shall  be 
fined  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisoned 
not  more  than  five  years,  or  both." 

False  Personation,  Forgery,  Uttering,  and  Counter- 
feiting. 
Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  5424  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3668]: 
"Every  person  applying  to  be  admitted  a  citizen,  or  ap- 
pearing as  a  witness  for  any  such  person,  who  knowingly 
personates  any  other  person  than  himself,  or  falsely  ap- 
pears in  the  name  of  a  deceased  person,  or  in  an  assumed 
or  fictitious  name,  or  falsely  makes,  forges,  or  counter- 
feits any  oath,  notice,  affidavit,  certificate,  order,  record, 
signature,  or  other    instrument,    paper,  or    proceeding 


190  NATURALIZATION 

required  or  authorized  by  any  law  relating  to  or  providing 
for  the  naturalization  of  aliens;  or  who  utters,  sells,  dis- 
poses of,  or  uses  as  true  or  genuine,  or  for  any  unlawful 
purpose,  any  false,  forged,  antedated,  or  counterfeit  oath, 
notice,  certificate,  order,  record,  signature,  instrument, 
paper,  or  proceeding  above  specified;  or  sells  or  disposes 
of  to  any  person  other  than  the  person  for  whom  it  was 
originally  issued  any  certificate  of  citizenship,  or  certifi- 
cate showing  any  person  to  be  admitted  a  citizen — shall 
be  punished  by  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  not  less  than 
one  year,  nor  more  than  five  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not 
less  than  three  hundred  nor  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine  and  imprisonment." 

Sec.  16,  Act  of  June  29,  1906:  "Every  person  who 
falsely  makes,  forges,  counterfeits,  or  causes  or  procures 
to  be  falsely  made,  forged,  or  counterfeited,  or  knowingly 
aids  or  assists  in  falsely  making,  forging,  or  counterfeiting 
any  certificate  of  citizenship,  with  intent  to  use  the  same, 
or  with  the  intent  that  the  same  may  be  used  by  some 
other  person  or  persons,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony,  and  a 
person  convicted  of  such  offense  shall  be  punished  by 
imprisonment  for  not  more  than  ten  years,  or  by  a  fine  of 
not  more  than  ten  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine 
and  imprisonment." 

Use   of  forged  or  counterfeit  certificate,  etc. 

Rev.  Stat.  5425  (U.S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3669):  "Every 
person  who  uses,  or  attempts  to  use,  or  aids,  or  assists, 
or  participates  in  the  use  of,  any  certificate  of  citizen- 
ship, knowing  the  same  to  be  forged,  or  counterfeit,  or 
antedated,  or  knowing  the  same  to  have  been  procured 
by  fraud  or  otherwise  unlawfully  obtained;  or  who,  with- 
out lawful  excuse,  knowingly  is  possessed  of  any  false, 
forged,  antedated,  or  counterfeit  certificate  of  citizen- 
ship, purporting  to  have  been  issued  under  the  provisions 
of  any  law  of  the  United  States  relating  to  naturalization, 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS,  191 

knowing  such  certificate  to  be  false,  forged,  ante- 
dated, or  counterfeit,  with  intent  unlawfully  to  use  the 
same;  or  obtains,  accepts,  or  receives  any  certificate  of 
citizenship  known  to  such  person  to  have  been  procured 
by  fraud  or  by  the  use  of  any  false  name,  or  by  means  of 
any  false  statement  made  with  intent  to  procure,  or  to 
aid  in  procuring,  the  issue  of  such  certificate,  or  known 
to  such  person  to  be  fraudulently  altered  or  antedated; 
and  every  person  who  has  been  or  may  be  admitted  to 
be  a  citizen  who,  on  oath  or  by  affidavit,  knowingly 
denies  that  he  has  been  so  admitted,  with  intent  to 
evade  or  avoid  any  duty  or  liability  imposed  or  required 
by  law,  shall  be  imprisoned  at  hard  labor  not  less  than 
one  year,  nor  more  than  five  years,  or  be  fined  not  less 
than  three  hundred  dollars,  nor  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars,  or  both  such  punishments  may  be  imposed." 

It  has  been  held  that  this  section  does  not  render 
punishable  the  uttering  of  a  forged  certificate  by  a  person 
other  than  the  one  applying  for  such  certificate  or  ap- 
pearing as  a  witness  for  the  person  so  applying.  United 
States  V.  York,  131  Fed.  323. 

Rev.  Stat.  5426  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3669): 
"  Every  person  who  in  any  manner  uses,  for  the  purpose 
of  registering  as  a  voter,  or  as  evidence  of  a  right  to  vote, 
or  otherwise,  unlawfully,  any  order,  certificate  of  citizen- 
ship, or  certificate,  judgment,  or  exemplification,  show- 
ing any  person  to  be  admitted  to  be  a  citizen,  whether 
heretofore  or  hereafter  issued  or  made,  knowing  that 
such  order  or  certificate,  judgment,  or  exemplification 
has  been  unlawfully  issued  or  made;  and  every  person 
who  unlawfully  uses,  or  attempts  to  use,  any  such  order 
or  certificate,  issued  to  or  in  the  name  of  any  other  per- 
son, or  in  a  fictitious  name,  or  the  name  of  a  deceased 
person,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  at  hard  labor 
not  less  than  one  year  nor  more  than  five  years,  or  by  a 
fine  of  not  less  than  three   hundred  nor  more   than   one 


192  NATURALIZATION 

thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine  and  imprison- 
ment." 

Sec.  17,  Act  of  June  29,  1906:  "Every  person  who 
engraves  or  causes  or  procures  to  be  engraved,  or  assists 
in  engraving,  any  plate  in  the  likeness  of  any  plate  de- 
signed for  the  printing  of  a  certificate  of  citizenship,  or 
who  sells  any  such  plate,  or  who  brings  into  the  United 
States  from  any  foreign  place  any  such  plate,  except 
under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and 
Labor,  or  other  proper  officer,  and  any  person  who  has 
in  his  control,  custody,  or  possession  any  metallic  plate 
engraved  after  the  similitude  of  any  plate  from  which 
any  such  certificate  has  been  printed,  with  intent  to  use 
such  plate  or  suffer  the  same  to  be  used  in  forging  or 
counterfeiting  any  such  certificate  or  any  part  thereof; 
and  every  person  who  prints,  photographs,  or  in  any 
other  manner  causes  to  be  printed,  photographed,  made, 
or  executed,  any  print  or  impression  in  the  likeness  of 
any  such  certificate,  or  any  part  thereof,  or  who  sells  any 
such  certificate,  or  brings  the  same  into  the  United  States 
from  any  foreign  place,  except  by  direction  of  some 
proper  officer  of  the  United  States,  or  who  has  in  his 
possession  a  distinctive  paper  which  has  been  adopted 
by  the  proper  officer  of  the  United  States  for  the  print- 
ing of  such  certificate,  with  intent  to  unlawfully  use  the 
same,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than 
ten  thousand  dollars,  or  by  imprisonment  at  hard  labor 
for  not  more  than  ten  years,  or  by  both  such  fine  and 
imprisonment." 

Rev.  Stat.  5427  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3670):  "Every 
person  who  knowingly  and  intentionally  aids  or  abets 
any  person  in  the  commission  of  any  felony  denounced 
in  sections  5424,  5425,  and  5426,  or  attempts  to  do  any 
act  therein  made  felony,  or  counsels,  advises,  or 
procures,  or  attempts  to  procure,  the  commission  thereof, 
shall  be  punished  in  the  same  manner  and  to  the  same 
extent  as  the  principal  party." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  '  193 

Rev.  Stat.  5428  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  3670): 
"Every  person  who  knowingly  uses  any  certificate  of 
naturalization  heretofore  granted  by  any  court,  or  here- 
afterSgranted,  which  has  been  or  may  be  procured  through 
fraud  or  by  false  evidence,  or  has  been  or  may  be  issued  by 
the  clerk,  or  any  other  officer  of  the  court  without  any 
appearance  and  hearing  of  the  applicant  in  court  and 
without  lawful  authority;  and  every  person  who  falsely 
represents  himself  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
without  having  been  duly  admitted  to  citizenship,  for 
any  fraudulent  purpose  whatever,  shall  be  punishable  by 
a  fine  of  not  more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  be 
imprisoned  not  more  than  two  years,  or  both." 

Rev.  Stat.  5429  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1001,  3670) :  "The 
provisions  of  the  five  preceding  sections  [i.  e.  R.  S. 
5424-5428]  shall  apply  to  all  proceedings  had  or  taken, 
or  attempted  to  be  had  or  taken,  before  any  court  in 
which  any  proceeding  for  naturalization  may  be  com- 
menced or  attempted  to  be  commenced." 

Unlawful  possessioti  of  blank  certificate  of  citi- 
zenship. 

Sec.  19,  Act  of  June  29,  1906:  "Every  person  who 
without  lawful  excuse  is  possessed  of  any  blank  certifi- 
cate of  citizenship  provided  by  the  Bureau  of  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization,  with  intent  unlawfully  to  use  the 
same,  shall  be  imprisoned  at  hard  labor  not  more  than 
five  years  or  be  fined  not  more  than  one  thousand  dol- 
lars." 

Unlawfully  procuring  naturalization. 
Sec.  23,  Act  of  June  29,  11906:  "Any  person  who 
knowingly  procures  naturalization  in  violation  of  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  fined  not  more  than  five 
thousand  dollars,  or  shall  be  imprisoned  not  more  than 
five  years,  or  both,  and  upon  conviction  the  court  in 
which  such   conviction  is   had  shall    thereupon    adjudge 

6233—13 


194  NATURALIZATION 

and  declare  the  final  order  admitting  such  person  to 
citizenship  void.  Jurisdiction  is  hereby  conferred  on 
the  courts  having  jurisdiction  of  the  trial  of  such  offense 
to  make  such  adjudication.  Any  person  who  knowingly 
aids,  advises,  or  encourages  any  person  not  entitled 
thereto  to  apply  for  or  to  secure  naturalization,  or  to  file 
the  preliminary  papers  declaring  an  intent  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  or  who  in  any  naturaliza- 
tion proceeding  knowingly  procures  or  gives  false  testi- 
mony as  to  any  material  fact,  or  who  knowingly  makes 
an  affidavit  false  as  to  any  material  fact  required  to  be 
proved  in  such  proceeding,  shall  be  fined  not  more  than 
five  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisoned  not  more  than  five 
years,  or  both." 

2.  By  Clerks. 

Act  of  June  29,  1906. 

"Sec.  18.  It  is  hereby  made  a  felony  for  any  clerk  or 
other  person  to  issue  or  be  a  party  to  the  issuance  of  a 
certificate  of  citizenship  contrary  to  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  except  upon  a  final  order  under  the  hand  of  a 
court  having  jurisdiction  to  make  such  order,  and  upon 
conviction  thereof  such  clerk  or  other  person  shall  be 
punished  by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  five  years 
and  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  in 
the  discretion  of  the  court." 

"Sec.  20.  Any  clerk  or  other  officer  of  a  court  having 
power  under  this  Act  to  naturalize  aliens,  who  wilfully 
neglects  to  render  true  accounts  of  moneys  received  by 
him  for  naturalization  proceedings  or  who  wilfully  neg- 
lects to  pay  over  any  balance  of  such  moneys  due  to  the 
United  States  within  thirty  days  after  said  payment 
shall  become  due  and  demand  therefor  has  been  made 
and  refused,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  embezzlement  of 
the  public  moneys,  and  shall  be  punishable  by  imprison- 
ment for  not  more  than  five  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not 
more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  both." 


BY  FORMAL  PAPERS.  195 

"Sec.  21.  It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  clerk  of  any  court 
or  his  authorized  deputy  or  assistant  exercising  jurisdic- 
tion in  naturalization  proceedings  to  demand,  charge, 
collect,  or  receive  any  other  or  additional  fees  or  moneys 
in  naturalization  proceedings  save  the  fees  and  moneys 
herein  specified;  and  a  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions 
of  this  section  or  any  part  thereof  is  hereby  declared  to 
be  a  misdemeanor  and  shall  be  punished  by  imprison- 
ment for  not  more  than  two  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not 
more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine 
and  imprisonment." 

"Sec.  22.  The  clerk  of  any  court  exercising  jurisdiction 
in  naturalization  proceedings,  or  any  person  acting  un- 
der authority  of  this  Act,  who  shall  knowingly  certify 
that  a  petitioner,  affiant,  or  witness  named  in  an  affidavit, 
petition,  or  certificate  of  citizenship,  or  other  paper  or 
writing  required  to  be  executed  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  personally  appeared  before  him  and  was  sworn 
thereto,  or  acknowledged  the  execution  thereof  or  signed 
the  same,  when  in  fact  such  petitioner,  affiant,  or  witness 
did  not  personally  appear  before  him,  or  was  not  sworn 
thereto,  or  did  not  execute  the  same,  or  did  not  acknowl- 
edge the  execution  thereof,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine 
not  exceeding  five  thousand  dollars,  or  by  imprisonment 
not  to  exceed  five  years." 

3.  Limitation  of  Actions. 

"Sec.  24.  No  person  shall  be  prosecuted,  tried,  or 
punished  for  any  crime  arising  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act  [June  29,  1906],  unless  the  indictment  is  found 
or  the  information  is  filed  within  five  years  next  after 
the  commission  of  such  crime." 

Crimes  Committed  Prior  to  the  Date  When  the 
Act  of  June  29,  1906,  Went  Into  Effect. 
Act   of  June  29,  1906:  "Sec.  25.  For   the  purpose  of 
the   prosecution   of  all   crimes   and   offenses  against  the 


196  NATURALIZATION 

naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States  which  may  have 
been  committed  prior  to  the  date  when  this  Act  shall  go 
into  effect,  the  existing  naturalization  laws  shall  remain 
in  full  force  and  effect." 

"Sec.  31.  This  act  shall  take  effect  and  be  in  force 
from  and  after  ninety  days  from  the  date  of  its  passage: 
Provided  that  sections  one,  two,  twenty-eight,  and 
twenty-nine  shall  go  into  effect  from  and  after  the  passage 
of  this  Act." 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  197 

CHAPTER  II. 

NATURALIZATION  BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  Meaning  of  phrase  "dwelling  in  the  United  States." 

1.  Where  the  children  are  dwelling  in  United  States  at  naturaliza- 

tion of  parent. 

2.  Where  the  children  are  dwelling  abroad  at  naturalization  of 

parent. 

3.  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

C.  Mode  of  parent's  naturalization  immaterial. 

a.  By  naturalization  of  father  by  treaty. 

b.  By  naturalization  of  mother  by  marriage. 

D.  Illegitimate  children. 

E.  Adoption. 

F.  Effect  of  declaration  of  intention  of  parent  during  minority  of  child. 

G.  Naturalization  not  effective  internationally  as  to  absent  family. 

NATURALIZATION   BY    NATURALIZATION   OF    PARENT. 

A.  In  General. 

The  naturalization  of  an  alien  also  confers  citizenship 
upon  his  minor  children  dwelling  in  the  United  States. 

Section  2172,  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1334),  provides  that  "  the  children  of  persons  who  have 
been  duly  naturalized  under  any  law  of  the  United  States, 
.  .  .  being  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  at  the 
time  of  the  naturalization  of  their  parents,  shall,  if 
dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens 
thereof;  and  the  children  of  persons  who  now  are,  or 
have  been  citizens  of  the  United  States,  shall,  though 
born  out  of  the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States,  be  considered  as  citizens  thereof." 

This  is  substantially  the  language  of  the  Act  of  April 
14,  1802(2  Stat,  at  L.  153),  which  repealed  the  Act  of 
January  29,  1795  (1  Stat,  at  L.  414),  the  wording  of  which 
was:  "The  children  of  persons  duly  naturalized,  dwelling 
within  the  United  States,  and  being  under  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years,  at  the  time  of  such  naturalization,  and 


198  NATURALIZATION 

the  children  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  born  out  of 
the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States." 

B.  Meaning  of  Phrase  "  Dwelling  in  the  United  States." 

The  use  of  the  qualifying  phrase,  "  Dwelling  in  the 
United  States,"  makes  the  meaning  of  the  law  somewhat 
uncertain.  The  difficulty  is  in  determining  at  what  period 
of  time  the  child  is  required  to  be  "dwelling  in  the 
United  States"  in  order  to  acquire  citizenship.  The  ques- 
tion can  be  most  logically  considered  under  the  follow- 
ing division:  (1)  Where  the  children  are  dwelling 
in  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  the  parent's  natura- 
lization; (2)  where  the  children  are  dwelling  abroad  at 
the  time  of  the  parent's  naturalization. 

1.  Where  the  Children  Are  Dwelling  in  the  United  States 
at  the  Time  of  the  Parent's  Naturalization. 

The  naturalization  of  an  alien  naturalizes  his  minor 
children  born  abroad  but  residing  in  the  United  States 
at  the  time  of  his  naturalization.  Children  born  abroad 
of  aliens  who  subsequently  emigrated  to  this  country 
with  their  families,  and  were  naturalized  during  the 
minority  of  their  children,  are  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  10  Ops.  Atty.  General,  329;  Gumm  v.  Hubbard, 
97  Mo.  311;  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  312;  State,  ex  rel.  Carey  v. 
Andriano,  92  Mo.  70,  4  S.  W.  263. 

In  the  case  of  West  v.  West,  8  Paige  Ch.  432,  which 
arose  in  1840,  the  facts  were  that  a  British  subject  who 
was  twice  married,  each  time  to  a  native  English  woman, 
had  three  children  born  to  him  by  the  first  wife  and  four 
children  by  the  second.  The  first  two  children  of  his 
second  marriage  were  born  in  England.  In  1823,  after  the 
birth  of  the  second  child,  he  removed  to  New  York  with 
his  wife  and  five  children,  where  two  more  were  born  to 
him.  In  1830,  he  was  naturalized  while  his  children  were 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  199 

all  minors,  residing  with  him.  Upon  his  death,  claim 
was  asserted  on  behalf  of  the  children  born  in  this 
country  to  his  entire  estate  on  the  ground  that  the  chil- 
dren born  in  England  were  aliens  and  could  not  inherit. 
It  was  decided  by  the  court  that  it  was  the  intention  of 
the  law  of  1802  "to  embrace  the  children  of  those  who 
should  thereafter  be,  as  well  as  those  who  had  already 
been,  duly  naturalized  under  any  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States;"  that  "all  the  children  .  .  .  were  citizens 
of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  his  real 
estate  descended  to  them  in  equal  proportion  as  tenants 
in  common." 

In  State  v.  Penney,  10  Ark.  621,  it  appeared  that  an 
alien  came  to  the  United  States  when  his  son  was  eleven 
years  of  age,  and  that  the  father  was  naturalized  during 
the  son's  minority.  The  son  was  subsequently  elected  to 
the  oiBce  of  sheriff  in  Arkansas.  Quo  icarranto  proceed- 
ings were  brought  against  him,  upon  the  ground  that  at 
the  time  of  his  election  he  was  not  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States.  The  court  held  that  he  was  naturalized 
by  the  naturalization  of  his  father,  and  said  that  under 
the  Act  of  1802,  the  infant  children  of  aliens,  though 
born  out  of  the  United  States,  if  dwelling  within  the 
United  States  at  the  time  of  the  naturalization  of  their 
parents,  became  citizens  by  such  naturalization. 

In  State  v.  Andriano,  92  Mo.  70,  the  court  held  that: 

"The  infant  children  of  aliens,  though  born  out  of  the 
United  States,  if  dwelling  within  the  United  States  at 
the  time  of  the  naturalization  of  their  parents,  became 
citizens  by  such  naturalization,  and  the  provisions  of 
that  act  on  this  subject  are  prospective,  and  intended  to 
embrace  the  children  of  those  who  should  thereafter  be, 
as  well  as  those  who  had  already  been,  duly  naturalized 
under  any  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States," 

The   same    conclusion    was   reached    by  the    court    in 


200  NATURALIZATION 

O'Connor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215,  which  involved  the  citizen- 
ship of  a  native  of  Bavaria,  who  came  to  the  United 
States  while  a  minor,  with  his  father  who  took  out 
naturalization  papers  during  the  son's  minority.  See, 
also,  North  Noonday  Mining  Co.  v.  Orient  Mining  Co., "6 
Sawyer,  299. 

2.  Where  the  Children  are  Dwelling  Abroad  at  the  Time  of 
the  Parent's  Naturalization. 

The  statute  applies  also  to  children  who  come  to  the 
United  States  after  the  father's  naturalization,  but  be- 
fore they  reach  majority. 

In  Campbell  v.  Gordon,  6  Cranch,  175,  the  facts  were 
that  a  subject  of  Great  Britain  emigrated  to  the  United 
States,  leaving  in  Scotland  a  daughter  who  had  been 
born  there.  In  1795  the  father  was  naturalized  in  the 
United  States,  and  in  1797,  his  daughter  joined  him  in 
this  country.  The  question  of  her  citizenship  being  pre- 
sented to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in 
1809,  the  court  said: 

''The  next  question  to  be  decided  is  whether  the  natu- 
ralization of  William  Currie  conferred  upon  his  daughter 
the  rights  of  a  citizen,  after  her  coming  to  and  residing 
within  the  United  States,  she  having  been  a  resident  in 
a  foreign  country  at  the  time  when  her  father  was  natu- 
ralized? 

"  Whatever  difficulty  might  exist  as  to  the  construction 
of  the  third  section  of  the  Act  of  the  29th  of  January, 
1795,  in  relation  to  this  point,  it  is  conceived  that  the 
rights  of  citizenship  were  clearly  conferred  upon  the 
female  appellee  by  the  fourth  section  of  the  Act  of  the 
14th  of  April,  1802.  This  Act  declares  that  the  children 
of  persons  duly  naturalized  under  any  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  being  under  the  age  of  21  years  at  the 
time  of  their  parent's  being  so  naturalized,  shall,  if  dwell- 
ing in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens  of  the 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  20 1 

United  States.  This  is  precisely  the  case  of  Mrs.  Gordon. 
Her  father  was  duly  naturalized,  at  which  time  she  was 
an  infant;  but  she  came  to  the  United  States  before  the 
year  1802,  and  was  at  the  time  when  this  law  passed 
dwelling  within  the  United  States. 

"It  is  therefore  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  court 
that  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  James  Currie,  Mrs.  Gor- 
don was  entitled  to  all  the  right  and  privilege  of  a 
citizen." 

While  this  decision  has  been  cited  as  authority  for  the 
view  that  under  the  statute,  children  born  abroad  but 
who  come  to  the  United  States  and  dwell  here  after  the 
naturalization  of  the  father  and  during  their  minority  are 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  what  the  court  really  de- 
cided was  that  the  minor  daughter  of  a  person  natural- 
ized as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  became  a  citizen 
though  not  within  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  his 
naturalization,  as  she  was  dwelling  here  ai  the  time  when 
the  Act  of  1802  was  passed. 

The  Supreme  Court,  in  Boyd  v.  Thayer,  143  U.  S.  135, 
declared  that  the  Act  of  1802  was  intended  to  operate 
prospectively  as  well  as  retrospectively,  and  should  not 
be  limited  to  the  children  of  those  who  had  been  natural- 
ized at  the  time  of  its  passage.  See  U.  S.  v.  Kellar,  13 
Fed.  82. 

In  Young  v.  Peck,  21  Wend.  389,  and  26  Wend.  613, 
the  facts  were  that  a  native  of  Scotland  emigrated  to  the 
United  States  in  1774  and  acquired  citizenship  here,  not 
by  formal  naturalization,  but  by  residence  and  election  of 
American  allegiance.  He  had  a  daughter  who  had  been 
born  in  Scotland  about  1770  and  who  remained  there 
and  married  in  that  country.  Her  husband  died  and  she 
came  to  the  United  States  in  1830,  when  she  was  about 
sixty  years  old.  Notwithstanding  she  was  not  "dwelling 
in  the  United  States  "  either  at  the  time  of  her  father's 
naturalization,  or  at  any  time  during  her  minority,  and 
hence  did  not  come  within  the  description  of  "children" 


202  NATURALIZATION 

in  the  statute,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  decided 
that  she  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  of  1802.  The  court  appears  to  have 
taken  the  view  that  the  intent  of  the  law  was  that  such 
persons  were  to  be  considered  as  citizens  whenever 
dwelling  in  the  United  States.  It  does  not  appear  that 
there  is  legal  basis  for  the  opinion.  Although  the  deci- 
sion was  affirmed  on  appeal,  the  decision  of  the  superior 
court  is  no  more  satisfactory  than  that  of  the  court  be- 
low. It  seems  that  the  higher  court  based  its  decision 
that  the  daughter  was  a  citizen  upon  the  ground  of  the 
transfer  of  the  allegiance  by  her  father  while  she  was  a 
minor. 

In  Ludlam  v.  Ludlam,  31  Barb.  486,  the  court  said  that 
"Young  V.  Peck  was  decided  in  the  Supreme  Court  upon 
the  statute  of  1802,  and  in  the  court  of  errors  either  upon 
the  same  ground  or  upon  the  effect  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  and  the  treaty  of  peace  upon  persons 
domiciled  and  remaining  here  after  the  revolutionary 
war." 

The  phrase  "dwelling  in  the  United  States"  was  con- 
strued by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the 
interesting  case  of  Zartarian  v.  Billings,  decided  January 
7,  1907  (204  U.  S.  170).  Charles  Zartarian,  a  Turkish 
subject,  came  to  this  country  about  the  year  1880,  leav- 
ing his  wife  and  two  children  in  Turkey.  In  1896,  he  be- 
came naturalized  in  Chicago,  and  in  1904  sent  passage- 
money  for  his  wife  and  children  to  join  him  in  this 
country.  At  the  request  of  the  American  minister  at 
Constantinople,  the  Turkish  Government  granted  them 
permission  to  emigrate  to  the  United  States,  it  being 
stipulated  in  the  passport  that  they  could  never  return 
to  Turkey.  Upon  their  arrival  at  Boston,  Zartarian's 
wife  and  son  were  admitted,  but  it  being  found  that  the 
daughter  Mariam  had   trachoma,  she    was  debarred  from 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  203 

landing,  under  the  Immigration  Act  of  March  3,  1903, 
32  Stat,  at  L.  1213,  which  provides  that  aliens  afflicted 
with  a  loathsome  or  dangerous  contagious  disease,  shall 
be  excluded  from  admission  to  the  United  States.  She 
was  detained  in  the  immigration  detention  hospital  at 
Boston,  and  the  father,  by  writ  of  habeas  corpus  peti- 
tioned the  United  States  Circuit  Court  for  the  District  of 
Massachusetts,  alleging  that  her  restraint  was  in  viola- 
tion of  her  constitutional  rights,  without  due  process  of 
law,  and  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  Section  2172  of 
the  Revised  Statutes,  which,  it  was  claimed,  made  her  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  by  virtue  of  the  citizenship 
of  her  father.  The  circuit  court  having  denied  the  peti- 
tion, an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  Mr.  Justice  Day,  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  after  reciting  the  facts,  said: 

"  The  contention  is  that  she  does  not  come  within  the 
terms  of  this  statute,  not  being  an  alien,  but  entitled  to 
be  considered  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  under  the 
provisions  of  Section  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes, 
which  provides:  'The  children  of  persons  who  have  been 
duly  naturalized  under  any  law  of  the  United  States 
.  .  .  being  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  at  the 
time  of  naturalization  of  their  parents,  shall,  if  dwelling 
in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens  thereof.' 

"As  Mariam  was  born  abroad,  a  native  of  Turkey,  she 
has  not  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  except 
upon  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  Act  of  Congress, 
for,  wanting  native  birth,  she  can  not  otherwise  become 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Her  right  to  citizenship, 
if  any  she  has,  is  the  creation  of  Congress,  exercising  the 
power  over  this  subject  conferred  by  the  Constitution. 
United  States  v.  Wong  Kim  Ark,  169  U.  S.  649,  702. 

"The  relevant  section,  2172,  which  it  is  maintained 
confers  the  right  of  citizenship,  is  the  culmination  of  a 


204  NATURALIZATION 

number  of  Acts  on  the  subject  passed  by  Congress  from 
the  earliest  period  of  the  government.  Their  history  will 
be  found  in  vol.  3,  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  467. 

"Section  2172  is  practically  the  same  as  the  Act  of 
April  14,  1802,  2  Stat.  153,  which  provided: 

"'The  children  of  persons  duly  naturalized  under  any 
of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  being  under 
the  age  of  21  years  at  the  time  of  their  parents  being  so 
naturalized  .  .  .  shall,  if  dwelling  in  the  United 
States,  be  considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  children  of  persons  who  are  now  or  have  been 
citizens  of  the  United  States  shall,  though  born  out  of 
the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  be  con- 
sidered citizens  of  the  United  States.' 

"In  Campbell  i?.  Gordon,  6Cranch,  176,  it  was  held  that 
this  Act  conferred  citizenship  upon  the  daughter  of  an 
alien  naturalized  under  the  Act  of  January  29,  1795,  she 
being  in  this  country  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the 
Act  of  April  14,  1802,  and  then  'dwelling  in  the  United 
States.' 

"The  Act  has  also  been  held  to  be  prospective  in  its 
operation  and  to  include  children  of  aliens  naturalized 
after  its  passage,  when  'dwelling  in  the  United  States.' 
Boyd  V.  Thayer,  143  U.  S.  135,  177. 

"The  construction  of  this  law  and  the  meaning  of  the 
phrase  'dwelling  in  the  United  States'  has  been  the 
subject  of  much  consideration  in  the  executive  depart- 
ment of  the  government  having  to  do  with  the  admis- 
sion of  foreigners  and  the  rights  of  alleged  naturalized 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  rulings  of  the  State 
Department  are  collected  in  Prof.  Moore's  Digest  of  Inter- 
national Law,  vol.  3,  467  et  seq. 

"The  Department  seems  to  have  followed  a  rule  estab- 
lished at  an  early  period,  and  formulated  with  fullness 
in  Foreign  Relations  for  1890,  301,  in  an  instruction 
from  Mr.  Blaine  to  Minister  Phelps,  at  Berlin,  in  which  it 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  205 

was  laid  down  that  the  naturalization  of  the  father 
operates  to  confer  the  municipal  right  of  citizenship 
upon  the  minor  child  if,  at  the  time  of  the  father's  nat- 
uralization, dwelling  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States,  or  if  he  come  within  that  jurisdiction 
subsequent  to  the  father's  naturalization  and  during  his 
own  minority. 

"Whether,  in  the  latter  case,  a  child  not  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  the 
parents'  naturalization,  but  coming  therein  during  minor- 
ity, acquires  citizenship  is  not  a  question  now  before  us. 
"The  limitation  to  children  'dwelling  in  the  United 
States'  was  doubtless  inserted  in  recognition  of  the 
principle  that  citizenship  can  not  be  conferred  by  the 
United  States  on  the  citizens  of  another  country  when 
under  such  foreign  jurisdiction;  and  is  also  in  deference 
to  the  right  of  independent  sovereignties  to  fix  the  alle- 
giance of  those  born  within  their  dominions,  having  re- 
gard to  the  principle  of  the  common  law  which  permits 
a  sovereignty  to  claim,  with  certain  exceptions,  the  citi- 
zenship of  those  born  within  its  territory. 

"It  is  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  delivering  the 
opinion  in  United  States  v.  Wong  Kim  Ark,  169  U.  S. 
649,  686,  that  the  naturalization  acts  of  the  United 
States  have  been  careful  to  limit  admission  to  citizen- 
ship to  those  'within  the  limits  and  under  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  United  States.' 

"The  right  of  aliens  to  acquire  citizenship  is  purely 
statutory;  and  the  petitioner's  child  having  been  born  and 
remained  abroad,  clearly  does  not  come  within  the  terms 
of  the  statute.  She  was  debarred  from  entering  the 
United  States  by  the  action  of  the  authorized  officials, 
and,  never  having  legally  landed,  of  course  could  not 
have  dwelt  within  the  United  IStates.  Nishimura  Ekiu 
V.  United  States,  142  U.  S.  651. 

"It  is  urged  that  this  seems  a  harsh  application  of  the 


206  NATURALIZATION 

law,  but  if  the  terms  of  the  statute  are  to  be  extended 
to  include  children  of  a  naturalized  citizen  who  have 
never  dwelt  in  the  United  States,  such  action  must  come 
from  legislation  of  Congress  and  not  judicial  de- 
cision. Congress  has  made  provision  concerning  an  alien's 
wife  or  minor  child  suffering  from  contagious  disease, 
when  such  alien  has  made  a  declaration  of  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen,  and  when  such  disease  was  con- 
tracted on  board  the  ship  in  which  they  came,  holding 
them  under  regulations  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
until  it  shall  be  determined  whether  the  disorder  will  be 
easily  curable,  or  whether  such  wife  or  child  can  be  per- 
mitted to  land  without  danger  to  other  persons,  requiring 
that  they  shall  not  be  deported  until  such  facts  are  ascer- 
tained, 37  Stat.  1221,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  Supp.  of 
1903,  185.  But  Congress  has  not  said  that  an  alien  child 
who  has  never  dwelt  in  the  United  States,  coming  to 
join  a  naturalized  parent,  may  land  when  afflicted  with  a 
dangerous  contagious  disease. 

"As  this  subject  is  entirely  within  Congressional  con- 
trol, the  matter  must  rest  there;  it  is  only  for  the  courts 
to  apply  the  law  as  they  find  it. 

"It  is  suggested  that  the  agreed  finding  of  facts  con- 
tains no  stipulation  as  to  the  dangerous  or  contagious 
quality  of  trachoma,  but  the  petition  shows  that  the 
petitioner's  daughter  was  debarred  from  landing  because 
it  was  found  that  she  had  a  dangerous  contagious  disease, 
to  wit,  trachoma.  Furthermore,  the  statute  makes  the 
finding  of  the  board  of  inquiry  final,  so  far  as  review  by 
the  courts  is  concerned,  the  only  appeal  being  to  certain 
officers  of  the  department.  32  Stat.  1213;  Nishimura 
Ekiu  V.  United  States,  142  U.  S.  651." 

The  order  of  the  Circuit  Court  was  affirmed,  and  orders 
for  the  deportation  of  the  young  woman  were  issued.  As 
she  was  precluded  from  returning  to  her  native  land,  she 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  207 

was  "a  woman  without  a  country,"  and  it  seemed  im- 
probable that  she  would  be  allowed  to  enter  any  civil- 
ized country.  Fortunately,  just  at  this  juncture,  the 
doctors  at  the  hospital  pronounced  her  cured,  the  De- 
partment of  Commerce  and  Labor  issued  an  order  for 
her  release,  and  she  was  allowed  to  join  her  parents. 

The  instruction  of  Mr.  Blaine,  to  which  the  court  re- 
ferred was  prepared  by  John  Bassett  Moore,  than  whom 
there  is  no  higher  authority  on  such  questions  in  the 
United  States,  and  it  related  to  the  case  of  Carl  Heis- 
inger.  Because  of  the  importance  of  the  instruction,  it 
is  quoted  in  full: 

"  Mrs.  Heisinger  was  born  in  Altona,  Prussia.  Her  hus- 
band was  also  an  alien  by  birth  and  came  to  the  United 
States  in  May,  1866.  He  was  naturalized  August  18, 
1871,  and  died  probably  not  later  than  1879.  The  son 
Carl  was  born  in  Philadelphia,  in  the  State  of  Pennsyl- 
vania, Jan.  21,  1871,  more  than  six  months  before  the 
naturalization  of  his  father.  In  1879  Mrs.  Heisinger  re- 
turned to  Germany,  taking  her  son  with  her,  and  has 
ever  since  resided  in  that  country.  .  .  .  It  is  a 
reasonable  interpretation  that  the  words,  '  if  dwelling  in 
the  United  States  '  were  intended,  among  other  things, 
to  meet  the  cases  of  conflicting  claims  of  allegiance.  In 
this  relation  it  is  pertinent  to  disclose  the  origin  of  those 
words.  On  March  26,  1790,  an  act  was  approved,  enti- 
tled 'An  Act  to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  naturaliza- 
tion.' 1  Stats,  at  Large,  103.  This  was  the  first  law 
enacted  by  Congress  on  that  subject.  The  first  clauses 
prescribe  the  conditions  and  methods  of  naturalization. 
Then  followed  these  words:  'And  the  children  of  such 
persons  so  naturalized,  dwelling  within  the  United  States, 
being  under  the  age  of  21  years  at  the  time  of  such  natu- 
ralization, shall  also  be  considered  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States.'     In   1795  the  law  of  1790  was  repealed 


208  NATURALIZATION 

by  an  Act  of  the  29th  of  January  of  the  former  year 
entitled  'An  Act  to  establish  an  uniform  rule  of  natural- 
ization, and  to  repeal  the  act  heretofore  passed  on  that 
subject.'  1  Stats,  at  Large,  414.  By  the  third  section 
of  the  Act  of  January  29,  1795,  it  was  provided  that: 

"'The  children  of  persons  duly  naturalized,  dwelling 
within  the  United  States  and  being  under  the  age  of  21 
years  at  the  time  of  such  naturalization,  and  the  children 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States  born  out  of  the  limits 
and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  shall,  if  dwelling 
in  the  United  States,  be  considered  citizens  thereof.' 

"It  will  be  observed  that  in  this  provision,  which  is 
incorporated  in  section  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  the 
words  *if  dwelling  in  the  United  States'  are  transposed. 
The  effect  of  this  transposition  was  considered  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Camp- 
bell V.  Gordon  (6  Cranch,  176),  in  1810.  The  case  involved 
a  title  to  land,  which  depended  upon  the  citizenship 
of  one  Yanetta  Gordon,  nee  Currie,  who  was  by  birth  a 
British  subject.  Her  father,  also  a  natural-born  British 
subject,  emigrated  to  the  United  States,  and  in  1795  was 
naturalized.  His  daughter  Yanetta  was  then  residing  in 
Scotland,  where  she  remained  until  1797,  in  which  year 
she  came  to  the  United  States.  It  was  contended 
by  counsel  that  she  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  inasmuch  as  she  was  not  dwelling  in  the  United 
States  at  the  time  of  her  father's  naturalization.  The 
Supreme  Court  took  a  different  view  of  the  matter.  Mr. 
Justice  Washington,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
said:  'The  next  question  to  be  decided  is  whether  the 
naturalization  of  William  Currie  conferred  upon  his 
daughter  the  rights  of  a  citizen  after  her  coming  to  and 
residing  within  the  United  States,  she  having  been  a 
resident  in  a  foreign  country  at  the  time  when  her  father 
was  naturalized.     Whatever  difficulty  might  exist  as  to 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  209 

the  construction  of  the  third  section  of  the  Act  of 
January  29,  1795,  in  relation  to  this  point,  it  is  con- 
ceived that  the  rights  of  citizenship  were  clearly  con- 
ferred upon  the  female  appellee  by  the  fourth  section  of 
the  Act  of  April  14,  1802.  This  Act  declares  that  the 
children  of  persons  duly  naturalized  under  any  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  being  under  the  age  of  21 
years  at  the  time  of  their  parents  being  so  naturalized, 
shall,  if  dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  This  is  precisely  the  case 
of  Mrs.  Gordon.' 

"The  effect  of  the  law,  as  thus  expounded,  is  to  make 
actual  residence  in  the  United  States,  and  not  residence 
at  the  time  of  naturalization,  the  test  of  the  claim  to 
citizenship;  and  here  as  explanatory  of  this  rule,  it  is 
important  to  observe  the  associated  provision,  found  in 
all  the  acts  above  quoted,  and  incorporated  in  the  same 
relation  in  Section  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  that  chil- 
dren born  of  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall,  though 
born  out  of  the  limts  and  jurisdiction  of  theUnited States, 
be  considered  as  citizens  thereof.  Under  this  provision, 
such  children  are  treated  as  citizens  thereof,  whether 
dwelling  in  the  United  States  or  not,  being  regarded  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States  by  birth.  The  preceding 
provision  relates  to  children  born  of  parents  who  were 
not  at  the  time  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  upon 
whom  the  country  of  the  parents,  under  the  same  rule 
of  law  as  that  announced  by  this  Government,  might  have 
claims  of  allegiance.  In  respect  to  such  persons,  the 
words  '  if  dwelling  in  the  United  States '  recognize  another 
principle,  and  that  is  that  it  is  not  within  the  power  of 
a  parent  to  eradicate  the  original  nationality  of  his  child, 
though  he  may,  during  the  minority  of  such  child,  invest 
him  with  rights  or  subject  him  to  duties  which  may  or 
may  not  be  claimed  or  performed.    For  this  reason,  also, 

5233—14 


210  NATURALIZATION 

it  is  provided  that  children  not  born  citizens  of  the 
United  States  are,  by  virtue  of  naturalization  of  the 
parents,  to  be  considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States 
'if  dwelling'  therein. 

"The  Department  does  not  desire  to  be  understood  to 
a,ssert  that  natural-born  subjects  of  a  foreign  power  whose 
parents  have  been  naturalized  in  the  United  States  must 
at  every  moment  be  dwelling  in  the  United  States  in 
order  to  claim  its  citizenship.  That  question  does  not 
arise  in  the  present  case.  The  words  'if  dwelling  in  the 
United  States,'  whether  meaning  residence  at  a  particular 
moment  or  contemplating  a  settled  abode,  apply  to  Carl 
Heisinger,  who,  being  now  19  years  of  age,  has  for  about 
11  years  been  dwelling  in  Germany.  It  is  not  known  that 
the  government  of  that  country  has  made  any  claims 
upon  him.  But,  if  the  German  government  should,  under 
a  provision  of  law  similar  to  that  in  force  in  the  United 
States  in  relation  to  the  foreign-born  children  of  citizens, 
seek  to  exact  from  him  the  performance  of  obligations  as 
a  natural-born  subject,  the  Department  would  be  bound 
to  consider  the  provisions  of  Section  2172  of  the  Revised 
Statutes."  Mr.  Blaine  to  Mr.  Phelps,  Feb.  1,  1890,  For. 
Rel.  1890,  301. 

A  boy  of  18  years,  who  has  never  been  out  of  Germany, 
but  whose  father  is  a  naturalized  citizen  of  and  resident 
in  the  United  States,  is  not  entitled  to  obtain  the  inter- 
vention of  this  government  to  secure  him  from  military 
service  in  Germany,  or  to  relieve  him  from  being  detained 
in  Germany  for  that  purpose.  Mr.  Evarts  to  Mr.  Cald- 
well, Mch.  6,  1880;  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  464. 

"The  laws  of  the  United  States  on  the  subject  of  natu- 
ralization provide,  in  relation  to  persons  situated  as  your 
sons  are,  'that  the  children  of  persons  duly  naturalized 
under  any  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  .  .  . 
being  under  the  age  of  21  years  at  the  time  of  their 
parents  being  so  naturalized  or  admitted  to  the  rights  of 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  211 

citizenship,  shall,  if  dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be 
considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States.'  Assuming 
that  your  three  sons  were  born  in  France,  accompanied 
you  to  this  country,  and  have  continued  to  reside  here, 
they,  together  with  your  son  born  here,  are,  under  the 
provision  just  cited,  to  be  considered  when  dwelling  in 
the  United  States,  citizens  of  the  United  States,  with  all 
the  rights  and  privileges  attaching  to  that  character,  and 
entitled  to  the  protection  which  this  government  ex- 
tends to  all  its  citizens  in  the  exercise  and  enjoyment  of 
these  rights."  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Jouffret,  Feb.  11,  1874; 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  465. 

Robert  Emden  was  born  in  Switzerland  in  1862.  His 
father,  a  native  of  Switzerland,  was  naturalized  in  the 
United  States  in  1854,  but  soon  afterwards  returned  to 
Switzerland,  where  he  ever  afterwards  continued  to  reside. 
In  1885  the  son,  who  had  never  been  in  theUnited  States, 
applied  to  the  American  legation  at  Berne  for  a  passport. 
Secretary  Bayard  held:  "The  passport  application  of  Mr. 
Robert  Emden,  although  he  is  the  son  of  a  naturalized 
American,  can  not  be  granted,  because  he  is  not,  and 
never  has  been,  'dwelling  in  the  United  States,'  according 
to  Section  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes.  3  Moore's  Int. 
Law  Digest,  466. 

A  native  of  Germany  was  taken  in  infancy  to  the  United 
States.  Her  father,  who  was  a  German,  died  soon  after 
his  emigration,  and  his  widow  married  his  brother,  who 
was  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Subse- 
quently, when  she  was  24  years  of  age,  having  lived 
nearly  all  her  life  in  the  United  States,  she  went  to  Ger- 
many, temporarily,  to  study  music.  She  applied  soon 
afterwards  to  the  embassy  for  a  passport,  which  was 
granted.  The  action  of  the  embassy  was  approved  by 
the  Department  of  State.  Mr.  Adee,  Acting  Secretary,  to 
Mr.  Runyon,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  466. 

J.    W.    claimed    American    citizenship    through    the 


212  NATURALIZATION 

naturalization  of  his  father.  The  latter  was  born  in  the 
Crimea  in  1836,  came  to  the  United  States  in  1875,  and 
was  naturalized  in  1881.  Three  months  later  he  returned 
to  Russia,  where  he  continued  to  reside,  following  the 
occupation  of  a  farmer.  J.  W.  was  born  in  Russia  and 
returned  to  that  country  with  his  father  in  1881,  being 
then  19  years  of  age,  and  afterwards  resided  there,  also 
following  the  occupation  of  a  farmer.  In  1891,  being 
then  28  years  of  age,  he  applied  to  the  American  legation 
at  St.  Petersburg  for  a  passport.  He  expressed  no  inten- 
tion as  to  returning  to  the  United  States.  Mr.  Blaine 
declared  that  it  would  not  have  availed  him  if  he  had. 
Under  Section  2172,  Revised  Statutes,  said  the  Depart- 
ment, the  children  of  persons  who  have  been  duly  nat- 
uralized, being  under  the  age  of  21  years  at  the  time  of 
their  parents'  naturalization,  are,  "if  dwelling  in  the 
United  States,"  to  be  considered  as  citizens  thereof. 
J.  W.,  said  the  Department,  "never  has  dwelt  here 
since  attaining  his  majority,  and  is  not  dwelling  here 
now.  He  is  therefore  precluded  by  the  statute  from 
claiming  the  benefits  of  citizenship  of  the  United  States." 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  469. 

In  the  case  of  Henry  Huber  and  family  and  Frederick 
Huber  and  family,  who,  in  1881,  applied  to  our  legation 
in  Vienna  for  passports,  the  facts  were  as  follows:  Henry 
Huber  was  born  in  Switzerland  in  1823,  married  there  in 
1846,  and  had  five  children  born  in  that  country.  He 
came  to  the  United  States  with  his  family  in  1854,  was 
naturalized  in  1859,  and  returned  with  his  family  to 
Europe  in  1860.  His  eldest  son,  Heinrich  Huber,  returned 
to  this  country  in  1864,  and  continued  to  reside  here 
His  son  Frederick  married  an  Austrian  subject  in  Austria 
in  1876.  The  latter  stated  that  he  intended  "in  course  of 
time"  "to  return  to  America."  Minister  Kasson  granted 
a  passport  to  Henry  Huber,  accompanied  by  his  wife  and 
infant  child.  In  reporting  the  matter  to  the  Department^ 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  213 

he  said:  "My  difficulty  in  arriving  at  a  satisfactory  de- 
cision in  these  cases  arises  from  the  language  of  our  stat- 
ute. .  .  .  Sec.  2172  (U.S.Comp.  Stat.  1901, 1334)  intends 
minors  living  with  their  parents  at  the  time  of  natural- 
ization, but  employs  as  to  these  the  dubious  expression 
'shall,  if  dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as 
citizens  thereof.'  Does  that  mean  that  our  laws  make 
them  citizens  by  virtue  of  the  father's  naturalization 
while  they  are  minors  living  with  him?  Or  does  it  mean 
that  the  law  considers  them  to  be  citizens  only  during 
their  residence  in  the  United  States,  and  withholds  pro- 
tection from  them  outside  of  the  domestic  jurisdiction? 
Or  that  they  are  not  to  be  considered  our  citizens  at  all, 
anywhere  beyond  their  minority?  Are  they  thrown  back, 
on  arriving  in  Europe,  upon  their  born  allegiance?"  Sec- 
retary Blaine  approved  Mr.  Kasson's  action,  and  said  in 
reply:  "This  Department  has  always  held  the  provisions 
of  Sec.  2172,  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334), 
as  applicable  to  such  children  as  were  actually  residing 
in  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  their  fathers'  natural- 
ization, and  to  minor  children  who  came  to  the  United 
States  during  their  minority  and  while  the  parents  were 
residing  here  in  the  character  of  citizens.  This  view  ap- 
pears to  be  in  consonance  with  the  traditional  policy  of 
the  government  on  the  subject  of  citizenship."  Mr.  Blaine 
to  Mr.  Kasson,  March  31,  1881,  For.  Rel.  1881,  53. 

In  a  despatch  dated  October  13,  1884,  Mr.  Kasson  in- 
quired: "Does  the  phrase,  'if  dwelling  in  the  United 
States'— Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2172  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1334) — refer  to  the  date  of  naturalization,  or  to  the 
duration  of  residence  within  the  United  States,  and 
excluding  a  foreign  residence?  In  other  words,  which  of 
these  readings  is  correct:  'Sec.  2172  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1334).  The  children  of  persons  who  have  been 
duly  naturalized  under  any  law  of  the  United  States, 
.     .     .     being  under  the  age  of    twenty-one  years  at  the 


214  NATURALIZATION 

time  of  the  naturalization  of  their  parents,  shall,  if  [at 
the  time]  dwelling  in  the  United  States  [or  while  dwell- 
ing in  the  United  States]  be  considered  as  citizens  there- 
of.' The  former  construction  would  allow  a  young  man 
to  join  his  father  in  the  United  States  a  week  before  his 
naturalization,  and  return  to  his  native  land  a  week  after, 
a  full-fledged  American  citizen,  while  still  in  his  minority, 
and  without  renunciation  of  old  allegiance  or  swearing 
to  the  new."     For.  Rel.  1884,   202. 

In  reply.  Secretary  Frelinghuysen  stated  that  Mr. 
Kasson's  query  was  hypothetical,  and  that  no  such  case 
had,  so  far  as  he  knew,  been  presented  for  the  decision 
of  the  Executive  or  the  courts  of  the  United  States.  He 
said,  however,  that  in  the  light  of  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  1999  (U. 
S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1269),  declaring  any  decision  of  any 
officer  of  the  government  tending  to  restrict  the  right  of 
expatriation  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  Republic,  and  of  Sec.  2000  (U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  1270),  declaring  that  all  naturalized  citizens 
of  the  United  States  while  in  foreign  countries  are  en- 
titled to  receive  from  this  government  the  same  protec- 
tion which  is  accorded  to  native-born  citizens,  it  was 
difficult  to  see  how  any  branch  of  the  government  could 
well  maintain  that  the  children  of  persons  duly  natural- 
ized in  the  United  States,  and  therefore  also  citizens  by 
law,  should  lose  that  status  by  the  mere  act  of  passing 
beyond  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States, 
especially  if  they  passed  within  the  limits  of  a  third 
state  not  of  the  original  allegiance,  which  could  under 
no  circumstances  lay  claim  to  their  subjection.  ^'It  can 
be  seen,"  said  he,  "how  such  an  interpretation  might  re- 
gard a  citizen  of  the  United  States  as  a  citizen  of  no 
country  whatever,  through  the  sole  fact  of  setting  foot 
outside  of  our  territory,  and  how,  by  again  setting  foot 
within  our  borders,  his  right  of  citizenship  might  be 
deemed  to  revive  unimpaired." 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  215 

Referring  to  Mr.  Kasson's  remark  that  the  construction 
of  the  phrase  as  meaning  that  the  minor  children  who 
become  citizens  through  the  naturalization  of  the  father 
must  be,  at  the  time  of  the  father's  naturalization, 
dwelling  in  the  United  States,  would  allow  a  young  man 
to  join  his  father  in  the  United  States  a  week  before  his 
naturalization,  and  return  to  his  native  land  a  week 
after,  a  full-fledged  American  citizen.  Secretary  Freling- 
huysen  said:  ''That  such  a  thing  is  possible  is  a  defect 
in  our  existing  naturalization  laws."  For.  Rel.  1885,395,, 
396;  Van  Dyne,  Citizenship  of  the  United  States,  111., 
112. 

Jacob  Lenzen,  Jr.,  was  born  in  Germany  in  1881,  and  in 
1882  was  taken  by  his  father  to  the  United  States,  where 
he  lived  until  August,  1898,  when  he  went  to  Germany 
with  the  intention  of  remaining  two  or  three  years.  His 
father  was  naturalized  September  13,  1898 — after  young 
Lenzen  had  left  the  United  States.  Lenzen  applied  for  a 
passport,  to  the  United  States  embassy  at  Berlin.  Upon 
the  request  of  the  embassy  for  instructions,  Secretary 
Hay  said:  "The  words  'dwelling  in  the  United  States,' 
in  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  2172  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334), 
have  been  held  by  the  Department  to  mean  either  at  the 
time  of  the  father's  naturalization  or  afterwards  during 
the  child's  minority." 

After  quoting  Mr.  Blaine's  instruction  to  Mr.  Kasson, 
supra,  he  added:  "Taking  this  view,  young  Lenzen,  who 
was  not  dwelling  in  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  his 
father's  naturalization,  and  has  not  dwelt  here  since,  is 
not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Should  he  come  to 
the  United  States  and  dwell  here  during  his  minority  he 
would,  however,  be  entitled  to  claim  citizenship  under 
the  statute."  Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  White,  October  15,  1898, 
MSS.  Inst,  to  Germany;  Id.  August  18,  1898. 

It  is  sufficient,  therefore,  it  seems,  if  the  children  are 
"dwelling   in   the  United    States"    at    the    time  of    the 


216  NATURALIZATION 

naturalization    of    tiieir  parents,  or  at  any   subsequent 
period  during  their  minority. 

The  naturalization  of  an  alien,  after  his  son,  born  out 
of  the  United  States,  has  become  of  age,  does  not  make 
the  latter  a  citizen.  Boyd  v.  Nebraska,  143  U.  S.  135,  36 
L.  ed.  103,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  375. 

Naturalization  of  the  parent  in  the  United  States  does 
not  confer  citizenship  on  his  minor  children  born  abroad 
before  that  event,  and  continuing  to  reside  and  attain 
their  majority  abroad.  Mr.  Foster  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  August 
10,  1892,  MSS.  Inst,  to  Gt.  Brit.,  For.  Rel.  1892,  233.  See, 
also,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  to  Mr.  Brulatour,  July  30,  1883, 
For.  Rel.  1883,  274. 

If  the  children  remain  abroad  until  they  reach  major- 
ity, they  can  not  acquire  citizenship  through  their 
parents'  naturalization.  In  the  case  of  Frank  Fred 
Nicklas,  the  father  emigrated  to  the  United  States  from 
Germany  in  1869,  and  was  naturalized  here  in  1884.  In 
1885  he  sent  for  his  son,  aged  seventeen,  to  join  him  in 
this  country.  The  son  was  arrested  just  before  he  started, 
was  confined  in  jail  for  a  couple  of  weeks,  and  was  then 
brought  before  a  court  of  justice  and  discharged.  The 
father  requested  the  intervention  of  this  government  in 
the  son's  behalf.  Secretary  Bayard  said:  "If,  as  is  under- 
stood from  your  statement,  the  son,  Frank  Fred  Nicklas, 
did  not  emigrate  with  his  father  to  America,  was  not  re- 
siding in  America  when  his  father  was  naturalized  here 
in  1884,  and  has  not  at  any  time  since  been  a  resident  of 
the  United  States,  he  can  not  be  considered  a  United 
States  citizen.  Our  laws  require  that  the  children  of 
persons  who  have  been  naturalized  here  must  be  'dwelling 
in  the  United  States'  to  be  considered  citizens  thereof." 
Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Cole,  November  9,  1885,  MSS.  Dom. 
Let. 

And  upon  the  application  of  Mr.  Charles  Drevet  for  a 
passport,  it  appeared  that  he  was  born,  in  1864,  in  Paris, 
where  he  had  always   resided.     His  father,  a  Frenchman, 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  217 

came  to  the  United  States  in  1852;  in  1858  he  declared 
his  intention  to  become  an  American  citizen;  in  1859  he 
married  an  American  lady;  in  1860  he  went  back  to 
France;  in  1869  he  returned  to  America;  in  the  same 
year  he  took  out  his  second  papers,  and  shortly  after  re- 
sumed his  residence  in  France,  where  he  continued  to 
live.  The  son  had  always  lived  in  France;  the  father 
had  been  domiciled  there  for  many  years;  neither  the 
son  nor  the  father  had  expressed  any  intention  of  residing 
in  the  United  States  at  any  time  in  the  future.  The 
department  held  that,  under  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2172  (U.  S. 
Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334),  as  Charles  Drevet  was  not,  at 
the  time  of  the  naturalization  of  his  father,  dwelling  in 
the  United  States;  as  he  had  never  resided  in  this  coun- 
try, and  never  intended  to  do  so,  he  could  not  be  con- 
sidered an  American  citizen.  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  McLane, 
July  2,  1885,  MSS.  Inst,  to  France,  For.  Rel.  1885,  373; 
2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  410. 

Section  2172,  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1334),  only  confers  citizenship  upon  minors  dwelling  in 
the  United  States;  and  the  Department  holds  that  the 
prescribed  minority  residence  in  this  country  must  have 
coincided  with,  or  been  subsequent  to,  the  parent's  ad- 
mission to  citizenship.  Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Harris,  April  1, 
1899,  MSS.  Inst,  to  Austria. 

Anton  Macek  was  born  in  Vienna  of  Austrian  parents 
August  13,  1875.  In  May,  1884,  his  father  emigrated  to 
the  United  States  with  his  entire  family  and  had  resided 
in  Chicago  ever  since.  Before  his  naturalization  and 
while  the  son  Anton  was  yet  a  minor,  August  16,  1894, 
his  father  sent  him  to  Austria  to  be  educated.  The 
father  was  naturalized  in  Chicago  October  22,  1894 — 
that  is,  subsequent  to  the  return  of  the  son  Anton  to 
Austria,  where  he  had  since  remained.  Upon  application 
for  a  passport  it  was  held  that  Anton  Macek  was  not 
entitled  to  claim  citizenship  in  the  United  States  for  the 
reason  that  "he  was  not  dwelling  in  the  United  States  at 


218  NATURALIZATION 

the  time  of  his  father's  naturalization,  he  has  not  at  any 
time  since  dwelt  in  the  United  States,  and  of  course  is 
not  now  dwelling  here." 

In  this  case  the  view  was  advanced  that  the  words  of 
the  statute,  "dwelling  in  the  United  States,"  refer  to  the 
legal  residence  of  a  minor;  that  although  at  the  time  of 
the  naturalization  of  the  father  Anton  Macek  was  not 
actually  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States, 
his  legal  residence  was  with  the  parent,  and  that  he  might 
be  held  to  have  been  vicariously  present  in  the  person 
of  his  father,  through  whom  he  became  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  the  same  as  though  he  had  been  person- 
ally present  at  the  father's  home  in  Chicago.  The  De- 
partment said  that  "the  principle  may  be  broadly  stated 
that  no  country  can  naturalize  an  inhabitant  of  another 
country  while  that  person  is  dwelling  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  other  country."  Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Harris,  Jan- 
uary 22,  1900,  For.  Rel.  1900,  13. 

And  in  answering  the  same  contention  advanced  in  the 
case  of  Miss  Meta  Schwartz  in  1902,  Secretary  Hay  said: 
"The  law  (Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2172  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1334])  is  anomalous  enough  in  permitting  the  minor  son 
of  an  alien  to  come  to  the  United  States  immediately 
before  his  father's  naturalization  here,  and  to  leave  this 
country  a  full-fledged  citizen  the  day  after  such  naturali- 
zation. To  construe  the  statute  as  conferring  citizen- 
ship upon  a  minor  who  is  not  in  the  United  States  at  the 
time  of  the  father's  naturalization,  nor  subsequently, 
would  be  to  needlessly  open  the  door  to  further  abuses 
of  our  citizenship."  Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Hardy,  July  15, 
1902,  MSS.  Inst,  to  Switzerland.  See,  also,  the  case  of 
Antonio  Basile,  For.  Rel.  1902,  685. 

3.  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

In  order  that  there  might  be  no  further  doubt  as  to 
the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "dwelling  in  the  United 
States,"  Congress,  in  pursuance  of  the  recommendation 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  219 

of  the  Citizenship  Commission  of  1906,  designated  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  pursuant  to  the  request  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  (Report  No.  4784,  59th 
Congress,  1st  Session),  enacted  the  law  of  March  2,  1907, 
Section  5  of  which  provides  "that  a  child  born  without 
the  United  States  of  alien  parents  shall  be  deemed  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  by  virtue  of  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  or  resumption  of  American  citizenship  by  the 
parent:  Provided,  That  such  naturalization  or  resump- 
tion takes  place  during  the  minority  of  such  child:  And 
provided,  further.  That  the  citizenship  of  such  minor 
child  shall  begin  at  the  time  such  minor  child  begins  to 
reside  permanently  in  the  United  States." 

By  the  terms  of  this  law,  naturalization  of  the  parent 
confers  citizenship  on  the  foreign-born  minor  child  if 
the  latter  is  permanently  residing  in  this  country  at  the 
time  of  the  parent's  naturalization,  or  subsequently  to 
such  naturalization,  during  the  minority  of  the  child. 
This  would  preclude  the  naturalization  of  the  son  of  a 
naturalized  citizen,  coming  to  the  United  States  tem- 
porarily just  before  reaching  majority  and  going  at  once 
back  to  his  native  country,  with  the  design  of  escaping 
military  or  other  obligations  there.  See  pp.  213-15,  ante. 

By  this  statute,  resumption  of  American  citizenship 
has  the  same  effect  as  naturalization  upon  the  status  of 
the  minor  child.  It  is  understood  that  this  provision 
was  designed  to  meet  the  case  of  the  foreign-bornminor 
child  of  an  American  woman  who,  after  the  termination 
of  her  marriage  with  a  foreigner,  resumes  American 
citizenship,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section 
3  of  the  same  Act. 

Under  this  statute,  such  decisions  as  Campbell  v.  Gor- 
don and  Young  v.  Peck,  would  be  impossible. 

To  give  further  effect  to  this  provision,  the  President, 
by    Executive  Order  of  April  6,  1907,*  amended  para- 

*For  the  full  text  of  this  order  see  Appendix. 


220  NATURALIZATION 

graph  142  of  the  Instructions  to  Diplomatic  Officers  and 
of  the  Consular  Regulations  so  as  to  read  as  follows: 

"Paragraph  142.  Children  of  Naturalized  Citizens. — 
The  naturalization  or  resumption  of  American  citizen- 
ship of  the  parents  confers  American  citizenship  upon 
the  minor  children  and  such  citizenship  shall  begin  at 
the  time  such  minor  children  begin  to  reside  permanently 
in  the  United  States." 

C.  Mode  of  Parent's  Naturalization  Immaterial. 

The  language  of  the  statute  is:  "The  children  of  per- 
sons who  have  been  duly  naturalized  under  any  law  of 
the  United  States,"  etc.  It  does  not  matter  in  what  law- 
ful mode  the  naturalization  of  the  parent  is  effected. 

a.  By  Naturalization  of  Father  by  Treaty. 

A  treaty  is  just  as  much  a  law  of  the  United  States  as 
an  Act  of  Congress.  Hence,  it  was  decided,  in  the  case 
of  Crane  v.  Reeder,  25  Mich.  303,  that  the  minor  child  of 
one  who  became  a  citizen  under  Article  2  of  Jay's  Treaty, 
if  residing  in  the  United  States  at  the  time,  thereby  be- 
came a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

b.  By  Naturalization  of  Mother  by  Marriage. 

In  United  States  v.  Kellar,  11  Biss.  314,  where  a  resi- 
dent alien  woman  married  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  it  was  held  that  her  9-year-old  son,  dwell- 
ing with  her,  became  a  citizen,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions 
of  Sec.  2172  Rev.  Stat.  The  mother  became  "duly 
naturalized"  by  her  marriage  to  an  American  citizen, 
under  Sec.  1994,  Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1268),  which  will  form  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 
The  court  said:  "The  marriage  of  the  defendant's  mother 
with  a  naturalized  citizen  was  made,  by  the  statute,  an 
equivalent,  in  respect  of  citizenship,  to  formal  naturaliza- 
tion under  the  Acts  of  Congress.  Thenceforward  she  was 
to  be  regarded  as   having  been  duly   naturalized   under 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  221 

the  laws  of  this  country,  and  her  infant  son,  then  dwell- 
ing in  this  country,  was  therefore  to  be  considered,  not 
an  alien,  but  as  a  citizen."  See,  also.  People  v.  Newell, 
38  Hun  78;  Gumm  v.  Hubbard,  97  Mo.  311,  10  Am.  St. 
Rep.  312,  11  S.  W.  61,  and  Kreitz  v.  Behrensmeyer,  125 
HI.  141,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  349,  17  N.  E.  232,  For.  Rel. 
1900,  527. 

In  the  last  case,  two  children  born  in  Canada  of  Brit- 
ish parents  were  brought  to  the  United  States  upon  the 
death  of  their  father;  and  the  mother  married  an  Ameri- 
can citizen.  Upon  an  application  for  a  passport.  Secre- 
tary Hay  said:  "Under  our  law  the  two  persons  referred 
to  are  citizens  of  the  United  States.  By  her  second  mar- 
riage the  mother  acquired  American  citizenship  by  vir- 
tue of  the  provisions  of  Sec.  1994  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  the  United  States  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1268), 
which  reads  as  follows:  'Any  woman  who  is  now,  or  may 
hereafter  be,  married  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
and  who  might  herself  be  lawfully  naturalized,  shall  be 
deemed  a  citizen.'  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2172  (U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  1334),  declares  that  'the  children  of  persons 
who  have  been  duly  naturalized  under  any  law  of  the 
United  States,  .  .  .  being  under  the  age  of  twenty-one 
years  at  the  time  of  the  naturalization  of  their  parents, 
shall,  if  dwelling  in  the  United  States,  be  considered  as 
citizens  thereof.'  Any  possible  question  whether,  by  the 
marriage  of  the  mother,  she  became  duly  naturalized  is  set 
at  rest  by  the  decision  of  the  United  States  Circuit  Court 
in  the  case  of  the  United  States  v.  Kellar,  11  Biss.  314, 
13  Fed.  82,  in  which  the  court  held  that  the  mother,  an 
alien,  by  her  marriage  to  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  became 'duly  naturalized.'  .  .  .  In  the 
opinion  of  the  Department  the  persons  referred  to  .  .  . 
are  entitled  to  passports  as  citizens  of  the  United  States." 
For.  Rel.  1900,  527. 


222  NATURALIZATION 

The  minor  son  of  an  alien,  who  has  been  naturalized 
under  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2172  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1334), 
by  the  naturalization  of  his  father  in  the  United  States, 
has  "become  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  naturalization  treaty  between 
the  United  States  and  Wiirttemberg  (6  Stat,  at  L.  735). 
Actg.  Secy.  Adee  to  Mr.  White,  July  15,  1902,  MSS.  Inst. 
Germany. 

The  language  of  the  statute  is:  "The  children  of 
'persons'  duly  naturalized  .  .  .  shall  be  considered 
as  citizens  of  the  United  States."  Under  this  section, 
the  naturalization  of  an  alien  womaii,  a  widow,  confers 
citizenship  on  her  minor  son.  Brown  v.  Shilling,  9  Md. 
74. 

In  Kreitz  v.  Behrensmeyer,  125  111.  141,  where  a  widow, 
an  alien  woman,  had  married  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  the  court  said:  "The  children  of  such  a  woman, 
under  the  age  of  21  years,  become  citizens  by  virtue  of 
her  citizenship." 

The  same  court,  in  Dale  v.  Irwin,  78  111.  170,  which  in- 
volved the  question  of  the  citizenship  of  an  illegitimate 
child,  whose  mother  married  his  reputed  father,  and  the 
latter  was  afterwards  naturalized,  said:  "His  (the  son's) 
case  is  a  peculiar  one,  and  though  he  may  be  illegitimate, 
he  came  to  this  country  as  a  member  of  John  Ruckle's 
family,  whose  wife  was  his  mother  and  who  was  natur- 
alized whilst  the  son  was  an  infant.  John  Ruckle  is  his 
reputed  father,  and  the  husband  of  his  mother.  We  are 
inclined  to  hold,  as  he  was  a  member  of  his  reputed 
father's  family  when  his  father  was  naturalized,  and  he 
an  infant,  that,  by  virtue  of  the  Act  of  Congress,  he  be- 
came naturalized." 

In  United  States  v.  Rodgers,  144  Fed.  711,  it  was  held 
that    a   minor   residing   in    the   United   States  with  his 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  223 

mother  and  stepfather  became  a  citizen  when   the  latter 
was  naturalized. 

D.  Illegitimate  Children. 

Where  the  reputed  father  of  an  illegitimate  child  mar- 
ried the  mother  and  was  subsequently  naturalized,  it 
was  decided  that  the  child  became  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States.  Dale  v.  Irwin,  78  111.  170;  Van  Dyne,  Citi- 
zenship of  the  United  States,  118. 

Opinions  of  Secretaries  of  State. — A  bastard  who  is 
legitimated  by  the  intermarriage  of  his  natural  father 
and  mother,  the  mother  being  an  alien  and  the  father  a 
citizen,  becomes  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  virtue 
of  the  provisions  of  Sec.  2172  of  the  Revised  Statutes. 
Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  White,  Mch.  3,  1899,  Van  Dyne,  Citizen- 
ship of  the  United  States,  118. 

E.  Adoption. 

Citizenship  can  not  be  conferred  upon  an  alien  child 
by  adoption.  The  naturalization  laws  of  the  United 
States  contain  no  provision  as  to  the  effect  of  adoption 
by  an  American  citizen  on  the  status  of  an  alien  minor. 

Opinions  of  Secretaries  of  State. — A  citizen  of  the 
United  States  can  not,  by  adopting  a  child  of  foreign 
nationality,  confer  on  such  child  the  privileges  of  citizen- 
ship in  the  United  States.  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Rand,  Jan.  6, 
1872,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  484. 

The  only  mode  of  adoption  by  which  a  private  person 
can  confer  citizenship  upon  an  alien  is  that  of  marrying 
a  female  of  foreign  birth.  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Morris,  Feb. 
26,  1870,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  484. 

Secretary  Frelinghuysen  in  1884  expressed  the  view 
that  a  child  born  abroad  of  foreign  parents  is  not,  by  an 
act  of  adoption  under  a  state  law,  brought  within  any  of 


224  NATURALIZATION 

the  provisions  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  prescrib- 
ing United  States  citizenship.  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  to  Mr. 
Willis,  Feb.  21,  1884,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  485. 

Secretary  Bayard  in  1886  declined  to  grant  a  passport 
to  a  Chinese  woman  who  had  been  adopted  in  China  by 
an  American  citizen  and  who  desired  to  go  to  Japan  as  a 
medical  missionary  in  the  service  of  an  American  mission- 
ary society.  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  McCartee,  Oct.  15,  1886, 
3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  485. 

F.  Effect  of    Declaration  of  Intention   of    Parent   during 

Minority  of  Child. 

Under  this  statute,  citizenship  is  not  conferred  on  a 
minor  child  by  the  declaration  of  intention  of  the  parent 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  To  effect 
naturalization  of  the  child,  the  father  must  take  out 
final  naturalization  papers  during  the  minority  of  the 
child.  Berry  v.  Hull,  6  N.  Mex.  643:  In  re  Conway,  17 
Wis.  526;  In  re  Moses,  83  Fed.  995;  Dorsey  v.  Brigham, 
177  111.  250. 

Opinion  of  Secretary  of  State. — It  does  not  suffice  that 
the  child  was  a  minor  when  the  parent's  declaration  of 
intention  was  made;  he  must  have  been  a  minor  when 
the  naturalization  was  completed.  Mr.  Cass  to  Mr.  Medill, 
June  14,  1859,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  464. 

G.  Naturalization  Not  Effective  Internationally  as  to  Absent 

Children. 

A  native  of  the  canton  of  Vaud,  who  had  been  natur- 
alized in  the  United  States,  invoked  the  intervention  of 
the  United  States  in  order  to  secure  the  removal  of  his 
children  to  the  United  States.  It  appeared  that  by  the 
proceedings  in  his  native  country,  which  took  place  prior 
to  his  change  of  allegiance,  he  was  divorced  from  his  wife, 
and  the  custody  of  the  children  was  assigned  to  her.  He 
had  demanded  their  custody  from  the  authorities  of  the 


BY  NATURALIZATION  OF  PARENT.  225 

canton  of  Vaud,  but  without  effect.  The  Department  of 
State  said:  "The  fact  of  your  having  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  has  the  effect  of  entitling  you  to 
the  same  protection  from  this  Government  that  a  native 
citizen  would  receive;  but  it  can  not  operate  to  destroy 
or  to  weaken  in  any  way  the  authority  of  the  canton  of 
Vaud  over  its  native-born  citizens  who  have  never  been 
out  of  its  jurisdiction,  nor  the  exclusive  rights  of  the 
tribunals,  to  whom  the  administration  of  its  law  is  com- 
mitted, to  decide  all  questions  which  may  arise  between 
such  citizens." 

Mr.  Buchanan  to  Mr.  Rosset,  Nov.  25,  1845,  3  Moore's 
Int.  Law  Digest,  487. 

"As  the  question  as  to  the  right  of  your  daughter,  who 
is  a  minor,  to  leave  her  native  country  for  the  purpose 
of  joining  you  in  the  United  States,  appears  to  be  one 
over  which  the  authorities  of  the  former  have  exclusive 
jurisdiction,  and  as  these  have  decided  against  that  right 
it  is  conceived  that  there  is  no  occasion  for  the  inter- 
ference of  this  Department  in  the  matter." 

Mr.  Trescot,  Assist.  Sec.  of  State,  to  Mr.  Capelle,  June 
18,  1860,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  487. 

"  I  have  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the 
21st  ultimo  in  relation  to  the  impediment  interposed  to 
the  embarkation  from  Italy  of  the  wife  and  children  of 
Mr.  Dominick  Valon,  a  native  of  that  kingdom,  now  a 
naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States.  It  may  be 
open  to  question  whether  the  Act  of  Congress  of  Feb.  10, 
1855,  declaring  to  be  a  citizen  any  woman  who  might 
be  lawfully  naturalized  and  who  has  married  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  can  be  deemed  to  have  operated 
upon  a  woman  who  has  never  been  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  this  government.  This  doubt  renders  it  inex- 
pedient to  issue  a  passport  to  the  lady  in  question,  as 
the  law  requires  that  passports  be  issued  only  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  The  facts  of  the  case  will,  however, 

5233-15 


226  NATURALIZATION 

be  communicated  to  our  consul  at  Naples  with  instruc- 
tions to  use  his  good  offices  to  procure  the  withdrawal 
by  the  state  authorities  of  all  obstacles  to  the  emigration 
of  Mrs.  Valon  and  her  children." 

Mr.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Tinelli,  April 
1,  1868,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  485. 

"  While  the  general  rule  is  that  the  wife  and  minor 
children  share  the  fortunes  of  the  husband  and  father, 
it  is  necessary  that  they  should  in  fact  partake  of  his 
change  of  domicil  and  allegiance  and  it  has  been  held 
that  the  naturalization  of  an  alien  in  the  United  States 
does  not  require  this  government  to  regard  as  American 
citizens  those  members  of  his  household  who  have  never 
been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  but 
have  remained  in  the  land  of  their  original  allegiance." 

Mr.  Rives,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Smith, 
December  13,  1888,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  486. 


BY    MARRIAGE.  227 

CHAPTER  III. 

NATURALIZATION  BY  MARRIAGE. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  Women  who  may  be  naturalized  by  marriage. 

C.  Time  of  marriage. 

D.  Necessity  of  residence  in  United  States. 

a.  Residence  in  United  States  held  not  to  be  necessary. 

b.  Residence  in  United  States  held  to  be  necessary. 

E.  Nature  of  citizenship  acquired. 

F.  Effect  of  death  of  husband  on  citizenship  of  alien  woman  married  to 

an  American. 
Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State. 

G.  Citizenship  of  American  woman  married  to  alien. 

a.  Under  law  prior  to  1907. 

b.  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State. 
H.  Case  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris. 
I.  Effect  of  divorce. 
J.  Declaration  of  intention  of  husband. 

NATURALIZATION  BY  MARRIAGE. 

A.  In  General. 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  February  10,  1855 
(10  Stat,  at  L.  604,  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  1994,  U.S.  Comp.Stat. 
1901,  1268),  marriage  had  no  effect  upon  the  citizenship 
of  a  woman;  under  our  laws  an  alien  woman  marrying  a 
citizen  remained  an  alien  still.  This  was  in  virtue  of  the 
common-law  doctrine  that  no  person  can  by  any  act  of 
his  own,  without  the  consent  of  the  government,  put  off 
his  allegiance  and  become  an  alien.  The  leading  case  on 
this  point  is  Shanks  v.  Dupont,  3  Peters,  242,  7  L.  ed.  666. 

In  this  case,  a  woman  who  had  been  born  in  this  coun- 
try before  the  Revolution,  lived  here  until  after  reaching 
majority,  and  while  the  war  was  still  in  progress  was 
married  to  an  officer  of  the  British  army.  Later,  the 
couple  removed  to  England,  where  she  resided  until  her 
death.  The  Supreme  Court  decided  that  her  marriage  did 
not  effect  a  change  of  allegiance,  as  "marriage  with  an 


228  NATURALIZATION 

alien  .  .  .  produces  no  dissolution  of  the  native  allegi- 
ance of  the  wife.  It  may  change  her  civil  rights,  but  it  does 
not  affect  her  political  rights  or  privileges.  The  general 
doctrine  is  that  no  person  can,  by  any  act  of  their  own, 
without  the  consent  of  the  government,  put  off  their 
allegiance  and  become  aliens.  If  it  were  otherwise,  then 
a  feme  alien  would,  by  her  marriage,  become  ipso  facto, 
a  citizen,  and  would  be  dowable  of  the  estate  of  her 
husband,  which  is  clearly  contrary  to  law.  .  .  .  Our 
conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  neither  of  these  acts  warrant 
the  court  in  saying  that  Ann  Shanks  had  ceased  to  be  a 
citizen  of  South  Carolina  at  the  death  of  her  father." 

In  the  case  of  Beck  v.  McGillis,  9  Barb.  35,  the  facts 
were  that  a  native  American  citizen,  married,  in  Canada, 
a  British  subject,  where  they  remained  and  had  children 
born  to  them.  In  passing  upon  the  rights  of  the  wife 
and  children  to  take  under  a  will,  the  court  said:  "Mrs. 
McGillis  was  born  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  While 
a  minor  she  intermarried  with  a  subject  of  Great  Britain, 
but  neither  her  marriage  nor  her  residence  in  a  foreign 
country  constitutes  her  an  alien.  Whether,  indeed,  a 
citizen  can,  by  any  mere  act  of  his  own,  dissolve  his 
native  allegiance  and  become  an  alien  is  not  definitively 
settled  in  this  country.  The  question  has  been  regarded 
as  one  of  much  difficulty  as  well  as  delicacy,  and  though 
frequently  discussed  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  it  has  never,  I  believe,  been  regarded  as 
the  leading  point  in  the  case  presented,  so  as  to  call  for 
the  judgment  of  the  court.  But  it  has  been  decided  by 
that  court  that  the  marriage  of  a  feme  sole  with  an  alien 
husband  does  not  produce  a  dissolution  of  her  native 
allegiance." 

The  British  Act  of  Parliament  of  1844  (7  &  8  Vict. 
154,  Chap.  66)  declared  that  "any  woman  married,  or 
who  shall  be  married,  to  a  natural-born  subject  or  person 
naturalized,  shall  be  deemed   and   taken   to  be   herself 


BY    MARRIAGE.  229 

naturalized,  and  have  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  a 
natural-born  subject." 

The  American  law  is  based  on  the  British  act. 

Section  2  of  the  Act  of  February  10,  1855,  reads  as 
follows:  "Any  woman  who  might  lawfully  be  naturalized 
under  the  existing  laws,  married,  or  who  shall  be  married 
to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  shall  be  deemed  and 
taken  to  be  a  citizen"  of  the  United  States. 

The  language  of  the  law  as  incorporated  in  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States,  Section  1994  (U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  1268),  is  as  follows:  "Any  woman  who  is  nov/, 
or  may  hereafter  be,  married  to  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  who  might  herself  be  lawfully  naturalized, 
shall  be  deemed  a  citizen." 

The  power  of  Congress  to  enact  a  uniform  rule  of 
naturalization  throughout  the  United  States  authorizes 
the  provision  of  Rev.  Stat.,  Section  1994  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1268),  that  the  marriage  of  an  alien  woman  with  a 
citizen  makes  her  a  citizen.  Dorsey  v.  Brigham,  177  111. 
250,  42  L.  R.  A.  809,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  228,  52   N.  E.  303. 

Any  woman  capable  of  naturalization  under  our  laws, 
who  is  married  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  is  to  be 
deemed  a  citizen. 

B.  Women  Who  May  be  Naturalized  by  Marriage. 

What  women  may  be  naturalized?  What  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  clause,  "who  might  herself  be  lawfully  natu- 
ralized?" 

In  Burton  v.  Burton,  26  How.  Pr.  474,  it  was  held  the 
Act  was  designed  for  the  benefit  of  "alien  white  women." 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  Kelly  v. 
Owen,  7  Wall.  496,  19  L.  ed.  283,  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  terms  of  the  Act  limit  the  application  of  the 
law  to  "free  white  women." 

In  Kane  v.  McCarthy,  63  N.  C.  299,  it  was  decided  that 


230  NATURALIZATION 

"a  white  woman  not  an  alien  enemy"  answered  the  de- 
scription required  by  the  section  under  consideration. 
To  the  same  effect  is  14  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  403.  See,  also, 
Secy.  Hay  to  Mr.  Cruger,  February  6,  1903. 

In  Leonard  v.  Grant,  6  Sawy.  603,  5  Fed.  11,  which 
was  decided  after  the  extension  by  the  Act  of  July  14, 
1870  (16  Stat,  at  L.  256,  Ch.  254,  Sec.  7,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  1333),  of  the  naturalization  laws  to  the 
African,  it  was  declared  that  the  law  applied  to  free 
white  persons,  or  persons  of  African  nativity  or  descent. 
It  was  decided  in  this  case  that  a  native  Swiss  woman 
became  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  virtue  of  her 
marriage  to  a  citizen. 

In  Broadis  v.  Broadis,  86  Fed.  951,  it  was  held  that  an 
alien  woman  of  African  descent,  married  to  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  since 
the  extension  of  the  naturalization  laws  to  persons  of 
African  birth  or  descent. 

In  the  case  of  Pequignot  v.  Detroit,  16  Fed.  215,  the 
court  said:  "All  doubt  upon  the  construction  to  be 
placed  upon  the  words,  'who  might  herself  be  natural- 
ized,' was  put  at  rest  by  the  case  of  Kelly  v.  Owen,  7 
Wall.  496,  19  L.  ed.  283,  in  which  it  was  held  that  these 
terms  only  limited  the  application  of  the  law  to  'free  white 
women,'  inasmuch  as  the  naturalization  act  existing  at 
the  time  only  required  that  a  person  applying  for  its 
benefits  should  be  a  'free  white  person,'  and  not  an  alien 
enemy." 

The  Act  of  August  9,  1888  (25  Stat,  at  L.  392,  Chap. 
818,  Sec.  2),  provides  that  every  Indian  woman,  mem- 
ber of  any  Indian  tribe  in  the  United  States,  or  any  of 
its  territories  except  the  Five  Civilized  Tribes  in  the 
Indian  Territory,  who  may  hereafter  be  married  to  any 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  is  declared  to  become  by 
such  marriage  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  with  all  the 


BY    MARRIAGE.  231 

rights,    privileges,  and  immunities   of  any    such  citizen, 
being  a  married  woman. 

As  the  law  now  stands,  therefore,  any  white  woman, 
or  woman  of  African  nativity  or  descent,  or  Indian 
woman,  a  member  of  any  Indian  tribe  (except  a  member 
of  the  Five  Civilized  Tribes  in  Indian  Territory),  married 
to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  is  a  citizen  thereof. 

C.  Time  of  Marriage. 

What  is  the  significance  of  the  term  "married  "  in  the 
section  under  consideration?  In  order  to  confer  citizen- 
ship upon  the  wife,  must  the  husband  be  a  citizen  at  the 
time  of  marriage,  or  does  his  subsequent  naturalization 
have  the  same  effect? 

Kelly  V.  Owen,  7  Wall.  496,  19  L.  ed.  283,  was  a  case 
in  which  it  appeared  that  one  Miles  Kelly,  a  native  of 
Ireland,  emigrated  to  the  United  States  in  1848.  In  1853 
he  married  Ellen  Duffy;  in  1855  he  was  naturalized;  and 
in  1862  he  died  in  the  city  of  Washington,  intestate, 
seized  of  certain  real  property.  He  left  surviving  him  in 
the  United  States,  his  widow,  the  said  Ellen,  and  two 
sisters,  Ellen  Owen  and  Margaret  Kahoe.  The  sister 
Ellen  arrived  in  1856,  and  was  married  in  1861  to  Ed- 
ward Owen,  who  had  been  naturalized  in  1835.  The  sister 
Margaret  arrived  in  the  United  States  in  1850,  and  was 
married  in  1862  to  James  Kahoe,  who  was  naturalized  in 
1854.  Mr.  Justice  Field,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  said  that  the  case  turned  upon  the  construction 
given  to  the  second  section  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of 
February  10,  1855  (10  Stat,  at  L.  604,  Ch.  71,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  1268).  He  said:  "As  we  construe  this  Act,  it 
confers  the  privileges  of  citizenship  upon  women  married 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States,  if  they  are  of  the  class 
of  persons  for  whose  naturalization  the  previous  Acts  of 
Congress  provide.    The  terms  'married,'  or  'who  shall  be 


232  NATURALIZATION 

married,'  do  not  refer,  in  our  judgment,  to  the  time  when 
the  ceremony  of  marriage  is  celebrated,  but  to  a  state  of 
marriage.  They  mean  that  whenever  a  woman,  who  un- 
der previous  Acts  might  be  naturalized,  is  in  a  state  of 
marriage  to  a  citizen,  whether  his  citizenship  existed  at 
the  passage  of  the  Act  or  subsequently,  or  before  or  after 
the  marriage,  she  becomes,  by  that  fact,  a  citizen  also. 
His  citizenship,  whenever  it  exists,  confers,  under  the 
Act,  citizenship  upon  her.  The  construction  which  would 
restrict  the  Act  to  women  whose  husbands,  at  the  time 
of  marriage,  are  citizens,  would  exclude  far  the  greater 
number,  for  whose  benefit,  as  we  think,  the  Act  was  in- 
tended. ...  It  follows,  from  these  views,  that  the 
widow  and  the  two  sisters  were  citizens  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  decease  of  the  intestate  husband.  The 
widow  and  Margaret  Kahoe  became  such  on  the  natural- 
ization of  their  respective  husbands,  and  Ellen  Owen 
became  such  on  her  marriage." 

And  in  Kane  v.  McCarthy,  63  N.  C.  299,  where  the  facts 
showed  that  the  naturalization  of  the  husband  took 
place  after  the  marriage,  the  court  said:  "The  circum- 
stance that  the  husband  was  not  a  citizen  at  the  time  of 
marriage  is  wholly  immaterial,  for  he  became  a  citizen 
afterward  ipso  facto.''  Referring  to  the  wife,  the  court 
said:  "Being  a  free  white  woman  married  to  a  citizen, 
[she]  comes  within  the  description  and  the  very  words 
of  the  Act  of  Congress  [10  Stat,  at  L.  604,  Chap.  71,  Sec. 
2,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1268],  'and  is  deemed  and 
taken  to  be  a  citizen;'  for  it  is  the  status  of  being  mar- 
ried to — being  the  wife  of — a  citizen  that  makes  her  one. 
It  can  in  no  possible  view  make  any  difference  whether 
the  marriage  ceremony  is  performed  first  and  then  the 
husband  becomes  a  citizen,  or  whether  he  becomes  a 
citizen  first  and  the  marriage  afterwards  takes  place. 
Whenever  the  two  events  concur  and  come  together  'she 


BY   MARRIAGE.  233 

is  a  woman  married  to  a  citizen.'"  See,  also,  14  Ops. 
Atty.  Gen.  402.  The  fact  that  the  wife  is  under  twenty- 
one  years  of  age  does  not  exclude  her  from  citizenship. 
She  acquires  citizenship  when  her  husband  becomes  a 
citizen.     Renner  v.  Muller,  57  How.  Pr.  229. 

The  wife  of  an  alien  becomes  a  citizen  upon  the 
naturalization  of  her  husband.  People  v.  Newell,  38 
Hun,  78. 

D.  Kecessity  of  Residence  in  the  United  States. 

Whether,  under  this  law,  residence  in  the  United 
States,  is  essential,  in  order  to  confer  citizenship  upon  a 
woman  of  foreign  nationality  married  to  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  is  not  entirely  well  settled,  although  the 
better  view  appears  to  be  that  such  residence  is  neces- 
sary. 

It  has  been  contended  that  an  alien  woman,  in  order 
to  be  naturalized  by  marriage  to  an  American  citizen, 
must  have  resided  in  the  United  States  for  the  statutory 
period  of  five  years.  In  Burton  v.  Burton,  1  Keyes, 
359,  the  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  were 
divided  in  opinion  upon  this  point.  Mr.  Justice  Mullin 
said:  "If  a  residence  of  five  years  was  not  a  condition 
precedent  to  citizenship,  residence  for  some  length  of 
time  was  most  obviously  contemplated.  Without  resi- 
dence she  could  not  be  naturalized,  and  it  is  the  most 
essential  of  all  the  requirements  for  naturalization,  and 
can  not  be  dispensed  with,  unless  the  intention  to  dis- 
pense with  it  is  most  clearly  manifested  by  the  legisla- 
ture." But  Mr.  Justice  Wright  thought  that  the  act  did 
not  require  that  the  woman  claiming  its  benefits  should 
have  resided  within  the  United  States;  and,  if  it  did,  he 
thought  the  residence  of  the  wife  was,  by  construction  of 
law,  the  same  as  that  of  her  husband. 


234  NATURALIZATION 

a.  Residence  in  the  United  States  Held  not  to  be  Necessary. 

In  Kane  v.  McCarthy,  63  N.  C.  299,  it  was  decided 
that  a  woman  who,  in  1857,  married  in  Ireland  a  natural- 
ized citizen  of  the  United  States,  was  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States    although  she    always    resided  in  Ireland. 

The  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the  case  of 
Ware  v.  Wisner,  50  Fed.  310,  held  that  a  nonresident 
alien  woman  who  marries  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
is  capable  of  inheriting,  in  Iowa,  since  she  thereby  be- 
comes a  citizen  of  the  United  States  under  Rev.  Stat. 
Sec.  1994  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,1268). 

In  Headman  v.  Rose,  63  Ga.  458,  it  was  held  than  an 
alien  woman  whose  husband  becomes  a  naturalized  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States,  is  under  Section  2  of  the  Act 
of  1855  (10  Stat,  at  L.  604,  Ch.  71,  R.  S.  1994,  U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901, 1268),  thereby  made  a  citizen,  though  she  may 
live  at  a  distance  from  her  husband  for  years,  and  never 
come  to  the  United  States  until  after  his  death. 

In  the  opinion  of  Attorney  General  Williams  (14  Ops. 
Atty.  Gen.  402),  an  alien  woman  residing  abroad,  who 
has  intermarried  with  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  re- 
siding abroad,  the  marriage  having  been  solemnized 
abroad,  and  the  parties  after  marriage  continuing  to  re- 
side abroad,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  within  the  meaning  of  said  Act,  though  she  may 
never  have  resided  within  the  United  States. 

b.  Residence  in  the  United  States  Held  to  be  Necessary. 

In  Burton  v.  Burton,  26  How.  Pr.  474,  where  aliens  were 
married  abroad,  the  husband  came  to  the  United  States, 
was  naturalized  and  died,  the  wife  not  coming  to  this 
country  until  after  his  death,  the  court  in  passing  upon 
her  citizenship,  said: 

"The  Act  of  1855,  therefore,  as  we  glean  from  this  pre- 
vious legislation,  though  unfinished,  the  history  of  the 
legislative  object  to  be  attained   by  it,  and  as  well  the 


BY    MARRIAGE.  235 

general  considerations  which  influence  nations  in  framing 
naturalization  laws,  was  designed,  certainly,  for  the  bene- 
fit of  an  alien  white  woman,  whether  resident  or  not, 
married  to  a  person  who  was  at  the  time  of  the  marriage 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  thus,  securing,  by  the 
same  law,  the  rights  of  citizenship  to  the  children  of 
American  citizens  born  abroad,  and  to  such  alien  wife 
all  legal  rights  of  citizenship  which  otherwise,  and  by 
reason  of  her  alienism,  she  might  not  possess  .  .  . 
Construed  with  liberality,  however,  it  might  be  held  also 
to  extend  to  an  alien  woman  resident  in  this  country, 
though  married  abroad  to  an  alien,  and  who  came  to  this 
country  with  him  or  followed  him  here,  and  in  that  way, 
or  in  one  of  these  ways,  identified  herself  with  the  coun- 
try of  his  adoption.  ...  In  this  case  the  plaintiff 
has  neither  sought  to  derive  the  benefit  of  her  husband's 
naturalization  by  coming  with  or  following  him  here  nor 
entitled  herself  to  the  benefit  of  a  liberal  construction 
in  her  favor  of  the  act,  as  suggested  by  a  residence  in 
this  country  of  any  duration  prior  to  her  husband's 
death.  Her  rights,  therefore,  as  a  citizen  depend  entirely 
upon  the  construction  of  the  section  of  the  statute  under 
consideration,  and  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  she  has  no 
claim  upon  her  husband's  estate  thereunder.  He  was 
not,  when  he  married  her,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
and  she  was  never  a  resident  thereof  during  his  life.  On 
the  contrary,  she  was,  and  continued  to  be,  both  alien 
and  stranger. 

"The  plaintiff  being  an  alien,  and  having  married  an 
alien,  and  not  having  resided  in  this  country  prior  to 
her  husband's  death,  has  no  dower  right  in  the  lands  of 
which  her  husband  died  seized  under  the  provisions  of 
the  act  of  the  legislature  passed  in   1845." 

Secretary  Seward,  in  1868,  in  the  case  of  the  wife  and 
children  of  one  Valon,  a  native  Italian  who  left  his  family 
in  Italy,  came   to   the   United  States,  was  subsequently 


236  NATURALIZATION 

naturalized  here,  and  then  sought  the  assistance  of  the 
Department  of  State  in  overcoming  an  impediment  inter- 
posed to  their  embarkation  from  that  country, said:  "It 
may  be  open  to  question  whether  the  Act  of  Congress  of 
February  10,  1855,  declaring  to  be  a  citizen  any  woman 
who  might  be  lawfully  naturalized  and  who  has  married 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  can  be  deemed  to  have 
operated  upon  a  woman  who  has  never  been  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  this  Government.  This  doubt  renders  it 
inexpedient  to  issue  a  passport  to  the  lady  in  question, 
as  the  law  requires  that  passports  be  issued  only  to  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States.  The  facts  of  the  case  will, 
however,  be  communicated  to  our  consul  at  Naples  with 
instructions  to  use  his  good  offices  to  procure  the  with- 
drawal by  the  state  authorities  of  all  obstacles  to  the 
emigration  of  Mrs.  Valon  and  her  children."  Mr.  Seward 
to  Mr.  Tinelli,  April  1,  1868;  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest, 
486. 

In  1888,  Asst.  Secy.  Rives,  said,  referring  to  the  same 
question:  "While  the  general  rule  is  that  the  wife  and 
minor  children  share  the  fortunes  of  the  husband  and 
father,  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  in  fact  partake 
of  his  change  of  domicil  and  allegiance,  and  it  has  been 
held  that  the  naturalization  of  an  alien  in  the  United 
States  does  not  require  this  Government  to  regard  as 
American  citizens  those  members  of  his  household  who 
have  never  been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States,  but  have  remained  in  the  land  of  their  original 
allegiance."  Mr.  Rives  to  Mr.  Smith,  Dec.  13,  1888;  3 
Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  486. 

Secretary  Foster,  in  an  instruction  to  the  American 
Minister  to  Turkey,  in  1893,  said: 

"Although  Attorney  General  Williams,  in  his  opinion 
of  June  4,  1874,  14  Op.  402,  referring  to  Kelly  v.  Owen, 
7  Wall.  496,  and  to  certain  other  cases,  stated  that  the 
authorities  'go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that,  irrespective 


BY   MARRIAGE.  237 

of  the  time  or  place  of  marriage  or  the  residence  of  the 
parties,  any  free  white  woman,  not  an  alien  enemy,  mar- 
ried to  a  citizen  of  this  country,  is  to  be  taken  and 
deemed  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,'  yet  in  view  of  the 
obstacles  to  claiming  for  the  laws,  judicial  decisions,  and 
executive  opinions  of  the  UnitedjStates  effective  validity 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  this  Depart- 
ment prudently  refrains  from  asserting  its  application  to 
the  case  of  an  alien  wife  continuing  within  her  original 
allegiance  at  the  time  of  her  husband's  naturalization  in 
the  United  States,  inasmuch  as  the  citizenship  of  the 
wife  might  not  be  effectively  asserted  as  against  any 
converse  claim  of  the  sovereignty  within  which  she  has 
remained.  The  result  would  naturally  be  a  conflict  of 
private  international  law,  wherein  the  state  within  whose 
actual  jurisdiction  the  wife  remains  might  be  found  to 
have  the  practical  advantage  of  the  argument."  Mr.  Fos- 
ter, Secretary  of  State,  to  Mr.  Thompson,  Minister  to 
Turkey,  February  9,  1893,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  486. 

Mr.  Gresham  expressed  the  opinion  that  naturalization 
in  the  United  States  has  no  international  effect  on  the 
allegiance  of  the  wife  and  children  of  the  naturalized 
person  while  they  continue  to  reside  in  the  country  of 
origin.  Secretary  Gresham  to  Mr.  Watrous,  January  23, 
1905,  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  487. 

And  Secretary  Olney,  in  1896,  in  a  report  in  response 
to  a  resolution  of  the  Senate,  expressed  the  view  that 
the  naturalization  of  a  Turkish  subject  in  the  United 
States  does  not  operate  to  naturalize  his  wife,  who  has 
never  been  in  the  United  States,  and  who  is  at  the  time 
dwelling  in  a  foreign  country.  He  said:  "The  naturali- 
zation laws  of  the  United  States  being  obviously  framed 
to  permit  the  bestowal  of  the  franchise  of  citizenship 
upon  certain  persons  of  alien  birth  who  are  within  its 
jurisdiction,  and  the  application,  of  these  statutes  being 
intrusted  to  the  judicial  branch,  it  is  clear  that  they  can 


238  NATURALIZATION 

not  operate  to  naturalize  by  indirection  or  by  executive 
interpretation  a  person  who  is  an  alien  by  birth  and 
origin,  who  has  never  been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States,  and  who  at  the  time  may  be  dwelling 
within  a  foreign  jurisdiction."  S.  Doc.  No.  83,  1st  Ses- 
sion, 54th  Congress. 

Secretary  Olney  added,  however,  that  the  Turkish  gov- 
ernment had,  on  several  occasions  permitted  the  emigra- 
tion of  the  wives  and  children  of  Turkish  subjects  who 
had  come  to  the  United  States  and  here  acquired  citizen- 
ship, leaving  their  families  behind  them;  had  even  per- 
mitted the  emigration  of  other  kinsmen  of  a  degree  not 
within  the  purview  of  the  naturalization  laws  of  the 
United  States;  and  had  also,  asserting  a  discretionary 
power  in  the  premises,  refused  to  permit  the  emigration 
of  the  families  of  naturalized  Armenians,  even  within 
the  marital  or  filial  degree.  He  continued:  "The  good 
offices  of  the  United  States  Minister  are  uniformly  ex- 
erted on  all  proper  occasions  to  assist  the  emigration  of 
such  persons,  upon  permission  properly  secured  from  the 
Turkish  authorities,  and  when  funds  have  been  assured 
to  pay  the  journey,  he  has  assisted  their  departure.  He 
has  likewise  assisted  the  coming  to  the  United  States  of 
the  wives  of  citizens  of  Armenian  origin,  who,  being  in 
this  country  at  or  subsequent  to  the  naturalization  of 
their  husbands,  have  returned  to  Turkey;  and  of  the 
children  of  such  citizens  born  abroad  subsequent  to  the 
naturalization  of  the  father,  or  who  may  have  acquired 
American  citizenship  by  actual  presence  in  the  United 
States  subsequent  to  the  father's  naturalization,  and  in 
such  instances  permission  for  the  families  to  emigrate  has 
been  demanded  as  of  right.'"  For.  Rel.  1895,  Part  II,  1472. 

E.  Nature  of  Citizenship  Acquired. 

What  is  meant  by  the  phrase,  "shall  be  deemed  a  citi- 
zen," in  the  section  of  the  Revised  Statutes  under  con- 
sideration? 


BY    MARRIAGE.  239 

''The  phrase,  'shall  be  deemed  a  citizen,'  in  Section  1994, 
Rev.  Stat.  (U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1268)  or  as  it  was  in 
the  Act  of  1855  (10  Stat,  at  L.  604,  Chap.  71,  Sec.  2), 
'shall  be  deemed  and  taken  to  be  a  citizen,'  while  it  may 
imply  that  the  person  to  whom  it  relates  has  not  actually 
become  a  citizen  by  the  ordinary  means  or  in  the  usual 
way,  as  by  the  judgment  of  a  competent  court,  upon  a 
proper  application  and  proof,  yet  it  does  not  follow  that 
such  person  is  on  that  account  practically  any  the  less  a 
citizen.  The  word  'deemed'  is  the  equivalent  of  'con- 
sidered '  or  'judged,'  and  therefore,  whatever  an  Act  of 
Congress  requires  to  be  'deemed'  or  'taken'  as  true  of 
any  person  or  thing  must,  in  law,  be  considered  as  having 
been  duly  adjudged  or  established  concerning  such  per- 
son or  thing,  and  have  force  and  effect  accordingly. 
When,  therefore,  Congress  declares  that  an  alien  woman 
shall,  under  certain  circumstances,  be  'deemed'  an  Ameri- 
can citizen,  the  effect  when  the  contingency  occurs,  is 
equivalent  to  her  being  naturalized  directly  by  an  Act  of 
Congress  or  in  the  usual  mode  thereby  prescribed." 
Leonard  v.  Grant,  6  Sawyer,  603,  5  Fed.  11. 

The  Supreme  Court,  in  Kelly  v.  Owen,  7  Wall.  496, 
19  L.  ed.  283,  said  that  the  object  of  the  Act  was  to 
allow  the  citizenship  of  the  wife  "  to  follow  that  of  her 
husband,  without  the  necessity  of  any  application  for 
naturalization  on  her  part." 

In  U.  S.  V.  Kellar,  11  Biss.  314,  13  Fed.  82,  Mr.  Justice 
Harlan  said  that  the  woman,  "upon  her  marriage,  there- 
fore, with  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
.  .  .  became,  under  the  plain  words  of  Sec.  1994 
[U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1268], ipso  facto,  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  as  fully  as  if  she  had  complied  with  all 
the  provisions  of  the  statutes  upon  the  subject  of 
naturalization." 

And  in  Haberacker's  case,  Mr.  Wharton,  Acting  Secre- 
tary of  State,  in  an  instruction  to  Mr.  Phelps,  said:  "It 


240  NATURALIZATION 

is  uniformly  held  under  Sec.  1994  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1268],  that  an  alien  woman  who  might  herself  be 
lawfully  naturalized,  by  marriage  to  a  citizen  becomes 
herself  a  citizen  without  any  previous  declaration  or 
act  on  her  part,  or  without  reference  to  the  previous 
length  of  her  residence  in  this  country,  as  fully  to  all  in- 
tents and  purposes  as  if  she  had  become  a  citizen  upon 
her  own  application  and  by  the  judgment  of  a  compet- 
ent court."  Mr.  Wharton  to  Mr.  Phelps,  March  26,  1891, 
MSS.  Inst,  to  Germany,  For.  Rel.  1891,  508. 

F.  Effect  of   Death   of   Husband   on  Citizenship   of   Alien 
Woman  Married  to  an  American. 

The  Act  of  March  2,  1907  (Sec.  4),  provides  that  "any 
foreign  woman  who  acquires  American  citizenship  by 
marriage  to  an  American  shall  be  assumed  to  retain  the 
same  after  the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  if 
she  continue  to  reside  in  the  United  States,  unless  she 
makes  formal  renunciation  thereof  before  a  court  having 
jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  or  if  she  resides  abroad 
she  may  retain  her  citizenship  by  registering  as  such  be- 
fore a  United  States  consul  within  one  year  after  the 
termination  of  such  marital  relation." 

It  was  the  practice  of  the  Department  of  State,  prior 
to  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  in  passing 
upon  applications  for  passports  and  for  protection  abroad, 
to  regard  the  American  citizenship  of  a  foreign-born 
widow  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  as  subsisting  at 
least  while  she  continued  to  reside  in  this  country. 
There  was  no  provision  by  statute  for  the  renunciation 
of  citizenship,  however.  This  law  serves  the  useful  pur- 
pose of  enabling  a  widow  of  an  American  citizen,  who 
desires  to  resume  her  former  nationality,  to  formally  an- 
nounce her  purpose  by  renouncing,  in  a  naturalization 
court,  the  citizenship  which  she  acquired  by  marriage. 

If  the  widow  resides  abroad,  and  desires  to  retain  the 


BY  MARRIAGE.  241 

citizenship  acquired  by  her  marriage,  she  is  required, 
under  this  law,  to  register  before  a  consul  of  the  United 
States,  within  one  year  after  the  termination  of  the 
marital  relation. 

The  same  rules  apply  in  case  the  marriage  is  terminated 
by  divorce  as  in  the  event  of  the  death  of  the  husband. 

Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State. 

The  Executive  Order  of  President  Roosevelt  of  April 
6,  1907,*  amending  the  diplomatic  and  consular  regula- 
tions so  as  to  embody  in  them  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  March  2,  1907,  makes  the  following  prescription  con- 
cerning foreign  women  who  have  acquired  American 
citizenship  by  naarriage  to  citizens  from  whom  they  have 
afterward  been  separated   by  death  or  absolute  divorce: 

"Registration  to  Resume  or  Retain  Citizenship. 

"Whenever  any  foreign  woman  has  acquired  American 
citizenship  through  her  marriage,  upon  the  death  of  her 
husband  or  upon  their  absolute  divorce  she  must,  if  she  is 
abroad  and  desires  to  retain  her  American  citizenship, 
register  as  an  American  citizen  before  a  United  States 
Consul  within  one  year  after  the  termination  of  the  mari- 
tal relation.     .     .     ." 

The  Department  of  State,  on  April  19,  1907,  issued  a 
circular  instruction,  addressed  to  the  American  diplo- 
matic and  consular  officers  to  carry  this  regulation  into 
effect,  the  pertinent  portion  whereof  reads  as  follows: 

"A  foreign  woman  who  has  acquired  American  citizen- 
ship by  marriage  to  an  American  citizen  and  who,  upon 
the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  by  the  death  of 
her  husband  or  by  their  absolute  divorce,  desires  to  re- 
tain the  American  citizenship  which  she  acquired  through 
her  marriage,  must,  within  one  year  after  the  termina- 
tion of  the  marital  relation,  register  with  an  American 
consular  officer  her  intention  to  retain  her  American 
citizenship. 

*  For  the  full  text  of  this  order  see  Appendix. 
5233—16 


242  NATURALIZATION 

"The  form  of   such   registration  shall  be   as   follows: 

"I, [name  of  affiant]  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm) 

that  I  was  born  on [date  of  birth]  in [place 

of  birth]  and  was,  up  to  the  time  of  my  marriage  on 

[date  of   marriage]  to [name  of   late    husband]  a 

citizen   (or  subject)  of  [name   of  country];   that 

the  said [name  of  late  husband]  was  born  in 

[place  of   birth]  and  was,  at  the  time  of   his   death  (or 

our  divorce),  a  citizen  of   the  United  States   by 

[birth  or  naturalization];  that  the   said [name  of 

husband]  died  (or  we  were  divorced)  on [date   of 

death  or  divorce]  at [place  of  death  or  divorce]; 

that  I  am  now  temporarily  residing  in [place  of 

residence]  and  desire  to  retain  my  American  citizenship; 
that  it  is  my  intention  to  go  to  the  United  States  within 

[length  of   intended  foreign  residence]  with  the 

intention  of  residing  and  performing   the  duties  of   an 
American  citizen. 

"Sworn  and   subscribed   to  before  me  this day 

of 

> 

American  Consul. 

"The  consul's  certificate  to  this  affidavit  should  be 
the  same  as  in  the  case  of  an  American  woman  married 
to  a  foreigner  who  desires  to  resume  her  American  citi- 
zenship, and  documentary  evidence  of  the  allegations 
relative  to  the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  should 
be  required  as  in  the  case  of  an  American  woman  mar- 
ried to  a  foreigner  who  desires  to  resume  her  American 
citizenship.  Also  documentary  proof  of  the  husband's 
citizenship  should  be  required.  The  affidavit  and  the 
consul's  certificate  should  be  made  in  duplicate  and  re- 
ported as  in  the  case  of  an  American  woman  who  desires 
to  resume  her  citizenship. 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root." 

G.  Citizenship  of  American  Woman  Married  to  an  Alien. 

a.   Under  laio  prior  to  1907. 
Under  Section  1994  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  which  we 
have   been   considering,  an  alien  woman  who   marries  a 


BY  MARRIAGE.  243 

citizen  of  the  United  States  is  deemed  a  citizen.  Is  the 
converse  of  this  rule  true?  Does  an  American  woman 
become  an  alien  by  marriage  to  a  foreigner?  The  status 
of  such  persons  prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  law  of 
March  2,  1907,  and  the  reasons  inducing  Congress  to  act 
in  the  matter,  appear  from  the  following  review  of  the 
decisions  of  the  courts  and  opinions  of  the  Executive 
Department  of  the  government,  and  of  international 
claims  commissions  to  which  the  United  States  has  been 
a  party. 

In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Preto  (10  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  321),  a 
woman  born  in  the  United  States,  of  American  parents, 
who  married  a  Spanish  subject  residing  here,  and  subse- 
quently removed  with  her  husband  to  Spain,  where  she 
lived  until  his  death,  Attorney  General  Bates,  in  1862, 
held  that  the  marriage  did  not  deprive  her  of  her  native 
citizenship. 

And  in  1877,  in  Mrs.  D'Ambrogia's  case  (15  Ops.  Atty. 
Gen.  599)  Solicitor  General  Phillips  decided  that  the 
marriage  of  an  alien-born  woman  to  a  naturalized  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  conferred  on  her  "a  permanent 
status  of  citizenship,  defeasible  only  as  in  the  case  of 
other  persons;"  and,  on  the  authority  of  Shanks  v. 
Dupont,  3  Pet.  242,  7  L.  ed.  666,  it  was  further  held  that 
her  subsequent  marriage  with  an  alien  did  not  affect  this 
status. 

But  in  1866,  in  the  case  of  Mrs.  Berthemy  (12  Ops. 
Atty.  Gen.  7),  who  was  born  in  France,  of  American 
parents,  there  married  a  Frenchman,  and  continued  to 
reside  in  France  after  the  death  of  her  husband,  Attorney 
General  Stanbery  held  that  she  was  not  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States. 

And,  in  1869,  Attorney  General  Hoar  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  same  woman,  who  was  still  domiciled  in 
France,  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  for  the 
purposes  of  the  internal  revenue  law.  The  Attorney 
General,  however,  expressly  disclaimed  any  opinion  upon 


244  NATURALIZATION 

the  question  whether  a  native  woman  marrying  an  alien 
"is  not,  after  such  marriage,  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  in  a  qualified  sense."     13  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  128. 

In  the  claim  of  the  heirs  of  Felix  Mahan  v.  Mexico, 
American  and  Mexican  claims  commission,  convention  of 
1868  (15  Stat,  at  L.  679),  the  umpire  held  that  the 
daughter  of  the  original  claimant,  who  was  married  to  a 
Spaniard,  was  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  3  Moore's 
Int.  Arbitrations,  2485. 

In  the  cases  of  Bowie  v.  United  States,  and  Calder- 
wood  V.  United  States,  and  Tooraen  v.  United  States, 
before  the  American  and  British  claims  commission, 
treaty  of  1871  (17  Stat,  at  L.  863),  it  was  held  that  the 
national  character  of  a  married  woman  is  governed  by 
that  of  her  husband  in  all  cases,  irrespective  of  domicil; 
and  that  on  the  death  of  the  husband  the  national 
character  of  the  widow,  acquired  by  marriage,  remains 
unchanged.  From  this  conclusion  Mr.  Commissioner 
Frazer  (the  American  commissioner)  dissented  in  the  case 
of  a  widow  of  American  origin  who  had  always  remained 
domiciled  in  the  United  States,  holding  that  in  such  case, 
upon  the  death  of  her  British  huband,  her  original 
national  character  reverted.  In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Bowie, 
the  claimant  was  by  birth  a  British  subject,  but  was  at 
the  time  of  the  alleged  injuries  the  widow  of  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  and  domiciled  in  the  insurrectionary 
State  of  Virginia,  and  before  the  filing  of  her  memorial 
had  again  intermarried  with  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  who  was  still  living  and  there  domiciled.  Her 
claim  was  disallowed,  all  the  commissioners  agreeing.  In 
the  case  of  Mrs.  Tooraen,  claimant  was  by  birth  a  British 
subject,  her  husband  at  the  time  of  marriage  being  a 
subject  of  Sweden,  but  naturalized  as  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  subsequent  to  the  marriage.  Claimant 
and  her  husband  were  both  domiciled  from  the  time  of 
marriage    within    the    United    States.      Her   claim   was 


BY  MARRIAGE.  245 

unanimously  dismissed.  Hale's  Report,  17;  3  Moore, 
International  Arbitrations,  2486. 

In  the  case  of  Jane  L.  Brand  v.  United  States,  Ameri- 
can and  British  Claims  Commission,  treaty  of  1871  (17 
Stat,  at  L.  863),  claimant,  a  native  of  Ireland,  married  in 
New  Orleans  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  who  died, 
and  she  continued  domiciled  in  New  Orleans.  The  com- 
mission held  that  the  national  character  of  a  married 
woman  was  in  all  cases  determined  by  that  of  her  hus- 
band; and  that  such  national  character,  once  acquired 
by  marriage,  continues  on  the  death  of  the  husband ;  that 
this  doctrine  had  always  prevailed  in  Great  Britain,  as  well 
as  elsewhere,  where  the  domicil  of  the  wife  and  widow  had 
continued  to  be  that  of  the  husband's  nntionality;  and 
that  by  no  treaty  stipulation  or  law,  municipal  or  inter- 
national,was  the  widoweven  allowed  to  reclaim  her  original 
nationality  while  still  domiciled  within  the  nationality 
of  her  husband,  until  the  conventions  of  1870  and  1871; 
and  that  by  those  conventions  she  could  only  reclaim  her 
original  nationality  in  the  form  provided  by  the  conven- 
tion of  1871,  which  in  the  case  of  Mrs.  Brand  had  never 
been  done;  that  she  was  therefore,  both  at  the  time  of 
the  commission  of  the  alleged  wrongs  and  at  the  time  of 
the  presentation  of  her  memorial,  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  The  claim  was  dismissed  for  want  of  jurisdiction. 
3   Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  2487,  2488. 

In  the  cases  of  Mrs.  De  Brissot  and  Mrs.  Hammer,  before 
the  United  States  and  Venezuelan  Commission,  sitting  in 
Washington,  the  claimants  were  born  in  Venezuela  and 
married  citizens  of  the  United  States.  They  were  domi- 
ciled in  Venezuela,  and  continued  to  reside  there  after 
the  death  of  their  husbands.  Their  claim  against  the 
Venezuelan  government  was  for  the  killing  of  their  hus- 
bands. It  was  held  that,  inasmuch  as  they  were  Vene- 
zuelan citizens  according  to  Venezuelan  law,  and  that 
law    and   the  law  of    the    United  States  being  thus    in 


246  NATURALIZATION 

conflict,  the  matter  must  be  decided  by  tlie  public  law.  On 
that  basis  the  claim  of  the  Venezuelan  government  was 
considered  the  better,  the  claimants  were  treated  as  Vene- 
zuelan citizens,  and  their  claims  ruled  out  for  want  of 
jurisdiction.  Opinion  of  Commissioners,  3  Moore's  Inter- 
national Arbitrations,  2457-60. 

In  several  cases  before  the  British  and  American  Mixed 
Commission,  under  the  treaty  of  Washington  (17  Stat,  at 
L.  803),  it  was  held  that  a  married  woman's  nationality 
is  governed  by  that  of  her  husband  in  all  cases,  irrespec- 
tive of  domicil,  and  remains  unchanged  after  his  death. 
Hence,  that  an  American  woman  married  to  a  British 
subject,  and  who  continued  to  live  in  this  country  after 
his  death,  was  still  a  British  subject.  The  American 
commissioner  dissented  from  this  decision  (U.  S.  Agent's 
Report,  pp.  17, 18,  vol.  6,  Washington  Arbitration).  These 
claims  arose  before  the  passage  of  the  British  Act  of  1870, 
33  and  34  Vict.  104,  Chap.  14. 

In  Pequignot  v.  Detroit,  16  Fed.  211,  it  was  decided 
(in  1883)  by  the  United  States  Circuit  Court,  that  an 
alien  woman  who  has  once  become  an  American  citizen 
by  marriage,  which  is  subsequently  dissolved,  may  re- 
sume her  alienage  by  marriage  to  a  native  of  her  own 
country.  In  this  case  the  facts  were  that  a  native  French 
woman  came  to  the  United  States  with  her  parents  when 
she  was  a  child.  Her  parents  never  applied  for  naturali- 
zation. In  1863  she  married  one  Partridge,  a  native  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States.  Upon  his  death  several  years 
later  she  married  one  Pequignot,  a  native  of  France,  who 
never  sought  naturalization  in  this  country.  While  living 
with  him  the  suit  was  brought.  Judge  Brown  (afterward 
Associate  Justice  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court) 
expressed  doubt  as  to  the  binding  force  of  Shanks  v. 
Dupont,  3  Pet.  242,  7  L.  ed.  666,  in  its  literalisms,  be- 
cause the  two  reasons  given  for  that  decision  have 
ceased    to    exist,  viz:    (1)  that    the  general    doctrine  is 


BY    MARRIAGE.  247 

"that  no  person  can,  by  any  act  of  their  own,  without 
the  consent  of  the  government,  put  off  their  allegiance 
and  become  aliens;"  (2)  that,  "if  it  were  otherwise,  then 
a  feme  alien  would  by  marriage  become,  ipso  facto,  a 
citizen,  and  would  be  dowable  of  the  estate  of  her  hus- 
band, which  are  clearly  contrary  to  law." 

In  view  of  the  Act  of  July  27,  1868  (Rev.  Stat.  Sec. 
1999,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1269),  expressly  recogniz- 
ing the  right  of  expatriation,  and  the  Act  of  February  10, 
1855  (Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  1994,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1268), 
declaring  that  any  woman  married  to  an  American  citi- 
zen shall  be  deemed  a  citizen,  Judge  Brown  said  that  it 
seemed  to  him  "that  we  ought  to  apply  the  maxim 
cessante  ratione,  cessat  lex,  to  this  case,  and  are  not 
bound  to  treat  it  as  controlling  authority."  He  added: 
"We  should  regard  the  sections  above  quoted  as  announc- 
ing the  views  of  Congress  upon  this  branch  of  interna- 
tional law,  and  ought  to  apply  the  same  rule  of  decision 
to  a  case  where  a  female  American  citizen  marries  an 
alien  husband,  that  we  should  to  a  case  where  an  alien 
woman  marries  an  American  citizen." 

In  Comitis  v.  Parkerson  (decided  in  1893),  22  L.  R.  A. 
148,56  Fed.  556,  the  plaintiff,  a  native  citizen  of  Louis- 
iana, married  a  native-born  subject  of  Italy  who  had 
come  to  Louisiana  and  engaged  in  business,  without  in- 
tending ever  to  return  to  Italy.  He  never  became 
naturalized.  After  the  marriage,  the  woman  and  her 
husband,  until  his  death,  lived  together  in  Louisiana 
without  any  intention  on  the  part  of  either  to  depart 
from  the  United  States.  After  the  husband's  death  the 
widow  continued  to  reside  in  Louisiana.  The  court 
(Billings,  J.)  held  that  expatriation  must  be  effected  by 
removal  from  the  country,  and  that,  in  the  absence  of 
any  act  of  Congress  authorizing  it,  there  can  be  no  im- 
plied renunciation  of  citizenship  by  an  American  woman 
marrying  an  alien. 


248  NATURALIZATION 

In  Jenns  v.  Landes,  85  Fed.  801,  it  appeared  that  the 
complainant  was  born  in  the  State  of  Washington,  and 
lived  with  her  father  until  the  year  1896,  when  she  per- 
manently removed  from  the  State  of  Washington,  and 
was  married  to  a  British  subject;  that  she  and  her  hus- 
band resided  in  Canada,  and  had  their  domicil  in  the 
city  of  Victoria,  The  Canadian  statute  of  1886,  Vol.  2, 
Chap.  113,  Sec.  22,  declared  that  "a  married  woman  shall, 
within  Canada,  be  deemed  to  be  a  subject  of  the  state  of 
which  her  husband  is  for  the  time  being  a  subject."  The 
court  held  that  the  complainant  became  an  alien,  as  re- 
spects the  United  States,  so  as  to  enable  her  to  sue  in  a 
Federal  court. 

In  Ruckgaber  v.  Moore,  104  Fed.  947,  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  for  the  eastern  district  of  New  York 
held  that  the  political  status  of  a  native-born  American 
woman,  who  married  a  citizen  of  France  and  removed 
with  him  to  that  country,  followed  that  of  her  husband. 
The  woman  having  died  in  France,  the  court  declared 
that  she  must  be  regarded  as  having  been  a  nonresident 
alien  at  the  time  of  her  death.  The  court  said:  "  By  the 
several  statutes  of  America,  France,  and  Great  Britain  the 
marriage  of  a  citizen  of  such  country  with  an  alien  wife 
confers  upon  the  latter  the  citizenship  of  the  husband; 
and  this  policy  of  three  great  powers,  in  connection  with 
Sec.  1999  of  the  Revised  Statutes  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  1269],  which  proclaims  that  expatriation  is  an  in- 
herent right,  establishes  that  the  political  status  of  the 
wife  follows  that  of  her  husband,  with  the  modification 
that  there  must  be  withdrawal  from  her  native  country, 
or  equivalent  act  expressive  of  her  election  to  renounce 
her  former  citizenship  as  a  consequence  of  her  marriage. 
Some  serious  objection  to  this,  or  even  the  opposite 
conclusion,  exist,  but  it  has  been  reached  after  due  con- 
sideration   of    the    subject,  and    pertinent    authorities. 


BY    MARRIAGE,  249 

including  Shanks  v.  Dupont,  3  Pet.  243,  7  L.  ed.  666; 
Pequignot  v.  Detroit,  16  Fed.  211;  and  CoEQitis  v.  Parker- 
son,  22  L.  R.  A.  148,  56  Fed.  556." 

For  the  same  reason  the  court  declared  that  the 
daughter  of  the  deceased,  who  had  intermarried  with  a 
citizen  of  Germany  and  for  eight  years  previous  to  her 
mother's  death  had  resided  there,  should  be  regarded  as 
a  citizen  of  that  country. 

The  question  was  presented  to  the  Department  of 
State  in  1871.  In  this  case  an  American  woman  had  mar- 
ried an  alien,  and  after  his  death  applied  to  our  legation 
in  Paris  for  a  passport.  Secretary  Fish,  in  an  instruction 
to  Mr.  Washburne,  said:  "By  the  law  of  England  and 
the  United  States,  an  alien  woman  on  lier  marriage  with 
a  subject  or  citizen  merges  her  nationality  in  that  of  her 
husband.  But  the  converse  has  never  been  established 
as  the  law  of  the  United  States,  and  only  by  the  Act  of 
Parliament  of  May  12,  1870,  [33  and  34  Vict.  104,  Ch.  14] 
did  it  become  British  law  that  an  English  woman  lost 
her  quality  of  a  British  subject  by  marrying  an  alien. 
The  Continental  codes,  on  the  other  hand,  enable  a 
woman  whose  nationality  has  been  changed  by  marriage 
to  resume  it  when  she  becomes  a  widow,  on  the  condi- 
tion, however,  of  her  returning  to  the  country  of  her 
origin.  The  widow  to  whom  you  refer  may,  as  a  matter 
of  strict  right,  remain  a  citizen,  but,  as  a  citizen  has  no 
absolute  right  to  a  passport,  and  as  the  law  of  the 
United  States  has,  outside  of  their  jurisdiction,  only  such 
force  as  foreign  nations  may  choose  to  accord  it  in  their 
own  territory,  I  think  it  judicious  to  withhold  passports 
in  such  cases  unless  the  widow  gives  evidence  of  her  in- 
tention to  resume  her  residence  in  the  United  States." 
Sec'y  Fish  to  Mr.  Washburne,  February  24,  1871,  MSS. 
Inst,  to  France. 

Secretary  Fish    in   a  letter    to    the    President,  dated 


250  NATURALIZATION 

August  25, 1873,  said:  "Chief  Justice  Marshall  (Murray  v. 
The  Charming  Betsy,  2  Cranch,  119,  2  L.  ed.  226)  says 
that  when  a  citizen  by  his  own  act  has  made  himself  the 
subject  of  a  foreign  power,  his  situation  is  completely 
changed,  and  the  act  certainly  places  him  out  of  the  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States  while  within  the  territory 
of  the  sovereign  to  whom  he  has  sworn  allegiance.  .  .  . 
Hence,  it  would  seem  that  the  marriage  of  a  female 
citizen  of  the  United  States  with  a  foreigner,  subject  of 
a  country  by  whose  laws  marriage  confers  citizenship 
upon  the  wife  of  its  subject,  and  her  removal  to  and  res- 
idence in  the  country  of  her  husband's  citizenship, 
would  devest  her  of  her  native  character  of  an  American 
citizen."     For.  Rel.  1873,  pt.  2,  1187. 

In  1874  the  case  was  presented  of  an  American  lady, 
native  born,  who,  after  arriving  at  womanhood,  went  to 
Europe  and  married  an  Englishman;  after  living  many 
years  with  her  husband  and  having  children  by  him,  she 
obtained  a  divorce  in  England.  She  applied  to  the  United 
States  legation  in  Paris  for  a  passport,  to  be  issued  in 
her  maiden  name  and  as  an  American  citizen.  Mr.  Wash- 
burne,  the  United  States  minister,  declined  giving  such 
a  passport  for  the  reasons:  "(1)  That  there  is  nothing  in 
the  decree  of  divorce  authorizing  her  to  take  her  maiden 
name;  and  that  I  am  not  advised  that  the  laws  of  Eng- 
land, independent  of  the  order  in  the  decree,  authorize  a 
divorced  woman,  at  her  option,  to  take  her  maiden  name. 
(2)  Touching  the  question  of  citizenship,  I  consider  her 
case  analogous  to  that  decided  by  you  in  your  despatch 
dated  February  24,  1871,  supra,  where  you  decided  that 
it  would  be  judicious  to  withhold  a  passport  in  a  case 
where  an  American  woman  had  married  a  foreigner,  and 
her  husband  had  afterwards  died,  unless  she  gave  evidence 
of  her  intention  to  resume  her  residence  in  the  United 
States.     In  the  present  case,  the  party  desiring  the  pass- 


BY  MARRIAGE.  251 

port  not  only  does  not  'give  evidence  of  her  intention 
to  resume  her  residence  in  the  United  States,'  but  avows 
that  her  purpose  in  obtaining  a  passport  in  her  maiden 
name  is  to  enable  her  to  marry  a  Frenchman." 

Mr.  Washburne  said  that  it  was  strongly  contended  by 
the  parties  interested  that  the  decree  of  divorce  dissolved 
the  nationality  of  the  woman  as  well  as  the  bonds  of  mat- 
rimony. He  added  that  he  did  not  take  this  view  of  the 
subject,  but  he  had  been  pressed  with  so  much  insistence 
to  give  the  passport  that  he  had  to  promise  to  submit 
the  question  to  the  Department  for  its  decision.  The 
course  pursued  by  the  minister  was  approved  by  Secre- 
tary Fish.     For.  Rel.  1874,  408,  413. 

In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Lawrence,  a  native  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, who  married  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  from 
whom  she  obtained  a  divorce,  Acting  Secretary  Uhl  held 
that  "Mrs.  Lawrence,  by  her  marriage,  became  an  Ameri- 
can citizen,  both  by  British  and  American  law;  she  is 
undoubtedly  still  an  American  citizen,  viewed  either 
from  the  American  or  the  English  standpoint.  She  has  not 
lost  her  American  nationality  by  any  method  recognized 
by  our  law;  and,  according  to  British  law,  an  English 
woman,  who,  by  marriage  acquires  foreign  citizenship, 
must,  in  order  to  reacquire  her  original  nationality  upon 
her  husband's  death,  obtain  a  certificate  therefor  from 
the  British  authorities.  It  is  not  believed  that  any  dif- 
ferent rule  would  be  applied  where  the  parties  are  di- 
vorced. As  Mrs.  Lawrence  claims  American  citizenship, 
it  is  assumed  that  she  has  not  taken  any  steps  to  reac- 
quire British  nationality.  It  is  not  understood,  either, 
that  there  is  any  conflicting  claim  to  her  allegiance." 
Mr.  Uhl  to  Mr.  Denby,January30,1894,For. Rel.  1894,139. 

The  question  was  again  presented  to  Secretary  Fish  in 
Degallado's  case.  He  said:  "It  would  seem  that  the 
marriage  of  a  female  citizen  of  the  United  States  with  a 


252  NATURALIZATION 

foreigner,  the  subject  of  a  country  by  whose  laws  mar- 
riage confers  citizenship  upon  the  wife  of  a  subject,  and 
her  removal  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States 
and  residence  in  the  country  of  her  husband's  citizen- 
ship would  devest  her  of  her  native  citizenship."  He 
added:  "But,  although  the  marriage  of  a  female  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  with  a  foreigner  should  make 
her  a  citizen  of  the  country  to  which  her  husband  be- 
longs, it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  she  becomes 
subject  to  all  the  disabilities  of  alienage,  such,  for  in- 
stance, as  inability  to  inherit  or  transfer  real  property," 
Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Williamson,  September  22,  1875,  MSS. 
Inst,  to  Costa  Rica. 

In  1886  Mr.  Bayard,  in  the  case  of  Mrs.  Zografo,  held 
that  a  native-born  American  woman,  who  marries  a  Turk- 
ish subject  and  takes  up  her  residence  in  Turkey,  be- 
comes a  Turkish  subject.  Upon  the  death  of  her  hus- 
band, in  order  to  revive  her  American  nationality,  she 
must  leave  Turkey  and  take  up  an  American  residence. 
Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Zografo,  February  6,  1886,  MSS.  Dom. 
Let. 

In  1887  Mrs.  Arana,  who  had  been  born  in  the  United 
States  in  1846  of  American  parents,  and  had  married  in 
1869  a  Spanish  subject,  claimed  that,  by  the  death  of 
her  husband  in  1883,  her  United  States  citizenship  had 
reverted.  She  applied  to  the  United  States  minister  to 
Salvador  for  a  passport.  Secretary  Bayard,  in  instructing 
the  minister,  quoted  from  Secretary  Fish's  instruction  of 
February  24,  1871,  to  Mr.  Washburne,  supra,  and  said 
that  he  was  not  disposed  to  depart  from  this  precedent. 
He  held  that  Mrs.  Arana,  so  long  as  she  remained  with- 
out the  jurisdiction  of  this  government  was  not  entitled 
to  the  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  so  far, 
at  least,  as  would  entitle  her  to  diplomatic  interposition 
against  the  government  of  Salvador  on  a  claim  accruing 
since  her  marriage  and  departure  from  the  United  States. 


BY    MARRIAGE.  253 

Secretary  Bayard  to  Mr.  Hall,  January  6,  1887,  For.  Rel. 
1887,  92. 

In  1890,  in  the  case  of  Carl  Heisinger,  Mr.  Blaine  said 
that  the  Department  had  several  times  taken  the  view 
that  the  marriage  of  an  American  woman  to  a  foreigner 
does  not  completely  devest  her  of  her  original  national- 
ity; that  her  American  citizenship  was  held  for  most 
purposes  to  be  in  abeyance  during  coverture,  but  to  be 
susceptible  of  revival  by  her  return  to  the  jurisdiction  and 
allegiance  of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Blaine  to  Mr.  Phelps, 
Feb.  1,  1890,  For.  Rel.  1890,  302. 

And  in  an  instruction  to  the  American  consul  at  Sagua 
la  Grande,  June  7,  1895,  Acting  Secretary  Uhlsaid:  "The 
view  has  been  taken  by  this  Department  in  several  cases 
that  the  marriage  of  an  American  woman  to  a  foreigner 
does  not  completely  devest  her  of  her  American  citizen- 
ship, but  that  the  same  is  only  suspended  during  cover- 
ture, and  reverts  upon  the  death  of  her  husband,  if  she 
is  residing  in  the  United  States,  or  upon  her  returning 
to  this  country  if  she  is  residing  abroad."  Van  Dyne  on 
Citizenship  of  the  United  States,  137. 

It  is  believed  that  this  view  that  marriage  to  an  alien 
does  not  completely  devest  an  American  woman  of  her 
original  nationality,  but  that  it  is  only  suspended  while 
the  marriage  exists,  and  reverts  upon  the  husband's 
death  if  the  wife  is  residing  in  the  United  States,  or  upon 
her  return  here,  if  residing  abroad,  was  based  on  the  case 
of  Moore  v.  Tisdale,  5  B.  Mon.  352,  which  was  decided  in 
Kentucky  in  1845.  The  facts  in  that  case  were  that  a 
native  American  woman  went  with  her  husband,  who  was 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  from  their  home  in  Ken- 
tucky, to  the  "province  of  Texas,"  prior  to  1845,  resided 
there  for  some  years,  returning  to  Kentucky  upon  the 
death  of  her  husband.  The  court  decided  that  as  she 
had  returned  to  the  United  States  soon  after  the 
death  of  her  husband,  "it  should   be   assumed  that  she 


254  NATURALIZATION 

had  merely  submitted  herself  temporarily,  and  as  a  wife, 
to  the  dominion  of  Texas,  without  having  renounced  her 
native  allegiance;  that  she,  therefore,  never  has  been 
an  alien,  and  that  her  rights  of  property  remain  as  if, 
instead  of  having  been  a  temporary  resident  of  Texas, 
she  had,  during  her  absence  from  Kentucky,  been  a  resi- 
dent of  one  of  the  other  states  of  the  Union.  She  can 
not,  therefore,  be  debarred  of  her  dower  on  the  ground 
of  having  been  an  alien  at  the  death  of  her  husband." 

In  October,  1895,  Mrs.  Beatens,  a  native-born  Amer- 
ican woman,  who  had  in  1889  married  a  Hollander  resid- 
ing in  the  United  States,  applied  for  a  passport  as  an 
American  citizen.  She  was  temporarily  sojourning  in  Ger- 
many for  the  purpose  of  completing  her  musical  education. 
In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  who  had 
transmitted  Mrs.  Beatens'  application.  Secretary  Olney, 
after  citing  the  decisions  of  the  courts,  and  of  the  At- 
torneys General  on  the  subject  of  citizenship  of  married 
women,  said:  "It  has  been  the  uniform  practice  of  this 
Department  to  decline  to  grant  passports  to  American 
women  who  are  married  to  aliens.  In  my  opinion  the 
Department  would  not  be  warranted  in  departing  from 
this  practice  in  the  present  case."  Mr.  Olney  to  Mr. 
Morton,  MSS.  Dom.  Let.  October  26,  1895.  Van  Dyne, 
Citizenship  of  United  States,  138. 

Secretary  Sherman,  in  an  instruction  to  the  United 
States  minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  March  15,  1897,  said: 

"By  our  statute  an  alien  wife  of  an  American  citizen 
shares  his  citizenship.  By  the  usual  rules  of  Continental 
private  international  law  a  woman  marrying  an  alien 
shares  his  status,  certainly  during  his  life;  but  there- 
after, on  widowhood,  reverts  to  her  original  status  unless 
she  abandons  the  country  of  her  origin  and  returns  to 
that  of  her  late  husband."    For.  Rel.  1901,  443. 

These  authorities  were  not  entirely  uniform.    But  the 


BY    MARRIAGE.  255 

decided  weight  of  authority  was  to  the  effect  that  the 
marriage  of  an  American  woman  to  an  alien  conferred 
upon  her  the  nationality  of  her  husbamd. 

Cockburn,  in  his  work  on  Nationality  (published  in 
1869),  says:  "In  every  country,  except  where  the  English 
law  prevnils,  the  nationality  of  a  woman  on  marriage 
merges  in  that  of  her  husband,  she  loses  her  own  nation- 
ality and  acquires  his"  (p.  24).  Since  this  was  written, 
the  British  Act  of  1870  has  been  passed,  which  expressly 
declares  that  a  married  woman  shall  be  deemed  to  be  a 
subject  of  the  state  of  which  her  husband  is  for  the  time 
being  a  subject. 

The  practice  of  the  Department,  alluded  to  above,  of 
declining  to  grant  passports  to  American-born  women 
married  to  foreigners,  showed  the  recognition  of  this 
principle  by  the  Executive  Department  of  ourgovernment. 

Provision  is  made,  in  all  Continental  European  codes, 
for  enabling  a  woman  whose  nationality  of  origin  has 
been  changed  by  marriage  into  that  of  her  husband,  to 
resume,  if  so  minded,  her  original  nationality  on  becom- 
ing a  widow;  on  the  condition,  however,  if  not  resident 
in  the  country  of  origin,  of  returning  to  it.  Cockburn, 
Nationality,  25. 

And  it  had  been  repeatedly  held  by  the  Department 
of  State  that  the  nationality  of  origin  of  an  American- 
born  woman  reverted  upon  the  death  of  her  alien  hus- 
band if  she  were  residing  in  the  United  States,  or  upon 
her  returning  to  this  country  if  residing  abroad. 


b.  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

To  resolve  any  doubt  that  might  exist  because  of 
variant  decisions  of  the  courts  and  opinions  of  Secre- 
taries of  State  as  to  the  effect  of  the  marriage  of  an  Amer- 
ican   woman    to  an  alien,    the   Citizenship   Commission 


256  NATURALIZATION 

of  1906  recommended  and  Congress  enacted  the  fol- 
lowing law: 

"Any  American  woman  who  marries  a  foreigner  shall 
take  the  nationality  of  her  husband.  At  the  termination 
of  the  marital  relation  she  may  resume  her  American 
citizenship,  if  abroad,  by  registering  as  an  American 
citizen  within  one  year  with  a  consul  of  the  United  States, 
or  by  returning  to  reside  in  the  United  States,  or,  if  re- 
siding in  the  United  States  at  the  termination  of  the 
marital  relation,  by  continuing  to  reside  therein."  Sec. 
3,  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

This  law  not  only  served  to  settle  definitely,  and  in 
the  same  manner  that  the  matter  has  been  fixed  by 
statute  in  most  other  civilized  countries,  the  citizenship 
of  married  women,  but  it  removed  from  the  sphere  of 
''executive  legislation  "  the  constantly  recurring  question 
of  the  reversion  of  nationality  of  married  women  upon 
the  death  of  their  alien  husbands.  The  proposition  that 
upon  the  termination  of  the  marriage  relation,  the 
American  nationality  of  an  American  woman  married  to 
a  foreigner  reverted,  did  not  square  with  the  proposition 
laid  down  by  Chief  Justice  Marshall  that  when  a  citizen 
becomes  an  alien — by  whatever  process — he  can  recover 
his  rights  as  a  citizen  only  by  going  through  the  forms 
which  our  laws  prescribe  for  the  naturalization  of  aliens. 

Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State. 

The  Executive  Order  of  President  Roosevelt  of  April, 
6,  1907,*  amending  the  diplomatic  and  consular  regula- 
tions so  as  to  embody  in  them  the  provisions  of  the  Act 
of  March  2,  1907,  makes  the  following  prescription  con- 
cerning American  worn,  n  who  have  married  foreigners 
and  been  separated  from  their  husbands  by  death  or 
absolute  divorce: 

"Registration  to  Resume  or  Retain  Citizenship. — 
When  an  American   woman  has  married  a  foreigner  and 

*For  the  full  text  of  this  order  see  Appendix. 


BY    MARRIAGE.  257 

he  dies  or  they  are  absolutely  divorced,  in  order  to  re- 
sume her  rights  as  an  American  citizen,  she  must  register 
with  an  American  consulate  within  one  year  after  the 
termination  of  the  marital  relation." 


The  Department  of  State,  on  April  19,  1907,  issued  a 
circular  instruction  addressed  to  the  American  diplo- 
matic and  consular  officers  to  carry  this  regulation  into 
effect,  the  pertinent  portion  whereof  reads  as  follows: 

"A  woman  who  was  an  American  before  her  marriage 
to  a  foreigner,  and  who,  upon  the  termination  of  the 
marital  relation  by  the  death  of  her  husband  or  by  their 
absolute  divorce,  desires  to  resume  the  American  citizen- 
ship which  she  enjoyed  before  her  marriage,  must,  within 
one  year  after  the  termination  of  the  marital  relation, 
register  with  an  American  consular  officer  her  intention 
to  resume  her  American  citizenship.  The  form  of  such 
registration  shall  be  as  follows: 

"I, [name  of  affiant]  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm) 

that  I  was  born  on [date  of  birth]  in [place 

of  birth]  and  was,  up  to  the  time  of  my  marriage  on 
[date  of  marriage]  to [name  of  late  hus- 
band] a  citizen  of    the    United   States;    that    the   said 

[name   of   husband]  was  born   in [place  of 

his  birth]  and  was,  at  the  time  of  his  death  (or  our  di- 
vorce), a  citizen  (or  subject)  of [name  of  country]; 

that  the  said [name  of   late  husband]  died  (or  we 

were  divorced)  on [date  of   death  or  divorce]  at 

[place  of  death  or  divorce];  that  I  am  now  tem- 
porarily resident  in  [place  of  residence]  and  de- 
sire to  resume  my  American  citizenship;  that  it  is  my 
intention  to  return  to  the  United  States  within 
[limit  of  intended  foreign  residence]  with  the  intention 
of  residing  and  performing  the  duties  of  an  American 
citizen. 


"Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this dav 

of 


[L.  S.]  American  Consul. 

5233-17 


258  NATURALIZATION 

"I,    [name  of  consul]  American  consul  at 

[place  of  consulate]  certify  that [name  of  affiant] 

who  signed  the  above  affidavit,  is  the  person  she  repre- 
sents herself  to  be  and  that  the  proof  presented  of   her 

marriage    to  [name  of   late  husband]  and  of  the 

termination  of  her  marital  relation  with [name  of 

late  husband]  is  as  follows:  [state  here 

nature  of  proof  presented]. 

"In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  signed  my  name 
and  affixed  my  seal  of  office. 

> 

AmeiHcan  Consul. 


"Documentary  evidence  in  support  of  the  allegations 
relative  to  the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  should 
be  required  in  each  case  and  the  nature  of  such  docu- 
mentary proof  should  be  set  forth  in  the  consul's  certifi- 
cate. In  the  case  of  a  woman  having  been  a  native  citizen 
of  the  United  States  before  her  marriage,  documentary 
proof  of  such  citizenship  need  not  be  required  unless  the 
consul  entertains  doubts  as  to  the  statements  made  to 
him,  in  which  case  he  should  require  a  certificate  of  birth 
or  the  affidavit  of  a  credible  witness  personally  known 
to  him. 

"  In  the  case  of  a  woman  having  been  a  naturalized  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  previous  to  her  marriage,  proof 
of  the  naturalization,  such  as  would  be  required  if  she 
applied  for  a  passport,  should  be  required.  The  affidavit 
and  the  consul's  certificate  should  be  made  in  duplicate, 
and  one  copy  should  be  sent  to  this  Department  immed- 
iately afterwards  and  the  embassy  or  legation  in  the 
country,  in  which  the  consulate  is  situated  should  be  at 
the  same  time  advised  of  the  making  of  the  affidavit  and 
of  the  report  to  the  Department." 


H.  Case  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris. 

By  Article  1  of  the  convention  relative  to  naturaliza- 
tion, concluded  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  May  13,  1870  (16  Stat,  at  L.  775),  it  was  provided 


BT    MARRIAGE.  259 

that  "citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America,  who  have 
become,  or  shall  become,  and  are,  naturalized  according 
to  law  within  the  British  dominions  as  British  subjects, 
shall  ...  be  held  by  the  United  States  to  be  in  all 
respects  and  for  all  purposes  British  subjects,  and  shall 
be  treated  as  such  by  the  United  States." 

Article  3  provides  that  "if  any  such  citizen  of  the 
United  States  as  aforesaid,  naturalized  within  the  do- 
minions of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  should  renew  his  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States,  the  United  States  government 
may,  on  his  own  application  and  on  such  conditions  as 
that  government  may  think  fit  to  impose,  readmit  him 
to  the  character  and  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  Great  Britain  shall  not,  in  that  case,  claim 
him  as  a  British  subject  on  account  of  his  former  natura- 
lization." 

In  1874  Nellie  Grant,  daughter  of  President  Grant, 
married  Algernon  Sartoris,  a  British  subject,  and  went 
to  England,  where  she  resided  until  his  death  in  1896. 
In  May,  1898,  the  following  joint,  resolution  of  Congress 
was  adopted  readmitting  Mrs.  Sartoris  to  American  citi- 
zenship, in  pursuance  of  the  above  treaty.  Resolution  of 
May  18,  1898(30  Stat,  at  L.  1496): 

"Whereas,  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris,  widow,  daughter  of 
the  late  General  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  being  a  natural-born 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  married  in  eighteen  hundred 
and  seventy-four  Algernon  Charles  Frederick  Sartoris,  a 
subject  of  the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  and  emigrated  to 
Great  Britain,  becoming  thereby,  under  the  laws  of  Great 
Britain,  a  naturalized  British  subject,  to  be  recognized 
as  such  by  the  United  States,  according  to  the  provisions 
of  the  convention  relative  to  naturalization  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  of  the  thirteenth  of 
May,  eighteen  hundred  and  seventy;  and 

"Whereas,  the  said  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris  has  since  re- 
turned to  the  United  States  and  renewed   her  residence 


260  NATURALIZATION 

therein,  and  petitioned  Congress  to  be  readmitted  to  the 
character  and  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
under  and  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  article  third  of 
the  convention  aforesaid;  therefore, 

"  Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress 
assembled,  That  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris,  daughter  of  Gen- 
eral Ulysses  S.  Grant,  be,  and  she  is  hereby,  on  her  own 
application,  unconditionally  readmitted  to  the  character 
and  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  provisions  of  article  third  of  the  con- 
vention relative  to  naturalization  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  concluded  May  thirteenth, 
eighteen  hundred  and  seventy." 

I.  Effect  of  Divorce. 

The  decree  of  a  competent  court  granting  an  absolute 
divorce  would  have  the  same  effect  as  the  death  of  the 
husband  upon  the  citizenship  of  the  woman. 

Secretary  Hay,  in  a, case  arising  before  the  enactment 
of  the  law  of  1907,  in  replying  to  the  request  of  the 
United  States  minister  at  Berne  for  instructions  as  to 
the  issuance  of  a  passport  to  Mrs.  Daisie  Annie  Newman 
Van  Buren,  the  daughter  of  a  native  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  who  had  been  married  to  Baron  Van  Buren,  a 
Dutch  subject,  from  whom  she  was  subsequently  di- 
vorced, said:  "In  accordance  with  the  view  which  the 
Department  has  taken  in  several  cases,  when  an  American 
woman  marries  an  alien  her  condition  from  the  stand- 
point of  nationality  is  lost  in  that  of  her  husband,  as 
long  as  the  marital  union  lasts.  Upon  its  termination 
she  may  resume  the  nationality  of  her  birth  by  returning 
to  the  United  States  to  reside,  if  residing  abroad,  or 
acquire  a  new  one.  In  this  case  Mrs.  Van  Buren's  status 
under  the  laws  of  the  Netherlands  calls  for  no  considera- 
tion.    She  does  not  live  in   that   country,  nor  does  she. 


BY    MARRIAGE,  261 

apparently,  intend  to  do  so.  Her  divorce  having  been 
lawfully  obtained,  her  marital  relations  with  Baron  Van 
Buren  having  ceased,  her  domicil  bona  fide  being  in  this 
country,  you  may  properly  issue  a  passport  in  her  favor 
upon  satisfactory  proof  of  the  facts  as  set  forth  in  your 
despatch,  and  in  the  letter  from  the  consul  at  Geneva." 
Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Leishman,  March  16,  1899,  MSS.  Inst,  to 
Switzerland. 

In  a  case  coming  before  the  Department  of  State  in 
1906,  it  appeared  that  a  native-born  Swiss  woman  had 
married  in  the  United  States  an  American  citizen,  and 
that  thereafter  the  marital  relationship  had  been  dis- 
solved by  a  decree  of  absolute  divorce  in  Kansas.  The 
woman  then  returned  to  her  native  country  and  estab- 
lished a  residence  there  with  her  parents,  until  her  symp- 
toms of  mental  infirmity  became  so  pronounced  that  she 
was  removed  to  an  insane  asylum.  The  Swiss  Minister 
at  Washington  informed  the  Department  of  the  intention 
to  send  the  woman  to  the  United  States,  and  requested 
that  she  be  permitted  to  land  and  that  provision  be  made 
for  her  by  locating  her  in  some  institution. 

The  Department  of  State  replied  stating  that,  under  its 
practice,  "a  widow,  or  a  woman  who  has  obtained  an  abso- 
lute divorce,  being  an  American  citizen  and  who  has 
married  an  alien,  must  return  to  the  United  States  or 
must  have  her  residence  here  in  order  to  have  her  Amer- 
ican citizenship  revert  on  becoming  feme  sole.  Con- 
versely, an  alien  woman  who  marries  an  American  citizen 
and  secures  a  divorce  from  him  in  the  United  States  and 
returns  to  her  native  country  must  be  held  to  have  aban- 
doned her  citizenship  acquired  by  marriage  and  to  have 
intended  to  adopt  her  native  allegiance. 

"The  views  above  expressed  seem  also  to  be  in  keep- 
ing with  the  provisions  of  the  Continental  codes,  which 
enable  a  woman  whose  nationality  has  been  changed  by 


262  NATURALIZATION 

marriage  to  resume  it  when  she  becomes  a  widow  on  the 
condition  of  her  returning  to  the  country  of  origin. 

"Under  the  circumstances  of  the  present  case,  the  De- 
partment is  of  the  opinion  that  Mrs. has  lost  her  na- 
tionality as  an  American  citizen;  and  as  the  statutes  of 
the  United  States  prohibit  the  landing  of  insane  aliens,  it 
would  seem  to  be  impossible  to  allow  her  to  land  in  this 
country."  Mr.  Root  to  Mr.  Vogel,  June  2,  1906,  MSS. 
Notes  to  Switzerland. 

J.  Declaration  of  Intention  of  Husband. 

As  an  alien  does  not  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  by  making  a  declaration  of  intention,  it  is  clear 
that  his  wife  does  not  acquire  American  citizenship;  nor 
does  an  alien  woman  become  naturalized  by  marriage  to  a 
foreigner  who  has  merely  declared  his  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen. 

Section  2168  of  the  Revised  Statutes  provided  that: 
"When  any  alien,  who  has  complied  with  the  first  condi- 
tion specified  in  Sec.  2165,  [viz.,  formally  declared  his  in- 
tention to  become  a  citizen]  dies  before  he  is  actually 
naturalized,  the  widow  and  children  of  such  alien  shall 
be  considered  as  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  shall 
be  entitled  to  all  rights  and  privileges  as  such,  upon 
taking  the  oaths  prescribed  by  law." 

The  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  repealed  Section  2168,  and 
provided  that:  "When  any  alien  who  has  declared  his  in- 
tention to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  dies  be- 
fore he  is  actually  naturalized,  the  widow  and  minor  chil- 
dren of  such  alien  may,  by  complying  with  the  other  pro- 
visions of  this  act  be  naturalized  without  making  any 
declaration  of  intention." 

Under  the  provision  of  Section  2168,  when  it  was  in 
force,  there  was  some  doubt  as  to  the  exact  meaning  of 
the  latter  part  of  the  section,  viz.,  "  taking  the  oaths  pre- 
scribed by  law."  It  had  been  held  that  what  was  meant 


BY    MARRIAGE.  263 

was  "  the  oaths  prescribed  by  law  to  be  taken  by  an  alien 
upon  his  admission  to  citizenship."  Van  Dyne,  Citizen- 
ship of  United  States  98. 

It  is  understood  that  the  object  of  the  amendment  of 
the  law  was  to  resolve  this  doubt,  and  also  to  remove 
any  doubt  which  might  have  existed  as  to  the  meaning  of 
the  words  "first  condition  specified  in  Section  2165,"  had 
they  been  allowed  to  stand  as  in  the  Revised  Statutes. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  declaration  of  intention 
and  death  of  the  husband  and  father  do  not  of  themselves 
confer  citizenship  upon  the  widow  and  minor  children. 
There  is  a  further  requisite:  They  must  comply  with 
the  other  provisions  of  the  law,  go  before  a  competent 
court  and  be  admitted  to  citizenship.  And  while,  under 
the  terms  of  Section  2168,  the  intent  of  the  law  was  ap- 
parent to  admit  them  to  citizenship  merely  upon  applica- 
tion to  a  court  of  naturalization  and  the  taking  of  the 
necessary  oaths,  it  is  not  clear  under  the  language  of 
the  existing  law  that  it  was  intended  to  dispense  with 
any  other  requirement  in  their  case  than  the  declaration 
of  intention. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

COLLECTIVE  NATURALIZATION. 
I.  Naturalization  by  conquest. 

A.  Allegiance  of  inhabitants  of  conquered  state. 

B.  Citizenship  of  inhabitants  of  conquered  state. 

C.  American  ante-nati. 
11.  Naturalization  by  treaty. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  Power  of   United  States  to  acquire   territory   by  treaty    and   to 

prescribe  terms  upon  which  it  will  receive  inhabitants. 

C.  Treaties  of   cession  to  which  the  United  States  has  been  a  party. 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Treaty  of  1794  with  Great  Britain. 

c.  Treaty  of  I803  with  France. 

1.  Case  of  Egle  Aubry. 

2.  Case  of  Foucher. 

3.  Case  of  De  Baca. 

d.  Treaty  of  1819  with  Spain. 

e.  Treaty  of  1848  with  Mexico. 

f.  Treaty  of  1853  with  Mexico. 

g.  Treaty  of  1867  with  Russia, 
h.  Treaty  of  I898  with  Spain. 

1.  Insular  cases:  Decision  of  Supreme  Court. 

2.  Status  of  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 
i.  Treaties  with  Indians. 

III.  Naturalization  by  special  act  of  Congress. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  On  the  acquisition  of  Oregon. 

C.  On  the  annexation  of  Hawaii. 

D.  Readmission  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris  to  citizenship. 

E.  Naturalization  of  Indians. 

IV.  Naturalization  by  admission  of  territory  to  statehood. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  Louisiana. 

C.  Northwest  territory. 

1.  In  general. 

2.  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois. 

3.  Michigan. 

D.  Florida. 

E.  Texas. 

F.  Power  of  Congress  over  territories. 

G.  Nebraska. 


266  NATURALIZATION 

COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION. 

Besides  naturalization  of  the  individual  alien  by  com- 
pliance with  the  formalities  prescribed  by  the  general 
naturalization  law,  citizenship  may  be  conferred  upon 
certain  people  in  mass,  or  upon  particular  classes  of  per- 
sons. This  method  of  naturalization  is  called  collective 
naturalization.  It  may  be  effected  by  conquest,  by 
treaty,  by  special  Act  of  Congress,  or  by  admission  of 
new  states. 

I.  Naturalization  by  Conquest. 

A.  Allegiance  of  Inhabitants  of  Conquered  State. 

According  to  the  general  principles  of  the  law  of  na- 
tions, every  sovereign  nation  has,  as  an  inherent  attri- 
bute, the  power  to  acquire  territory  by  conquest.  In 
the  absence  of  stipulations  on  the  subject,  whenever  a 
government  acquires  territory  by  conquest  the  relation 
of  the  conquered  territory  to  the  new  government  is  to 
be  determined  by  the  conquering  state. 

The  Constitution  [of  the  United  States]  confers  abso- 
lutely on  the  government  of  the  Union  the  powers  of 
making  war,  and  of  making  treaties;  consequently  that 
government  possesses  the  power  of  acquiring  territory, 
either  by  conquest  or  by  treaty.  Insular  cases,  182  U.  S. 
300.  The  usage  of  the  world  is,  if  a  nation  be  not 
entirely  subdued,  to  consider  the  holding  of  conquered 
territory  as  a  mere  military  occupation,  until  its  fate 
shall  be  determined  at  the  treaty  of  peace.  If  it  be 
ceded  by  the  treaty,  the  acquisition  is  confirmed,  and 
the  ceded  territory  becomes  a  part  of  the  nation  to  which 
it  is  annexed;  either  on  the  terms  stipulated  in  the  treaty 
of  cession,  or  on  such  as  its  new  master  shall  impose. 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter,  1  Pet.  511,  7  L.  ed.  242; 
Johnson  v.  Mcintosh,  8  Wheat.  543. 

In  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  L.  D.  S.  v.  United  States, 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  267 

136  U.  S.  1,  34  L.  ed.  478,  the  Supreme  Court  declared: 
"The  power  to  acquire  territory  ...  is  derived 
from  the  treaty-making  power  and  the  power  to  declare 
and  carry  on  war.  The  incidents  of  these  powers  are 
those  of  national  sovereignty,  and  belong  to  all  inde- 
pendent governments.  The  power  to  make  acquisitions 
of  territory  by  conquest,  by  treaty,  and  by  cession  is  an 
incident  of  national  sovereignty." 

Upon  the  conquest  of  a  country  the  allegiance  due  by 
birth  from  its  citizens  or  subjects  to  its  sovereign  passes, 
by  operation  of  law,  to  the  conqueror,  who,  as  sovereign 
de  facto,  has  a  right  to  the  allegiance  of  all  who  are  sub- 
ject to  his  power  and  submit  to  the  protection  of  his 
arms.  Inglis  v.  Sailor's  Snug  Harbour,  3  Pet.  99,  7  L. 
ed.  617;  Leitensdorfer  v.  Webb,  20  How.  176. 

The  nationality  of  the  inhabitants  of  territory  acquired 
by  conquest  or  cession  becomes  that  of  the  government 
under  whose  dominion  they  pass,  subject  to  the  right  of 
election  on  their  part  to  retain  their  former  nationality 
by  removal  or  otherwise,  as  may  be  provided.  Boyd  v. 
Thayer,  143  U.  S.  135. 

In  the  absence  of  express  treaty  stipulations  or  legis- 
lation by  the  conqueror,  the  relations  between  the  con- 
quered and  the  conqueror  are  determined  by  the  law  of 
nations,  which  establishes  the  general  rule  that  the  alle- 
giance of  the  conquered  is  transferred  to  the  new  sov- 
ereign.    2  Halleck,  International  Law,  485. 

B.  Citizenship  of  Inhabitants  of  Conquered  State. 

The  acquisition  of  territory  by  conquest  by  the  United 
States  does  not  operate  to  incorporate  the  inhabitants  of 
the  conquered  territory  as  citizens  of  the  conquering 
State.  Insular  Cases,  182  U.  S.  300.  The  grounds  upon 
which  the  court  based  its  opinion  are  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing quotation  from  the  concurring  opinion  of  Justices 
White,  Shiras,  and  McKenna: 


268  NATURALIZATION 

"It  is  insisted,  .  .  .  conceding  the  right  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  to  acquire  territory, 
as  all  such  territory  when  acquired  becomes  absolutely 
incorporated  into  the  United  States,  every  provision  of 
the  Constitution  which  would  apply  under  that  situa- 
tion is  controlling  in  such  acquired  territory.  This, 
however,  is  but  to  admit  the  power  to  acquire,  and 
immediately  to  deny  its  beneficial  existence. 

"The  general  principle  of  the  law  of  nations,  .  .  . 
is  that  acquired  territory,  in  the  absence  of  agreement 
to  the  contrary,  will  bear  such  relation  to  the  acquiring 
government  as  may  be  by  it  determined.  To  concede  to 
the  government  of  the  United  States  the  right  to  acquire, 
and  to  strip  it  of  all  power  to  protect  the  birthright  of 
its  own  citizens  and  to  provide  for  the  well-being  of  the 
acquired  territory  by  such  enactments  as  may,  in  view 
of  its  condition,  be  essential,  is,  in  effect,  to  say  that  the 
United  States  is  helpless  in  the  family  of  nations,  and 
does  not  possess  that  authority  which  has  at  all  times 
been  treated  as  an  incident  of  the  right  to  acquire.  Let 
me  illustrate  the  accuracy  of  this  statement.  Take  a  case 
of  discovery.  Citizens  of  the  United  States  discover  an 
unknown  island,  peopled  with  an  uncivilized  race,  yet 
rich  in  soil,  and  valuable  to  the  United  States  for  com- 
mercial and  strategic  reasons.  Clearly,  by  the  law  of  na- 
tions, the  right  to  ratify  such  acquisition  and  thus  to 
acquire  the  territory  would  pertain  to  the  government  of 
the  United  States.  Johnson  v.  M'Intosh,  8  Wheat.  543, 
595,  5  L.  ed.  681,  694;  Martin  v.  Waddell,  16  Pet.  367, 
409,  10  L.  ed.  997,  1012;  Jones  v.  United  States,  137 
U.  S.  202,  212,  34  L.  ed.  691,  695,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  80; 
Shively  v.  Bowlby,  152  U.  S.  1,  50,  38  L.  ed.  331,  349,  14 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  548.  Can  it  be  denied  that  such  right  could 
not  be  practically  exercised  if  the  result  would  be  to  en- 
dow the  inhabitants  with  citizenship  of  the  United  States 
and  to  subject  them,  not  only   to  local,  but  also  to  an 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  269 

equal  proportion  of  national  taxes,  even  although  the 
consequence  would  be  to  entail  ruin  on  the  discovered 
territory,  and  to  inflict  grave  detriment  on  the  United 
States,  to  arise  both  from  the  dislocation  of  its  fiscal 
system  and  the  immediate  bestowal  of  citizenship  on 
those  absolutely  unfit  to  receive  it? 

"The  practice  of  the  government  has  been  otherwise. 
As  early  as  1856  Congress  enacted  the  Guano  Islands 
Act,  .  .  .  which  by  Sec.  1  provided  that  when  any 
citizen  of  the  United  States  shall  'discover  a  deposit 
of  guano  on  any  island,  rock,  or  key  not  within  the 
lawful  jurisdiction  of  any  other  government,  and  not 
occupied  by  the  citizens  of  any  other  government,  and 
shall  take  peaceable  possession  thereof,  and  occupy 
the  same,  said  island,  rock,  or  key  may,  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  be  con- 
sidered as  appertaining  to  the  United  States.'  11  Stat» 
at  L.  119,  Chap.  164;  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  5570  [U.  S.  Comp. 
Stat.  1901,  3739].  Under  the  Act  referred  to,  it  was 
stated,  in  argument,  that  the  government  now  holds 
and  protects  American  citizens  in  the  occupation  of 
some  seventy  islands.  The  statute  came  under  consid- 
eration in  Jones  v.  United  States,  137  U.  S.  202  [34 
L.  ed.  691,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  80],  where  the  question 
was  whether  or  not  the  Act  was  valid,  and  it  was 
decided  that  the  Act  was  a  lawful  exercise  of  power, 
and  that  islands  thus  acquired  were  'appurtenant'  to 
the  United  States.  The  court,  in  the  course  of  the  opin- 
ion, speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  said,  page  212 
[L.  ed.  695,  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  83] :  'By  the  law  of  nations,  rec- 
ognized by  all  civilized  states,  dominion  of  new  territory 
may  be  acquired  by  discovery  and  occupation,  as  well  as 
by  cession  or  conquest;  and  when  citizens  or  subjects  of 
one  nation,  in  its  name  and  by  its  authority  or  with  its 
assent,  take  and  hold  actual,  continuous,  and  useful  pos- 
session (although  only  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  a 


270  NATURALIZATION 

particular  business,  such  as  catching  and  curing  fish  or 
working  mines)  of  territory  unoccupied  by  any  other 
government  or  its  citizens,  the  nation  to  which  they  be- 
long may  exercise  such  jurisdiction  and  for  such  period 
as  it  sees  fit  over  territory  so  acquired.  This  principle 
affords  ample  warrant  for  the  legislation  of  Congress 
concerning  guano  islands.     .     .     .' 

''And  these  considerations  concerning  discovery  are 
equally  applicable  to  ownership  resulting  from  conquest. 
A  just  war  is  declared,  and  in  its  prosecution  the  terri- 
tory of  the  enemy  is  invaded  and  occupied.  Would  not 
the  war,  even  if  waged  successfully,  be  fraught  with 
danger  if  the  effect  of  occupation  was  to  necessarily  in- 
corporate an  alien  and  hostile  people  into  the  United 
States?  Take  another  illustration.  Suppose  at  the 
termination  of  a  war  the  hostile  government  had  been 
overthrown,  and  the  entire  territory  or  a  portion  thereof 
was  occupied  by  the  United  States,  and  there  was  no 
government  to  treat  with  or  none  willing  to  cede  by 
treaty,  and  thus  it  became  necessary  for  the  United 
States  to  hold  the  conquered  country  for  an  indefinite 
period,  or  at  least  until  such  time  as  Congress  deemed 
that  it  should  be  either  released  or  retained  because  it 
was  apt  for  incorporation  into  the  United  States.  If 
holding  was  to  have  the  effect  which  is  now  claimed  for 
it,  would  not  the  exercise  of  judgment  respecting  the 
retention  be  so  fraught  with  danger  to  the  American 
people  that  it  could  not  be  safely  exercised? 

"Yet  again.  Suppose  the  United  States,  in  conse- 
quence of  outrages  perpetrated  upon  its  citizens,  was 
obliged  to  move  its  armies  or  send  its  fleets  to  obtain 
redress,  and  it  came  to  pass  that  an  expensive  war  re- 
sulted and  culminated  in  the  occupation  of  a  portion  of 
the  territory  of  the  enemy,  and  that  the  retention  of 
such  territory — an  event  illustrated  by  examples  in  his- 
tory— could  alone  enable  the  United  States  to  recover 
the  pecuniary  loss  it  had  suffered.  And  suppose,  further, 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  271 

that  to  do  so  would  require  occupation  for  an  indefinite 
period,  dependent  upon  whether  or  not  payment  was 
made  of  the  required  indemnity.  It  being  true  that  in- 
corporation must  necessarily  follow  the  retention  of  the 
territory,  it  would  result  that  the  United  States  must 
abandon  all  hope  of  recouping  itself  for  the  loss  suffered 
by  the  unjust  war,  and  hence  the  whole  burden  would 
be  entailed  upon  the  people  of  the  United  States.  This 
would  be  a  necessary  consequence,  because  if  the  United 
States  did  not  hold  the  territory  as  security  for  the 
needed  indemnity  it  could  not  collect  such  indemnity, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  incorporation  must  follow 
from  holding  the  territory  the  uniformity  provision  of 
the  Constitution  would  prevent  the  assessment  of  the 
cost  of  the  war  solely  upon  the  newly  acquired  country. 
In  this,  as  in  the  case  of  discovery,  the  traditions  and 
practices  of  the  government  demonstrate  the  unsound- 
ness of  the  contention." 

"  In  Brown's  case,  5  Court  of  Claims,  571,  the  facts  were 
that  claimant,  a  former  subject  of  the  Kingdom  of  Han- 
over, brought  suit  before  the  Court  of  Claims  as  a 
Prussian  subject  to  recover  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  of 
his  cotton  seized  by  the  authorities  of  this  government 
during  our  civil  war.  Subsequently  to  the  time  when  the 
claim  arose  and  before  the  bringing  of  the  suit,  Hanover 
had  been  incorporated  by  conquest  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Prussia.  The  law  gives  the  Court  of  Claims  jurisdiction 
of  claims  against  the  United  States  of  aliens,  'citizens, 
or  subjects  of  any  government  which  accords  to  citizens 
of  the  United  States  the  right  to  prosecute  claims 
against  such  governments  in  their  courts.'  Under  the 
law  of  Prussia  aliens  could  prosecute  claims  against  that 
government  in  its  courts.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Court  of 
Claims,  which  held  that  Brown  was  a  Prussian  subject, 
and  hence  capable  of  prosecuting  his  claim  before  the 
court,  the  court  said: 

"  'Hanover,  hy  conquest,  in  1866  became  incorporated 


272  NATURALIZATION 

in  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia.  .  .  .  When  the  territory 
and  government  of  a  kingdom  pass  to  and  become  merged 
in  the  territory  and  government  of  another  nation,  all  of 
its  subjects  pass  also.  The  tie  which  binds  and  carries 
them  is  not  bodily  presence,  but  allegiance.'" 

C.  American  Ante-nati. 

All  white  persons,  or  persons  of  European  descent, 
who  were  born  in  any  of  the  colonies,  or  resided  or  had 
been  adopted  there,  before  1776,  and  had  adhered  to  the 
cause  of  independence  up  to  July  4,  1776,  were,  by  the 
Declaration,  invested  with  the  privileges  of  citizenship. 
Inglis  V.  Sailor's  Snug  Harbour,  3  Pet.  164,  7  L.  ed.  640. 

It  is  universally  admitted,  both  in  English  courts  and 
in  those  of  our  own  country,  that  all  persons  born  within 
the  colonies  of  North  America  while  subject  to  the 
Crown  of  Great  Britain  were  natural-born  British  sub- 
jects, and  it  must  necessarily  follow  that  that  charcter 
was  changed  by  the  separation  of  the  colonies  from  the 
parent  state,  and  the  acknowledgment  of  their  inde- 
pendence. 

The  rule  as  to  the  point  of  time  at  which  the  Ameri- 
can ante-nati  ceased  to  be  British  subjects  differs  in  this 
country  and  in  England,  as  established  by  the  courts  of 
justice  in  the  respective  countries.  The  English  rule  is 
to  take  the  date  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace,  in  1783.  Our 
rule  is  to  take  the  date  of  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence. The  settled  doctrine  of  this  country  is  that  a 
person  born  here,  who  left  the  country  before  the  Decla- 
ration of  Independence  and  never  returned  here,  became 
thereby  an  alien.  Inglis  v.  Sailor's  Snug  Harbour,  3  Pet. 
99,  7  L.  ed.  617. 

By  withdrawing  from  this  country  and  adhering  to  the 
British  government,  the  ante-nati  lost,  or,  perhaps,  more 
properly  speaking,  never  acquired  the  character  of  Amer- 
ican citizens.  Id. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  273 

n.   Naturalization  by  Treaty. 

A.  In  General. 

Collective  naturalization  is  also  effected  by  treat5^ 
Treaties  of  cession  of  territory,  whether  made  as  the 
result  of  military  conquest  or  peaceful  transfer,  ordi- 
narily contain  stipulations  determining  the  relations 
which  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  shall  bear 
to  the  acquiring  state. 

B.  Power  of  United  States  to  Acquire  Territory  by  Treaty 

and  to  Prescribe  Terms  Upon  Which  It  Will  Receive 
Inhabitants. 

Justices  White,  Shiras,  and  McKenna,  in  their  concur- 
ring opinion  in  the  Insular  cases  (182  U.  S.,  300),  said: 

"  It  maynot  be  doubted  that,  by  the  general  principles 
of  the  law  of  nations,  every  government  which  is  sovereign 
within  its  sphere  of  action  possesses  as  an  inherent  attri- 
bute the  power  to  acquire  territory  by  discovery,  by 
agreement  or  treaty,  and  by  conquest.  It  can  not  also 
be  gainsaid  that,  as  a  general  rule,  wherever  a  govern- 
ment acquires  territory  as  a  result  of  any  of  the  modes 
above  stated,  the  relation  of  the  territory  to  the  new 
government  is  to  be  determined  by  the  acquiring  power 
in  the  absence  of  stipulations  upon  the  subject.  These 
general  principles  of  the  law  of  nations  are  thus  stated 
by  Halleck  in  his  treatise  on  International  Law,  page 
126:  'A  state  may  acquire  property  or  domain  in  various 
ways ;  its  title  may  be  acquired  originally  by  mere  occu- 
pancy, and  confirmed  by  the  presumption  arising  from 
the  lapse  of  time  ;  or  by  discovery  and  lawful  possession  ; 
or  by  conquest,  confirmed  by  treaty  or  tacit  consent;  or 
by  grant,  cession,  purchase  or  exchange;  in  fine,  by  any 
of  the  recognized  modes  by  which  private  property  is 
acquired  by  individuals.  It  is  not  our  object  to  enter 
into  any  general   discussion   of    these  several   modes  of 

5233—18 


274  NATURALIZATION 

acquisition,  any  further  than   may  be  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish the  character  of  certain  rights  of  property  which 
are  the  peculiar  objects  of  international  jurisprudence. 
...... 

"In  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter,  1  Pet.  511  [7  L.  ed. 
242],  the  general  doctrine  was  thus  summarized  in 
the  opinion  delivered  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall, 
page  542  [L.  ed,  255]  :  'If  it  (conquered  territory) 
be  ceded  by  the  treaty,  the  acquisition  is  confirmed, 
and  the  ceded  territory  becomes  a  part  of  the  nation 
to  which  it  is  annexed,  either  on  the  terms  stipulated 
in  the  treaty  of  cession  or  on  such  as  its  new  master 
shall  impose.' 

"When  our  forefathers  threw  off  their  allegiance  to 
Great  Britain  and  established  a  republican  government, 
assuredly  they  deemed  that  the  nation  which  they  called 
into  being  w^as  endowed  with  those  general  powers  to 
acquire  territory  which  all  independent  governments  in 
virtue  of  their  sovereignty  enjoyed.  This  is  demonstrated 
hy  the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence, which  reads  as  follows:  'As  free  and  inde- 
pendent states,  they  [the  United  States  of  America] 
have  full  power  to  levy  war,  conclude  peace,  contract 
alliances,  establish  commerce,  and  to  do  all  other  acts 
and  things  which  independent  states  may  of  right  do.' 

"That  under  the  Confederation  it  w^as  considered  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States  had  authority  to 
acquire  territory  like  any  other  sovereignty  is  clearly 
established  by  the  11th  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation. 

"The  decisions  of  this  court  leave  no  room  for  ques- 
tion that,  under  the  Constitution,  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  in  virtue  of  its  sovereignty,  supreme 
within  the  sphere  of  its  delegated  power,  has  the  full 
right  to  acquire  territory  enjoyed  by  every  other 
sovereign  nation. 

"In  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter,  1  Pet.  511  [7  L.  ed. 
242] ,  the    court,    by   Mr.  Chief  Justice    Marshall,  said 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  2/5 

page  542  [L.  ed.  255]  :  'The  Constitution  confers  abso- 
lutely on  the  government  of  the  Union  the  powers  of 
caaking  war  and  of  making  treaties;  consequently,  that 
government  possesses  the  power  of  acquiring  territory, 
either  by  conquest  or  hy  treaty.'' 

"In  United  States  v.  Huckabee  (1872),  16  Wall.  414 
[21  L.  ed.  457],  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice 
Clifford,  said,  page  434  [L.  ed.  464] :  'Power  to  acquire 
territory  either  by  conquest  or  treaty  is  vested  by  the 
Constitution  in  the  United  States.  Conquered  territory, 
however,  is  usually  held  as  a  mere  military  occupation 
until  the  fate  of  the  nation  from  which  it  is  conquered 
is  determined;  but  if  the  nation  is  entirely  subdued,  or 
in  case  it  be  destroyed  and  ceases  to  exist,  the  right  of 
occupation  becomes  permanent,  and  the  title  vests 
absolutely  in  the  conqueror.  .  .  .  Complete  con- 
quest, by  whatever  mode  it  may  be  perfected,  carries 
with  it  all  the  rights  of  the  former  government;  or, 
in  other  words,  the  conqueror,  by  the  completion  of  his 
conquest,  becomes  the  absolute  owner  of  the  property 
conquered  from  the  enemy  nation  or  state.  His  rights 
are  no  longer  limited  to  mere  occupation  of  what  he 
has  taken  into  his  actual  possession,  but  they  extend 
to  all  the  property  and  rights  of  the  conquered  state, 
including  even  debts  as  well  as  personal  and  real  prop- 
erty. Halleck,  International  Law,  839;  Elphinstone  v. 
Bedreechund,  1  Knapp  P.  C.  C.  329;  Vattel,  365;  3  Phil- 
limore.  International  Law,  505.'  " 

For  a  further  quotation  from  the  opinion  of  the  court 
in  this  case  see  pp.  295  et  seq,  post. 

C.  Treaties  of  Cession  to  which  United  States  has  been  a 

Party. 
a.  In  General. 

Every  treaty  of  cession  to  which  the  United  States  has 
been  a  party,  with  the  exception  of  the  treaty  of  peace 
of  1898    (30  Stat,  at  L.  1754),  with  Spain,  ceding  Porto 


276  NATURALIZATION 

Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands  to  the  United  States^ 
contains  a  stipulation  providing  that  the  inhabitants  of 
the  territory  ceded  may,  in  whole  or  in  part,  become  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  either  immediately  or  under 
certain  conditions. 

The  treaty  with  Russia  for  the  cession  of  Alaska  (15 
Stat,  at  L.  542)  excepted  "uncivilized  native  tribes" 
from  the  privilege  of  admission  to  citizenship. 

The  pertinent  provisions  of  these  several  treaties  are 
set  out  below,  together  with  concrete  cases  in  which 
they  have  been  construed  by  the  courts  or  international 
claims  commissions. 

b.  Treaty  of  1794  with  Great  Britain. 

Under  the  2d  article  of  the  treaty  of  1794  (8  Stat,  at 
L.  116),  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
British  subjects  who  resided  at  Detroit  before  and  at 
the  time  of  the  evacuation  of  the  territory  of  Michigan, 
and  who  continued  to  reside  there  afterwards  without 
at  any  time  prior  to  the  expiration  of  orje  year  from  such 
evacuation  declaring  their  intention  of  remaining  British 
subjects,  became,  ipso  facto,  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
American  citizens.  Crane  v.  Reeder,  25  Mich.  303. 

c.  Treaty  of  1803  with  France . 

By  Article  3  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1803  (8  Stat,  at 
L.  200),  ceding  Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
provided  that  "  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory 
shall  be  incorporated  in  the  Union  of  the  United  States, 
and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the  enjoyment  of 
all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities  of  citizens  of 
the  United  States." 

1.  Case  of  Egle  Aubry. 

Egle  Aubry,  a  person  of  color,  presented  to  the  com- 
mission under  the  convention  between  the  United  States 
and   France   of  January  15,  1880  (21   Stat,  at  L.  673),  a 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  277 

memorial  in  which,  in  the  character  of  a  citizen  of 
France,  she  claimed  damages  from  the  United  States  for 
the  occupation  of  buildings  by  General  Grover  in  the 
parish  of  St.  Tammany,  Louisiana,  in  February,  1864.  In 
this  memorial  it  was  set  forth,  as  the  ground  of  the 
claimant's  French  citizenship,  that  she  was  born  in  the 
territory  of  Orleans,  January  3, 1803,  while  that  territory 
was  a  French  colony. 

Counsel  for  the  United  States  demurred  on  the  ground 
that,  as  the  claimant  was  an  inhabitant  of  the  territory 
in  question  when  it  was  ceded  by  France  to  the  United 
States  by  the  treaty  of  April  30,  1803  (8  Stat,  at  L.  200), 
she  thereby  became  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  inas- 
much as  the  treaty  of  cession  transferred  to  the  United 
States  full  and  complete  jurisdiction  over  the  inhabitants 
resident  upon  the  territory  without  any  reservation 
whatever  on  the  part  of  the  French  government.  In 
support  of  this  position,  counsel  cited  Wheaton's  Inter- 
national Law,  6th  ed.,  627,  where,  in  treating  of  "col- 
lective naturalization,"  the  author  mentions  the  con- 
vention of  April  30,  1803. 

Counsel  for  the  memorialist  relied  upon  the  third  ar- 
ticle of  the  treaty,  which  is  in  these  words:  "The  inhabi- 
tants of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in  the 
Union  of  the  United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as 
possible,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages, 
and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  in 
the  meantime  they  shall  be  maintained  and  protected  in 
the  free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty,  property,  and  the 
religion  which  they  profess." 

As  memorialist  was  a  person  of  color,  whose  citizen- 
ship was  not  recognized  by  the  United  States  till  the 
ratification  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  her  counsel 
contended  that  she  had  not,  at  the  time  her  claim  arose, 
enjoyed  the   advantages  and  immunities  of  a  citizen  of 


278  NATURALIZATION 

the  United  States,  but  that  she  remained  a  citizen  of 
France,  and  as  such  was  entitled  to  be  "maintained  and 
protected"  in  the  "free  enjoyment"  of  her  "liberty, 
property,  and  religion."  In  support  of  this  position  he 
cited  the  case  of  one  Decuir,  whose  father,  a  free  negro, 
was  an  inhabitant  of  the  territory  of  Louisiana  when  it 
was  ceded  to  the  United  States.  The  son,  having  been 
impressed  into  the  Confederate  service,  was  discharged 
by  the  superior  court  of  Alexandria  on  a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  upon  the  ground  that  he  was  not  a  citizen  of 
Louisiana,  and,  consequently,  that  he  was  protected  as  a 
French  subject  under  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  of 
1803. 

Upon  the  issues  thus  presented,  the  demurrer  was 
sustained  by  the  following  decision  of  the  Commission: 
"The  claimant,  Egle  Aubry,  a  colored  woman,  was  born 
on  the  3d  day  of  January,  1803,  in  the  territory  of 
Louisiana,  then  a  French  colony,  and  therefore  was  by 
birth  a  citizen  of  France.  On  the  30th  day  of  April,  1803, 
the  territory  of  Louisiana  was,  by  treaty,  ceded  by 
France  to  the  United  States.  The  treaty  '  cedes  to  the 
United  States  forever  and  in  full  sovereignty  the  territory, 
with  all  its  rights  and  appurtenances,  as  fully  and  in  the 
same  manner  as  they  have  been  acquired  by  the  French 
Republic  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  with  Spain.'  Spain  had 
ceded  the  territory  to  France  in  October,  1801,  and  the 
cession  did  not  affect  slavery,  which  then  existed  there. 
The  treaty  of  cession  contains  no  provision  by  which  the 
inhabitants  could  remain,  or  by  their  option  choose  to 
remain,  French  citizens.  On  the  contrary,  the  third 
article  of  the  treaty  obviously  contemplates  that  they 
were  to  be  American  citizens.  Article  3  of  the  treaty  is 
as  follows:  [Here  follows  the  article  as  above  quoted.] 
There  is  nothing  in  the  treaty,  therefore,  to  indicate 
that  it  was  the  intention,  either  of  France,  or  of  the 
United  States,  that  the  inhabitants,  or  any  of  them,  were 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  279 

to  remain  citizens  of  France.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  in- 
tended that  they  should  be  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
The  demurrer  is  sustained,  and  the  claim  is  disallowed." 
3  Moore's  International  Arbitrations,  2511  et  seq. 

2.  Case  of  Foucher. 

A  claim  against  the  United  States,  for  the  seizure  and 
destruction  of  property  by  military  authorities,  was 
made  before  the  same  Commission  in  behalf  of  the  heirs 
of  Louis  Frederick  Foucher  Marquis  de  Circe,  who  died 
in  France  in  1869.  It  appeared  that  Foucher  was  born  in 
1798  in  New  Orleans,  province  of  Louisiana,  then  a  pos- 
session of  Spain,  and  that  he  was  residing  there  with  his 
father  in  1803,  when  the  territory  of  Louisiana  was  ceded 
by  France  to  the  United  States.  ^-^'  remained  at  New 
Orleans  till  1836,  when  he  removed  to  France,  where  he 
continued  to  reside  till  his  decease.  In  France  he  exer- 
cised the  rights  and  enjoyed  the  privileges  of  a  citizen, 
owned  a  chateau,  and  assumed  his  inherited  title;  but 
there  was  no  evidence  of  record  that  he  was  ever  rein- 
stated or  naturalized  in  conformity  with  the  French 
Code. 

It  was  claimed  by  counsel  for  the  United  States,  on 
the  authority  of  the  decision  of  the  commission  in  the 
case  of  Egle  Aubry  (supra),  that  Foucher  became  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  by  the  treaty  of  cession  in  1803; 
that  his  residence  in  France,  even  with  the  attending 
circumstances,  did  not  entitle  him  to  be  considered  a 
citizen  of  that  country;  and  that  consequently  the  com- 
mission could  not  take  jurisdiction  of  the  case;  but  it 
was  admitted  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state  of 
Louisiana,  in  a  case  entitled  De  Circe's  Succession,  41  La. 
Ann.  506,  6  So.  812,  had  held  that  he  was,  at  the  time  of 
his  death,  a  French  citizen  within  the  meaning  of  both 
the  French  law  and  the  law  of  Louisiana. 

Counsel    for    the    French    Republic    maintained    that. 


280  NATURALIZATION 

inasmuch  as  the  father  of  Louis  Fredericlc  Foucher  was 
born  in  Louisiana  when  that  province  was  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  France,  his  descendant,  Louis  Fredericli 
Foucher,  was  a  citizen  of  France,  and  not  affected  by  the 
cession  of  the  territory  of  Louisiana  by  France  to  Spain, 
then  by  Spain  to  France,  then  by  France  to  the  United 
States.  It  was  also  claimed  by  counsel  for  the  French 
Republic  that  the  opinions  of  certain  French  lawyers, 
whose  words  were  quoted  in  the  brief,  should  be  accepted 
as  the  evidence  of  experts  in  regard  to  the  law  of  France. 
M.  Harrisse,  speaking  of  the  French  law,  said:  "Citizen- 
ship is  conferred  in  the  forms  given  in  my  first  cross- 
interrogatory.  It  is  evidenced  by  public  notoriety  and 
enjoyment  and  practice  of  certain  political  rights  which 
are  conferred  on  French  citizens  only,  such  as  the  registry 
of  voting  at  elections  or  inscription  on  the  electoral 
lists.  But,  as  the  law  does  not  prescribe  the  rules  of 
evidence  for  such  cases,  it  springs  from  circumstances." 
The  certificate  of  the  minister  of  the  interior  was  also 
relied  upon.  He  said,  in  substance,  that  Louis  Frederick 
Foucher,  Marquis  de  Circe,  born  at  New  Orleans,  had 
been,  in  view  of  the  evidence  produced,  considered  to  be 
French  and  inscribed  on  the  electoral  list  of  the  seventh 
arrondissement  of  Paris  for  the  years  1864  to  1869,  and 
that  his  inscription  on  that  list  established,  until  the 
contrary  was  proved,  that  he  was  French.  M.  Jason,  a 
French  lawyer,  who  was  examined  as  an  expert,  said:  "I 
consider  the  French  nationality  of  Louis  Frederick 
Foucher,  Marquis  de  Circe,  as  proved,  first,  by  the  judg- 
ment of  the  tribunal  of  the  Seine  of  April  11,  A.  D.  1851, 
ordering  the  rectification  of  the  birth  certificate  of  his 
son,  and  the  addition  of  the  name  of  Circe,  which  had  been 
omitted — an  addition  which  the  tribunal  could  order 
only  after  the  Marquis  de  Circe  had  established  his  qual- 
ity of  French  citizen;  second,  by  the  inscription  of  L.  F. 
Foucher  de  Circe  on  the    electoral   lists  of   the   seventh 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  281 

arrondissemeyit  on  presentation  to  the  competent  muni- 
cipal officers  of  documents  establishing  his  quality  of 
French  citizen." 

The  commission  unanimously  awarded  $9,200.  Coun- 
sel for  the  United  States  in  his  final  report,  referring  to 
this  award,  said:  "This  act  was  a  recognition  of  the 
citizenship  of  Foucher  in  France;  but  whether  the  con- 
clusion was  reached  upon  the  ground  that  the  father  of 
Foucher  was  a  citizen  of  France  and  that  the  son, 
although  born  in  the  territory  of  Louisiana,  then  a 
province  of  Spain,  followed  the  condition  of  his  father, 
or  whether  the  commission  were  of  opinion  that  the  re- 
moval of  Foucher  to  France  in  1836,  and  his  continuous 
residence  there  for  a  third  of  a  century  and  during  his 
life,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  he  was  recognized  as  a 
citizen  of  France,  although  formal  proceedings,  as  re- 
quired by  articles  9  and  10  of  the  French  Code,  had  not 
been  complied  with,  justified  the  conclusion,  legally, 
that  he  was  a  citizen  of  France,  does  not  appear." 
Arthur  Denis,  Testamentary  Executor  of  L.  F.  Foucher, 
Marquis  de  Circe  v.  United  States,  3  Moore,  International 
Arbitrations,  2512  et  seq. 

3.  Case  of  De  Baca. 

Neither  the  treaty  of  1800  between  Spain  and  France, 
nor  that  of  1803  (8  Stat,  at  L.  200),  between  France  and 
the  United  States,  ceding  "the  colony  or  province  of 
Louisiana,"  definitely  fixed  the  boundaries  of  that  colony 
or  province.  A  dispute  arose  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  on  this  subject.  The  United  States  contended 
that  the  Rio  Grande  River  was  the  western  boundary  of 
the  territory  ceded,  but  Spain  controverted  this.  After 
a  lengthy  correspondence,  the  differences  between  the 
two  governments  were  settled  by  the  treaty  of  February 
22,  1819  (8  Stat  at  L.  252),  by  which  the  United  States 
acquired   East   and   West  Florida,  and  renounced  all  its 


282  NATURALIZATION 

rights,  claims,  and  pretensions  to  the  territories  lying  west 
and  north  of  a  line  beginning  at  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine 
River  and  running  north  and  west  in  the  manner  described 
in  the  treaty. 

In  the  case  of  De  Baca  v.  United  States,  37  Ct.  CI.  482, 
it  appears  that  Sandoval,  claimant's  decedent,  was  born 
of  Spanish  parents  in  1809  in  Sante  Fe,  in  the  territory 
of  New  Mexico  (within  the  territory  described  above  to 
which  the  United  States  renounced  all  its  rights,  claims, 
and  pretensions),  and  continued  to  reside  there  until  his 
death  in  1862.  It  was  contended  by  the  claimant  that 
decedent  acquired  citizenship  in  the  United  States  under 
article  3  of  the  treaty  of  1803,  between  the  United  States 
and  France,  which  entitled  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  ter- 
ritory to  "be  incorporated  in  the  Union  of  the  United 
States,  and  admitted,  as  soon  as  possible,  according  to 
the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the  enjoy- 
ment of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States."  The  court  held  that  the 
disputed  territory  was  not  acquired  by  cession  from 
France,  citing  in  support  of  that  view  the  provision  of 
article  6  of  the  treaty  of  1819,  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  which  provides  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territories  which  His  Catholic  Majesty  cedes  to  the 
United  States  by  this  treaty  shall  be  "incorporated  in 
the  Union  of  the  United  States  as  soon  as  may  be  con- 
sistent with  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution* 
and  admitted  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  privileges, 
rights,  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States."  "There  is  no  provision  in  the  treaty,"  says  the 
court,  "with  reference  to  the  citizenship  of  the  inhabi- 
tants in  the  disputed  territory,  thus  indicating  to  our 
minds  that  such  territory  had  not,  up  to  that  time, 
ceased  to  be  Spanish  territory,  and  for  that  reason  no 
provision  was  necessary  concerning  their  citizenship 
under  the  Spanish  government." 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  283 

The  court's  conclusion  was  that  it  could  not  regard 
these  treaties  as  affecting  or  changing  the  citizenship  of 
any  person  dwelling  within  the  limits  of  the  disputed 
territory;  that  Spaniards  continued  to  be  Spaniards,  and 
Americans  continued  to  be  Americans,  and  their  children 
were  of  the  citizenship  of  their  parents.  The  court  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  inhabitants  of  Santa  Fe 
were  universally  regarded  as  Spaniards  or  Mexicans, 
until  the  United  States  acquired  that  territory  by  treaty; 
and  that  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo  recognized 
all  of  these  inhabitants  as  Mexican  citizens,  and  made 
provision  for  their  remaining  such  or  becoming  citizens 
of  the  United  States  at  their  own  election. 

The  decision  of  the  court  was  that  claimant's  decedent 
was  born  a  subject  of  Spain,  and  did  not  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  until  the  expiration  of  the  year  pre- 
scribed by  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo — that  is,  one 
year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  the 
treaty,  which  took  place  May  30,  1848  (9  Stat,  at  L.  922.) 

d.  Treaty  of  1819,  with  Spain. 

The  treaty  of  1819  (8  Stat,  at  L.  252),  art.  6,  with  Spain, 
ceding  Florida  to  the  United  States,  provided  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  "shall  be  incorporated 
in  the  Union  of  the  United  States  as  soon  as  maybe  con- 
sistent with  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution, 
and  admitted  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  privileges, 
rights,  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States." 

In  the  case  of  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter,  1  Pet. 
511,  7  L.  ed.  242,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  said:  "This 
treaty  is  the  law  of  the  land,  and  admits  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Florida  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  privileges, 
rights,  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  unnecessary  to  inquire  whether  this  is  not 
their  condition,   independent  of  stipulation.      They  do 


284  NATURALIZATION 

not,  however,  participate  in  political  power;  they  do  not 
share  in  the  government  till  Florida  shall  become  a 
state." 

In  Tannis  v.  Doe  ex  dem.  St.  Cyre,  21  Ala.  449,  it  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama,  in  1852,  that  a 
free  negro,  who  was  an  inhabitant  of  Florida  at  the  date 
of  the  treaty  by  which  Spain  ceded  that  territory  to  the 
United  States,  lost  the  character  of  an  alien  by  the 
operation  of  that  treaty.  See,  also,  Boyd  v.  Thayer,  143 
U.  S.  135. 

e.  Treaty  of  February  2,  1848,  with  Mexico. 

The  Treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  signed  February  2, 
1848  (9  Stat,  at  L.  922),  effected  a  collective  naturaliza- 
tion of  all  (Mexicans)  inhabitants  of  California  and  other 
territory  ceded  by  that  treaty  who  remained  in  and  ad- 
hered to  the  United  States.  Article  8  of  the  treaty  pro- 
vided that  "Mexicans  now  established  in  territories 
previously  belonging  to  Mexico;"  and  which  were  to  "re- 
main for  the  future  within  the  limits  of  the  United 
States,  as  defined  hy  the  present  treaty,"  should,  if  re- 
maining in  such  territories,  elect  within  a  year  from  the 
date  of  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty 
whether  they  would  "retain  the  title  and  rights  of  Mexi- 
can citizens,  or  acquire  those  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States,"  but  that  those  who  remained  "in  the  said  terri- 
tories after  the  expiration  of  that  year,  without  having 
declared  their  intention  to  retain  the  character  of  Mexi- 
cans," should  "  be  considered  to  have  elected  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States." 

Under  the  provision  of  this  treaty  that  Mexicans  re- 
siding in  the  ceded  territory  should  acquire  United 
States  citizenship,  it  was  decided,  in  United  States  v. 
Lucero,  1  N.  Mex.  422,  that  Pueblo  Indians,  who  were 
"  Mexicans,"  under  Mexican  law,  became  citizens  of    the 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  285 

United  States.  See,  also,  U.  S.  v.  Santistevan,  1  New 
Mex.  583. 

The  8th  section  of  the  treaty  is  inapplicable  to  per- 
sons who,  before  the  revolution  in  Texas,  had  been  citi- 
zens of  Mexico,  and  who,  by  that  revolution,  had  been 
separated  from  it.  McKinney  v.  Saviego,  18  How.  235, 
15  L.  ed.365. 

Two  claimants,  natives  of  Mexico,  who  had  remained 
in  New  Mexico  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  with- 
out having  indicated  an  election  to  "retain  the  title  and 
rights  of  Mexican  citizens,"  complained  of  acts  commit- 
ted by  the  authorities  of  the  United  States  prior  to  the 
date  of  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty.  It  was  held  by  the 
commissioners,  without  reference  of  the  question  to  the 
umpire,  that  the  claimants  in  question  had  no  standing 
as  Mexicans  before  the  commission.  Melquiades  and 
Josefa  Chavez  v.  United  States,  United  States  and  Mexi- 
can Claims  Commission,  Convention  of  July  4,  1868,  15 
Stat,  at  L.  679,  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  2510. 

A.,  a  native  of  Mexico,  where  he  was  born  in  1833,  was 
taken  by  his  father,  in  1851,  to  California,  whither  the 
latter  had  gone  in  March,  1848.  It  was  held  by  the  Commis- 
sioners that  the  phrase,  "Mexicans  now  established,"  as 
employed  in  article  8  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo,  applied  only  to  those  who  were  established  in 
the  ceded  territories  at  the  date  of  the  conclusion  of  the 
treaty,  and  not  to  those  who  came  subsequently;  and 
that  neither  the  father,  nor  consequently  the  son  through 
him,  acquired,  under  the  treaty,  the  citizenship  of  the 
United  States.  Jesus  M.  Ainsa  t?.  Mexico,  United  States 
and  Mexican  Claims  Commission,  Convention  of  July  4, 
1868,  15  Stat,  at  L.  679,  3  Moore,  International  Arbitra- 
tions, 2510. 

The  constitution  of  California  of  October  1,  1849,  Art. 
2,  Sec.  1,   provided:  "Every  white   male  citizen   of   the 


286  NATURALIZATION 

United  States,  and  every  white  male  citizen  of  Mexico, 
who  shall  have  elected  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  under  the  treaty  of  peace  exchanged  and  ratified 
at  Queretaro  on  the  30th  day  of  May,  1848  [9  Stat,  at  L. 
922],  of  the  age  of  21  years,  who  shall  have  been  a  resi- 
dent of  the  state  six  months  next  preceding  the  day  of 
the  election,  and  of  the  county  or  district  in  which  he 
claims  his  vote  thirty  days,  shall  be  entitled  to  vote  at 
all  elections  which  are  now  or  hereafter  may  be  author- 
ized by  law."  The  Commissioners  held  that  neither  this 
article,  nor  anything  in  the  Act  of  Congress  admitting 
California  into  the  Union,  helped  claimant's  case. 

"The  umpire  considers  that  the  claimant  must  be  con- 
sidered to  be  a  Mexican  citizen,  the  contrary  not  having 
been  proved  by  the  defense.  The  witnesses  testify  that 
he  was  born  in  Mexico,  and  it  is  not  shown  that  he  had 
divested  himself  of  that  nationality.  The  umpire  does 
not  think  that  article  8  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo  applied  to  the  claimant,  though  he  might  have 
been  a  resident  of  Texas  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of 
that  treaty  and  for  a  year  afterward.  Texas  was  not,  in 
the  meaning  of  that  article,  one  of  the  territories  pre- 
viously belonging  to  Mexico,  and  which  remained  for  the 
future  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States.  Texas 
had  been  independent  since  1836,  and  a  state  of  the 
Union  since  1845.  It  was  claimed  by  the  United  States 
that  the  strip  of  territory  between  the  rivers  Nueces  and 
Bravo  was  a  part  of  Texas,  and  had  always  been  so.  It 
must  therefore  be  supposed,  nothing  to  the  contrary 
having  been  proved,  that  the  claimant  was  a  Mexican 
citizen  residing  in  Texas."  Thornton,  Umpire,  July  7, 
1876,  Convention  of  July  4,  1868,  15  Stat,  at  L.  679; 
Agapito  Longoria  v.  United  States,  United  States  and 
Mexican  Claims  Commission,  3  Moore,  International 
Arbitrations,  2510,  2511. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  287 

The  right  of  election  secured  to  Mexican  citizens  of 
the  territory  of  New  Mexico  by  the  treaty  with  Mexico, 
to  retain  their  citizenship  or  to  become  American  citi- 
zens, was  not  required  to  be  exercised  in  any  particular 
mode,  but  could  be  exercised  and  proved  in  any  manner 
appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the  case.  A  declaration  of 
intention  by  a  Mexican  citizen  to  retain  Mexican  citizen- 
ship, by  signing  his  name  to  a  list  authorized  to  be  kept 
by  the  clerks  of  the  prefects'  courts  by  a  proclamation 
of  the  military  governor  of  New  Mexico,  is  a  sufficient 
exercise  of  such  right  of  election,  and  is  not  affected  by 
a  subsequently  declared  intention  to  withdraw  such 
signature,  which  is  not  shown  to  have  been  acted  on. 
Quintana  v.  Tomkins,  1  N.  M.  29. 

A  declaration  of  intention  to  retain  Mexican  citizen- 
ship, made  before  a  probate  court,  in  accordance  with 
the  proclamation  above  referred  to,  was  a  binding  and 
valid  exercise  of  the  right  of  election  reserved  to  Mexi- 
can residents  of  the  territory  of  New  Mexico  by  Article 
8  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo  (9  Stat,  at  L.  922). 
Carter  v.  Territory,  1  N.  M.  317. 

In  the  case  of  Tobin  v.  Walkinshaw,  McAll.  186,  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  14,070,  the  United  States  Circuit  Court  held 
that  the  principle  that  the  allegiance  of  the  inhabitants 
of  territory  ceded  is  transferred  with  the  territory,  un- 
less the  treaty  of  cession  provides  otherwise,  applies 
only  to  natural-born  citizens  of  the  country  making  the 
cession.  In  this  case  one  Forbes,  a  native  of  Great 
Britain,  was,  at  the  date  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo,  a  naturalized  citizen  of  Mexico.  He  continued 
to  reside  in  California  after  the  execution  of  the  treaty, 
and  never  made  any  declaration  of  intention  to  retain 
the  rights  of  a  Mexican  citizen.  It  was  contended  that 
these  facts,  with  the  subsequent  admission  of  California 
into  the  Union,  fixed  at  once  and  by  mere  operation  of 


288  NATURALIZATION 

law  the  status  of  American  citizenship  upon  him.  The 
treaty  stipulated,  as  to  those  Mexicans  who  should  pre- 
fer to  remain  in  the  ceded  territory,  that  they  might 
either  retain  the  title  and  rights  of  Mexican  citizens,  or 
acquire  those  of  American  citizens;  but  declared  that 
they  should  be  under  the  obligation  to  make  their  elec- 
tion within  one  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  the 
ratifications  of  the  treaty,  and  those  who  should  remain 
after  the  expiration  of  that  year,  without  having  declared 
their  intention  to  retain  the  character  of  Mexican  citi- 
zens, should  be  considered  to  have  elected  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  court  said  that  birth 
binds  man  by  the  tie  of  natural  allegiance  to  his  native 
soil,  and  such  allegiance  gives  to  the  country  in  which 
he  was  born  the  right  to  transfer  this  natural  allegiance, 
subject,  however,  to  the  right  of  election  in  the  party 
whether  he  will  retain  his  allegiance  to  his  old  sover- 
eign, or  pay  allegiance  to  the  new.  Said  the  court: 
"The  object  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo  was  to 
regulate  the  exercise  of  this  right  of  election  by 
such  parties  as  by  the  principles  of  international 
law  were  subject  to  their  jurisdiction  as  contract- 
ing parties.  The  Mexican  government  stipulated 
for  a  right  for  Mexicans  residing  in  the  territory 
to  elect  at  any  time  within  a  year  after  the  date 
of  the  treaty  to  retain  their  title  and  rights  as  Mexicans; 
the  government  of  the  United  States  guarded  against  the 
abuse  of  the  right,  by  limiting  the  time  within  which  it 
was  to  be  executed,  and  stipulating  that,  if  the  election 
was  not  made  within  the  time  limited,  they  should  be 
considered  as  having  elected  to  become  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  The  right  of  the  two  governments  thus 
to  stipulate  in  relation  to  native-born  Mexicans,  under 
the  law  of  nations,  is  unquestionable.  It  was  evidently 
proper  that  the  status  of  all  such  should  be  fixed.     If 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  289 

they  were  neither  to  continue  Mexican  citizens,  nor  be- 
come citizens  of  the  United  States,  a  whole  people  would 
become  disfranchised.  They  would  have  no  status  as 
citizens,  owe  no  allegiance,  and  be  left  in  the  anomalous 
position  of  a  people  without  a  country.  Not  so  with 
the  defendant  Forbes.  So  soon  as  he  had  been  released 
from  the  voluntary  allegiance  to  Mexico,  he  was  remitted 
to  his  original  status.  No  power  existed  in  one  govern- 
ment to  transfer,  or  in  the  other  to  receive,  the  volun- 
tary or  statutory  allegiance  of  a  naturalized  citizen. 
Neither  had  the  right  to  say  to  such,  '  You  shall  continue 
your  allegiance  to  Mexico,  although  she  has  conveyed  it 
away;  or  you  shall  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.' 
The  allegiance  of  the  naturalized  citizen  is  the  offspring 
of  municipal  law.  Unlike  natural  allegiance,  its  support 
does  not  rest  upon  the  law  of  nature  and  the  code  of 
nations.  The  only  relations  that  Mexico  or  the  United 
States  could  change  were  those  arising  from  those 
sources.  Nor  does  the  language  of  the  treaty  authorize 
the  conclusion  that  the  contracting  parties  intended 
to  include  within  the  word  'Mexicans'  naturalized 
citizens  of  foreign  countries.  ...  In  the  8th 
article  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  Mexicans 
are  only  mentioned  as  entitled  to  the  rights  of  election. 
The  whole  of  this  article  refers  to  Mexicans  ;  and  the 
9th  article  speaks  of  '  Mexicans  '  only,  and  provides  that 
those  who  do  not  preserve  the  character  of  Mexican  citi- 
zens shall  be  subsequently  incorporated  into  and  become 
entitled  to  all  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
Naturalized  citizens  are  nowhere  included,  eo  nomine, 
within  the  provisions  of  the  treaty,  and,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  it  was  not  intended  to  include  them.  This 
construction  of  the  treaty  is  sought  to  be  defeated  by  the 
assumption  that  the  change  in  the  political  relations  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  was  contemplated 

5233—19 


290  NATURALIZATION 

to  be  made  by  the  treaty  with  their  consent  by  giving 
to  them  the  right  of  election;  hence,  that  it  is  to  be 
reasonably  concluded  that  naturalized  citizens  were  in- 
tended to  be  included  in  the  term  'Mexicans.'  The 
answer  is,  first,  it  is  a  violence  to  the  language  of  the 
treaty  so  to  construe  it;  secondly,  the  allegiance  of  the 
naturalized  citizen  was  not  a  subject  of  transfer  between 
the  contracting  parties;  and  thirdly,  the  argument  sur- 
renders the  whole  question,  because  if  the  defendant  was 
included  in  the  treaty,  his  consent  was  essential  to  en- 
title him  to  exercise  the  right  of  election.  .  .  .  But, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  election  was  given  only 
to  Mexicans  who  remained  in  the  ceded  territory  longer 
than  one  year  after  the  date  of  the  treaty,  who  were 
during  that  interval  to  elect  to  retain  Mexican  rights  or 
be  considered  citizens  of  the  United  States.  Both  gov- 
ernments had  the  right  so  to  negotiate  in  regard  to 
Mexicans;  but  in  relation  to  the  defendant,  Forbes,  a 
naturalized  citizen,  his  voluntary  allegiance  might  be 
released  by  Mexico — not  transferred.  On  his  release  he 
was  remitted  to  his  original  status  of  a  British  subject, 
derived  from  his  birth,  and  the  courts  know  no  principle 
of  law  which  would  authorize  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  compel  the  transfer  of  the  defendant's 
voluntary  allegiance  from  Mexico  to  themselves.  The 
contracting  parties  did  not  intend  to  do  so.  The  court 
considering  the  defendant  without  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty,  his  claim  to  be  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
under  them  can  not  be  sustained;  and  he  stood  at  the 
execution  of  the  treaty,  and  now  stands,  where  his  acts 
and  declarations  and  original  status  have  placed  him — 
an  alien,  and  subject  of  Great  Britain." 

A  subject  of  a  foreign  state,  residing  in  the  State  of 
Texas  at  the  time  of  its  admission  to  the  Union,  did  not 
thereby  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Coutzen 
V.  United  States,  33  Ct.  CI.  475. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  291 

A  person  born  in  Texas,  and  removing  therefrom  be- 
fore tlie  separation  from  Mexico,  remains  a  citizen  of 
Mexico,  though  a  minor  when  the  separation  took  place. 
Jones  V.  McMasters,  20  How.  8,  15  L.  ed.  805. 

In  the  case  of  Masson  v.  Mexico  (American  and  Mexi- 
can Claims  Commission,  Convention  of  1868,  15  Stat,  at 
L.  679),  claimant  stated  that  he  emigrated  from  France 
to  the  Republic  of  Texas  in  1844,  and  continued  to  re- 
side there  until  the  annexation  of  that  republic  to  the 
United  States  and  its  incorporation  into  the  Union.  He 
asserted  that  he  thereby  became  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  The  umpire  held  that,  to  have  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  by  virtue  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas,  the  claimant  must  have  first  been  a  citizen  of  the 
Republic  of  Texas,  and,  as  it  was  not  found  that  he  went 
through  the  forms  required  to  acquire  that  citizenship, 
his  claim  to  American  citizenship  was  not  established. 
3  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  2542,2543. 

f .  Treaty  of  December  30,  1853,  with  Mexico  (Gadsden 
Treaty). 

Article  5  of  the  Gadsden  treaty,  signed  December  30, 
1853  (10  Stat,  at  L.  1031),  declared  that  the  provisions 
of  article  8  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo  (9  Stat. 
at  L.  922)  relative  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  ter- 
ritory should  apply  to  the  territory  ceded  by  the  Gadsden 
treaty.  The  Mexican  inhabitants  of  the  territory  re- 
ferred to  (Arizona)  who  adhered  to  and  remained  in  the 
United  States  thereby  became  citizens  of  the  United 
States. 

g.  Treaty  of  1867  with  Russia. 

The  treaty  of  1867  with  Russia,  ceding  Alaska  to  the 
United  States,  gave  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  terri- 
tory the  privilege  of  reserving  their  Russian  allegiance 
and  returning  to  Russia  within  three  years.  It  was  pro- 
vided that  those  remaining  there  (with  the  exception  of 


292  NATURALIZATION 

uncivilized  native  tribes)  should  be  admitted  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

The  treaty  provision  (art.  3)  reads  as  follows:  "The 
inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory,  according  to  their 
choice,  reserving  their  natural  allegiance,  may  return  to 
Russia  within  three  years;  but,  if  they  should  prefer  to 
remain  in  the  ceded  territory,  they,  with  the  exception 
of  uncivilized  native  tribes,  shall  be  admitted  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  shall  be  maintained 
and  protected  in  the  free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty, 
property,  and  religion.  The  uncivilized  tribes  will  be 
subject  to  such  laws  and  regulations  as  the  United 
States  may  from  time  to  time  adopt  in  regard  to  abor- 
iginal tribes  of  that  country."  15  Stat,  at  L.  542.  See 
Rasmussen  v.  U.  S.,  197  U.  S.  516.* 

*The  following  report  from  Moore's  International  Arbitrations  of 
an  interesting  case  which  came  before  a  claims  commission  to  which  the 
United  States  was  a  party,  is  given: 

Henriette  Levy,  widow  of  Jacob  Levy,  and  a  native  of  Alsace,  filed, 
in  her  own  right,  and  as  tutrix  of  her  six  minor  children,  a  memorial 
before  the  commission  under  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
France  of  January  15,  1880  (21  Stat  at  L.  673),  for  damages  for  the 
seizure  of  cotton  by  the  United  States  forces  in  Louisiana  in  1863.  The 
cotton  in  question  belonged  to  the  firm  of  Isaac  Levy  &  Co.,  then  doing 
business  in  Louisiana.  This  firm  was  composed  of  Jacob  Levy  and 
Isaac  Levy,  citizens  of  France,  and  Marx  Levy  and  Benjamin  Weil,  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States.  In  1866  Jacob  Levy  purchased  the  interests 
of  Marx  Levy  and  Benjamin  Weil  in  the  property  and  assets  of  the  firm, 
and  subsequently  removed  to  Strasburg,  in  Alsace,  then  in  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  France,  where  he  died  March  1,  1871.  The  memorial  filed  by 
Henriette  Levy  embraced  both  the  original  and  the  acquired  interest  of 
Jacob  Levy  in  the  property  and  assets  of  the  firm. 

On  this  state  of  facts  counsel  for  the  United  States  demurred  to  the 
memorial,  on  the  following  grounds  :  "  1,  As  to  the  whole  case  :  That 
it  appears  that  the  claimant  and  her  children,  about  the  year  1871, 
became  citizens  or  subjects  of  Germany,  and  have  ever  since  remained 
and  are  now  such  citizens  or  subjects,  and  have  not  since  that  year  been 
citizens  of  the  Republic  of  France,  and  that  this  claim  is,  therefore,  not 
presented  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  citizens  of  that  Republic.     2.  As  to  the 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  293 

h.  Treaty  of  1898,  with  Spain. 

The  treaty  of  Paris  of  December  10,  1898  (30  Stat,  at 
L.  1754),  which  terminated  the  late  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  and  by  which  Spain  ceded  Porto 
Rico  and  the  Philippine  Islands  to  the  United  States,  pro- 
vided (art.  9)  that  Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Pen- 
insula, residing  in   the   territory  ceded,  might  preserve 

interest  alleged  to  have  been  assigned  by  Benjamin  Weil :  That  as  it 
appears  that  said  Weil  was  at  the  time  of  the  acts  complained  of  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  the  claim  is  not  one  arising  out  of  acts  committed 
against  the  persons  or  propertj'  of  citizens  of  France." 

In  support  of  so  much  of  the  demurrer  as  related  to  the  claim  derived 
from  Benjamin  Weil,  counsel  for  the  United  States  referred  to  the  case 
of  Archbishop  Perch^. 

In  support  of  the  demurrer  to  the  whole  case  counsel  for  the  United 
States  invoked  the  treaty  of  Frankfort  of  May  10,  1871,  by  which  Alsace 
was  ceded  to  Germany,  By  article  2  of  this  treaty  it  was  provided  that 
French  subjects,  born  in  the  ceded  territory  and  actually  domiciled 
therein,  who  desired  to  preserve  their  French  nationality,  should  be 
allowed  till  October  1,  1872,  to  declare  their  intention  to  do  so,  before 
competent  authority,  and  to  remove  their  domicil  to  France. 

As  there  was  no  allegation  in  the  memorial  that  Henriette  Levy  had 
availed  herself  of  this  privilege,  counsel  for  the  United  States  main- 
tained that  it  was  a  reasonable  presumption  that  she  had  omitted  to  do 
so,  and  had  in  consequence  become  a  German  subject.  Counsel  cited 
in  this  relation  the  case  of  Archbishop  Perchd,  and  moved  that  the 
memorialist  be  required  to  amend  her  memorial  and  state  whether  she 
had  availed  herself  of  the  privilege  secured  by  article  2  of  the  treaty  of 
Frankfort.  He  further  moved  that  in  default  of  such  a  statement  the 
case  be  dismissed. 

Special  counsel  for  the  memorialist  contended  (l)that  the  case  was  not 
analogous  to  that  of  Archbishop  Perch6,  since  in  that  case  the  claimant 
had  voluntarily  renounced  his  allegiance  to  France  and  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  ;  while  Jacob  Levy,  the  husband  of  Henriette  Levy, 
was  born  in  France,  lived  in  France,  and  died  a  citizen  of  France  ;  and 
(2)  that  as  Jacob  Levy  was  a  citizen  of  France  when  the  loss  was  sus- 
tained and  continued  to  be  a  citizen  of  France  during  his  life,  the  claim 
was  by  a  citizen  of  France,  and  that  the  commission  should  take  and 
maintain  jurisdiction.  In  support  of  this  position  the  1st,  2d,  and  4th 
articles  of  the  treaty  were  quoted.  The  attention  of  the  commission  was 
also  called  to  the  7th  article  of  the  treaty  of  February  23,  1853  (10  Stat, 
at  L.  996),  between  France  and  the  United  States,  in  which  it  is  provided 
that  :  "  Frenchmen  shall  enjoy  the  right  of  possessing  personal  and  real 
property  by  the  same  title  and  in  the  same  manner  as  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States.     They  shall  be  free  to  dispose  of  it  as  they  may  please, 


294  NATURALIZATION 

their  allegiance  to  Spain  by  making,  before  a  court  of 
record,  within  a  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of 
ratifications  of  the  said  treaty,  a  declaration  of  their 
decision  to  preserve  such  allegiance.  The  treaty  declared 
that  in  default  of  such  declaration  they  should  be  held 
to  have  renounced  such  allegiance  and  to  have  adopted 
the  nationality  of  the  territory  in  which  they  resided. 

either  gratuitously  or  for  value  received,  by  donation,  testament,  or  other- 
wise, just  as  those  citizens  themselves  ;  and  in  no  case  shall  they  be  sub- 
ject to  taxes  on  transfer,  inheritance,  or  any  others  different  from  those 
paid  by  the  latter." 

It  was  also  contended  that  any  change  in  the  nationality  of  the  country 
of  their  nativity  could  not  affect  the  rights  acquired  by  the  heirs  of  Jacob 
Levy  while  the  country  was  an  integral  part  of  France  and  they  were 
citizens  thereof  ;  that  the  repeal  of  a  law,  or  change  of  a  treaty,  or  a 
cession  of  territorial  domain  subsequent  to  the  date  when  the  right  of 
inheritance  attached  could  not  affect  any  right  acquired  under  the 
treaty  or  such  law  or  cession  of  territory.  Several  authorities  were 
cited  in  the  brief  in  support  of  these  positions,  and  especially  the  decis- 
ion of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Dawson  v. 
Godfrey,  4  Cranch,  321,  2  L.  ed.  634.  It  was  also  claimed  by  counsel  for 
the  memorialist  that  the  nationality  of  the  father  was  transmitted  to  his 
minor  children  ;  that  neither  the  mother  nor  guardian  could  change  it 
during  their  minority  ;  that  when  the  minors  attained  their  majority 
they  had  the  right  to  elect  whether  they  would  adhere  to  the  country  to 
which  their  father  owed  allegiance  at  the  date  of  his  death,  and  that  until 
that  period  arrived  they  continued  citizens  of  France.  The  cession  of 
Alsace,  it  was  alleged,  did  not  affect  in  any  particular  the  private  rights 
of  the -citizens  to  property  or  claims  for  injuries  committed  prior  to  the 
cession. 

Counsel  for  the  United  States,  in  reply  to  the  contention  of  private 
counsel  that  there  was  no  analogy  between  the  case  of  Perch^  and  the 
case  at  bar,  maintained  that  the  question  for  the  commission  to  consider 
was  one  solely  of  the  fact  of  citizenship  ;  that  the  motive  or  reason  or 
the  attending  circumstances  in  the  case  of  a  change  of  nationality  ought 
not  to  be  considered,  and  could  properly  have  no  weight;  that,  assuming 
the  position  of  counsel  for  the  claimant  to  be  a  tenable  one,  it  was  true 
that  she  had  the  option  tendered  to  her  by  the  treaty  of  187 1 ;  but  that  she 
was  then  called  upon  to  make  her  choice,  either  to  remain  in  Germany 
and  become  a  subject  of  the  German  Empire  or  to  accept  the  privileges 
of  the  treaty  and  retain  her  citizenship  in  France.  She  chose  to  remain 
in  the  German  Empire,  and  thas  voluntarily  fixed  her  character  as  a 
German  subject. 

The  Commission  sustained  the  demurrer  in  these  words  :   "  The  com- 
mission, in  this  case,   judges  well-founded,  and  admits  the  demurrer 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  295 

The  trent}^  (art.  9)  further  provided  that  "the  civil 
rights  and  political  status  of  the  native  inhabitants  of 
the  territories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United  States  shall 
be  determined  by  the  Congress." 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  treaty,  unlike  previous 
treaties  of  cession  to  which  the  United  States  has  been  a 
party,  makes  no  provision  for  the  incorporation  of  the 

interposed  by  the  agent  of  the  United  States  to  the  claim  or  memorial. 
In  its  opinion,  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  the  claimant  and  her  children, 
being  natives  of  Alsace  and  having  always  resided  there,  and  not  having 
made  choice  of  the  French  nationalit}'  during  the  interim  granted  by 
the  treaty  of  May  10th,  1871  (which  applied  to  persons  of  full  age  as  well 
as  to  minors),  are  included  in  the  collective  naturalization,  real  as  well 
as  personal,  which  resulted  to  that  country  in  consequence  of  its  annexa- 
tion to  the  German  Empire,  sanctioned  by  that  treaty.  And  as  German 
subjects,  which  they  have  become,  they  can  not  in  any  manner  have 
recourse  to  a  commission  created  solely  for  the  settlement  of  certain 
claims  of  French  or  American  citizens.  The  French  nationality  of  Jacob 
Levy,  whose  rights  the  claimant  and  her  children  have  inherited,  can 
not  be  included  in  this  inheritance.  Possessed  by  him  alone,  it  does  not 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  convention,  which  demands  French 
nationality  in  those  who  actualh'  present  themselves  before  the  com- 
mission. Benjamin  Weil  and  Marx  Levy  never  having  been  French,  the 
rights  which  they  transferred  to  Jacob  Levy  can  not,  a  fortiori,  be  taken 
into  consideration,  nor  can  they  render  any  better  the  legal  condition 
of  the  claimant  and  her  children.  For  these  reasons  the  commission 
sustains  the  demurrer  of  the  United  States  counsel,  and  declares  the 
claim  outside  of  its  jurisdiction." 

The  judgment  of  the  commission  sustaining  the  demurrer  was  dated 
the  25th  of  June,  l8Sl.  The  20th  of  September,  iSSl,  the  claimant,  by 
her  attorney,  filed  an  amendment  to  the  memorial,  in  which  she  declared 
that  she  and  her  minor  children  were  then  residents  and  citizens  of 
France,  and  that  her  post-office  address  at  that  time  was  in  Paris,  France. 
Documentary  evidence  was  also  produced,  showing  that  Henriette  Levy, 
the  claimant,  was,  upon  a  proper  application  to  the  authorities  of  France, 
reinstated  as  a  French  subject  on  the  3d  of  June,  1882. 

Counsel  for  the  United  States  maintained  that  the  amendment  was,  in 
effect,  an  admission  that  Henriette  Levy  and  her  minor  children  were 
subjects  of  Germany  at  the  time  the  treaty  was  ratified,  and  that  citizen- 
ship in  France,  acquired  after  the  date  of  the  treaty,  could  not  give 
jurisdiction  to  the  commission  over  parties  so  acquiring  citizenship. 

The  case  was  dismissed  finally  for  want  of  jurisdiction. 

Boutwell's  Report,  65,  French  and  American  Claims  Commission,  Con- 
vention of  January  l5,  1880,  21  Stat,  at  L.  673;  3  Moore's  Int.  Arbitrations, 
2514  et  seq. 


296  NATURALIZATION 

inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  as  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  It  expressly  declares  that  the  civil  rights 
and  political  status  of  the  native  inhabitants  shall  be 
determined  by  the  Congress. 

The  contention  was  advanced  by  those  who  were  op- 
posed to  the  acquisition  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philippine 
Islands  that  the  United  States  has  no  power,  in  acquiring 
and  governing  territory,  to  provide  against  the  incorpo- 
ration of  the  inhabitants  of  the  acquired  territory  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  They  contended  that  the 
inhabitants  of  the  territory  ceded  to  the  United  States 
by  Spain  became,  immediately  upon  annexation,  citizens 
of  the  United  States.     • 

1.    Insular  Cases :   Decisions  of  Supreme  Court. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the  Insular 
Cases,  182  U.  S.  1-391,  45  L.  ed.  1041-1146,  21  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  742-827,  declared,  however,  that  this  government, 
in  acquiring  territory,  has  power  to  prescribe  the  terms 
upon  which  it  will  receive  the  inhabitants ;  and,  in  the 
concurring  opinion  of  Justices  White,  Shiras,  and  Mc- 
Kenna,  it  was  held  that  where  a  treaty  of  cession  con- 
tains provisions  against  the  incorporation  of  the  inhabit- 
ants as  citizens,  incorporation  does  not  take  place  until, 
in  the  wisdom  of  Congress,  it  is  deemed  that  the  acquired 
territory  has  reached  a  condition  where  it  is  proper  that 
it  should  enter  into  and  form  a  part  of  the  American 
family. 

In  their  concurring  opinion  (182  U.  S.  300),  Justices 
White,  Shiras,  and  McKenna  said: 

".  .  .  Let  me  .  .  .  eliminate  the  case  of  war,  and 
consider  the  treaty-making  power  as  subserving  the  pur- 
poses of  the  peaceful  evolution  of  national  life.  Suppose 
the  necessity  of  acquiring  a  naval  station  or  a  coaling 
station  on  an  island  inhabited  with  people   utterly  unfit 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  297 

for  American  citizenship  and  totally  incapable  of  bear- 
ing their  proportionate  burden  of  the  national  expense. 
Could  such  island,  under  the  rule  which  is  now  insisted 
upon,  be  taken?  Suppose,  again,  the  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory for  an  interoceanic  canal,  where  an  inhabited  strip 
of  land  on  either  side  is  essential  to  the  United  States 
for  the  preservation  of  the  work.  Can  it  be  denied  that, 
if  the  requirements  of  the  Constitution  as  to  taxation 
are  to  immediately  control,  it  might  be  impossible  by 
treaty  to  accomplish  the  desired  result? 

"Whilst  no  particular  provision  of  the  Constitution  is 
referred  to,  to  sustain  the  argument  that  it  is  impossible 
to  acquire  territory  by  treaty  without  immediate  and 
absolute  incorporation,  it  is  said  that  the  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution excludes  the  conception  of  property  or  depend- 
encies possessed  by  the  United  States  and  which  are  not 
so  completely  incorporated  as  to  be  in  all  respects  a 
part  of  the  United  States;  that  the  theory  upon  which 
the  Constitution  proceeds  is  that  of  confederated  and 
independent  states,  and  that  no  territory,  therefore,  can 
be  acquired  which  does  not  contemplate  statehood,  and 
excludes  the  acquisition  of  any  territory  which  is  not  in 
a  position  to  be  treated  as  an  integral  part  of  the  United 
States.  But  this  reasoning  is  based  on  political,  and  not 
judicial,  considerations.  Conceding  that  the  conception 
upon  which  the  Constitution  proceeds  is  that  no  terri- 
tory, as  a  general  rule,  should  be  acquired  unless  the 
territory  may  reasonably  he  expected  to  be  worthy  of 
statehood,  the  determination  of  when  such  blessing  is  to 
be  bestowed  is  wholly  a  political  question,  and  the  aid 
of  the  judiciary  can  not  be  invoked  to  usurp  political 
discretion  in  order  to  save  the  Constitution  from  imagi- 
nary, or  even  real,  dangers.  The  Constitution  may  not 
be  saved  by  destroying  its  fundamental  limitations. 

"Let   me  come,   however,   to   a  consideration   of  the 


298  NATURALIZATION 

express  powers  which  are  conferred  by  the  Constitution, 
to  show  how  unwarranted  is  the  principle  of  immediate 
incorporation,  which  is  here  so  strenuously  insisted  on. 
In  doing  so  it  is  conceded  at  once  that  the  true  rule  of 
construction  is  not  to  consider  one  provision  of  the  Con- 
stitution alone,  but  to  contemplate  all,  and  therefore  to 
limit  one  conceded  attribute  by  those  qualifications 
which  naturally  result  from  the  other  powers  granted  by 
that  instrument,  so  that  the  whole  may  be  interpreted 
by  the  spirit  which  vivifies,  and  not  by  the  letter  which 
killeth.  Undoubtedly,  the  power  to  carry  on  war  and  to 
make  treaties  implies  also  the  exercise  of  those  incidents 
which  ordinarily  inhere  in  them.  Indeed,  in  view  of  the 
rule  of  construction  which  I  have  just  conceded — that 
all  powers  conferred  by  the  Constitution  must  be  inter- 
preted with  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  government, 
and  be  construed  in  harmony  with  related  provisions  of 
the  Constitution — it  seems  to  me  impossible  to  conceive 
that  the  treaty-making  power  by  a  mere  cession  can  in- 
corporate an  alien  people  into  the  United  Saates  without 
the  express  or  implied  approval  of  Congress.  And  from 
this  it  must  follow  that  Chere  can  be  no  foundation  for 
the  assertion  that,  where  the  treaty-making  power  has 
inserted  conditions  which  preclude  incorporation  until 
Congress  has  acted  in  respect  thereto,  such  conditions 
are  void  and  incorporation  results  in  spite  thereof.  If 
the  treaty-making  power  can  absolutely,  without  the 
consent  of  Congress,  incorporate  territory,  and  if  that 
power  may  not  insert  conditions  against  incorporation,  it 
must  follow  that  the  treaty-making  power  is  endowed  by 
the  Constitution  with  the  most  unlimited  right,  suscep- 
tible of  destroying  every  other  provision  of  the  Consti- 
tution; that  is,  it  may  wreck  our  institutions.  If  the 
proposition  be  true,  then  millions  of  inhabitants  of  alien 
territory,  if  acquired  by  treat}^,  can,  without   the  desire 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  299 

or  consent  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  speaking 
through  Congress,  be  immediately  and  irrevocably  incor- 
porated into  the  United  States,  and  the  whole  structure 
of  the  government  be  overthrown.  While  thus  aggran- 
dizing the  treaty-making  power  on  the  one  hand,  the 
construction  at  the  same  time  minimizes  it  on  the  other, 
in  that  it  strips  that  authority  of  any  right  to  acquire 
territory  upon  any  condition  which  would  guard  the 
people  of  the  United  States  from  the  evil  of  immediate 
incorporation.  The  treaty-making  power,  then,  under 
this  contention,  instead  of  having  the  symmetrical  func- 
tions which  belong  to  it  from  its  very  nature,  becomes 
distorted — vested  with  the  right  to  destroy  upon  the 
one  hand,  and  deprived  of  all  power  to  protect  the  gov- 
ernment on  the  other. 

"And,  looked  at  from  another  point  of  view,  the  effect 
of  the  principle  asserted  is  equally  antagonistic,  not 
only  to  the  express  provisions,  but  to  the  spirit  of  t  e 
Constitution  in  other  respects.  Thus,  if  it  be  true  that 
the  treaty-making  power  has  the  authority  which  is 
asserted,  what  becomes  of  that  branch  of  Congress 
which  is  peculiarly  the  representative  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  and  what  is  left  of  the  functions  of 
that  body  under  the  Constitution?  For,  although  the 
House  of  Representatives  might  be  unwilling  to  agree 
to  the  incorporation  of  alien  races,  it  would  be  impotent 
to  prevent  its  accomplishment,  and  the  express  provi- 
sions conferring  upon  Congress  the  power  to  regulate 
commerce,  the  right  to  raise  revenue — bills  for  which, 
by  the  Constitution,  must  originate  in  the  House  of 
Representatives — and  the  authority  to  prescribe  uniform 
naturalization  laws,  would  be  in  effect  set  at  naught  by 
the  treaty-making  power.  And  the  consequent  result — 
incorporation — would  be  beyond  all  future  control  of  or 
remedy  by  the  American  people,  since,  at  once  and  with- 
out hope  of    redress    or  power  of  change,    incorporation 


300  NATURALIZATION 

by  the  treaty  would  have  been  brought  about.  The  in- 
consistency of  the  position  is  at  once  manifest.  The 
basis  of  the  argument  is  that  the  treaty  must  be  con- 
sidered to  have  been  incorporated,  because  acquisition 
presupposes  the  exercise  of  judgment  as  to  fitness  for 
immediate  incorporation.  But  the  deduction  drawn  is, 
although  the  judgment  exercised  is  against  immediate 
incorporation  and  this  result  is  plainly  expressed,  the 
conditions  are  void  because  no  judgment  against  in- 
corporation can  be  called  into  play. 

"All  the  confusion  and  dangers  above  indicated,  how- 
ever, it  is  argued,  are  more  imaginary  than  real,  since, 
although  it  be  conceded  that  the  treaty-making  power 
has  the  right  by  cession  to  incorporate  without  the  con- 
sent of  Congress,  that  body  may  correct  the  evil  by 
availing  itself  of  the  provision  of  the  Constitution  giving 
to  Congress  the  right  to  dispose  of  the  territory  and 
other  property  of  the  United  States.  This  assumes  that 
there  has  been  absolute  incorporation  by  the  treaty- 
making  power  on  the  one  hand,  and  yet  asserts  that 
Congress  may  deal  with  the  territory  as  if  it  had  not 
been  incorporated  into  the  United  States.  In  other 
words,  the  argument  adopts  conflicting  theories  of  the 
Constitution,  and  applies  them  both  at  the  same  time. 
I  am  not  unmindful  that  there  has  been  some  contrariety 
of  decision  on  the  subject  of  the  meaning  of  the  clause 
empowering  Congress  to  dispose  of  the  territories  and 
other  property  of  the  United  States,  some  adjudged 
cases  treating  that  article  as  referring  to  property  as  such, 
and  others  deriving  from  it  the  general  grant  of  power 
to  govern  territories.  In  view,  however,  of  the  relations 
of  the  territories  to  the  government  of  the  United  States 
at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  the 
solemn  pledge  then  existing  that  they  should  forever 
'remain  a  part  of  the  Confederacy  of  the  United  States 
of  America,'  I  can  not   resist  the  belief  that    the   theory 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  301 

that  the  disposing  clause  relates  as  well  to  a  relin- 
quishment or  cession  of  sovereignty  as  to  a  mere  transfer 
of  rights  of  property  is  altogether  erroneous. 

"Observe,  again,  the  inconsistency  of  this  argument. 
It  considers,  on  the  one  hand,  that  so  vital  is  theq,ues- 
tion  of  incorporation  that  no  alien  territory  may  be  ac- 
quired by  a  cession  without  absolutely  endowing  the 
territory  with  incorporation  and  the  inhabitants  with 
resulting  citizenship,  because,  under  our  system  of  gov- 
ernment, the  assumption  that  a  territory  and  its  inhabi- 
tants may  be  held  by  any  other  title  than  one  incor- 
porating is  impossible  to  be  thought  of.  And  yet,  to 
avoid  the  evil  consequences  which  must  follow  from 
accepting  this  proposition,  the  argument  is  that  all  citi- 
zenship of  the  United  States  is  precarious  and  fleeting, 
subject  to  be  sold  at  any  moment  like  any  other  prop- 
erty. That  is  to  say,  to  protect  a  newly  acquired  people 
in  their  presumed  rights,  it  is  essential  to  degrade  the 
whole  body  of  American  citizenship. 

"The  reasoning  which  has  sometimes  been  indulged 
in  by  those  who  asserted  that  the  Constitution  was  not 
at  all  operative  in  the  territories,  is  that,  as  they  were 
acquired  by  purchase,  the  right  to  buy  included  the  right 
to  sell.  This  has  been  met  by  the  proposition  that  if  the 
country  purchased  and  its  inhabitants  become  incorpo- 
rated into  the  United  States,  it  came  under  the  shelter 
of  the  Constitution,  and  no  power  existed  to  sell  Ameri- 
can citizens.  In  conformity  to  the  principles  which  I 
have  admitted,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  say  at  one  and 
the  same  time  that  territory  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
United  States,  protected  by  the  Constitution,  and  yet 
the  safeguards,  privileges,  rights,  and  immunities  which 
arise  from  this  situation  are  so  ephemeral  in  their 
character  that  by  a  mere  act  of  sale  they  may  be  de- 
stroyed.    And  applying  this  reasoning  to  the  provisions 


302  NATURALIZATION 

of  the  treaty  under  consideration,  to  me  it  seems  indu- 
bitable that  if  the  treaty  with  Spain  incorporated  all 
the  territory  ceded  into  the  United  States,  it  resulted 
that  the  millions  of  people  to  whom  that  treaty  related 
were,  without  the  consent  of  the  American  people  as  ex- 
pressed by  Congress,  and  without  any  hope  of  relief, 
indissolubly  made  a  part  of  our  common  country. 

"Undoubtedly,  the  thought  that  under  the  Constitu- 
tion power  existed  to  dispose  of  people  and  territory, 
and  thus  to  annihilate  the  rights  of  American  citizens, 
was  contrary  to  the  conceptions  of  the  Constitution 
entertained  by  Washington  and  Jefferson. 

"True,  from  the  exigency  of  a  calamitous  war  or  the 
necessity  of  a  settlement  of  boundaries,  it  may  be  that 
citizens  of  the  United  States  may  be  expatriated  by  the 
action  of  the  treaty-making  power,  impliedly  or  expressly 
ratified  by  Congress. 

"But  the  arising  of  these  particular  conditions  can  not 
justify  the  general  proposition  that  territory  which  is  an 
integral  part  of  the  United  States  may,  as  a  mere  act  of 
sale,  be  disposed  of.  If,  however,  the  right  to  dispose 
of  an  incorporated  American  territory  and  citizens  by 
the  mere  exertion  of  the  power  to  sell  be  conceded, 
arguendo,  it  would  not  relieve  the  dilemma.  It  is  ever 
true  that,  where  a  malign  principle  is  adopted,  as  long 
as  the  error  is  adhered  to  it  must  continue  to  produce 
its  baleful  results.  Certainly,  if  there  be  no  power  to 
acquire  subject  to  a  condition,  it  must  follow  that  there 
is  no  authority  to  dispose  of  subject  to  conditions,  since 
it  can  not  be  that  the  mere  change  of  form  of  the  trans- 
action could  bestow  a  power  which  the  Constitution  has 
not  conferred.  It  would  follow,  then,  that  any  condi- 
tions annexed  to  a  disposition  which  looked  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  or  to  enable 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  303 

them  to  safeguard  the  disposal  of  territory,  would  be 
void;  and  thus  it  would  be  that  either  the  United  States 
must  hold  on  absolutely,  or  must  dispose  of  uncondi- 
tionally. 

"A  practical  illustration  will  at  once  make  the  con- 
sequences clear.  Suppose  Congress  should  determine 
that  the  millions  of  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands 
should  not  continue  appurtenant  to  the  United  States, 
but  that  they  should  be  allowed  to  establish  an  autono- 
mous government,  outside  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  coupled,  however,  with  such  conditions 
providing  for  control  as  far  only  as  essential  to  the 
guaranty  of  life  and  property  and  to  protect  against 
foreign  encroachment.  If  the  proposition  of  incorpora- 
tion be  well  founded,  at  once  the  question  would  arise 
whether  the  ability  to  impose  these  conditions  existed, 
since  no  power  was  conferred  by  the  Constitution  to 
annex  conditions  which  would  limit  the  disposition.  And 
if  it  be  that  the  question  of  whether  territory  is  immedi- 
ately fit  for  incorporation  when  it  is  acquired  is  a  judi- 
cial and  not  a  legislative  one,  it  would  follow  that  the 
validity  of  the  conditions  would  also  come  within  the 
scope  of  judicial  authority,  and  thus  the  entire  political 
policy  of  the  government  be  alone  controlled  by  the 
judiciary. 

"The  theory  as  to  the  treaty-making  power  upon  which 
the  argument  which  has  just  been  commented  upon  rests, 
it  is  now  proposed  to  be  shown,  is  refuted  by  the  history 
of  the  government  from  the  beginning.  There  has  not 
been  a  single  cession  made  from  the  time  of  the  Confed- 
eration up  to  the  present  day,  excluding  the  recent 
treaty  with  Spain,  which  has  not  contained  stipulations 
to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  through  Congress 
would  either  not  disincorporate  or  would  incorporate  the 
ceded  territory  into  the  United  States.    ...    To  adopt 


304  NATURALIZATION 

the  limitations  on  the  treaty-making  power  now  insisted 
upon  would  presuppose  that  every  one  of  these  condi- 
tions thus  sedulously  provided  for  was  superfluous, 
since  the  guaranties  which  they  afforded  would  have  ob- 
tained, although  they  were  not  expressly  provided   for. 

"When  the  various  treaties  by  which  foreign  territory 
has  been  acquired  are  considered  in  the  light  of  the  cir- 
cumstances which  surrounded  them,  it  becomes  to  my 
mind  clearly  established  that  the  treaty-making  power 
was  always  deemed  to  be  devoid  of  authority  to  incor- 
porate territory  into  the  United  States  without  the 
assent,  express  or  implied,  of  Congress,  and  that  no  ques- 
tion to  the  contrary  has  ever  been  even  mooted." 

The  opinion  reviews  the  history  of  the  various  acqui- 
sitions of  territory  by  the  United  States,  quotes  from  the 
decisions  of  the  court,  and  concludes: 

"  It  is,  then,  as  I  think,  indubitably  settled  by  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  law  of  nations,  by  the  nature  of  the  govern- 
ment created  under  the  Constitution,  by  the  express  and 
implied  powers  conferred  upon  that  government  by  the 
Constitution,  by  the  mode  in  which  those  powers  have 
been  executed,  from  the  beginning,  and  by  an  unbroken 
line  of  decisions  of  this  court,  first  announced  by  Mar- 
shall and  followed  and  lucidly  expounded  by  Taney,  that 
the  treaty-making  power  can  not  incorporate  territory 
into  the  United  States  without  the  express  or  implied 
assent  of  Congress,  that  it  may  insert  in  a  treaty  condi- 
tions against  immediate  incorporation,  and  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  when  it  has  expressed  in  the  treaty  the  con- 
ditions favorable  to  incorporation,  they  will,  if  the  treaty 
be  not  repudiated  by  Congress,  have  the  force  of  the  law 
of  the  land,  and  therefore  by  the  fulfilment  of  such  con- 
ditions cause  incorporation  to  result.  It  must  follow, 
therefore,  that  where  a  treaty  contains  no  conditions  for 
incorporation,  and,  above  all,  where    it  not  only  has  no 


COLLECTIVE  NATURALIZATION.  305 

such  conditions,  but  expressly  provides  to  the  contrary, 
incorporation  does  not  arise  until,  in  the  wisdom  of  Con- 
gress, it  is  deemed  that  the  acquired  territory  has  reached 
that  state  where  it  is  proper  that  it  should  enter  into 
and  form  a  part  of  the  American  family. 

"  Does,  then,  the  treaty  in  question  contain  a  provision 
for  incorporation,  or  does  it,  on  the  contrary,  stipulate 
that  incorporation  shall  not  take  place  from  the  mere 
effect  of  the  treaty  and  until  Congress  has  so  deter- 
mined ? — is  then  the  only  question  remaining  for  consid- 
eration. 

"The  provisions  of  the  treaty  with  respect  to  the 
status  of  Porto  Rico  and  its  inhabitants  are  as  follows: 

"  'Article  II.  Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the 
island  of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Span- 
ish sovereignty  in  the  West  Indies,  and  the  island  of 
Guam,  in  the  Marianas  or  Ladrones.'  [30  Stat,  at  L. 
1755.] 

"  'Article  IX.  Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Penin- 
sula, residing  in  the  territory  over  which  Spain  by  the 
present  treaty  relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty,  may 
remain  in  such  territory  or  may  remove  therefrom,  re- 
taining in  either  event  all  their  rights  of  property,  in- 
cluding the  right  to  sell  or  dispose  of  such  property  or 
of  its  proceeds;  and  they  shall  also  have  the  right  to 
carry  on  their  industry,  commerce,  and  professions,  be- 
ing subject  in  respect  thereof  to  such  laws  as  are  appli- 
cable to  other  foreigners.  In  case  they  remain  in  the 
territory  they  may  preserve  their  allegiance  to  the  Crown 
of  Spain  by  making,  before  a  court  of  record,  within 
a  year  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
of  this  treaty,  a  declaration  of  their  decision  to  pre- 
serve such  allegiance;  in  default  of  which  declaration 
they  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  it  and  to  have 
adopted  the  nationality  of  the  territory  in  which  they 
may  reside. 

5233-20 


306  NATURALIZATION 

'"The  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the  native 
inhabitants  of  the  territories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United 
States  shall  be  determined  by  the  Congress.'  [30  Stat,  at 
L.   1759.] 

"'Article  X.  The  inhabitants  of  the  territories  over 
which  Spain  relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty  shall 
be  secured  in  the  free  exercise  of  their  religion.'  [30  Stat, 
at  L.  1759,  1760.] 

"It  is  to  me  obvious  that  the  above-quoted  provisions 
of  the  treaty  do  not  stipulate  for  incorporation,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  expressly  provide  that  the  'civil  rights  and 
political  status  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  the  terri- 
tories hereby  ceded  '  shall  be  determined  by  Congress. 
When  the  rights  to  which  this  careful  provision  refers 
are  put  in  juxtaposition  with  those  which  have  been 
deemed  essential  from  the  foundation  of  the  government 
to  bring  about  incorporation,  all  of  which  have  been  pre- 
viously referred  to,  I  can  not  doubt  that  the  express 
purpose  of  the  treaty  was,  not  only  to  leave  the  status 
of  the  territory  to  be  determined  by  Congress,  but  to 
prevent  the  treaty  from  operating  to  the  contrary.  Of 
course,  it  is  evident  that  the  express  or  implied  acqui- 
escence by  Congress  in  a  treaty  so  framed  can  not  import 
that  a  result  was  brought  about  which  the  treaty  itself — 
giving  effect  to  its  provisions — could  not  produce.  And, 
in  addition,  the  provisions  of  the  Act  by  which  the  duty 
here  in  question  was  imposed,  taken  as  a  whole,  seem  to 
me  plainly  to  manifest  the  intention  of  Congress  that, 
for  the  present,  at  least,  Porto  Rico  is  not  to  be  incor- 
porated into  the  United  States. 

"The  fact  that  the  Act  directs  the  officers  to  swear  to 
support  the  Constitution  does  not  militate  against  this 
view,  for,  as  I  have  conceded,  whether  the  island  be  in- 
corporated or  not,  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  Con- 
stitution are  there  in  force.  A  further  analysis  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  seems  to  me  not  to  be  required  in 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  307 

view  of  the  fact  that,  as  the  Act  was  reported  from  the 
committee,  it  contained  a  provision  conferring  citizen- 
ship upon  the  inhabitants  of  Porto  Rico,  and  this  was 
stricken  out  in  the  Senate.  The  argument,  therefore,  can 
only  be  that  rights  were  conferred,  which,  after  con- 
sideration, it  was  determined  should  not  be  granted. 
Moreover  I  fail  to  see  how  it  is  possible,  on  the  one  hand, 
to  declare  that  Congress  in  passing  the  Act  had  exceeded 
its  powers  by  treating  Porto  Rico  as  not  incorporated 
into  the  United  States,  and,  at  the  same  time,  it  be  said 
that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  itself  amount  to  an  incor- 
poration of  Porto  Rico  into  the  United  States,  although 
the  treaty  had  not  previously  done  so.  It  in  reason  can 
not  be  that  the  Act  is  void  because  it  seeks  to  keep  the 
island  disincorporated,  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  ma- 
terial provisions  are  not  to  be  enforced  because  the  Act 
does  incorporate.  Two  irreconcilable  views  of  that  Act  can 
not  be  taken  at  the  same  time,  the  consequence  being  to 
cause  it  to  be  unconstitutional. 

"In  what  has  preceded  I  have  in  effect  considered 
every  substantial  proposition,  and  have  either  conceded 
or  reviewed  every  authority  referred  to  as  establishing 
that  immediate  incorporation  resulted  from  the  treaty 
of  cession  which  is  under  consideration.  Indeed,  the 
whole  argument  in  favor  of  the  view  that  immediate  in- 
corporation followed  upon  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
in  its  last  analysis  necessarily  comes  to  this:  Since  it  has 
been  decided  that  incorporation  flows  from  a  treaty  which 
provides  for  that  result,  when  its  provisions  have  been 
expressly  or  impliedly  approved  by  Congress,  it  must 
follow  that  the  same  effect  flows  from  a  treaty  which  ex- 
pressly stipulates  to  the  contrary,  even  although  the 
condition  to  that  end  has  been  approved  by  Congress. 
That  is  to  say,  the  argument  is  this:  Because  a  provi- 
sion for  incorporation  when  ratified  incorporates,  there- 
fore a  provision  against  incorporation  must  also  produce 


308  NATURALIZATION 

the  very  consequence  which itexpressly  provides  against. 

"The  result  of  what  has  been  said  is  that  whilst,  in  an 
international  sense,  Porto  Rico  was  not  a  foreign  country, 
since  it  was  subject  to  the  sovereignty  of  and  was  owned 
by  the  United  States,  it  was  foreign  to  the  United  States 
in  a  domestic  sense,  because  the  island  had  not  been  in- 
corporated into  the  United  States,  but  was  merely 
appurtenant  thereto  as  a  possession.  As  a  necessary 
consequence,  the  impost  in  question  assessed  on  mer- 
chandise coming  from  Porto  Rico  into  the  United  States 
after  the  cession  was  within  the  power  of  Congress,  and 
that  body  was  not,  morever,  as  to  such  imposts,  con- 
trolled by  the  clause  requiring  that  imposts  should  be 
uniform  throughout  the  United  States;  in  other  words, 
the  provision  of  the  Constitution  just  referred  to  was 
not  applicable  to  Congress   in  legislating  for  Porto  Rico. 

"Incidentally  I  have  heretofore  pointed  out  that  the 
arguments  of  expediency  pressed  with  so  much  earnest- 
ness and  ability  concern  the  legislative,  and  not  the  judi- 
cial, department  of  the  government.  But  it  may  be 
observed  that,  even  if  the  disastrous  consequences  which 
are  foreshadowed  as  arising  from  conceding  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  may  hold  property  with- 
out incorporation  were  to  tempt  me  to  depart  from  what 
seems  to  me  to  be  the  plain  line  of  judicial  duty,  reason 
admonishes  me  that  so  doing  would  not  serve  to  pre- 
vent the  grave  evils  which  it  is  insisted  must  come,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  would  only  render  them  more  danger- 
ous. This  must  be  the  result,  since,  as  already  said,  it 
seems  to  me  it  is  not  open  to  serious  dispute  that  the 
military  arm  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  may 
hold  and  occupy  conquered  territory  without  incorpora- 
tion for  such  length  of  time  as  may  seem  appropriate  to 
Congress  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion.  The  denial  of 
the  right  of  the  civil  power  to  do  so  would  not,  there- 
fore,  prevent    the  holding   of   territory   by  the   United 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  309 

States  if  it  was  deemed  best  by  the  political  department 
of  the  government,  but  would  simply  necessitate  that  it 
should  be  exercised  by  the  military  instead  of  by  the 
civil  power." 

2.  Status  of  Porto  Ricans  and  Filipinos. 

In  conformity  with  the  provision  of  the  treaty  which 
declares  that  the  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the 
native  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territories  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  the  Congress,  Congress,  by  the  Act  of  April  12, 
1900  (31  Stat,  at  L.  77,  Ch.  191),  establishing  a  civil  gov- 
ernment for  Porto  Rico,  provided  that  "all  inhabitants 
continuing  to  reside  therein  who  were  Spanish  subjects 
on  the  11th  day  of  April,  1899,  and  then  resided  in  Porto 
Rico,  and  their  children  born  subsequent  thereto,  shall 
be  deemed  and  held  to  be  citizens  of  Porto  Rico,  and  as 
such  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  ex- 
cept such  as  shall  have  elected  to  preserve  their  alleg- 
iance to  the  Crown  of  Spain  on  or  before  the  11th  day 
of  April,  1900,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  en- 
tered into  on  the  11th  day  of  April,  1899  (30  Stat,  at  L. 
1754);  and  they,  together  with  such  citizens  of  the 
United  States  as  may  reside  in  Porto  Rico,  shall  consti- 
tute a  body  politic  under  the  name  of  The  People  of 
Porto  Rico,  with  governmental  powers  as  hereinafter 
conferred,  and  with  power  to  sue  and  be  sued  as  such." 
(Sec.  7.) 

And  by  the  Act  of  July  1st,  1902  (32  Stat,  at  L.  691, 
Chap.  1369),  providing  for  the  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  civil  government  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  Con- 
gress declared  that  "all  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine 
Islands  continuing  to  reside  therein,  who  were  Spanish 
subjects  on  the  11th  day  of  April,  1899,  and  then  resided 
in  said  islands,  and  their  children  born  subsequent 
thereto,  shall  be  deem9d   and   held  to  be  citizens  of   the 


310  NATURALIZATION 

Philippine  Islands,  and  as  such  entitled  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States,  except  such  as  shall  have 
elected  to  preserve  their  allegiance  to  the  Crown  of 
Spain  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  of 
peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  signed  at 
Paris  December  10th,  1898"  (Sec.  4).*  [30  Stat,  at  L. 
1754]. 

From  a  despatch  of  the  United  States  consul  at  Amoy 
in  August,  1903,  it  appeared  that  Buenaventura  Chun- 
tianlay,  a  Chinese  merchant,  born  at  Amoy,  emigrated  to 
the  Philippines  thirty  years  ago,  and  had  been  domiciled 
there  since  that  time.  In  1899  he  married  a  native  of  the 
Philippines,  and,  as  the  result  of  the  marriage,  a  son  was 
born  in  the  Philippine  Islands  December  5,  1902.  Chun- 
tianlay,  who  was  then  with  his  family  on  a  temporary 
visit  in  Amoy,  wished  to  be  registered  in  the  consulate, 
or,  failing  that,  desired  to  have  either  his  wife  or  child 
registered.  The  consul  stated  that  Chuntianlay  had  con- 
siderable property  interests  in  Amoy,  and  that  his  object 

*  The  whole  law  relating  to  the  citizenship  of  residents  of  the  Philip- 
pine Islands  is  as  follows  : 

ARTICLE  IX   OF  THE  TREATY   OF   PARIS. 

Spanish  subjects,  natives  of  the  Peninsula,  residing  in  the  territory  over 
which  Spain  by  the  present  treaty  relinquishes  or  cedes  her  sovereignty 
may  remain  in  such  territory  or  may  remove  therefrom,  retaining  in 
either  event  all  their  rights  of  property,  including  the  right  to  sell  or  dis- 
pose of  such  property  or  of  its  proceeds,  and  they  shall  also  have  the 
right  to  carry  on  their  industry,  commerce,  and  professions,  being  sub- 
ject in  respect  thereof  to  such  laws  as  are  applicable  to  other  foreigners. 
In  case  they  remain  in  the  territory  they  may  preserve  their  allegiance  to 
the  Crown  of  Spain  by  making,  before  a  court  of  record,  within  a  year 
(extended  by  the  protocol  of  agreement  proclaimed  on  April  28,  1900,  to 
eighteen  months,  31  Stat,  at  L.,  l88l)  from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of 
ratifications  of  this  treaty  (April  11,  1899),  a  declaration  of  their  decision 
to  preserve  such  allegiance  ;  in  default  of  which  declaration  they  shall 
be  held  to  have  renounced  it  and  to  have  adopted  the  nationality  of  the 
territory  in  which  they  may  reside. 

The  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  the 
territories  hereby  ceded  to  the  United  States  shall  be  determined  by  the 
Congress. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  311 

in  trying  to  register  a  member  of  the  family  in  tiie  con- 
sulate was  to  enable  him  to  transfer  the  property  to  the 
member  so  registered,  thus  putting  it  under  American 
ownership,  to  avoid  the  assessments  of  the  Chinese  offi- 
cials, which  are  said  to  be  quite  heavy  on  property 
owned  by  nonresidents.  The  consul  inquired  whether 
any  one  of  his  family  was  entitled  to  registration,  and,  if 
so,  whether  it  would  be  proper  for  him  to  record  a  trans- 
fer of  property  from  Mr.  Chuntianlay  to  such  member  of 
his  family. 

In  reply,  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State  said:  "Upon 
the  facts  stated,  neither  of  the  Chuntianlays  appears  to 
be  entitled  to  registration  in  the  consulate. 

"Section  4  of  the  Act  of  July  1,  1902  (32  Stat,  at  L. 
692,  Ch.  1369),  provides  that  'all  inhabitants  of  the  Phil- 
ippine Islands  continuing  to  reside  therein,  who  were 
Spanish  subjects  on  the  11th  day  of  April,  1899,  and 
then  resided  in  said  islands,  and  their  children  born  sub- 

SECTION   4   OF   ACT  OF  CONGRESS  OF  JULY   1,    1902. 

That  all  inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  continuing  to  reside 
therein  who  were  Spanish  subjects  on  the  eleventh  day  of  April,  eighteen 
hundred  and  ninety-nine,  and  then  resided  in  said  islands,  and  their 
children  born  subsequent  thereto,  shall  be  deemed  and  held  to  be  citizens 
of  the  Philippine  Islands  and  as  such  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the 
United  States,  except  such  as  shall  have  elected  to  preserve  their  alle- 
giance to  the  Crown  of  Spain  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  signed  at  Paris 
December  tenth,  eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight.  [And  the  protocol 
proclaimed  April  28,  1900.] 

PROVISIONS  OF  THE  SPANISH   CIVIL   CODE. 

Art.  17.  The  following  are  Spaniards:  (1)  Persons  born  in  Spanish 
territory ;  (2)  children  of  a  Spanish  father  or  mother,  even  though  they 
were  born  out  of  Spain;  (3)  foreigners  who  may  have  obtained  naturali- 
zation papers  ;  (4)  those  who,  without  said  papers,  may  have  acquired 
a  residence  in  any  town  in  the  monarchy. 

Art.  18.  Children,  while  they  remain  under  the  parental  authority, 
have  the  nationality  of  their  parents. 

In  order  that  those  born  of  foreign  parents  in  Spanish  territory  may 
enjoy  the  benefits  granted  them  by  No.  1   of  article  17,  it  shall  bean 


312  NATURALIZATION 

sequent  thereto,  shall  be  deemed  and  held  to  be  citizens 
of  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  as  such  entitled  to  the 
protection  of  the  United  States,  except  such  as  shall 
have  elected  to  preserve  their  allegiance  to  the  Crown 
of  Spain  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  treaty 
of  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  signed  at 
Paris  December  10,  1898.'  30  Stat,  at  L.  1754. 

"While  Mr.  Chuntianlay  comes  within  the  language  of 
the  statute,  'inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands,'  he  is 
not  included  within  the  description,  'who  were  Spanish 
subjects  on  the  11th  day  of  April,  1899.'  According  to 
the  statement  in  your  despatch,  he  is  'a  Chinese  merchant 
who  emigrated  to  the  Philippine  Islands  thirty  years  ago 
and  has  been  domiciled  there  since  that  time.'  If  he  had 
acquired  Spanish  citizenship  it  is  inferred  that  that  fact 
would  have  been  stated. 

indispensable  requisite  that  the  parents  declare,  in  the  manner  and  be- 
fore the  officials  specified  in  article  19,  that  they  choose  in  the  name  of 
their  children  the  Spanish  nationality,  renouncing  all  others. 

Art.  19.  The  children  of  a  foreigner  born  in  Spanish  possessions  must 
state,  within  the  year  following  their  majority  of  emancipation,  whether 
they  desire  to  enjoy  the  citizenship  of  Spaniards  granted  them  by 
article  17. 

Those  who  are  in  the  kindom  shall  make  this  declaration  before  the 
official  in  charge  of  the  civil  registry  of  the  town  in  which  they  reside; 
those  who  reside  abroad  before  one  of  the  consular  or  diplomatic  agents 
of  the  Spanish  government,  and  those  who  are  in  a  country  in  which 
the  government  has  no  agent  addressing  the  secretary  of  state  of  Spain. 

The  effect  of  these  provisions,  as  interpreted  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  Philippine  Islands  in  the  Bosque  case  (1  Philippine  Reports,  88) 
is  that: 

1.  Natives  of  Spain  became  citizens  of  the  Philippine  Islands  if  they 
complied  with  two  requirements:  (a)  Residence  in  the  islands  from  11 
April,  1899,  toll  October,  1900,  and  {b)  failure  to  preserve  allegiance 
to  Spain  by  a  legal  declaration  made  within  that  period. 

2.  Inhabitants  of  the  Philippine  Islands  (other  than  those  embraced 
in  the  last  paragraph),  and  their  children  born  after  11  April,  1899,  are 
citizens  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  if  {a)  they  were  Spanish  subjects  on 
that  date,  and  (b)  resided  in  the  Philippine  Islands  on  that  date  and 
continue  to  reside  therein.  Memorandum  regarding  Naturalization  of 
Residents  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  S.  Doc.  336,  59th  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  313 

"Assuming,  then,  that  Mr.  Chuntianlay  is,  as  stated  in 
your  despatch,  a  Chinese  subject  domiciled  in  the  Philip- 
pine Islands,  upon  his  marriage  to  a  native  of  the  Philip- 
pines, under  the  general  rule  that  the  nationality  of  the 
wife  follows  that  of  the  husband,  she  became  a  Chinese 
subject. 

"The  son,  born  in  the  Philippines  December  5,  1902, 
is  not  a  citizen  of  the  Philippine  Islands  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  as  that  only  applies  to  the  chil- 
dren of  inhabitants  of  the  islands  who  were  Spanish 
subjects  on  April  11, 1899."  Asst.  Sec'y  Adee  to  United 
States  Consul  at  Amoy,  September  5,  1903. 

The  treaty  provision  and  the  Act  of  Congress  of  April 
12,  1900,  were  construed  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 
United  States  for  the  southern  district  of  New  York,  in 
October,  1902,  in  the  case  of  Re  Gonzalez,  118  Fed.  941, 
upon  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The  facts 
are  stated  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Lacombe,  Judge: 
"Petitioner,  an  unmarried  woman,  is  a  native  of  Porto 
Rico,  twenty  years  of  age,  who  arrived  here  from  that 
island  on  August  24,  1902.  She  was  detained  at  Ellis 
Island  immigrant  station,  was  duly  examined  by  a  board 
of  special  inquiry,  and  was  excluded  from  admission  into 
the  United  States  upon  the  ground  that  she  was  liable 
to  become  a  public  charge.  The  only  question  open  for 
discussion  on  this  application  is  whether  or  not  peti- 
tioner is  an  alien.  Upon  all  other  questions  the  decision 
of  the  appropriate  immigration  officers,  when  adverse  to 
the  admission  of  the  alien,  is  made  final,  unless  reversed 
on  appeal  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Act  August 
18,  1894  (28  Stat,  at  L.  390,  Chap.  301  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,1303]).  .  .  .  The  14th  Amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution provides  that  all  persons  born  or  naturalized 
in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
thereof,  are  citizens  of  the  United  States.  It  is  not  dis- 
puted that  petitioner  was  by  birth  an  alien.     Unless  in 


314  NATURALIZATION 

some  appropriate  way  she  has  since  been  naturalized, 
she  is  still  an  alien.  There  is  no  suggestion  that 
she  was  ever  naturalized  under  the  general  laws  pre- 
scribed by  Congress  regulating  the  admission  of 
aliens  to  citizenship.  The  treaty  of  Paris,  unlike  earlier 
treaties  which  dealt  with  the  Louisiana  and  Florida 
purchases,  with  California,  and  with  Alaska,  did  not 
undertake  to  make  the  native-born  inhabitants  of  Porto 
Rico  citizens  of  the  United  States.  It  expressly  pro- 
vided that  'the  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the 
native  inhabitants  of  the  territories  hereby  ceded  to  the 
United  States  shall  be  determined  by  the  Congress.'  In 
conformity  with  this  provision  of  the  treaty  it  was  pro- 
vided in  Act  April  12,  1900,  Chap.  191,  Sec.  7  [31  Stat. 
at  L.  77],  'that  all  inhabitants  continuing  to  reside  there- 
in who  were  Spanish  subjects  on  the  11th  day  of  April, 
1899,  and  then  resided  in  Porto  Rico,  and  their  children 
born  subsequent  thereto,  shall  be  deemed  and  held  to  be 
citizens  of  Porto  Rico,  and  as  such  entitled  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States  (excepting  such  as  had  pre- 
served their  allegiance  to  Spain),  and  they,  together  with 
such  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  may  reside  in  Porto 
Rico,  shall  constitute  a  body  politic  under  the  name  of 
"The  People  of  Porto  Rico,"  with  governmental  powers 
as  hereinafter  conferred  and  with  power  to  sue  and  be 
sued  as  such.'  This  legislation  has  certainly  not  operated 
to  effect  a  naturalization  of  the  petitioner  as  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States.  Being  foreign  born  and  not  natural- 
ized, she  remains  an  alien,  and  subject  to  the  provisions 
of  law  regulating  the  admission  of  aliens  who  come  to  the 
United  States." 

Upon  appeal,  however,  the  Supreme  Court  reversed 
this  decision,  and  held  that  a  native  of  Porto  Rico  who 
was  an  inhabitant  of  that  island  at  the  time  it  was  ceded 
to  the  United  States,  is  not  an  alien  immigrant  within 
the  meaning  of  the  immigration  law  of  1891.     The  court 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  315 

said  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  go  into  the  question 
whether  the  cession  accomplished  the  naturalization  of 
the  people  of  Porto  Rico,  or  whether  a  citizen  of  Porto 
Rico,  under  the  law  of  Congress  creating  a  civil  govern- 
ment for  that  country,  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States; 
that  the  question  presented  to  the  court  was  one  of 
alienage  rather  than  one  of  citizenship;  that  it  seemed 
clear  that  the  immigration  act  related  to  persons  owing 
allegiance  to  a  foreign  government  and  citizens  or  sub- 
jects thereof;  and  that  citizens  of  Porto  Rico,  whose 
permanent  allegiance  is  due  to  the  United  States,  living 
within  the  peace  and  domain  of  the  United  States,  the 
organic  law  of  whose  domicil  was  enacted  by  the  United 
States  and  is  enforced  through  officials  sworn  to  support 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  are  not  aliens, 
and  upon  their  arrival  at  our  ports  are  not  alien  immi- 
grants.    Gonzales  v.  Williams,  192  U.  S.  1. 

In  the  case  of  Mercado,  a  native  of  Porto  Rico,  who, 
in  1901,  sought  the  intervention  of  this  government  to 
present  for  him  a  claim  against  the  government  of  Vene- 
zuela, where  he  had  been  residing  for  fourteen  years,  it 
was  held  that  as  he  was  not  an  "  inhabitant "  of  Porto 
Rico  at  the  time  of  its  cession  to  the  United  States,  and 
was  not  a  citizen  of  Porto  Rico  within  the  definition  of 
the  Act  of  Congress  of  April  12,  1900  (31  Stat,  at  L.  77), 
he  was  not  entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  United 
States.  Mr.  Adee  to  Mr.  Loomis,  August  10,  1901,  MSS. 
Inst,  to  Venezuela.  See,  also,  Paradis'  case.  For.  Rel. 
1905,  542  et seq. 

In  the  case  of  Marrero,  a  native  of  Porto  Rico,  who 
had  resided  in  Chile  since  1884,  but  who  proposed,  in 
1901,  to  return  to  Porto  Rico  to  perform  the  duties  of 
citizenship  there,  it  was  held  by  Acting  Secretary  Hill 
that  the  language  of  Sec.  7  of  the  Act  of  April  12,  1900 
(31  Stat,  at  L.  77,  Ch.  191),  was  to  be  construed  in  its 
general  legal  sense,  in  which  continued  personal  presence 


316  NATURALIZATION 

is  not  necessary  to  constitute  continuous  residence;  and 
that  a  native  of  Porto  Rico  who  makes  it  his  permanent 
domicil  does  not,  therefore,  lose  the  benefits  of  this 
law  because  he  was  temporarily  abiding  elsewhere  when 
it  went  into  efl'ect.  Acting  Secretary  Hill  to  Mr.  Lend- 
erink,  April  29,  1901,  For.  Rel.  1901,  32.  And  Attorney- 
General  Knox  (24  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  40)  held  that  a  native 
Porto  Rican  temporarily  living  in  France,  who  was  not 
in  Porto  Rico  on  April  11,  1899,  is,  under  Sec.  7  of  the 
Act  of  April  12,  1900  (31  Stat,  at  L.  79),  a  citizen  of 
Porto  Rico. 

At  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  April  12 
1900,  the  law  of  the  United  States  (Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  4076, 
U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2765)  prohibited  the  granting 
or  verification  of  passports  to  or  for  any  persons  other 
than  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  Act  of  June  14, 
1902  (32  Stat,  at  L.  386,  Ch.  1088),  however,  amended 
this  section  so  as  to  make  it  read:  "No  passport  shall 
be  granted  or  issued  to,  or  verified  for,  any  other  per- 
sons than  those  owing  allegiance,  whether  citizens  or  not, 
to  the  United  States."  Under  this  law  as  amended  pass- 
ports are  now  issued  to  citizens  of  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

i.  Treaties  with  Indians. 

Certain  Indian  tribes,  or  such  members  thereof  as 
chose  to  remain  behind  on  the  removal  of  their  tribes 
westward,  have  been  declared  to  be  citizens,  and  indi- 
viduals of  the  particular  tribes  have  been  authorized  to 
become  citizens  on  application  to  a  court  of  the  United 
States  for  naturalization,  and  satisfactory  proof  of  fitness 
for  civilized  life.  See  treaties  in  1817  and  1835  with  the 
Cherokees  (7  Stat,  at  L.  159,  483) ;  and  in  1820  and  1830, 
with  the  Choctaws  (7  Stat,  at  L.  211,  335);  in  1855  with 
the  Wyandottes  (10  Stat,  at  L.  1159);  in  1861  and  1866 
with  the  Pottawatomies  (12  Stat,  at  L.  1192  and  14  Stat. 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  317 

at  L.  763);  in  1862  with  the  Ottawasl(12  Stat,  at  L. 
1237).  and  the  Kickapoos  (13  Stat,  at  L.  624).  See,  also, 
treaties  with  the  Stockbridge  Indians  in  1848  and  1856 
(9  Stat,  at  L.  955,  and  11  Stat,  at  L.  663). 

The  Act  of  Congress  of  March  3,  1871  (16  Stat,  at  L. 
566,  Chap.  120,  Rev.  Stat.  Sec.  2079),  required  that  the 
Indian  tribes  should  be  dealt  with  for  the  future  through 
the  legislative,  and  not  through  the  treaty-making  power. 
The  provision  is  as  follows:  "Hereafter  no  Indian  nation 
or  tribe  within  the  territory  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  acknowledged  or  recognized  as  an  independent  nation, 
tribe,  or  power  with  whom  the  United  .States  may  con- 
tract by  treaty." 

m.  Naturalization  by  Special  Act  of  Congress. 

A.  In  General. 

There  are  numerous  instances  of  naturalization  by 
special  statute. 

The  Act  of  April  14,  1802  (see  Par.  5,  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec. 
2165,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1330),  provided  for  the 
admission  of  aliens  who  were  residing  in  the  United 
States  before  January  29,  1795,  upon  proof  of  two  years' 
residence  in  this  country. 

The  Act  of  March  22,  1816  (see  Par.  6,  Rev.  Stat.,  Sec. 
2165,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1330),  provided  for  the 
admission,  without  previous  declaration  of  intention,  of 
aliens  who  had  resided  in  the  United  States  between 
June  18,  1798,  and  June  18,  1812. 

B.  On  the  Acquisition  of  the  Territory  of  Oregon. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Territory  of  Oregon  led  to  the 
enactment  of  another  special  law  extending  citizenship 
to  persons  born  therein.  The  Act  of  Congress  of  May 
18,  1872  (Rev.  Stat.,  Sec.  1905,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901, 
1268),  provided  that  "all  persons  born  in  the  district 
of  country  formerly  known  as  the  Territory  of  Oregon, 
and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction   of  the  United  States  on 


318  NATURALIZATION 

the  18th  May,   1872,  are  citizens   in  the  same    manner 
as  if  born  elsewhere  in  the  United  States." 

C.  On  the  Annexation  of  Hawaii. 

The  annexation  of  Hawaii  was  followed  by  the  enact- 
ment of  the  law  of  April  30,  1900  (31  Stat,  at  L.  141, 
Chap.  339),  "providing  a  government  for  the  Territory 
of  Hawaii,"  Section  4  of  which  declares  that  all  persons 
who  were  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii  on  August 
12, 1898,  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  citizens  of 
the  Territory  of  Hawaii. 

Ng  Faun,  a  subject  of  China,  was  admitted  to  citizen- 
ship in  the  Kingdom  of  Hawaii  in  1892  and  was  a  citizen 
of  Hawaii  on  August  12,  1898.  In  1901  he  made  appli- 
cation to  the  Department  of  State  for  a  passport  as  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States.  The  Attorney  General,  to 
whom  the  Secretary  of  State  referred  the  question 
whether  Ng  Faun  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
quoted  the  language  of  Section  4  of  the  Act  of  April  30, 
1900  (31  Stat,  at  L.  141,  Chap.  339),  "that  all  persons 
who  were  citizens  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii  on  August 
12,  1898,  are  hereby  declared  to  be  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  citizens  of  the  Territory  of  Hawaii,"  and  held 
that  this  comprehensive  language  included  Chinese  citi- 
zens of  Hawaii.  A  passport  was  accordingly  issued  to 
Ng  Faun.  23  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  509.  See,  also,  23  Ops.  Atty. 
Gen.  345  and  352,  in  which  it  was  held  that  any  Chinese 
person  who  was  a  citizen  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii  on 
August  12,  1898,  and  who  has  not  since  abandoned,  or 
been  legally  deprived  of,  his  citizenship,  is  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States.  See,  also,  Chung  Dai  Yau's  case.  For. 
Rel.  1905,  735. 

D.  Readmission  of  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris  to  Citizenship. 

And  in  1898,  Congress,  by  joint  resolution,  readmitted 
to  citizenship  Nellie  Grant  Sartoris,  the  daughter  of 
General  U.  S.  Grant,  who  had  married  a  British  subject. 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  319 

and  who,  upon  the  death  of  her  husband,  returned  to  the 
United  States  to  reside.     See  page  258,  supra. 

E.  Naturalization  of  Indians. 

In  the  same  way  many  classes  of  Indians  have  been 
made  citizens  of  the  United  States.  By  the  Act  of  March 
3,  1843,  it  was  provided  that,  on  the  completion  of  certain 
arrangements  for  the  partition  of  the  lands  of  the  tribe 
among  its  members,  the  Stockbridge  tribe  of  Indians,  and 
each  and  every  of  them,  shall  be  deemed  to  be  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  and 
entitled  to  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  of 
such  citizens.     5  Stat,  at  L.  645,  Chap.  101. 

The  Act  of  July  15,  1870,  (16  Stat,  at  L.  361,  Chap.  296), 
provided  that  if  at  any  time  thereafter  any  of  the  Win- 
nebago Indians  in  the  State  of  Minnesota  should  desire 
to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States  they  should 
make  application  to  the  District  Court  of  the  United 
States  for  the  district  of  Minnesota,  and  in  open  court 
make  the  same  proof  and  take  the  same  oath  of  alle- 
giance as  is  provided  by  law  for  the  naturalization  of 
aliens;  and  should  also  make  proof,  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  court,  that  they  were  sufficiently  intelligent  and 
prudent  to  control  their  affairs  and  interests;  that  they 
had  adopted  the  habits  of  civilized  life,  and  had,  for  at 
least  five  years  before,  been  able  to  support  themselves 
and  their  families;  and  thereupon  they  should  be  de- 
clared by  the  court  to  be  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
the  declaration  should  be  entered  of  record,  and  a  cer- 
tificate thereof  given  to  the  applicant. 

By  the  Act  of  March  3,  1873  (17  Stat,  at  L.  632,  Chap. 
332),  a  similar  provision  was  made  for  the  naturalization 
of  any  adult  member  of  the  Miami  tribe  in  Kansas,  and 
of  his  minor  children. 

Some  of  the  Sioux  tribes,  and  the  Brothertown  Indians, 


320  NATURALIZATION 

have  also  been  granted  citizenship  by  special  Acts  of 
Congress. 

The  Act  of  February  8,  1887  (24  Stat,  at  L.  390,  Ch. 
119,  Sec.  6),  providing  for  the  allotment  of  lands  in  sev- 
eralty to  Indians  on  the  various  reservations,  and  ex- 
tending the  protection  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
and  the  territories  over  the  Indians,  etc.,  is  very  sweep- 
ing in  its  terms,  making  every  Indian  situated  as  therein 
referred  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  It  reads  as 
follows:  "Every  Indian  born  within  the  territorial  limits 
of  the  United  States,  to  whom  allotments  shall  have  been 
made  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  or  under  any  law 
or  treaty,  and  every  Indian  born  within  the  territorial 
limits  of  the  United  States  who  has  voluntarily  taken 
up,  within  said  limits,  his  residence  separate  and  apart 
from  any  tribe  of  Indians  therein,  and  has  adopted  the 
habits  of  civilized  life,  is  hereby  declared  to  be  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  is  entitled  to  all  the 
rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  of  such  citizens, 
whether  said  Indian  has  been  or  not,  by  birth  or  other- 
wise, a  member  of  any  tribe  of  Indians  within  the  terri- 
torial limits  of  the  United  States." 

An  Indian  to  whom  land  has  been  allotted  in  sever- 
alty becomes  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  with  all  the 
rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  of  such,  including  the 
right  to  sue  in  the  proper  forum.  Re  Celestine,  114  Fed. 
551;  Bird  v.  Terry,  129  Fed.  472,  592;  Baldwin  v.  Let- 
son,  6  Kans.  App.  11;  Carter  v.  Wann,  6  Ida.  556.  See^ 
also,  6  Ida.  85. 

The  Act  of  May  2,  1890,  provided  that  ''any  member 
of  any  Indian  tribe  or  nation  residing  in  the  Indian  Ter- 
ritory may  apply  to  the  United  States  court  therein  to 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  such  court 
shall  have  jurisdiction  thereof,  and  shall  hear  and  deter- 
mine  such   application,  as    provided    in   the  statutes  of 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  321 

the  United  States."  26  Stat  at  L.  99,  Ch.  182,  Sec.  43. 
And  every  Indian  in  Indian  Territory  was  made  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  by  the  following  innocent  pro- 
vision in  the  Act  of  March  3,  1901,  31  Stat.  1447,  viz: 
"Section  six  of  chapter  one  hundred  and  nineteen  of  the 
United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  numbered  twenty-four, 
page  three  hundred  and  ninety,  is  hereby  amended  as 
follows,  to  wit:  after  the  words  'civilized  life,'  in  line  13, 
said  section  six,  insert  the  words  'and  every  Indian  in 
Indian  Territory.' " 

rV.  Naturalization  by  Admission  of  Territory  to  Statehood. 

A.  In  General. 

Section  3  of  article  4  of  the  Constitution  provides  that 
"new  states  may  be  admitted  by  the  Congress  into  this 
Union;"  and  the  second  paragraph  of  the  same  section 
declares  that  "  the  Congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose 
of,  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting 
the  territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United 
States." 

So  far  as  the  original  states  were  concerned,  all  those 
who  were  citizens  of  such  states  became,  upon  the  forma- 
tion of  the  Union,  citizens  of  the  United  States.  As  re- 
marked by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  Minor  v.  Happer- 
sett,  21  Wall.  162,  167,  22  L.  ed.  627,  628:  "Whoever, 
then,  was  one  of  the  people  of  either  of  these  states 
when  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  was  adopted, 
became  ipso  facto,  a  citizen — a  member  of  the  nation 
created  by  its  adoption.  He  was  one  of  the  persons  as- 
sociating together  to  form  the  nation,  and  was,  conse- 
quently, one  of  its  original  citi/ens.  As  to  this  there 
has  never  been  a  doubt." 

B.  Louisiana. 

By  article  3  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  of  1803  (8  Stat,  at 
L.  202)   it  was  provided  that  "the  inhabitants   of  the 

5233—21 


322  NATURALIZATION 

ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in  the  Union  of  the 
United  States,  and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible,  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages,  and  immunities 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States;  and  in  the  meantime 
they  shall  be  maintained  and  protected  in  the  free  en- 
joyment of  their  liberty,  property,  and  the  religion  which 
they  profess." 

It  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Catron,  in  his  separate  opin- 
ion in  Scott  V.  Sandford,  19  How.  393,  525,  15  L.  ed.  691, 
750:  "The  settled  doctrine  in  the  state  courts  of  Louis- 
iana is,  that  a  French  subject  coming  to  the  Orleans  ter- 
ritory, after  the  treaty  of  1803  was  made,  and  before 
Louisiana  was  admitted  into  the  Union,  and  being  an  in- 
habitant at  the  time  of  the  admisson,  became  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  by  that  Act;  that  he  was  one  of  the 
inhabitants  contemplated  by  the  3d  article  of  the  treaty, 
which  referred  to  all  inhabitants  embraced  within  the 
new  state  on  its  admission.  That  this  is  the  true  con- 
struction I  have  no  doubt." 

In  Desbois's  case,  2  Mart.  (La.)  185  (decided  in  1812), 
one  Desbois,  of  French  birth,  applied  for  a  license  to 
practise  as  a  counsellor  and  attorney  at  law  in  the  super- 
ior courts  of  Louisiana,  and  by  one  of  the  rules  of  the 
court  the  applicant  could  not  be  admitted  unless  he  was 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  Desbois  conceded  that  he 
had  no  claim  to  citizenship  by  birth,  nor  by  naturaliza- 
tion under  the  Acts  of  Congress  to  establish  an  uniform 
rule  on  that  subject,  but  he  contended  that  there  was  a 
third  mode  of  acquiring  citizenship  of  the  United  States, 
namely,  the  admission  into  the  Union  of  a  state  of  which 
he  was  a  citizen.  He  contended  that,  as  he  had,  in  the 
year  1806,  removed  to,  and  settled  with  his  family  in 
the  city  of  New  Orleans  in  the  territory  of  Orleans,  in 
contemplation  of  the  enjoyment  of  the  advantages  which 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  323 

the  laws  of  the  territory  and  of  the  United  States  held 
out  to  foreigners  removing  into  that  territory,  and  had 
ever  since  considered  it  as  his  adopted  country,  he  had 
become  a  citizen  under  the  Act  of  Congress  of  March  2, 
1805  (2  Stat,  at  L.  322,  Ch.  23),  further  providing  for  the 
territorial  government  of  Orleans,  the  enabling  Act  of 
February  20,  1811  (2  Stat,  at  L.  641,  Ch.21),and  that  of 
April  8,  1812  (2  Stat,  at  L.  701,  Ch.  50),  admitting  the 
state. 

Judge  Martin,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
referred,  among  other  things,  to  the  fact  that  the  Act  of 
Congress  authorizing  the  formation  of  the  state  govern- 
ment of  Louisiana  was  almost  literally  copied  from  that 
which  authorized  that  of  Ohio,  and,  pointing  out  that 
by  the  1st  section  of  the  latter  statute  the  inhabitants 
of  the  designated  territory  were  authorized  to  form  for 
themselves  a  state  constitution,  while,  by  the  4th  sec- 
tion the  persons  entitled  to  vote  for  members  of  the 
convention  were  described  as,  first,  all  male  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  and  next,  all  persons  having  in  all 
other  respects  the  legal  qualifications  to  vote  for  mem- 
bers of  the  general  assembly  of  the  territory,  which  were 
a  freehold  of  fifty  acres  of  land  in  the  district,  and  citi- 
zenship of  one  of  the  states,  and  residence  in  the  district, 
or  the  like  freehold  and  two  years'  residence  in  the  dis- 
trict, said:  "The  word  'inhabitants,'  in  the  1st  section 
of  this  Act,  must  be  taken  lato  sensu;  it  can  not  be  re- 
strained so  as  to  include  citizens  of  the  United  States 
only;  for  other  persons  are  afterwards  called  upon  to  vote. 
There  is  not  any  treaty,  or  other  instrument,  which  may 
be  said  to  control  it.  Every  attempt  to  restrict  it  must 
proceed  on  principles  absolutely  arbitrary.  If  the  word 
is  to  be  taken  lato  sensu  in  the  act  passed  in  favor  of 
the  people  of  one  territory,  is  there  any  reason  to  say 
that   we   are   to   restrain  it  in  another  act,  passed    for 


324  NATURALIZATION 

similar  purposes,  in  favor  of  the  people  of  another  terri- 
tory?"    Id.  192,  193. 

His  conclusion  was  that  the  applicant  must  be 
considered  a  citizen  of  the  State  of  Louisiana  and  enti- 
tled to  all  the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States. 

In  1813,  in  United  States  v.  Laverty,  3  Mart.  (La.)  733, 
Judge  Hall  of  the  district  court  of  the  United  States 
hekl  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  of  Orleans  be- 
came citizens  of  Louisiana  and  of  the  U^nited  States  by 
the  admission  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union;  denied  that 
the  only  constitutional  mode  of  becoming  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  is  naturalization  by  compliance  with 
the  uniform  rule  established  by  Congress;  and  fully 
agreed  with  the  decision  in  Desbois's  case,  which  he  cited. 

In  an  Alabama  case,  it  was  held,  however,  that  an  alien 
moving  into  the  territory  of  Louisiana  after  it  was  ceded 
to  the  United  States,  and  residing  there  until  after  its 
admission  into  the  Union,  as  a  state,  does  not  thereby 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  State  v.  Prim- 
rose, 3  Ala.  546. 

C.  States  Carved  Out  of  Northwest  Territory. 
1.  In  General. 

By  the  ordinance  for  the  government  of  the  Northwest 
Territory,  of  July  13,  1787  (1  Stat,  at  L.51,  note),  it  was 
provided  that,  as  soon  as  there  should  be  5,000  free  male 
inhabitants  of  full  age  in  the  district  thereby  constituted, 
they  were  to  receive  authority  to  elect  representatives 
to  a  general  assembly,  and  the  qualifications  of  a  repre- 
sentative in  such  cases  were  previous  citizenship 
of  one  of  the  United  States  for  three  years  and  resi- 
dence in  the  district,  or  a  residence  of  three  years  in 
the  district  and  a  fee  simple  estate  of  200  acres  of  land 
therein.     The  qualifications  of  electors  were  a  freehold 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION  325 

in  50  acres  of  land  in  the  district,  previous  citizenship 
of  one  of  the  United  States,  and  residence,  or  the  like 
freehold,  and  two  years'  residence  in  the  district.  And 
it  was  also  provided  that  there  should  be  formed  in  the 
territory  not  less  than  three,  nor  more  than  five,  states, 
with  certain  boundaries,  and  that,  whenever  any  such 
state  should  contain  60,000  free  inhabitants,  such  state 
should  be  admitted  by  its  delegates  in  Congress  on  an 
equal  footing  with  the  original  states  in  all  respects 
whatever,  and  should  be  at  liberty  to  form  a  permanent 
constitution  and  state  government,  provided  it  should 
be  republican  and  in  conformity  with  the  articles  of  com- 
pact. 1  Stat,  at  L.  51,  note;  Rev.  Stat.  2d  ed.  Organic 
Laws,  13,  14. 

2.  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois. 

Reference  to  the  various  Acts  of  Congress  creating  the 
Indiana  and  Illinois  territories  (2  Stat,  at  L.  58,  Chap.  41; 
2  Stat,  at  L.  514,  Chap.  13);  the  enabling  acts  under  which 
the  state  governments  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  were 
formed  (2  Stat,  at  L.  173,  Chap.  40 ;  3  Stat,  at  L.  289, Chap. 
57;  3  Stat,  at  L.  428,  Chap.  67);  and  the  act  recognizing 
and  resolutions  admitting  those  states  (2  Stat,  at  L.  201, 
Chap.  7;  3  Stat,  at  L.  399;  3  Stat,  at  L.  536);  and  to  their 
original  constitutions,  establishes  that  the  inhabitants 
or  people  who  were  empowered  to  take  part  in  the  crea- 
tion of  these  new  political  organisms  and  who  continued 
to  participate  in  the  discharge  of  political  functions, 
included  others  than  those  who  were  originally  citizens 
of  the  United  States.  And  that  the  action  of  Congress 
was  advisedly  taken  is  put  beyond  doubt  by  the  language 
used  in  the  legislation  in  question. 

3.  Michigan. 

In  case  of  the  admission  of  Michigan  this  was  strik- 
ingly shown.     By  the  Act  of  Congress  of  January  11,1805 


326  NATURALIZATION 

(2  Stat,  at  L.  309,  Chap.  5),  a  part  of  the  Indiana  Territory 
was  constituted  the  Territory  of  Michigan,  and  a  gov- 
ernment in  all  respects  similar  to  that  provided  by  the 
ordinance  of  1787  (1  Stat,  at  L.  51a),  was  established. 
The  Act  of  February  16,  1819  (3  Stat,  at  L.  482,  Chap. 
22),  authorized  that  territory  to  send  a  delegate  to 
Congress,  and  conferred  the  right  of  suffrage  on  the 
free  white  male  citizens  of  the  territory  who  had  resided 
therein  one  year  next  preceding  the  election,  and  had 
paid  county  or  territorial  taxes.  The  Act  of  March  3, 1823 
(3  Stat,  at  L.  769,  Chap.  36),  provided  that  all  citizens  of 
the  United  States  having  the  qualifications  prescribed 
by  the  Act  of  February  16,  1819,  should  be  entitled  to 
vote  and  be  eligible  to  office.  By  an  Act  of  the  territo- 
rial legislature  of  January  26,  1835,  the  free  white  male 
inhabitants  of  the  territory,  of  full  age,  who  had  resided 
therein  three  months  preceding  "the  4th  day  of  April 
next  in  the  year  1835,"  were  authorized  to  choose  dele- 
gates to  form  a  constitution  and  state  government. 
Mich.  Laws,  1835,  72,  75.  Delegates  were  elected  accord- 
ingly, and  a  constitution  completed  January  29,  1835, 
and  ratified  by  a  vote  of  the  people  November  2,  1835, 
which  provided  that  every  white  male  citizen  above  the 
age  of  21  years,  who  had  resided  in  the  state  six  months 
next  preceding  any  election,  should  be  entitled  to  vote 
at  any  election,  ''and  every  white  male  inhabitant  of  the 
age  aforesaid,  who  may  be  a  resident  of  the  state  at  the 
time  of  the  signing  of  this  constitution,  shall  have  the 
right  of  voting  as  aforesaid.''  1  Charters  and  Constitu- 
tions, 983,  984.  This  constitution  was  laid  before  Con- 
gress by  President  Jackson  in  a  special  message  Decem- 
ber 9,  1835,  and  a  bill  was  introduced  for  the  admission 
of  Michigan  into  the  Union.  While  this  was  under  con- 
sideration an  amendment  to  the  provision  that  on  the 
assent  being  given  by  a  convention  of  the  people  of 
Michigan  to   certain  boundaries   defined  in  the   bill,  the 


COLLECTIVE    NATURALIZATION.  327 

state  should  be  admitted,  to  strike  out  the  words, 
"people  of  the  said  state,"  and  insert,  "by  the  free  male 
white  citizens  of  the  United  States  over  the  age  of  21 
years,  residing  within  the  limits  of  the  proposed  state," 
was  voted  down;  as  was  also  another  amendment  pro- 
posing to  insert  after  that  part  of  the  bill  which  declared 
the  constitution  of  the  new  state  ratified  and  confirmed 
by  Congress  the  words,  "except  that  provision  of  said 
Constitution  by  which  aliens  are  permitted  to  enjoy  the 
right  of  suffrage."  The  Act  was  passed  June  15,  1836 
(5  Stat,  at  L.  49,  Chap.  99),  and  the  conditions  imposed 
having  been  first  rejected  and  then  finally  accepted,  the 
state  was  admitted  into  the  Union  by  the  Act  of  January 
26,  1837  (5  Stat,  at  L.  144,  Chap.  6). 

In  all  these  instances  citizenship  of  the  United  States 
in  virtue  of  the  recognition  by  Congress  of  the  qualified 
electors  of  the  state  as  citizens  thereof  was  apparently 
conceded,  and  it  was  the  effect  in  that  regard  that  fur- 
nished a  chief  argument  to  those  who  oppose  the  admis- 
sion of  Michigan.  As  to  that  state,  the  state  Constitution 
of  1850,  as  amended  in  1870,  preserved  the  rights  as  an 
elector  of  "every  male  inhabitant,  residing  in  the  state 
on  the  24th  day  of  June,  1835."  And  in  Atty.  Gen.  ex 
rel.  Conely  v.  Detroit,  78  Mich.  545,  7  L.  R.  A.  99, 
18  Am.  St.  Rep.  458,  44  N.  W.  388,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Michigan  assigned,  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  holding  the 
registry  law  under  consideration  invalid,  that  no  pro- 
vision was  therein  made  for  this  class  of  voters,  nor  for 
the  inhabitants  who  had  resided  in  Michigan  in  1850,  and 
declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  who  had  the  right  to  vote  under  the  Constitution 
of  1850. 

D.  Florida. 

The  6th  article  of  the  treaty  of  1819  with  Spain  (8 
Stat,    at    L.  256)    contained    a    provision   to  the  same 


328  NATURALIZATION 

effect  as  that  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (8  Stat,  at  L.  200), 
and  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall  said  (American  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Canter,  1  Pet.  511,  542,  7  L.  ed.  242,  255):  "This 
treaty  is  the  law  of  the  land,  and  admits  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Florida  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  privileges, 
rights,  and  immunities  of  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  unnecessary  to  inquire  whether  this  is  not 
their  condition,  independent  of  stipulation.  They  do  not, 
however,  participate  in  political  power;  they  do  not 
share  in  the  government,  till  Florida  shall  become  a  state. 
In  the  meantime,  Florida  continues  to  be  a  territory  of 
the  United  States;  governed  by  virtue  of  that  clause  in 
the  Constitution  which  empowers  Congress  'to  make  all 
needful  rules  and  regulations,  respecting  the  territory, 
or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States.'" 

At  the  second  session  of  the  27th  Congress,  in  the  case 
of  David  Levy,  who  had  been  elected  a  delegate  from  the 
Territory  of  Florida,  where  it  was  alleged  that  he  was  not 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  it  was  held  by  the  House 
Committee  of  Elections  that  "it  matters  nothing  whether 
the  naturalization  be  effected  by  Act  of  Congress,  by 
treaty,  or  by  the  admission  of  new  states;  the  provision 
is  alike  applicable." 

The  question  turned  on  whether  Mr.  Levy's  father  was 
an  inhabitant  of  Florida  at  the  time  of  its  transfer  to 
the  United  States,  as  the  son  admitted  that  he  was  not 
a  native-born  citizen  of  the  United  States,  but  claimed 
citizenship  through  that  of  his  father  effected  by  the 
treaty  while  he  was  a  minor.  The  argument  of  the  re- 
port in  support  of  the  position  that  "no  principle  has 
been  more  repeatedly  announced  by  the  judicial  tribunals 
of  the  country,  and  more  constantly  acted  upon,  than 
that  the  leaning,  in  questions  of  citizenship,  should 
always  be  in  favor  of  the  claimant  of  it,"  and  that 
liberality  of  interpretation   should  be  applied  to  such  a 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  329 

treaty,  is  well  worthy  of    perusal.     Contested  elections 
1834,  1835,  2d  Session,  38th  Congress,  41. 

E.  Texas. 

By  the  annexation  of  Texas,  under  a  joint  resolution 
of  Congress  of  March  1,  1845,  and  its  admission  into  the 
Union  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original  states, 
December  29,  1845,  all  the  citizens  of  the  former  re- 
public* became,  without  any  express  declaration,  citi- 
zens af  the  United  States.  5  Stat,  at  L.  798;  9  Stat,  at  L. 
108;  McKinney  v.  Saviego,  18  How.  235, 15  L.  ed.  365,  Cryer 
V.  Andrews,  11  Tex.  170;  Barrett  v.  Kelly,  31  Tex.  476; 
Carter  tJ.  Territory,  1  N.  M.  317;   13  Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  397. 

*"The  citizens  of  Texas  thus  adopted  into  the  citizenship  of  the 
United  States  were  of  three  classes. 

"1.  Persons  who  came  within  the  following  description  in  Section  10 
of  the  general  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Texas 
[viz.y.  'All  persons  (Africans,  the  descendants  of  Africans,  and  Indians 
excepted)  who  were  residing  in  Texas  on  the  day  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  [March  2,  1836]  shall  be  considered  citizens  of  the  Re- 
public, and  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  as  such;'  and  who  did  not  forfeit 
their  citizenship  by  the  acts  defined  in  the  8th  section  of  said  provisions, 
which  is  in  the  words  following:  'All  persons  who  shall  leave  the  country 
for  the  purpose  of  evading  a  participation  in  the  present  struggle  [the 
war  between  Texas  and  Mexico  for  Texas  independence],  or  who  shall 
refuse  to  participate  in  it,  or  shall  give  aid  or  assistance  to  the  present 
enemy,  shall  forfeit  all  rights  of  citizenship  and  such  lands  as  they  may 
hold  in  the  Republic.     .     .     .' 

"  2.  Persons  born  in  that  Republic  during  its  independence, — that  is, 
between  the  dates  of  March  2,  1836,  and  December  29,  1845. 

"3.  Persons  naturalized  in  the  Republic  of  Texas. 

"  The  provision  for  naturalization  in  that  Republic  was  Section  6  of 
the  general  provisions  of  the  Constitution  [of  Texas],  and  in  the  words 
following:  'All  free  white  persons  who  shall  emigrate  to  this  Republic, 
and  who  shall,  after  a  residence  of  six  months,  make  oath  before  some 
competent  authority  that  they  intend  to  reside  permanently  in  the  same, 
and  shall  swear  to  support  this  Constitution,  and  that  they  will  bear  true 
allegiance  to  the  Republic  of  Texas,  shall  be  entitled  to  all  the  privileges 
of  citizenship.'  "     13  Ops.  Atty  Gen.  397. 


330  NATURALIZATION 

F.  Powers  of  Congress  over  Territories. 

Chief  Justice  Fuller,  in  delivering  the  opinion  in  Boyd 
V.  Nebraska,  143  U.  S.,  at  p.  169,  36  L.  ed.  112, 12  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  375,  freely  quoted  above,  said :  "It  is  too  late  at  this 
day  to  question  the  plenary  power  of  Congress  over  the 
territories.  As  observed  by  Mr.  Justice  Matthews,  deliv- 
ering the  opinion  of  the  court  in  Murphy  v.  Ramsey,  114 
U.  S.  15,  44,  29  L.  ed.  47,  57,  5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  747:  '  It 
rests  with  Congress  to  say  whether,  in  a  given  case,  any 
of  the  people,  resident  in  the  territory,  shall  participate 
in  the  election  of  its  officers,  or  the  making  of  its  laws; 
and  it  may,  therefore,  take  from  them  any  right  of 
suffrage  it  may  previously  have  conferred,  or  at  any 
time  modify  or  abridge  it  as  it  may  deem  expe- 
dient. The  right  of  local  self-government,  as  known 
to  our  system  as  a  constitutional  franchise,  be- 
longs, under  the  Constitution,  to  the  states  and  to 
the  people  thereof,  by  whom  that  Constitution  was  or- 
dained, and  to  whom  by  its  terms  all  power  not  con- 
ferred by  it  upon  the  government  of  the  United  States 
was  expressly  reserved.  The  personal  and  civil  rights  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  territories  are  secured  to  them, 
as  to  other  citizens,  by  the  principles  of  constitutional 
liberty  which  restrain  all  the  agencies  of  government, 
state  and  national;  their  political  rights  are  franchises 
which  they  hold  as  privileges  in  the  legislative  discretion 
of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  If  we  concede 
that  this  discretion  in  Congress  is  limited  by  the  obvious 
purposes  for  which  it  was  conferred,  and  that  those  pur- 
poses are  satisfied  by  measures  which  prepare  the  people 
of  the  territories  to  become  states  in  the  Union,  still  the 
conclusion  can  not  be  avoided,  that  the  Act  of  Congress 
here  in  question  is  clearly  within  that  justification.' 

"Congress  having  the  power  to  deal  with  the  people 
of  the    territories    in  view   of  the    future  states    to  be 


COLLECTIVE   NATURALIZATION.  331 

formed  from  them,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that,  in  the 
admission  of  a  state,  a  collective  naturalization  may  be 
effected  in  accordance  with  the  intention  of  Congress 
and  the  people  applying  for  admission. 

"Admission  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original 
states,  in  all  respects  whatever,  involves  equality  of 
constitutional  right  and  power,  which  can  not  thereafter- 
wards  be  controlled;  and  it  also  involves  the  adoption, 
as  citizens  of  the  United  States,  of  those  whom  Congress 
makes  members  of  the  political  community,  and  who 
are  recognized  as  such  in  the  formation  of  the  new  state 
with  the  consent  of  Congress." 

When  a  state  is  admitted  into  the  Union  upon  an 
equal  footing  with  the  original  states,  all  residents 
thereof  who  are  endowed  by  Congress  with  political 
rights  and  privileges,  or  who,  with  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress, are  permitted  to  participate  in  the  formation  of 
the  new  state,  become  citizens  of  the  United  States  by 
adoption,  even  though,  being  foreigners,  they  have  never 
complied  with  the  requirements  of  the  naturalization 
laws.  Boyd  v.  Nebraska,  143  U.  S.  135,  36  L.  ed.  103,  12 
Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  375. 

Nebraska. 

The  Nebraska  enabling  Act  (13  Stat,  at  L.  47,  Chap.  59) 
declared  that  all  persons  qualified  to  vote  for  represen- 
tatives of  the  territorial  legislature  should  be  eligible  to 
election  as  members  of  the  convention,  and  should  be 
entitled  to  vote  upon  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the 
constitution.  By  the  existing  laws  of  the  territory,  for- 
eigners who  had  declared  an  intention  to  become  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  were  entitled  to  vote  at 
elections,  and  this  provision  was  carried  into  the  consti- 
tution of  the  new  state,  as  ratified  by  Congress.  The 
Supreme  Court   of  the   United   States  held  in  Boyd  v. 


332  NATURALIZATION 

Nebraska,  143  U.  S.  135,  36  L.  ed.  103,  12  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
375,  that  upon  the  admission  of  the  state  into  the  Union, 
all  persons  of  this  class  became  citizens  of  the  United 
States. 

A  citizen  of  France,  a  resident  and  inhabitant  of  the 
Territory  of  Nebraska,  who  had  declared  his  intention  to 
become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  became  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  upon  the  admission  of  Nebraska 
into  the  Union  as  a  state.     Bahuaud  v.  Bize,  105  Fed.  485. 


EXPATRIATION.  333 

CHAPTER  V. 

EXPATRIATION. 

A.  Definition. 

B.  Right  of  expatriation. 

C.  How  effected. 

a.  In  general. 

b.  Modes  of  expatriation. 

1.  Act  of  1907. 

(a)  By  naturalization  in  a  foreign  state. 

(b)  By  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  foreign  state. 

(c)  By  residence  in  a  foreign  country. 
Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State. 
Exceptions. 

(A)  When  residence  abroad  is  due  to  ill  health  or  finan- 

cial condition. 

(B)  Agents  of  American  enterprises. 

(C)  Missionaries. 

(d)  By  marriage. 

2.  By  desertion. 

3.  Military  or  Naval  service  in  foreign  country. 

4.  Accepting  public  office  under  foreign  government. 

A.  Definition. 

Expatriation  is  the  voluntary  renunciation  or  abandon- 
ment of  nationality  and  allegiance. 

B.  Right  of  Expatriation. 

While  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United  States  have 
from  the  beginning  been  based  on  the  principle  that  the 
right  to  change  one's  allegiance  is  a  natural  and  inherent 
right,  there  was  considerable  difference  of  opinion  in  this 
country,  prior  to  1868,  on  the  question  whether  the 
English  doctrine  of  perpetual  allegiance  obtained  here. 
The  right  of  a  citizen  to  devest  himself  of  his  allegiance 
to  the  United  States  without  the  consent  of  the  govern- 
ment was  denied  by  able  American  jurists,  but  the  poli- 
tical branch  of  this  government  uniformly  held  that  the 
doctrine  of  indelible  allegiance  was  not  in  force  in  the 
United  States. 

The  question  was  definitely  settled  in  this  country  by 


334  NATURALIZATION 

the  Act  of  Congress  of  July  27, 1868  (15  Stat,  at  L.  223, 
Ch.  249),  which  declares  that  "the  right  of  expatriation 
is  a  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people." 

This  Act,  which  has  been  embodied  in  the  Revised 
Statutes,  reads  as  follows: 

"Sec.  1999  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1269].  Whereas 
the  right  of  expatriation  is  a  natural  and  inherent  right 
of  all  people,  indispensable  to  the  enjoyment  of  the 
rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness;  and 
whereas,  in  the  recognition  of  this  principle,  this  govern- 
ment has  freely  received  emigrants  from  all  nations,  and 
invested  them  with  the  rights  of  citizenship;  and  whereas 
it  is  claimed  that  such  American  citizens,  with  their  de- 
scendants, are  subjects  of  foreign  states,  owing  alleg- 
iance to  the  governments  thereof;  and  whereas  it  is 
necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  public  peace  that  this 
claim  of  foreign  allegiance  should  be  promptly  and  fin- 
ally disavowed:  Therefore,  any  declaration,  instruction, 
opinion,  order,  or  decision  of  any  officer  of  the  United 
States  which  denies,  restricts,  impairs,  or  questions  the 
right  of  expatriation,  is  declared  inconsistent  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  republic. 

"Sec.  2000  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1270].  All  natur- 
alized citizens  of  the  United  States,  while  in  foreign 
countries,  are  entitled  to  and  shall  receive  from  this  gov- 
ernment the  same  protection  of  persons  and  property 
which  is  accorded  to  native-born  citizens. 

"Sec.  2001  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1270].  Whenever 
it  is  made  known  to  the  President  that  any  citizen  of  the 
United  States  has  been  unjustly  deprived  of  his  liberty 
by  or  under  the  authority  of  any  foreign  government,  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  the  President  forthwith  to  demand 
of  that  government  the  reasons  of  such  imprisonment; 
and  if  it  appears  to  be  wrongful  and  in  violation  of  the 
rights  of  American  citizenship,  the  President  shall  forth- 
with demand  the  release  of  such  citizen,  and  if  the  re- 


EXPATRIATION.  335 

lease  so  demanded  is  unreasonably  delayed  or  refused, 
the  President  shall  use  such  means,  not  amounting  to 
acts  of  war,  as  he  may  think  necessary  and  proper  to  ob- 
tain or  effectuate  the  release;  and  all  the  facts  and  pro- 
ceedings relative  thereto  shall  as  soon  as  practicable  be 
communicated  by  the  President  to  Congress." 

But  the  promulgation  of  this  municipal  law  did  not 
operate  to  override  the  laws  or  practice  of  foreign  gov- 
ernments inconsistent  with  it,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
secure  acceptance  of  the  principle  enunciated  thereby, 
by  means  of  treaties. 

Treaties  recognizing  the  right  of  expatriation,  with 
various  modifications  in  detail,  were  concluded  between 
the  United  States  and  the  North  German  Union  (15 
Stat,  at  L.  615),  Bavaria  (15  Stat,  at  L.  661),  Baden  (16 
Stat,  at  L.  731),  Wiirttemberg  (16  Stat,  at  L.  735),  and 
Belgium  (16  Stat,  at  L.  747),  in  1868;  with  Hesse  (16 
Stat,  at  L.  743),  and  Sweden  and  Norway  (17  Stat,  at  L. 
809),  in  1869;  with  Austria  (17  Stat,  at  L.  833),  and 
England  (16  Stat,  at  L.  775),  in  1870;  with  Denmark 
(17  Stat,  at  L.  941),  in  1872,  and  with  Haiti  in  1902. 

One  of  the  chief  causes  of  the  War  of  1812  between 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  was  the  rigor  with 
which  the  latter  government  applied  the  doctrine  of  in- 
alienable allegiance.  British  cruisers  took  from  Ameri- 
can vessels  on  the  high  seas  naturalized  American 
citizens  of  British  origin,  and  impressed  them  for  service 
in  the  royal  navy,  on  the  grounds  that  they  were  British 
subjects  by  birth,  and  that  no  forms  gone  through  in 
America  could  devest  them  of  their  British  nationality. 
This  was  vigorously  resisted  by  the  United  States. 

While  the  war  did  not  settle  this  question,  opinion  in 
England  gradually  changed,  and  by  the  naturalization 
act  of  1870  (33  &  34  Vict.  105,  Chap.  14),  which  shortly 
preceded  the  treaty  with  the  United  States,  the  old 
doctrine  of  the  common  law  was  abandoned,  and  it  was 


336  NATURALIZATION 

declared  that  "any  British  subject  who  has  at  any  time 
before,  or  may  at  any  time  after,  the  passing  of  this  act, 
when  in  any  foreign  state,  and  not  under  any  disability, 
voluntarily  become  naturalized  in  such  state,  shall,  from 
and  after  the  time  of  his  so  having  become  naturalized 
in  such  foreign  state,  be  deemed  to  have  ceased  to  be  a 
British  subject,  and  be  regarded  as  an  alien."  See  Law- 
rence, Principles  of  International  Law,  196,  197. 

C.  How  Effected, 
(a.)  In  GeneraL 
The  Act  of  Congress  of  1868  (15  Stat,  at  L.  223,  Chap. 
249,  U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  1269),  does  not  define  what 
steps  must  be  taken  by  a  citizen  before  it  can  be  held 
that  he  has  become  denationalized.  In  fact,  until  the 
enactment  of  the  law  of  March  2,  1907,  "  in  reference  to 
the  expatriation  of  citizens  and  their  protection  abroad," 
there  was  no  mode  of  renunciation  of  citizenship  pre- 
scribed by  our  laws,  with  the  exception  of  Section  1998, 
of  the  Revised  Statutes,  by  virtue  of  which  desertion  from 
the  Army  or  Navy  works  forfeiture  of  the  rights  of  citi- 
zenship.* Whether  expatriation  had  taken  place  in  any 
case  was  to  be  determined  by  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  the  particular  case.  No  general  rule  that  would  apply 
to  all  cases  could  be  laid  down. 

b.  Modes  of  Expatriation. 

1.  Act  of  1907. 

The  law  of  March  2,  1907,  expressly  prescribes  several 
modes  by  which  citizenship  of  the  United  States  may  be 
renounced. 

The  Act  (Sections  2  and  3)  reads  as  follows: 
"Sec.  2.  That  any  American  citizen  shall  be  deemed  to 
have  expatriated  himself  when  he  has  been  naturalized 
in  any  foreign  state  in  conformity  with  its  laws,  or  when 

*See,  also,  Section  15,  Act  of  June  29,  1906. 


EXPATRIATION.  337 

he  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance   to  any  foreign  state. 

"When  any  naturalized  citizen  shall  have  resided  for 
two  years  in  the  foreign  state  from  which  he  came,  or 
for  five  years  in  any  other  foreign  state,  it  shall  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citizen,  and 
the  place  of  his  general  abode  shall  be  deemed  his  place 
of  residence  during  said  years:  Provided,  however,  That 
such  presumption  may  be  overcome  on  the  presentation 
of  satisfactory  evidence  to  a  diplomatic  or  consular 
officer  of  the  United  States,  under  such  rules  and  regu- 
lations as  the  Department  of  State  may  prescribe:  A^id 
provided,  a^so,  That  no  American  citizen  shall  be  allowed 
to  expatriate  himself  when  this  country  is  at  war. 

"Sec.  3.  That  any  American  woman  who  marries  a  for- 
eigner shall  take  the  nationality  of  her  husband.  At 
the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  she  may  resume 
her  American  citizenship,  if  abroad,  by  registering  as  an 
American  citizen  within  one  year  with  a  consul  of  the 
United  States,  or  by  returning  to  reside  in  the  United 
States,  or,  if  residing  in  the  United  States  at  the  termi- 
nation of  the  marital  relation,  by  continuing  to  reside 
therein." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  Act  declares  that  expatri- 
ation may  be  effected  in  four  different  ways,  viz:  By 
naturalization  in  a  foreign  state,  by  taking  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  a  foreign  state,  by  marriage  of  an  American 
woman  to  a  foreigner,  and  by  residence  of  a  naturalized 
citizen  of  the  United  States  in  a  foreign  country. 

(A.)  By  Naturalization  in  a  Foreign  State. 

This  is  the  most  obvious  form  of  expatriation,  and, 
even  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  declaration  to  that 
effect,  was  always  regarded  as  a  method  of  expatriation. 

While  the  purpose  of  the  Act  of  1868  was,  primarily, 
to  define  the  rights  of  aliens  seeking  to  acquire  citizen- 
ship in  this  country  rather  than  the  rights  of  American 

5233—22 


338  NATURALIZATION 

citizens,  its  declaration  that  the  right  of  expatriation  is 
"a  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people,"  applies  to 
citizens  of  the  United  States  who  seek  to  exercise  it  as 
well  as  to  those  of  other  countries.  14  Ops.  Atty.  Gen. 
295. 

(B.)  By  Taking  the  Oath  of  Allegiance  to  a  Foreign  State. 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  the 
rulings  of  the  Executive  Departments  of  the  government 
show  a  difference  of  opinion  on  the  question  whether  or 
not  expatriation  was  effected  by  the  taking  of  an  oath  of 
allegiance  to  a  foreign  power. 

In  the  case  of  Sidney  Mason,  who,  while  residing  in 
Porto  Rico,  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  King 
of  Spain  and  renounced  his  citizenship  in  the  United 
States  ,  Secretary  Forsyth,  in  1839,  declined  to  sanction 
the  issuance  of  a  passport,  on  the  ground  that  Mason 
had  become  a  Spanish  subject.  3  Moore's  Int.  Law 
Digest,  718. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
in  Blight's  Lessee  v.  Rochester,  7  Wheat.  535,  that  a 
change  of  allegiance  can  not  be  effected  without  an 
actual  change  of  domicil.  Relying  upon  this  decision, 
Mr.  B.  R.  Curtis,  formerly  an  associate  justice  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  rendered  an  opinion 
to  the  effect  that  one  did  not  cease  to  be  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  who,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  protec- 
tion for  his  vessels,  placed  them  under  the  Hamburg 
flag,  and,  in  order  to  do  so,  took  the  citizen's  oath  to  be 
true  and  faithful  to  the  Free  and  Hanseatic  Town  of 
Hamburg.  The  oath  contained  no  renunciation  of  native 
allegiance.  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  721. 

Assistant  Secretary  Porter,  on  August  18, 1887,  held  that 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  take  the  oath  of  fealty 
promulgated  as  a  part  of  the  new  constitution  of  Hawaii, 
remain  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  are  entitled  to 


EXPATRIATION.  339 

be  regarded  and  protected  as  such.   For.  Rel.  1895,  pt 
2,  849. 

The  oath  mentioned  was  "to  support  the  constitution, 
laws,  and  government  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii." 

But  in  the  case  of  J.  F.  Bowler,  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  who,  in  1895,  took  an  oath  to  support  the  con- 
stitution and  laws  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  and  bear  true 
allegiance  to  the  King,  without  expressly  renouncing  or 
reserving  his  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  Secretary 
Gresham  said  that  Bowler  had  "manifested  his  intention 
of  abandoning  his  American  citizenship  by  taking  the 
oath  to  support  the  constitution  and  laws  of  Hawaii,  and 
bear  true  allegiance  to  the  King,  and,  so  far  as  is  known, 
he  manifested  no  contrary  intention  before  his  arrest.  The 
oath  is  inconsistent  with  his  allegiance  to  the  United 
States.  By  taking  it  he  obligated  himself  to  support 
the  government  of  his  adoption,  even  to  the  extent  of 
fighting  its  battles  in  the  event  of  war  between  it  and 
the  country  of  his  origin.  He  could  not  bear  true  allegi- 
ance to  both  governments  at  the  same  time.  The  Presi- 
dent directs  that  you  inform  Mr.  Bowler  he  is  not 
entitled  to  the  protection  of  the  United  States."  For. 
Rel.  1895,  pt.  2,  853. 

And  in  the  case  of  Frank  Godfrey,  an  American  citizen 
who  had  taken  the  oath  of  denization  in  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  Secretary  Olney,  on  November  13,  1895,  said: 
"Under  the  decisions  of  my  predecessor,  his  taking  the 
oath  and  voluntarily  subjecting  himself  to  accounta- 
bility to  the  laws  of  the  Hawaiian  Republic,  and  to  per- 
formance of  all  the  duties  and  obligations  of  a  citizen 
thereof,  constitute  naturalization  for  all  Hawaiian  pur- 
poses, while  within  Hawaiian  jurisdiction,  and  the  phrase 
that '  these  letters  are  without  prejudice  to  his  native  alle- 
giance,'can  have  no  significance,  either  as  to  his  status 
within  Hawaiian  jurisdiction,  or  as  to  his  status  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  should  he   return 


340  NATURALIZATION 

hither,  for,  in  the  latter  case,  it  would  be  determinable 
by  the  laws  of  this  country,  and  not  by  any  administra- 
tive act  of  Hawaii."  Mr.  Olney  to  the  United  States 
Minister  in  Hawaii,  For.  Rel.  1895,  pt.  2,  867. 

And  Secretary  Hay,  in  the  case  of  certain  American 
citizens  (colored),  who  had  gone  to  Liberia,  and  by 
taking  out  an  allotment  of  land,  became  for  all  national 
purposes  Liberian  citizens  (no  oath  of  allegiance  being 
required),  declared  that  the  principle  involved  in  this 
case  was  substantially  the  same  as  in  the  Bowler  and 
Godfrey  cases.  He  said:  "The  Republic  of  Liberia  is  an 
independent  sovereignty,  in  no  wise  bound  to  or  depend- 
ent upon  the  United  States,  and  theoretically  at  least,  it 
is  within  the  range  of  possibilities  that  differences  might 
arise  between  the  two  governments  leading  even  to 
rupture  of  relations.  It  is  inconsistent  for  an  individual 
to  bear  true  allegiance  at  the  same  time  to  two  different 
sovereigns,  and  the  exercise  of  the  rights  of  citizenship 
under  any  alien  sovereignty  must  be  regarded  as  a  vol- 
untary assumption  of  the  obligations  of  allegiance  to 
such  sovereignty."     3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  730. 

C.  By  Residence  in  a  Foreign  Country. 

The  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  provides  that  when  a  natu- 
ralized citizen  of  the  United  States  shall  have  resided 
for  two  years  in  the  foreign  state  from  which  he  came, 
or  five  years  in  any  other  foreign  state,  it  shall  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citizen 
(Sec.  2).  In  consequence  of  this  provision,  the  executive 
order  of  President  Roosevelt  of  April  6,  1907  (printed  in 
full  in  the  Appendix,  post),  directed  certain  changes  to 
be  made  in  the  diplomatic  and  consular  regulations,  in 
order  to  bring  them  into  conformity  with  the  new  law, 
and  the  following  circular  instructions  to  the  United 
States  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  relative  to  expa- 
triation were  thereafter  issued   by  the  Department  of 


EXPATRIATION.  341 

State  under  date  of  April  19,  1907,  bringing  the  provi- 
sions of  the  new  law  to  their  attention  and  mailing  the 
rules  and  regulations  authorized  by  the  second  section 
of  the  second  paragraph  of  the  Act. 

To  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers 

of  the  United  States. 

Gentlemen:  Paragraph  144  of  the  Diplomatic  Instruc- 
tions and  Consular  Regulations,  as  amended  by  Execu- 
tive order  of  April  6,  1907,  reads  as  follows: 

"  144.  Expatriation. — An  American  citizen  shall  be 
deemed  to  have  expatriated  himself  when  he  has  been 
naturalized  in  any  foreign  state  in  conformity  with  its 
laws,  or  when  he  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  any 
foreign  state.  When  any  naturalized  citizen  shall  have 
resided  for  two  years  in  the  foreign  state  from  which  he 
came,  or  for  five  years  in  any  other  foreign  state,  it  shall 
be  presumed  that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citi- 
zen, and  his  place  of  general  abode  shall  be  deemed  his 
place  of  residence  during  the  said  years;  Provided, 
That  such  presumption  may  be  overcome  on  the  pre- 
sentation of  satisfactory  evidence  to  a  diplomatic  or 
consular  officer  of  the  United  States,  under  such  rules 
and  regulations  as  the  Department  of  State  may  prescribe. 

"An  American  citizen  shall  not  be  allowed  to  expa- 
triate himself  when  this  country  is  at  war. — Act  of  March 
2,  1907,  Sec.  2." 

The  text  of  the  law  is  appended  for  your  information.* 

Whenever  it  comes  to  the  knowledge  of  a  diplomatic 
or  consular  officer  that  an  American  citizen  has  secured 
naturalization  in  a  foreign  state  in  conformity  with  its 
laws,  or  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  foreign 
state,  such  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  should  certify 
to  the  facts  under  his  seal  and  should  transmit  the  certi- 
fication to  this  Department.  If  the  citizen  who  has 
thus  acquired  foreign  naturalization  was  a  naturalized 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  the  fact  should  be  stated 
in  the  certification  and  the  certificate  of  American  natu- 
ralization should,  if  possible,  be  taken  up  and  forwarded 

*  For  the  text  of  the  law  see  Appendix,  post. 


342  NATURALIZATION 

to  the  Department  with  the  certification.  The  form  of 
the  certification  shall  be  as  follows: 

I,  A.  B.,  [name  and  rank  of  certifying  officer],  hereby 
certify  that  C.  B.,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  birth 
(or  naturalization),  has  secured  naturalization  as  a  citizen 
of ,  the  proof  of  such  naturalization  being  as  fol- 
lows : 

(If  he  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  by  naturali- 
zation, a  statement  of  the  date  and  place  of  his  natu- 
ralization in  the  United  States  should  follow.) 

In  testimony  whereof  I  have  hereunto  signed  my  name 
and  affixed  my  seal  of  office. 

[L.  s.]  ...  

When  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States  has 
resided  for  two  years  in  the  country  of  his  origin,  or  for 
five  years  in  any  other  country,  this  fact  creates  a  pre- 
sumption that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citizen; 
but  the  presumption  may  be  overcome  by  his  presenting 
to  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  proof  establishing  the 
following  facts  : 

(a.)  That  his  residence  abroad  is  solely  as  a  represen- 
tative of  American  trade  and  commerce,  and  that  he 
intends  eventually  to  return  to  the  United  States  per- 
manently to  reside;  or, 

(b.)  That  his  residence  abroad  is  in  good  faith,  for 
reasons  of  health  or  for  education,  and  that  he  intends 
eventually  to  return  to  the  United  States  to  reside;  or, 

(c.)  That  some  unforeseen  or  controlling  exigency  be- 
yond his  power  to  foresee  has  prevented  his  carrying  out 
a  bona  fide  intention  to  return  to  the  United  States 
within  the  time  limited  by  law,  and  that  it  is  his  inten- 
tion to  return  and  reside  in  the  United  States  immedi- 
ately upon  the  removal  of  the  preventing  cause. 

The  evidence  required  to  overcome  the  presumption 
must  be  of  the  specific  facts  and  circumstances  which 
bring  the  alleged  citizen  under  one  of  the  foregoing 
heads,  and  mere  assertions,  even  under  oath,  that  any  of 
the  enumerated  reasons  exist  will  not  be  accepted  as 
sufficient. 

Whenever  evidence  shall  be  produced  to  overcome  the 
presumption  of  expatriation  from  residence  abroad,  as 
indicated  in  this  instruction,  the  affidavit  or  affidavits 
must  be  made  in  duplicate,  one  copy  thereof  being  sent 


EXPATRIATION.  343 

forthwith  to  this  Department,  and  if  the  affidavits  or 
other  evidence  have  been  presented  to  a  consular  officer 
he  shall  notify  the  embassy  or  legation  in  the  country  in 
which  he  is  resident  of  the  name  of  the  person  and  of 
the  facts  concerning  his  residence  abroad. 

So  much  of  this  instruction  as  relates  to  residence 
abroad  is  not  applicable  to  natural-born  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  Their  status,  so  far  as  their  right  to  the 
protection  of  this  Government  is  concerned,  is  governed 
by  existing  instructions  of  this  Department  and  espec- 
ially by  so  much  of  the  circular  instruction  of  March  27, 
1899,  as  applies  to  them,  which  is  appended  to  this  in- 
struction for  your  information.* 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root. 

*The  circular  of  March  27,  1899,  reads  as  follows: 
Passports  for  Persons  Residing  or  Sojourning  Abroad. 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  March  27^  1899. 
To  the  Diplomatic  and  Constilar  Officers 

of  the  United  States. 
Gentlemen  : 

A  condition  precedent  to  the  granting  of  a  passport  is,  under  the  law 
and  the  rules  prescribed  by  authority  of  the  law,  that  the  citizenship  of 
the  applicant  and  his  domicil  in  the  United  States  and  intention  to  re- 
turn to  it  with  the  purpose  of  residing  and  performing  the  duties  of 
citizenship  shall  be  satisfactorily  established.  One  who  has  expatriated 
himself  can  not,  therefore,  receive  a  passport. 

Expatriation  has  been  defined  by  Mr.  Hamilton  Fish  as  "  the  quit- 
ting of  one's  country,  with  an  abandonment  of  allegiance  and  with  the 
view  of  becoming  permanently  a  resident  and  citizen  of  some  other 
country,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  the  party's  preexisting  character  of 
citizenship,"  Thus,  a  person  "maj' reside  abroad  for  purposes  of  health, 
of  education,  of  amusement,  of  business,  for  an  indefinite  period;  he 
may  acquire  a  commercial  or  civil  domicil  there,  but  if  he  do  so  sin- 
cerely and  bona  fide  ammo  revertendi,  and  do  nothing  inconsistent  with 
his  preexisting  allegiance,  he  will  not  thereby  have  taken  any  step 
towards  self-expatriation.  But  if,  instead  of  this,  he  permanently  with- 
draws himself  and  his  property  and  places  both  where  neither  can  be 
made  to  contribute  to  the  national  necessities,  acquires  a  political  domi- 
cil, and  avows  his  purpose  not  to  return,  he  has  placed  himself  in  the 
position  where  his  country  has  the  right  to  presume  that  he  has  made 
his  election  of  expatriation,"     .     .     , 


344  NATURALIZATION 

Before  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  1907,  some  authori- 
ties held  that  in  order  to  effect  expatriation  there  must 
be  a  change  of  residence.  "No  person  can  make  himself 
subject  to  another  power  while  domiciled  and  resident 
within  a  country  to  which  he  owes  allegiance,"  said  Sec- 
retary Fish  to  the  President,  August  25,  1873.  For  Rel. 
1873,  pt.  2, 1187;  The  Santissima  Trinidad,  7  Wheat.  283. 

In  Comitis  v.  Parkerson,  22  L.  R.  A.  148,  56  Fed.  556, 
where  a  woman,  a  native  of  Louisiana,  married  a  subject 
of  Italy  and  lived  with  her  husband  in  Louisiana  until 

But  even  where  expatriation  may  not  be  established,  a  person  who  is 
permanently  resident  and  domiciled  outside  of  the  United  States  can 
not  receive  a  passport.  "  When  a  person  zvko  has  attained  his  majority 
removes  to  another  country  and  settles  himself  there,  he  is  stamped  with 
the  national  character  of  his  new  domicil;  and  this  is  so,  notwithstand" 
ing  he  may  entertain  a  floating  intention  of  returning  to  his  original 
residence  or  citizenship  at  some  future  period,  and  the  presumption  of 
law  with  respect  to  residence  in  a  foreign  country,  especially  if  it  be 
protracted,  is  that  the  party  is  there  aniino  inanendi,  and  it  lies  upon 
him  to  explain  it."  Mr.  Fish  to  the  President,  For.  Rels.  1873,  1186, 
et  seq.  If,  in  making  application  for  a  passport,  he  swears  that  he  in- 
tends to  return  to  the  United  States  within  a  given  period,  and  after- 
wards, in  applying  for  a  renewal  of  his  passport,  it  appears  that  he  did 
not  fulfil  his  intention,  this  circumstance  awakens  a  doubt  as  to  his  real 
purpose,  which  he  must  dispel.    For.  Rels.  1890,  11. 

The  treatment  of  the  individual  cases  as  they  arise  must  depend 
largely  upon  attendant  circumstances.  When  an  applicant  has  completely 
severed  his  relations  with  the  United  States;  has  neither  kindred  nor 
property  here;  has  married  and  established  a  home  in  a  foreign  land; 
has  engaged  in  business  or  professional  pursuits  wholl5'  in  foreign  coun- 
tries; has  so  shaped  his  plans  as  to  make  it  impossible  or  improbable 
that  they  will  ever  include  a  domicil  in  this  country — these  and  similar 
circumstances  should  exercise  an  adverse  influence  in  determining  the 
question  whether  or  not  a  passport  should  issue.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
favorable  conclusion  may  be  influenced  by  the  fact  that  family  and 
property  connections  with  the  United  States  have  been  kept  up;  that 
reasons  of  health  render  travel  and  return  impossible  or  inexpedient; 
and  that  pecuniary  exigencies  interfere  with  the  desire  to  return.  But 
the  circumstance  which  is  perhaps  the  most  favorable  of  all  is  that  the 
applicant  is  residing  abroad  in  representation  and  extension  of  legiti- 
mate American  enterprises.     .     . 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

John  Hay. 


EXPATRIATION.  345 

his  death,  the  latter  never  becoming  naturalized,  it  was 
held  that  the  widow,  who  continued  to  reside  in  the 
United  States,  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States;  that 
expatriation  must  be  effected  by  removal  from  the 
country;  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  Act  of  Congress 
authorizing  it,  there  can  be  no  implied  renunciation  of 
citizenship  by  an  American  woman  marrying  an  alien. 
For  the  opposite  view,  see  Pequignot  v.  Detroit,  16 
Fed.  211. 

While  residence  of  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United 
States  in  a  foreign  country  is  not  sufficient  evidence  of 
expatriation,  long  continued  residence  abroad  raises  a 
presumption  of  abandonment  of  citizenship. 

The  presumption  of  law,  with  respect  to  residence  in 
a  foreign  country,  especially  if  it  be  protracted,  is  that 
the  party  is  there  "  animo  manendi,"  and  it  lies  upon  him 
to  explain  it. 

A  person  "may  reside  abroad  for  purposes  of  health, 
of  education,  of  amusement,  of  business,  for  an  indefi- 
nite period;  he  may  acquire  a  commercial  or  a  civil 
domicil  there;  but,  if  he  does  so  sincerely  and  bo7ia  fide 
animo  revertendi,  and  do  nothing  inconsistent  with 
his  pre-existing  allegiance,  he  will  not  thereby  have 
taken  any  step  towards  self-expatriation.  But  if,  in- 
stead of  this,  he  permanently  withdraws  himself  and  his 
property,  and  places  both  where  neither  can  be  made  to 
contribute  to  the  national  necessities,  acquires  a  politi- 
cal domicil  in  a  foreign  country,  and  avows  his  purpose 
not  to  return,  he  has  placed  himself  in  the  position 
where  his  country  has  the  right  to  presume  that  he 
has  made  his  election  of  expatriation."  Secretary  Fish 
to  the  President,  For  Rel.  1873,  pt.  2,  1188, 1189. 

"It  not  infrequently  happens  that  naturalization  is 
almost  immediately  followed  by  the  return  of  the  natur- 
alized person  to  his  native  country,  and  his  continued 
residence    there,   without  having    acquired    property  or 


346  NATURALIZATION 

established  any  permanent  relations  of  family  or  of  busi- 
ness in  the  United  States.  Again,  cases  are  of  frequent 
occurrence  of  naturalized  persons  who  have  resided  for 
years  in  the  country  of  nativity,  manifesting  no  purpose 
of  returning  to  the  United  States  and  exhibiting  no  in- 
terest in  the  government,  but  who  assert  American  citi- 
zenship only  when  called  upon  to  discharge  some  duty 
in  the  country  of  their  residence;  thus  making  the  claim 
to  American  citizenship  the  pretext  for  avoiding  duties 
to  one  country,  while  absence  secures  them  from  duties 
to  the  other.  These  are  among  the  class  of  cases  where 
the  continued  residence  in  the  country  of  nativity,  and 
the  absence  of  apparent  purpose  of  returning,  may  be 
taken  at  least  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  expatriation." 
Id.  For.  Rel.  1873,  pt.  2,  1191.* 

Voluntary  expatriation  by  a  naturalized  citizen,  which 
forfeits  a  right  to  diplomatic  intervention,  may  be  in- 
ferred from  a  long  residence  abroad  in  the  place  of  his 
birth,  by  nonpayment  of  taxes  and  nonpossession  of 
property  in  this  country,  and  by  failure  to  express  an  in- 
tention to  return.     2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  368. 

Persons  voluntarily  emigrating  from  the  United  States 
to  take  up  a  permanent  abode  in  a  foreign  land  "cease 
to  be  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  can  have,  after 
such  a  change  of  allegiance,  no  claims  to  protection  as 
such  citizens  from  our  government."  2  Wharton's  Int. 
Law  Digest,  447. 

The  theory  and  practice  of  this  government  proceed 
upon  the  principle  that  citizenship  involves  duties  and 
obligations  as  well  as  rights,  and  an  evasion  of  the  duties 
and  obligations  by  continued  residence  abroad  works  a 
forfeiture  of  the  right  to  protection  from  the  authorities 

*The  views  of  Mr.  Fish  upon  the  subject  of  expatriation  were  em- 
bodied by  Secretary  Hay  in  a  circular  dated  March  27,  1899,  entitled: 
"Passports  for  Persons  Residing  or  Sojourning  Abroad,"  printed  in  the 
note  on  pages  343-4,  supra. 


EXPATRIATION.  347 

of  the  United  States.  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr.  Niles,  MSS.  Dom. 
Let.,  October  30,  1871;  Mr.  Evarts  to  Mr.  Logan,  March 
9,  1881,  MSS.  Inst,  to  Cent.  America. 

In  determining  whether  expatriation  has  taken  place 
in  any  given  case,  the  intent  of  the  party  or  absence  of 
intent  to  return  to  the  United  States  is  a  very  material 
element. 

The  provision  of  the  law  of  1907  that  a  residence  of 
two  years  in  the  country  from  which  a  naturalized  citizen 
came  shall  create  a  presumption  that  he  has  ceased  to  be 
an  American  citizen,  is  analogous  to  the  provision  in 
several  of  the  naturalization  treaties  of  the  United  States 
with  other  countries  whereby  the  residence  of  a  natural- 
ized citizen  in  the  land  of  his  nativity,  without  intent  to 
return  to  the  United  States,  is  declared  to  work  of  itself 
a  renunciation  of  the  citizenship  acquired  by  such  natu- 
ralization, and  that  such  intent  may  be  held  to  exist 
when  the  residence  continues  for  more  than  two  years. 

The  adoption  of  this  period  of  two  years  as  that  when 
the  intent  not  to  return  to  the  United  States  may  be 
held  to  exist  on  the  part  of  the  naturalized  citizen  who 
has  returned  to  his  native  country  indicates  that,  while 
the  principle  on  which  rests  the  right  of  protection  while 
in  foreign  countries  of  the  naturalized  citizen  is  the  same 
with  that  of  the  native-born  citizen,  there  is  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  strong  proclivity  to  resume  his  original  citi- 
zenship, on  the  part  of  him  who,  having  wandered  from 
home,  returns  to  find  the  attractions  of  early  associations 
and  of  family  ties  enticing  him  at  a  period,  perhaps,  when 
the  restlessness  and  spirit  of  adventure  of  the  fresher 
years  of  life  have  passed,  to  rest  and  to  end  his  days 
amid  the  scenes  of  his  childhood  or  youth,  and  among 
those  who  claim  the  strong  ties  of  common  blood.  Hence, 
the  evidence  would  be  more  readily  obtained  to  deter- 
mine that  a  naturalized  citizen  who  had  returned  to  the 


348  NATURALIZATION 

country  of  his  nativity  should  be  deemed  to  have  ex- 
patriated himself,  or,  perhaps,  it  would  be  more  proper 
to  say,  to  have  rehabilitated  himself  with  his  original 
citizenship,  than  to  show  that  a  native-born  citizen  had 
expatriated  himself  by  the  same  period  of  foreign  resi- 
dence. Secretary  Fish  to  the  President,  August  25, 
1873,  For  Rels.  1873,  pt.  2,  1190,  1191. 

Under  the  provision  in  the  naturalization  treaty  with 
the  North  German  Confederation,  that  the  "intent  not 
to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when  the  person  natural- 
ized in  the  one  country  resides  more  than  two  years  in 
the  other  country,"  it  is  held  that  the  two  years'  resi- 
dence is  merely  prima  facie  evidence  of  abandonment  of 
nationality,  and  may  be  rebutted.  2  Wharton's  Int.  Law 
Digest,  379. 

While  the  intent  to  remain  in  the  country  of  birth  may 
be  held  to  exist  after  two  years'  continuous  residence,  it 
is  in  reality  not  so  held  without  special  circumstances 
showing,  either  an  intent  to  remain  permanently,  or  the 
absence  of  all  intent  to  return  to  the  United  States.  Id. 

By  the  express  terms  of  the  Act  of  1907,  the  presump- 
tion of  expatriation  "  may  be  overcome  on  the  presenta- 
tion of  satisfactory  evidence  to  a  diplomatic  or  consular 
officer  of  the  United  States,  under  such  rules  and  regula- 
tions as  the  Department  of  State  may  prescribe."  Sec.  2.* 

A  naturalized  citizen  may  forfeit  his  citizenship  before 
the  expiration  of  the  period  mentioned. 

When  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  goes  abroad  with- 
out any  intention  to  return,  he  forfeits,  with  the  aban- 
donment of  his  country,  all  right  to  the  protection  of  its 
government.  2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  450. 

A  citizen  of  the  United  States,  who,  being  of  a  lawful 
age,  leaves  the  United  States  and  establishes  himself 
in  a  foreign  country,  without  any  definite  intention  to 

*For  the  rules  and  regulations  adopted  by  the  Department  of  State 
in  pursuance  of  this  authority,  see  pages  341-343,  supra. 


EXPATRIATION.  349 

return  to  the  United  States,  is  to  be  considered  as  having 
expatriated  himself.  Decision  of  Arbitrators  in  American 
and  Spanish  Claims  Commission,  Convention  of  1871  (17 
Stat,  at  L.  839),  3  Moore's  International  Arbitrations, 
2565. 

The  position  of  the  Department  of  State,  where  an 
American  citizen  goes  to  a  foreign  country  and  settles 
there  animo  manendi,  is  that  he  thereby  forfeits  the 
right  to  the  protection  of  this  government,  and  is  to  be 
considered  as  having  expatriated  himself.  Acting  Secre- 
tary Hill  to  Mr.  Pioda,  June  14,  1901,  For.  Rel.  1901,  511. 

Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State  Relative  to  Election 
of  American  Citizenship  by  Minors  Abroad. 

Naturalized  citizens  are  not  the  only  citizens  of  this 
country  who  are  within  the  scope  of  the  Act  of  March  2, 
1907.  Its  prescriptions  affect  a  certain  class  of  natural- 
born  citizens  also. 

Under  Section  6  of  the  Act  of  1907,  it  is  provided  that 
children  born  abroad  to  an  American  father  must  register 
in  an  American  consulate  when  eighteen  years  of  age  and 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  at  twenty-one,  in  order  to 
receive  the  protection  of  the  United  States.  That  pro- 
vision reads  as  follows  : 

"Sec.  6.  That  all  children  born  outside  the  limits  of 
the  United  States  who  are  citizens  thereof  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  section  nineteen  hundred  and 
ninety-three  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States 
and  who  continue  to  reside  outside  the  United  States 
shall,  in  order  to  receive  the  protection  of  this  Govern- 
ment, be  required  upon  reaching  the  age  of  eighteen 
years  to  record  at  an  American  consulate  their  intention 
to  become  residents  and  remain  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  shall  be  further  required  to  take  the  oath  of 


350  NATURALIZATION 

allegiance    to    the  United   States  upon   attaining   their 
majority." 

An  appropriate  change  was  accordingly  made  by  the 
Executive  Order  of  April  6,  1907,*  in  the  diplomatic  and 
consular  regulations,  and  in  furtherance  of  the  new  pro- 
vision of  law  the  following  circular  instruction,  dated 
April  19,  1907,  was  addressed  by  the  Department  of  State 
to  the  American  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  : 

Children  of  Citizens  Born  Abroad. 

Department  of  State, 
Washington,  April  19,  1907. 
To  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers 

of  the  United  States. 

Gentlemen:  Paragraph  138  of  the  Instructions  to  Dip- 
lomatic Officers  and  of  the  Consular  Regulations,  as 
amended  by  the  Executive  order  of  April  6,  1907,  reads 
as  follows: 

"138.  Children  of  Citizens  Born  Abroad. — All  children 
born  out  of  the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  whose  fathers  were  at  the  time  of  their  birth  citi- 
zens thereof  are  citizens  of  the  United  States;  but  the 
rights  of  citizenship  do  not  descend  to  children  whose 
fathers  never  resided  in  the  United  States.  All  children 
who  are,  in  accordance  with  this  paragraph,  born  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  and  who  continue  to  reside  outside 
of  the  United  States,  are  required  in  order  to  receive  the 
protection  of  this  government,  upon  reaching  the  age 
of  eighteen  years  to  record  at  an  American  Consulate 
their  intention  to  become  residents  and  remain  citizens, 
and  upon  reaching  their  majority  are  further  required  to 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States.  R.  S. 
Sec.  1993;  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  Sec.  6." 

Appended  is  the  text  of  Section  1993  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  and  of  Section  6  of  the  Act  of  March  2,  1907. 

You  are  instructed  that  children  born  abroad  whose 
parents  were  American  citizens  at  the  time  of  their  birth 

*Fortlie  text  of  the  order  see  Appendix,  post. 


EXPATRIATION.  351 

should  report  to  a  convenient  American  consul  upon 
reaching  the  age  of  18  years  and  before  they  have  reached 
the  age  of  19  years  and  make  a  solemn  declaration  in 
the  following  form: 

I,  A.  B.,  born  in ,  on ,  of  parents  who  were 

at  the  time  of  my  birth  American  citizens,  do  solemnly 
declare  that  it  is  my  intention  and  desire  to  remain  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  and  to  become  a  resident 
thereof.     My  father  acquired  citizenship  through  birth 

(or  naturalization)  (if  by  birth  state  where 

the  father  was  born;  if  by  naturalization  state  when 
and  where  he  was  naturalized,  as  shown  by  record  evi- 
dence of  such  naturalization.) 

This  statement  should  be  made  in  triplicate,  one  copy 
being  sent  forthwith  to  the  embassy  or  legation  in  the 
country  in  which  the  consulate  is  situated,  one  to  the 
Department,  and  one  to  be  retained  and  filed  in  the  con- 
sulate. 

Upon  reaching  the  age  of  21  years  and  before  they 
have  reached  the  age  of  22  years,  such  children  are  re- 
quired to  take  before  a  convenient  consul  the  following 
oath  (or  affirmation): 

I,  A.  B.,  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm)  that  I  will  sup- 
port and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
against  all  enemies,  foreign  and  domestic;  that  I  will 
bear  true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  same;  and  that  I 
take  this  obligation  freely,  without  any  mental  reserva- 
tion or  purpose  of  evasion.  So  help  me  God. 

This  oath  or  affirmation  should  be  made  in  triplicate, 
one  copy  being  sent  forthwith  to  the  embassy  or  legation 
in  the  country  in  which  the  consulate  is  situated,  one  to 
the  Department,  and  one  to  be  retained  and  filed  in  the 
consulate. 

Diplomatic  and  consular  officers  are  instructed  to 
make  every  effort  necessary  to  bring  the  requirements  of 
the  law  to  which  this  instruction  relates  to  the  attention 
of  those  whom  it  will  affect. 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root. 


352  NATURALIZATION 

Instructions  of  the  Department  of  State  Relative  to  Regis- 
tration of  American  Citizens  Abroad. 

In  order  to  accomplish  more  effectually  the  purposes 
of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  1907,  the  President  on 
April  8, 1907,  by  Executive  order  supplementing  his  order 
of  the  6th  of  the  same  month,  amended  paragraph  172  of 
the  consular  regulations  and  provided  for  the  keeping 
of  a  detailed  registry  of  American  citizens  within  the 
consular  jurisdiction.  This  order  was  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  American  diplomatic  and  consular 
officers  in  a  circular  instruction  of  the  Department  of 
State,  dated  April  19,  1907,  which  reads: 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  April  19, 1907. 

To  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers 

of  the  United  States. 

Gentlemen:  Paragraph  172  of  the  Consular  Regula- 
tions, as  amended  by  the  Executive  order  of  April  8, 
1907,  reads  as  follows: 

"  172.  Registration  of  American  Citizens. — Principal 
consular  officers  should  keep  at  their  offices  a  register  of 
all  American  citizens  residing  in  their  several  districts, 
and  will  therefore  make  it  known  that  such  a  register  is 
kept  and  invite  all  resident  Americans  to  cause  their 
names  to  be  entered  therein.  The  same  general  princi- 
ples govern  applications  for  registry  which  govern  appli- 
cations for  passports.     Paragraph  151. 

"The  register  should  show  the  date  of  registration, 
the  full  name  of  the  person  registered,  the  date  and 
place  of  his  birth,  the  place  of  his  last  domicil  in  the 
United  States,  the  date  of  his  arrival  in  the  foreign 
country  where  he  is  residing  and  his  place  of  residence 
therein,  the  reasons  for  his  foreign  residence,  whether  or 
not  he  is  married,  and  if  married  the  name  of  his  wife, 
her  place  of  birth  and  residence,  and  if  he  has  children 
the  name,  date,  and  place  of  birth  and  residence  of  each. 


EXPATRIATION,  353 

The  nature  of  the  proof  accepted  to  establish  his  citi- 
zenship should  also  appear,  and  his  signature  should  be 
inscribed  in  the  register. 

"Consuls  may  issue  certificates  of  the  registration  pre- 
scribed above  for  use  with  the  authorities  of  the  place 
where  the  person  registered  is  residing.  Each  certificate 
shall  set  forth  the  facts  contained  in  the  register  and 
shall  be  good  for  use  for  one  year  only  and  shall  be 
in   a  form  prescribed   by  the  Secretary   of  State  (Form 

No. ).     When  a  certificate  expires  a  new  one  may  be 

issued,  the  old  one  being  destroyed,  if  it  is  clearly  shown 
that  the  residence  abroad  has  not  assumed  a  permanent 
character.  Persons  who  hold  passports  which  have  not 
expired  shall  not  be  furnished  with  certificates  of  regis- 
tration, and  it  is  strictly  forbidden  to  furnish  them  to 
be  used  for  traveling  in  the  place  of  passports.  Returns 
of  all  registrations  made  and  of  all  certificates  of  regis- 
tration issued  shall  be  made  to  the  embassy  or  legation 
in  the  country  in  which  the  consulate  is  situated  and  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  at  intervals  and  under  regulations 
to  be  prescribed  by  him.  No  fee  will  be  charged  for 
registration  nor  for  any  service  connected  therewith, 
nor  for  certificates  of  registration, 

"This  paragraph  shall  go  into  effect  July  1,  1907." 

Books  for  registration  are  being  prepared  and  will  be 
furnished  to  consuls  as  soon  as  possible.  In  the  mean- 
time, after  July  1,  consuls  will  register  American  citizens, 
following  carefully  the  requirements  of  the  paragraph 
quoted  above,  and  will  carefully  preserve  the  registra- 
tions and  enter  them  in  the  register  of  American  citizens 
as  soon  as  the  books  for  that  purpose  shall  have  been 
received. 

The  certificate  of  registration  shall  be  in  the  following 
form: 

I, [name  of  consul].  Consul  of  the  United  States 

of  America  at [name  of  place],  hereby  certify 

that [name  of  person  registered]  is  registered  as  an 

American  citizen  in  this  consulate.     He  was  born 

[date  of  birth]  at [place  of  birth]  and  is  a  citizen 

of  the  United  States  by  (birth  or  naturalization).  He 
arrived   in [place    of   foreign  residence]  on 

5233—23 


354  NATURALIZATION 

[date],  where  he  is  now  residing  for  the  purpose  of 

[reason  why  residing  in  foreign  place].     He  is  married  to 

[name  of  wife],  who  was  born  in [place   of 

birth  of  wife],  and  resides  at [place  of  wife's  resi- 
dence]. 

He  has  the  following  children: 

[name  of  child]  born  in [place  of  birth] 

on [date  of   birth]  and  residing  at [place  of 

residence];  and  [name   of  child]   born   in    

[place  of  birth]  on [date  of  birth]  and  residing  at 

[place  of  residence];  and  [name   of  child] 

born  in [place  of  birth]  on  [date  of  birth] 

and  residing  at  [place  of  residence];   his  citizen- 
ship of  the  United  States  is  established  by [nature 

of  proof  of  citizenship  produced]. 

This  certificate  is  not  a  passport  and  its  validity  ex- 
pires on [date  of  expiration]. 

The  following  is  the  signature  of  [person  regis- 
tered]. 

In  testimony  whereof  I  have  hereunto  signed  my  name 
and  affixed  the  seal  of  this  consulate. 

[l.  s.]  , 

Atnerican  Consul. 

Immediately  upon  the  registration  of  an  American 
citizen  the  fact  of  such  registration  should  be  certified 
to  the  embassy  or  legation  in  the  country  in  which  the 
consulate  is  situated,  and  a  duplicate  of  the  registration 
should  be  forthwith  sent  to  this  Department,  together 
with  a  statement  whether  a  certificate  of  registration  has 
been  issued. 

When  a  certificate  of  registration  shall  have  expired 
and  a  new  one  has  been  issued,  notice  of  this  fact  should 
be  sent  immediately  to  the  embassy  or  legation  in  the 
country  in  which  the  consulate  is  situated  and  to  this 
Department. 

American  citizens  resident  abroad  are  required  to 
register  each  year,  and  any  additional  facts  concerning 
residence,  marriage,  and  children  should  be  noted  in  the 
register,  but  the  full  registration  having  been  made  once 
need  not  be  repeated  on  each  subsequent  registration. 

The  Department  expects  consuls  to  observe  this  re- 
quirement with  great  care,   and   if   they  are   uncertain 


EXPATRIATION.  355 

concerning  any  of  their  duties  in  relation  thereto  they 
should  ask  for  instructions  from  the  Department. 
I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root. 

Exceptions;  Expatriation  not  Accomplished: 

(A)  When  Residence  Abroad  is  Due  to  111  Health  or  Finan- 

cial Condition. 

In  an  instruction  to  the  diplomatic  and  consular  offi- 
cers of  the  United  States,  March  27,  1899,'^  Secretary 
Hay  stated  that  a  favorable  conclusion  in  determining 
whether  a  passport  shall  be  granted  to  one  residing 
abroad  may  be  influenced  by  the  fact  that  reasons  of 
health  render  travel  and  return  to  the  United  States  im- 
possible or  inexpedient;  and  that  pecuniary  exigencies 
interfere  with  the  desire  to  return. 

In  the  case  of  Strahlheim,  which  arose  in  Switzerland 
in  1902,  where  it  was  shown  that  the  applicant  was  pre- 
vented from  returning  to  the  United  States,  where  he 
was  born,  by  precarious  health  and  impecunious  circum- 
stances, it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  a  passport. 
Mr.  Hay  to  Mr.  Hardy,  May  20,  1902,  For.  Rel.  1902,  975. 

(B)  Agents  of  American  Enterprises. 

An  American,  whether  by  birth  or  by  naturalization, 
residing  abroad,  in  representation  of  an  American  busi- 
ness, and  keeping  up  an  interested  association  with  this 
country,  is  not  deemed  to  have  forfeited  his  nationality 
by  residence  abroad.  See  Hunt's  American  Passport,  206. 

"Were  we  to  hold  that  citizens  of  the  United  States 
can  not,  without  forfeiting  their  nationality,  reside  from 
time  to  time  in  South  American  states  as  agents  of  their 
countrymen,  the  business  of  both  continents  would  re- 
ceive a  heavy  blow.  In  affairs  so  vast,  so  intricate,  and 
so  continuous  as  those  of  Alsop  &  Co.,  for  instance, 
there  can  be   neither  consistency  nor  responsibility  of 

*Printed  in  note  on  pages  343-4,  supra. 


356  NATURALIZATION 

action  except  through  trusted  agents,  who,  while  taking 
up  continuous  abode  in  their  places  of  business  action  in 
South  America,  would  from  early  personal  relations  be  in 
the  confidence  of  their  chiefs,  making  their  central  busi- 
ness in  this  country  the  place  to  which  their  domiciliary 
duties  would  relate,  and  continuing  to  subject  them- 
selves to  the  laws  of  the  country  in  which  the  firm  is 
domiciled.  As  a  matter  of  public  policy,  therefore,  as 
well  as  of  international  law,  lean  not  but  conclude  that 
Mr.  Wheelwright's  domicil  and  nationality  are  in  the 
United  States."  Mr.  Bayard  to  Mr.  Roberts,  March  20, 
1886,  2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  369,  370. 

An  exception  has  been  made  in  the  case  of  agents  of 
American  business  houses  who  are  engaged  in  foreign 
lands  in  promoting  trade  with  the  United  States.  Mr. 
Gresham  to  Mr.  Runyon,  November  1,  1894,  American 
Passport,  209. 

In  enumerating  the  circumstances  which  should  ex- 
ercise an  influence  in  determining  whether  or  not  a  pass- 
port should  issue  to  a  person  residing  abroad,  Secretary 
Hay  states  that  "the  circumstance  which  is,  perhaps,  the 
most  favorable  of  all  is  that  the  applicant  is  residing 
abroad  in  representation  and  extension  of  legitimate 
American  enterprises."  Circular  Instructions  to  Diplo- 
matic and  Consular  Officers,  March  27, 1899,  pages  343-4, 
supra,  note. 

(c.)  Missionaries. 

Our  legations  have  been  authorized  to  issue  passports 
to  missionaries  in  foreign  lands  whose  residence  there 
was  continuous  and  practically  permanent,  and  who  could 
not  allege  any  definite  intention  of  returning  to  and  re- 
siding in  the  United  States.  Mr.  Gresham  to  Mr.  Runyon, 
November  1,  1894,  American  Passport,  209. 

The  presumption  of  abandonment  of  nationality  by 


EXPATRIATION.  357 

long  residence  abroad  is  rebutted  by  proof  that  such 
residence  was  that  of  a  missionary,  who  never  intended 
to  relinquish  his  nationality  or  his  purpose  finally  to 
return  home.  Mr.  Everett  to  Mr.  Marsh,  February  5, 1853, 
2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest,  360. 

(d.)  By  Marriage. 

See  "Naturalization  by  Marriage,"  for  a  full  considera- 
tion of  the  subject  of  "expatriation  by  marriage,"  pp. 
227-263,  supra. 

2.  Desertion. 

A  fifth  way  in  which  expatriation  may  be  effected  is 
by  desertion  from  the  Army  or  Navy. 

By  Section  1996  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  deserters  from 
the  military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States  who 
did  not  return  or  report  themselves  to  a  provost-mar- 
shal within  sixty  days  after  March  11,  1865,  were  deemed 
to  have  voluntarily  relinquished  and  forfeited  their 
rights  of  citizenship,  as  well  as  the  right  to  become  citi- 
zens; and  such  deserters  were  declared  to  be  forever 
incapable  of  holding  office  or  exercising  any  rights  of 
citizenship. 

Section  1997  provided  that  no  soldier  or  sailor  who 
faithfully  served  until  April  19,  1865,  and  who,  without 
proper  authority  or  leave  first  obtained,  quit  his  com- 
mand or  refused  to  serve  after  that  date,  shall  be  held  to 
be  a  deserter  from  the  Army  or  Navy;  but  that  section 
shall  be  construed  solely  as  a  removal  of  any  disability 
such  soldier  or  sailor  may  have  incurred,  under  Section 
1996,  by  the  loss  of  citizenship  and  of  the  right  to  hold 
office,  in  consequence  of  his  desertion. 

Section  1998  provides  that  "every  person  who  here- 
after deserts  the  military  or  naval  service  of   the  United 


358  NATURALIZATION 

States,  or  who,  being  duly  enrolled,  departs  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  district  in  which  he  is  enrolled,  or  goes 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  with  intent  to 
avoid  any  draft  into  the  military  or  naval  service,  law- 
fully ordered,  shall  be  liable  to  all  the  penalties  and  for- 
feitures of  Section  nineteen   hundred   and   ninety-six." 

This  law  relative  to  desertion  is  applicable  only  where 
the  person  has  been  convicted  of  the  offense  by  court- 
martial.  Goetscheus  v.  Matthewson,  61  N.  Y.  420;  Holt 
V.  Holt,  59  Me.  464. 

The  law  means  that  the  forfeiture  which  it  prescribes, 
like  all  other  penalties  for  desertion,  must  be  adjudged 
to  the  convicted  person,  after  trial  by  a  court-martial, 
and  sentence  approved.     Huber  v.  Reily,  53  Pa.  St.  112. 

The  conviction  must  be  proved  by  a  duly  authenti- 
cated record.     Goetscheus  v.  Matthewson,  supra. 

3.  Military  or  Naval  Service  in  Foreign  Country. 

Merely  entering  into  the  military  or  naval  service  of  a 
foreign  sovereign  does  not,  of  itself,  work  expatriation. 
Chacon  y.  89  Bales  of  Cochineal,  1  Brock.  478;  The  San- 
tissima  Trinidad,  7  Wheat.  283;  State  v.  Adams,  45 
Iowa,  99. 

In  Calais  v.  Marshfield,  30  Me.  511,  it  was  held  that  the 
voluntary  performance  by  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
of  service  in  the  local  militia,  was  insufRcient  to  effect 
expatriation. 

Assistant  Secretary  Rives  on  January  5,  1888,  in  re- 
sponse to  an  inquiry  of  the  United  States  Consul  General 
at  Honolulu,  whether  citizens  of  the  United  States  by 
enlisting  in  the  army  in  Hawaii,  relinquished  their  Amer- 
ican nationality,  said:  "  Citizens  of  the  United  States  do 
not  lose  their  nationality  by  enlisting  in  foreign  armies." 
For.  Rel.  1895,  850. 


EXPATRIATION.  359 

Acting  Secretary  Hunter  in  an  instruction  to  the  con- 
sul at  Cordoba,  September  10,  1880,  said:  "Enlistment  in 
the  military  or  naval  service  of  a  foreign  power  is  not  of 
itself  a  renunciation  of  American  citizenship."  3  Moore's 
Int.  Law  Digest,  732. 

And  Secretary  Bayard  in  an  instruction  to  the  Ameri- 
can legation  in  Mexico,  November  14,  1888,  affirming  the 
same  principle,  said  that  besides  the  generallyrecognized 
principles  of  international  usage,  there  were  historical 
precedents  which  emphasized  the  position  of  this  gov- 
ernment in  respect  of  its  citizens  temporarily  abroad. 
"As  evidence  of  this,"  said  he,  "it  may  be  stated  that 
entering  the  military  service  of  a  foreign  state  is  by  itself 
in  no  sense  an  abjuration  of  prior  nationality.  In  our 
Revolutionary  war  over  six  thousand  Frenchmen  were 
enlisted  in  our  armies,  either  in  our  marine  forces  or  as 
auxiliaries,  but  the  cases  in  which  those  thus  serving  ac- 
cepted an  American  nationality  were  very  few.  This 
government  never  maintained,  nor  did  France  ever  con- 
cede, that  this  enlisting  into  our  service  had  any  effect 
on  their  nationality.  ...  La  Fayette  was  a  major- 
general  in  our  service,  but  during  the  diplomatic  contro- 
versies that  arose  as  to  him  subsequently,  when  he  was 
a  prisoner  in  Austria  this  government  never  claimed  that 
he  was  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  or  that  he  ever 
ceased  to  be  a  Frenchman."  3  Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest, 
734. 

On  the  other  hand,  however,  a  citizen  of  Illinois,  un- 
der the  declaration  adopted  by  the  convention  of  Texas, 
in  1835,  promising  citizenship  and  donations  of  land  to 
all  volunteers  in  her  war  for  independence,  who  after- 
wards entered  her  army  as  a  volunteer,  and  who  died  in 
her  service,  was  held  to  have  become  a  citizen  of  Texas; 
and    it    was    also    decided    that    his    wife's   citizenship 


360  NATURALIZATION 

followed  his,  though  she  never  came  to  Texas.    Kircher 
V.  Murray,  54  Fed.  617. 

It  was  held  by  Acting  Secretary  Seward,  in  1879,  that 
James  W.  Smith,  an  American  citizen,  by  the  act  of  vol- 
untarily taking  military  service  under  the  government 
of  Mexico,  while  a  law  was  in  existence  by  which  such 
an  act  on  his  part  conferred  and  involved  the  assump- 
tion of  Mexican  citizenship,  must  be  deemed  to  have 
understandingly  conformed  to  that  Mexican  law,  and  of 
his  own  accord  embraced  Mexican  citizenship.  Mr.  Sew- 
ard to  Mr.  Foster,  August  13,  1879,  For.  Rel.  1879,  824. 

4.  Accepting  Public   Ofi&ce  under  a  Foreign  Government. 

(A)  Engaging  in  the  Diplomatic  Service  of  a  Foreign  Govern- 

ment. 

In  Corvaia's  case,  which  came  before  the  Italian-Ven- 
ezuelan Commission  in  1903,  Mr.  Ralston,  umpire,  held 
that  one  who  accepts,  without  permission  of  his  govern- 
ment and  against  her  laws,  employment  in  the  diplo- 
matic service  of  another  government,  loses  his  citizen- 
ship.    Ralston's  Report,  808,  809. 

(B)  Engaging  in  the  Consular  Service  of  a    Foreign  Gov- 

ernment. 

In  Fish  V.  Stoughton,  2  Johns.  Cas.  407,  the  court 
held  that  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  did  not  expatri- 
ate himself  by  accepting  an  appointment  as  consul  of  a 
foreign  state  and  the  performance  of  duties  in  that 
capacity. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States,  of  Swiss 
origin,  was  advised  by  the  Department  of  State,  in  1869, 


EXPATRIATION.  361 

that  he  could  not  divest  himself  of  his  American  citizen- 
ship by  accepting  the  office  of  Swiss  vice-consul  at  New 
York,  but  must,  in  order  to  accomplish  that  result,  re- 
turn to  Switzerland  with  the  intention  to  reside  there,  or 
else  be  naturalized  in  some  third  country.  3  Moore's  Int. 
Law  Digest,  716. 

(C)  Entrance  into  Civil  Service  of  Foreign  Country. 

Entrance  into  the  civil  service  of  the  country  of  his 
nativity,  by  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
who  has  returned  to  that  country,  and  continues  his 
residence  there  beyond  the  length  of  time  at  which,  by 
convention  between  the  two  states,  the  intent  not  to 
return  to  the  country  of  adoption  may  be  held  to  exist, 
must  be  taken  to  be  very  strong  evidence  of  the  absence 
of  intent  to  return,  and  must  raise  a  presumption,  which 
might,  and  probably  would,  make  it  very  difficult  for 
the  country  of  adoption  to  assert  the  continued  citizen- 
ship of  the  party  thus  taking  service  and  continuing  to 
reside  in  the  country  of  his  nativity.  Mr.  Fish  to  Mr 
Miiller,  January  28,  1874,  2  Wharton's  Int.  Law  Digest, 
367. 

Assistant  Secretary  Rives,  in  an  instruction  to  the 
consul-general  at  Apia,  January  6,  1888,  said  that  tenure 
of  office  under  theSamoan  government,  unless  it  required 
the  assumption  of  Samoan  citizenship,  could  not  of  itself 
be  treated  as  an  act  of  expatriation,  as  there  is  nothing 
in  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United  States  that 
precludes  a  private  citizen  of  the  United  States  from 
rendering  official  services  to  foreign  governments.  3 
Moore's  Int.  Law  Digest,  718. 

Such  acts,  in  addition  to  the  selection  and  enjoyment 
of  a  foreign  domicil,  as  amount  to  a  renunciation  of 
United    States  citizenship  and  a  willingness  to  submit 


362  NATURALIZATION 

to,  or  adopt,  the  obligations  of  a  citizenship  of  the 
country  of  domicil,  such  as  accepting  public  employ- 
ment, etc.,  may  be  treated  as  effecting  expatriation.  14 
Ops.  Atty.  Gen.  295. 

Under  the  existing  law,  providing  that  an  American 
citizen  shall  be  deemed  to  have  expatriated  himself  when 
he  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  foreign  state,  if 
the  acceptance  of  office  under  the  foreign  government 
involves  the  taking  of  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  that  gov- 
ernment, this,  of  course,  operates  to  expatriate  him. 


PASSPORTS.  363 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PASSPORTS. 

A.  In  general. 

B.  Statutes. 

C.  Rules  and  regulations. 

1.  In  the  United  States. 

2.  In  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States. 

3.  Executive  order  of  President  Roosevelt,  April  6,  1907. 

D.  Forms. 

A.  In  General. 

The  American  passport  is  a  document  issued  by  the 
Secretary  of  State,  or  under  his  authority  by  a  diplomatic 
or  consular  officer  of  the  United  States  abroad  (or  by  an 
executive  officer  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United 
States),  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  (or  to  a  person 
owing  allegiance  to  the  United  States),  stating  his  citi- 
zenship (or  status),  and  requesting  for  him  free  passage 
and  all  lawful  aid  and  protection  during  his  travels  in 
foreign  lands.     See  American  Passport,  4. 

B.  Statutes. 

Until  the  passage  of  the  Act  of  Congress  of  June  14, 
1902  (32  Stat,  at  L.  386,  Chap.  1088),  amending  the 
statutes  of  the  United  States  so  as  to  permit  the  granting 
of  passports  to  residents  of  the  insular  possessions  of 
the  United  States,  passports  were  only  issued  to  citizens 
of  theUnitedStates.  The  sections  of  theRevisedStatutes, 
as  amended,  which  govern  the  subject,  are  as  follows: 

"Sec.  4075  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2764].  The  Secre- 
tary of  State  may  grant  and  issue  passports,  and  cause 
passports  to  be  granted,  issued,  and  verified  in  foreign 
countries  by  such  diplomatic  or  consular  officers  of  the 
United  States,  and  by  such  chief  or  other  executive 
officer  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States, 
and  under  such  rules  as  the  President  shall  designate  and 
prescribe  for  and  on  behalf  of   the  United   States;  and 


364  NATURALIZATION 

no  other  person  shall  grant,  issue,  or  verify  any  such 
passport.  Where  a  legation  of  the  United  States  is  es- 
tablished in  any  country  no  person  other  than  the  diplo- 
matic representative  of  the  United  States  at  such  place 
shall  be  permitted  to  grant  or  issue  any  passport,  except 
in  the  absence  therefrom  of  such  representative. 

"Sec.  4076  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2765].  No  passport 
shall  be  granted  or  issued  to,  or  verified  for,  any  other 
persons  than  those  owing  allegiance,  whether  citizens  or 
not,  to  the  United  States." 

Sec.  1,  Act  of  March  2,  1907:  "The  Secretary  of  State 
shall  be  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue  passports 
to  persons  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  follows: 
Where  any  person  has  made  a  declaration  of  intention  to 
become  such  a  citizen  as  provided  by  law  and  has  resided 
in  the  United  States  for  three  years  a  passport  may  be 
issued  to  him  entitling  him  to  the  protection  of  the 
government  in  any  foreign  county.  Provided^  That  such 
passport  shall  not  be  valid  for  more  than  six  months  and 
shall  not  be  renewed,  and  that  such  passport  shall  not 
entitle  the  holder  to  the  protection  of  this  government 
in  the  country  of  which  he  was  a  citizen  prior  to  making 
such  declaration  of  intention. 

"Sec.  4077  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2765].  All  persons 
who  shall  be  authorized  to  grant,  issue,  or  verify  pass- 
ports shall  make  return  of  the  same  to  the  Secretary  of 
State,  in  such  manner  and  as  often  as  he  shall  require; 
and  such  returns  shall  specify  the  names  and  all  other 
particulars  of  the  persons  to  whom  the  same  shall  be 
granted,  issued,  or  verified,  as  embraced  in  such  pass- 
ports. 

"Sec.  4078  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2766].  If  any  per- 
son acting,  or  claiming  to  act,  in  any  office  or  capacity, 
under  the  United  States,  its  possessions,  or  any  of  the 
states  of  the  United  States,  who  shall  not  be  lawfully 
authorized  so  to  do,  shall  grant,  issue,  or  verify  any  pass- 


PASSPORTS.  365 

ports  or  other  instrument  in  the  nature  of  a  passport,  to 
or  for  any  person  whomsoever,  or  if  any  consular  officer 
who  shall  be  authorized  to  grant,  issue,  or  verify  pass- 
ports shall  knowingly  and  wilfully  grant,  issue,  or  verify 
any  such  passport  to  or  for  any  person  not  owing  alle- 
giance, whether  a  citizen  or  not,  to  the  United  States, 
he  shall  be  imprisoned  for  not  more  than  one  year,  or 
fined  not  more  than  five  hundred  dollars,  or  both;  and 
may  be  charged,  proceeded  against,  tried,  convicted,  and 
dealt  with  therefor  in  the  district  where  he  may  be 
arrested  or  in  custody." 

An  excellent  historical  sketch  of  the  American  pass- 
port, together  with  a  digest  of  the  laws,  rulings,  and 
regulations  governing  its  issuance  by  the  Department  of 
State,  was  prepared  by  Mr.  Gaillard  Hunt,  chief  of  the 
passport  bureau  of  that  Department,  and  published  by 
the  government  printing  office  in  1898,  under  the  title  of 
"The  American  Passport." 

C.  Rules  and  Regulations  Governing  the  Granting  and  Issu- 
ance of  Passports,  Prescribed  by  the  President. 

The  following  are  the  existing  rules  and  regulations 
governing  the  granting  of  passports,  prescribed  by  the 
President: 

1.  Rules  Governing  the  Granting  and  Issuing  of   Passports 
in  the  United  States. 

1.  By  Whom  Issued. — No  one  but  the  Secretary  of 
State  may  grant  and  issue  passports  in  the  United 
States.  Rev.  Stat.  Sees.  4075,  4078  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat. 
1901,  2764,  2766]. 

A  person  who  is  entitled  to  receive  a  passport  if  tem- 
porarily abroad  should  apply  to  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  in  the  country  where  he 
happens  to  be;  or,  in  the  absence  of  a  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative, to  the  consul  general  of  the  United  States; 


366  NATURALIZATION 

or,  in  the  absence  of  both,  to  the  consul  of  the  United 
States.  The  necessary  statements  may  be  made  before 
the  nearest  consular  officer  of  the  United  States. 

Application  for  a  passport  by  a  person  in  one  of  the 
insular  possessions  of  the  United  States  should  be  made 
to  the  chief  executive  of  such  possession. 

(The  evidence  required  of  a  person  making  application 
abroad  or  in  an  insular  possession  of  the  United  States 
is  the  same  as  that  required  of  an  applicant  in  the 
United  States.) 

2.  To  Whom  Issued. — The  law  forbids  the  granting  of 
a  passport  to  any  person  who  does  not  owe  allegiance  to 
the  United  States.* 

3.  Applications. — A  person  who  is  entitled  to  receive 
a  passport,  if  within  the  United  States,  must  make  a 
written  application,  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit,  to  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

The  affidavit  must  be  attested  by  an  officer  authorized 
to  administer  oaths,  and  if  he  has  an  official  seal  it  must 
be  affixed.  If  he  has  no  seal,  his  official  character  must 
be  authenticated  by  certificate  of  the  proper  legal 
officer. 

If  the  applicant  signs  by  mark,  two  attesting  wit- 
nessses  to  his  signature  are  required. 

The  applicant  is  required  to  state  the  date  and  place 
of  his  birth,  his  occupation,  and  the  place  of  his  perma- 
nent residence,  and  to  declare  that  he  goes  abroad  for 
temporary  sojourn,  and  intends  to  return  to  the  United 
States  with  the  purpose  of  residing  and  performing  the 
duties  of  citizenship  therein. 

The  applicant  must  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  description 

*For  the  exception,  contained  in  the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  March 
2,  1907,  in  favor  of  persons  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens  and  have  resided  in  the  United  States  for  three  years.  See  pages 
371-373,  post. 


PASSPORTS.  367 

of  the  person  applying,  and  should  state   the   following 

particulars,  viz. :  Age, ;  stature, feet 

inches  (English  measure);  forehead, ;  eyes, ; 

nose, ;  mouth,  ;  chin, ;  hair, ; 

complexion, ;  face, 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate 
from  at  least  one  credible  witness  that  the  applicant  is 
the  person  he  represents  himself  to  be,  and  that  the  facts 
stated  in  the  affidavit  are  true  to  the  best  of  the  wit- 
ness' knowledge  and  belief. 

4.  Native  Citizens. — An  application  containing  the  in- 
formation indicated  by  rule  3  will  be  sufficient  evidence 
in  the  case  of  native  citizens;  but  a  person  of  the  Chinese 
race,  alleging  birth  in  the  United  States,  must  accompany 
his  application  with  supporting  affidavits  from  at  least 
two  credible  witnesses,  preferably  not  of  the  Chinese 
race,  having  personal  knowledge  of  the  applicant's  birth 
in  the  United  States. 

5.  A  Person  Born  Abroad,  Whose  Father  was  a  Native 
Citizen  of  the  United  States. — In  addition  to  the  state- 
ments required  by  rule  3,  his  application  must  show  that 
his  father  was  born  in  the  United  States,  resided  therein, 
and  was  a  citizen  at  the  time  of  the  applicant's  birth. 
The  Department  may  require  that  this  affidavit  be  sup- 
ported by  that  of  one  other  citizen  acquainted  with  the 
facts. 

6.  Naturalized  Citizens, — In  addition  to  the  statements 
required  by  rule  3,  a  naturalized  citizen  must  transmit 
his  certificate  of  naturalization,  or  a  duly  certified  copy 
of  the  court  record  thereof,  with  his  application.  It  will 
be  returned  to  him  after  inspection.  He  must  state  in 
his  affidavit  when  and  from  what  port  he  emigrated  to 
this  country,  what  ship  he  sailed  in,  where  he  has  lived 
since  his  arrival  in  the  United  States,  when  and  before 
what  court  he  was  naturalized,  and  that  he  is  the  iden- 
tical person  described  in  the  certificate  of  naturalization. 


368  NATURALIZATION 

The  signature  to  the  application  should  conform  in 
orthography  to  the  applicant's  name  as  written  in  his 
certificate  of  naturalization. 

7.  Woman's  Application. — If  she  is  unmarried,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  she  should 
state  that  she  has  never  been  married.  If  she  is  the  wife 
of  a  native  citizen  of  the  United  States  the  fact  should 
be  made  to  appear  in  her  application.  If  she  is  the  wife 
or  widow  of  a  naturalized  citizen,  in  addition  to  the 
statements  required  by  rule  3,  she  must  transmit  for  in- 
spection her  husband's  certificate  of  naturalization,  must 
state  that  she  is  the  wife  (or  widow)  of  the  person  de- 
scribed therein,  and  must  set  forth  the  facts  of  his  emi- 
gration, naturalization,  and  residence,  as  required  in  the 
rule  governing  the  application  of   a  naturalized  citizen. 

(A  married  woman's  citizenship  follows  that  of  her 
husband  so  far  as  her  international  status  is  concerned. 
It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  a  woman's  marital  relations 
be  indicated  in  her  application  for  a  passport,  and  that 
in  the  case  of  a  married  woman  her  husband's  citizenship 
be  established.) 

8.  The  nhild  of  a  Naturalized  Citizen  Claiming  Citizen- 
ship Through  the  Naturalization  of  the  Parent. — In  addi- 
tion to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  the  applicant 
must  state  that  he  or  she  is  the  son  or  daughter,  as  the 
case  may  be,  of  the  person  described  in  the  certificate  of 
naturalization,  which  must  be  submitted  for  inspection, 
and  must  set  forth  the  facts  of  emigration,  naturaliza- 
tion, and  residence,  as  required  in  the  rule  governing  the 
application  of  a  naturalized  citizen. 

9.  A  Resident  of  an  Insular  Possession  of  the  United 
States,  Who  Owes  Allegiance  to  the  United  States. — In 
addition  to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  he  must 
state  that  he  owes  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and 
that  he  does  not  acknowledge  allegiance  to  any  other 
government;  and  must  submit  an  affidavit  from  at  least 


PASSPORTS.  369 

two  credible  witnesses  liavins  good  means  of  knowledge 
in  substantiation  of  his  statements  of  birth,  residence, 
and  loyalty. 

10.  Expiration  of  Passport. — A  passport  expires  two 
years  from  the  date  of  its  issuance.  A  new  one  will  be 
issued  upon  a  new  application,  and,  if  the  applicant  be 
a  naturalized  citizen,  the  old  passport  will  be  accepted 
in  lieu  of  a  certificate  of  naturalization,  if  the  application 
upon  which  it  was  issued  is  found  to  contain  sufficient 
information  as  to  the  naturalization  of  the  applicant. 

11.  Wife,  Minor  Children,  and  Servants. — When  the  ap- 
plicant is  accompanied  by  his  wife,  minor  children,  or 
servant  who  would  be  entitled  to  receive  a  passport,  it 
will  be  sufficient  to  state  the  fact,  giving  the  respective 
ages  of  the  children  and  the  allegiance  of  the  servant, 
when  one  passport  will  suffice  for  all.  For  any  other 
person  in  the  party  a  separate  passport  will  be  required. 
A  woman's  passport  may  include  her  minor  children  and 
servant  under  the  above-named  conditions. 

(The  term  "servant"  does  not  include  a  governess, 
tutor,  pupil,  companion,  or  person  holding  like  relations 
to  the  applicant  for  a  passport.) 

12.  Professional  Titles. — They  will  not  be  inserted  in 
passports. 

13.  Fee. — By  Act  of  Congress  approved  March  23, 1888 
[24  Stat,  at  L.  45,  Chap.  34],  a  fee  of  $1  is  required  to  be 
collected  for  every  citizen's  passport.  That  amount  in 
currency  or  postal  money-order  should  accompany  each 
application  made  by  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
Orders  should  be  made  payable  to  the  disbursing  clerk 
of  the  Department  of  State.  Drafts  or  checks  will  not 
be  accepted. 

14.  Blank  Forms  of  Application. — They  will  be  fur- 
nished by  the  Department  to  persons  who  desire  to  apply 
for  passports,  but  are  not  furnished,  except  as  samples, 
to  those  who  make  a  business  of  procuring  passports. 

6233—24 


370  NATURALIZATION 

15.  Address. — Communications  should  be  addressed  to 
the  Department  of  State,  Passport  Bureau,  and  each  com- 
munication should  give  the  post-office  address  of  the 
person  to  whom  the  answer  is  to  be  directed. 

16.  Rejection  of  Application. — The  Secretary  of  State 
has  the  right,  in  his  discretion,  to  refuse  to  issue  a  pass- 
port, and  will  exercise  this  right  towards  anyone  who 
he  has  reason  to  believe  desires  it  for  an  unlawful  or 
improper  purpose. 

Section  4075  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901,  2764],  as  amended  by 
the  Act  of  Congress,  approved  June  14,  1902  [32  Stat,  at 
L.  386,  Chap.  1088],  providing  that  "  the  Secretary  of 
State  may  grant  and  issue  passports,  and  cause  passports 
to  be  granted,  issued,  and  verified  in  foreign  countries 
by  such  diplomatic  or  consular  officers  of  the  United 
States,  and  by  such  chief  or  other  executive  officer  of 
the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States,  and  under 
such  rules  as  the  President  shall  designate  and  prescribe 
for  and  on  behalf  of  the  United  States,"  the  foregoing 
rules  are  hereby  prescribed  for  the  granting  and  issuing 
of  passports  in  the  United  States. 

The  Secretary  of  State  is  authorized  to  make  regula- 
tions on  the  subject  of  issuing  and  granting  passports 
additional  to  these  rules  and  not  inconsistent  with  them. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 

Oyster  Bay,  New  York,  September  12,  1903. 

The  provisions  of  Rev.  Stat.  4076,  which  prescribe  that 
no  passport  shall  be  granted  to  any  person  who  does  not 
owe  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and  which  are  em- 
bodied in  paragraph  numbered  2  of  the  Rules  as  above 
printed  have  been  modified  by  the  first  section  of  the 
Act  of  March  2,  1907,  in  favor  of  persons  who  have  de- 
clared their  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United 
States   as    provided   by   law,    and    have  resided   in   the 


PASSPORTS.  371 

United  States  for  three  years.  By  this  law  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  is  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue 
passports  to  such  persons,  good  for  a  period  of  six 
months.  In  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  conferred 
upon  him  by  the  law,  the  Secretary  of  State  has  promul- 
gated the  following 

Rules  Governing  the  Granting  and  Issuing  of  Passports  to 
Those  Who  Have  Declared  their  Intention  to  Become 
Citizens  of  the  United  States. 

1.  The  first  section  of  the  Act  approved  March  2, 
1907,  "in  reference  to  the  expatriation  of  citizens  and 
their  protection  abroad,"  provides  "That  the  Secretary 
of  State  shall  be  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue 
passports  to  persons  not  citizens  of  the  United  States  as 
follows:  Where  any  person  has  made  a  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  such  a  citizen  as  provided  by  law 
and  has  resided  in  the  United  States  for  three  years,  a 
passport  may  be  issued  to  him  entitling  him  to  the 
protection  of  the  government  in  any  foreign  country: 
Provided,  That  such  passport  shall  not  be  valid  for 
more  than  six  months  and  shall  not  be  renewed,  and 
that  such  passport  shall  not  entitle  the  holder  to  the 
protection  of  this  government  in  the  country  of  which 
he  was  a  citizen  prior  to  making  such  declaration  of  in- 
tention." 

2.  This  section  is  not  intended  to  confer  upon  persons 
who  have  only  declared  their  intention  to  become  citi- 
zens a  general  right  to  receive  passports  upon  applica- 
tion. Such  passports  will  be  issued  only  when  it  is 
affirmatively  shown  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that  some 
special  exigency  requires  the  temporary  absence  of  the 
applicant  from  the  United  States,  and  that  without  such 
absence  the  applicant  would  be  subjected  to  special 
hardship  or  injury. 

3.  Such  passports  will  not  be  issued  to  those  who  have 
made  the  declaration   of    intention  and  who  have  failed, 


372  NATrRALIZATIOX 

through  their  own  neglect,  to  complete  their  intention 
and  secure  naturalization  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States;  nor  to  those  who  may  make  the  declaration  of 
intention  in  order  to  secure  passports  and  leave  the 
United  States,  ?2or  shall  more  than  one  such  passport 
be  issued  to  any  applicant. 

4.  It  is  therefore  ordered  that  before  a  passport  shall 
be  issued  to  an3"one  who  has  made  the  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  the 
folloii'ing  facts  shall  he  established  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  Secretary  of  State: 

(a)  That  the  applicant  has  resided  in  the  United 
States  for  at  least  three  years,  as  provided  by  ]a.w. 

(b)  That  he  is  not  yet  eligible  under  the  law  for  mak- 
ing application  for  final  naturalization. 

(c)  That  at  least  six  months  have  elapsed  since  the 
applicant' s  declaration  of  intention. 

(d)  That  the  applicant  has  not  previously  applied  for 
and  obtained  a  similar  passport  from  this  Department. 

(e)  That  a  special  and  imperative  exigency  exists  re- 
quiring the  absence  of  the  applicant  from  the  United 
States.  The  burden  of  proof  will,  in  each  case,  be  upon 
the  applicant,  to  show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  that  there  is  a  necessity  for  his  absence. 

if)  That  the  applicant  has  not  applied  for  or  obtained 
a  passport  from  any  other  government  since  he  declared 
his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

5.  Applications  must  be  made  in  the  form  of  an  affida- 
vit to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

6.  The  affidavit  must  be  attested  by  an  officer  author- 
ized to  administer  oaths,  and  if  he  has  an  official  seal  it 
must  be  affixed.  If  he  has  no  seal  his  official  character 
must  be  authenticated  by  certificate  of  the  proper  legal 
officer. 

7.  If  the  applicant  signs  by  mark  two  attesting  wit- 
nesses to  his  signature  are  required. 


PASSPORTS.  373 

8.  The  applicant  is  required  to  state  the  date  and 
place  of  his  birth,  his  occupation,  and  the  place  of  his 
permanent  residence,  where  he  intends  to  travel,  how 
long  he  expects  to  remain  in  each  foreign  country,  for 
what  purpose  he  is  proceeding  abroad,  the  circumstances 
which  make  his  absence  necessar}',  that  he  intends  to  re- 
turn to  the  United  States,  and  the  probable  duration  of 
his  absence  therefrom. 

9.  If  any  previous  application  for  a  similar  passport 
has  been  denied  by  the  Department,  this  fact  must  be 
stated  by  the  applicant. 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  description 
of  the  person  applying  and  should  state  the  following 

particulars,  namely:  Age, :  stature,  feet 

inches  (English  measure) :  forehead :  eyes, 

:  nose, ;   mouth :  chin, :  hair, 

;  complexion.  ;  face, 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  two  sup- 
porting affidavits  from  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who 
shall  state  that  the  applicant  is  the  person  he  represents 
himself  to  be,  how  long  they  have  known  him,  and  that 
the  facts  stated  in  his  affidavit  are  true  to  the  best  of 
their  knowledge  and  belief. 

Elihu  Root. 

Department  of  State. 

Washington,  March  23.  1907. 

2.  Rules  Governing  the  Granting  and  Issuing  of  Passports 
in  the  Insular  Possessions  of  the  United  States. 

Section  4075  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States  [U.  S.  Comp.  Stat.  1901.  2764],  as  amended  by 
the  Act  of  Congress,  approved  June  14,  1902  [32  Stat,  at 
L.  386,  Chap.  1088],  providing  that  "the  Secretary  of 
State  may  grant  and  issue  passports,  and  cause  pass- 
ports to  be  granted,  issued,  and  verified  in  foreign 
countries  by  such  diplomatic  or  consular  officers  of  the 


374  NATURALIZATION 

United  States,  and  by  such  chief  or  other  executive 
officer  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States,  and 
under  such  rules  as  the  President  shall  designate  and 
prescribe  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  United  States,"  the 
following  rules  are  hereby  prescribed  for  the  granting 
and  issuing  of  passports  in  the  insular  possessions  of  the 
United  States: 

1.  By  Whom  Issued. — Application  for  a  passport  by  a 
person  in  one  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United 
States  should  be  made  to  the  chief  executive  of  such 
possession. 

A  person  who  is  entitled  to  receive  a  passport  if  tem- 
porarily abroad  should  apply  to  the  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  in  the  country  where  he 
happens  to  be;  or,  in  the  absence  of  a  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative, to  the  consul  general  of  the  United  States;  or, 
in  the  absence  of  both,  to  the  consul  of  the  United 
States.  The  necessary  statements  may  be  made  before 
the  nearest  consular  officer  of  the  United  States. 

2.  To  Whom  Issued. — The  law  forbids  the  granting  of 
a  passport  to  any  person  who  does  not  owe  allegiance  to 
the  United  States.* 

3.  Applications. — A  person  who  is  entitled  to  receive 
a  passport  must  make  a  written  application  in  the  form 
of  an  affidavit.  The  affidavit  must  be  attested  by  an 
officer  authorized  to  administer  oaths,  and  if  he  has  an 
official  seal  it  must  be  affixed.  If  he  has  no  seal,  his 
official  character  must  be  authenticated  by  certificate  of 
the  proper  legal  officer. 

If  the  applicant  signs  by  mark,  two  attesting  witnesses 
to  his  signature  are  required. 

The  applicant  is  required  to  state  the  date  and  place 

*For  the  exception,  contained  in  the  first  section  of  the  Act  of  March 
2,  1907,  in  favor  of  persons  who  have  declared  their  intention  to  become 
citizens  and  have  resided  in  the  United  States  for  three  years,  see 
pages  378-380,  post. 


PASSPORTS.  375 

of  his  birth,  his  occupation,  and  the  place  of  his  perma- 
nent residence,  and  to  declare  that  he  goes  abroad  for 
temporary  sojourn,  and  intends  to  return  to  the  United 
States  or  one  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United 
States  with  the  purpose  of  residing  and  performing  the 
duties  of  citizenship  therein. 

The  applicant  must  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States. 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  description 
of   the  person  applying,  and  should  state  the  following 

particulars,  viz.:  Age, ;  stature, feet 

inches  (English  measure);  forehead, ;  eyes, ; 

nose, ;  mouth, ;  chin, ;  hair, ; 

complexion, ;  face, 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  certificate 
from  at  least  one  credible  witness  that  the  applicant  is 
the  person  he  represents  himself  to  be,  and  that  the  facts 
stated  in  the  affidavit  are  true  to  the  best  of  the  wit- 
ness' knowledge  and  belief. 

4.  Native  Citizens  of  the  United  States. — An  applica- 
tion containing  the  information  indicated  by  rule  3  will 
be  sufficient  evidence  in  the  case  of  native  citizens  of  the 
United  States. 

5.  A  Person  Born  Abroad,  Whose  Father  was  a  Native 
Citizen  of  the  United  States. — In  addition  to  the  state- 
ments required  by  rule  3,  his  application  must  show  that 
his  father  was  born  in  the  United  States,  resided  therein, 
and  was  a  citizen  at  the  time  of  the  applicant's  birth. 
The  Department  may  require  that  this  affidavit  be  sup- 
ported by  that  of  one  other  citizen  acquainted  with  the 
facts. 

6.  Naturalized  Citizens. — In  addition  to  the  statements 
required  by  rule  3,  a  naturalized  citizen  must  transmit 
his  certificate  of  naturalization  or  a  duly  certified  copy 
of  the  court  record  thereof  with  his  application.  It 
will    be    returned    to    him   after   inspection.     He    must 


376  NATURALIZATION 

state  in  his  affidavit  when  and  from  what  port  he  emi- 
grated to  this  country,  what  ship  he  sailed  in,  where  he 
has  lived  since  his  arrival  in  the  United  States,  when  and 
before  what  court  he  was  naturalized,  and  that  he  is  the 
identical  person  described  in  the  certificate  of  naturaliza- 
tion. The  signature  to  the  application  should  conform 
in  orthography  to  the  applicant's  name  as  written  in  his 
certificate  of  naturalization. 

7.  Woman's  Application. — If  she  is  unmarried,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  she  should 
state  that  she  has  never  been  married.  If  she  is  the  wife 
of  a  native  citizen  of  the  United  States  the  fact  should 
be  made  to  appear  in  her  application.  If  she  is  the  wife 
or  widow  of  a  naturalized  citizen,  in  addition  to  the 
statements  required  by  rule  3,  she  must  transmit  for  in- 
spection her  husband's  certificate  of  naturalization,  must 
state  that  she  is  the  wife  (or  widow)  of  the  person  de- 
scribed therein,  and  must  set  forth  the  facts  of  his  emi- 
gration, naturalization,  and  residence,  as  required  in  the 
rule  governing  the  application  of  a  naturalized  citizen. 

8.  The  Child  of  a  Naturalized  Citizen  Claiming  Citizen- 
ship through  the  Naturalization  of  the  Parent. — In  addi- 
tion to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  the  applicant 
must  state  that  he  or  she  is  the  son  or  daughter,  as  the 
case  may  be,  of  the  person  described  in  the  certificate  of 
naturalization,  which  must  be  submitted  for  inspection, 
and  must  set  forth  the  facts  of  emigration,  naturaliza- 
tion, and  residence,  as  required  in  the  rule  governing  the 
application  of  a  naturalized  citizen. 

9.  A  Resident  of  an  Insular  Possession  of  the  United 
States,  who  Owes  Allegiance  to  the  United  States. — In 
addition  to  the  statements  required  by  rule  3,  he  must 
state  that  he  owes  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and 
that  he  does  not  acknowledge  allegiance  to  any  other 
government;  and  must  submit  an  affidavit  from  at  least 
two  credible  witnesses  having  good  means  of  knowledge 


PASSPORTS.  377 

in  substantiation  of  his  statements  of  birth,  residence, 
and  loyalty. 

10.  Expiration  of  Passport. — A  passport  expires  two 
years  from  the  date  of  its  issuance.  A  new  one  will  be 
issued  upon  a  new  application,  and,  if  the  applicant  be 
a  naturalized  citizen,  the  old  passport  will  be  accepted 
in  lieu  of  a  certificate  of  naturalization,  if  the  applica- 
tion upon  which  it  was  issued  is  found  to  contain  suf- 
ficient information  as  to  the  naturalization  of  the  appli- 
cant. 

11.  Wife,  Minor  Children,  and  Servants. — When  the 
applicant  is  accompanied  by  his  wife,  minor  children,  or 
servant  who  would  be  entitled  to  receive  a  passport,  it 
will  be  suflScient  to  state  the  fact,  giving  the  respective 
ages  of  the  children  and  the  allegiance  of  the  servant, 
when  one  passport  will  suffice  for  all.  For  any  other  per- 
son in  the  party  a  separate  passport  will  be  required.  A 
woman's  passport  may  include  her  minor  children  and 
servant  under  the  above-named  conditions. 

12.  Professional  Titles. — They  will  not  be  inserted  in 
passports. 

13.  Rejection  of  Application. — The  chief  executive 
officers  of  the  insular  possessions  of  the  United  States 
are  authorized  to  refuse  to  issue  a  passport  to  anyone 
who,  there  is  reason  to  believe,  desires  it  for  an  unlawful 
or  improper  purpose,  or  who  is  unable  or  unwilling  to 
comply  with  the  rules. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 
Oyster  Bay,  New  York,  July  19,  1902. 

The  provisions  of  Rev.  Stat.  4076,  which  prescribe 
that  no  passport  shall  be  granted  to  any  person  who 
does  not  owe  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  and  which 
are  embodied  in  paragraph  numbered  2  of  the  Rules  as 
above  printed,  have  been  modified  by  the  first  section  of 
the  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  in  favor  of  persons  who  have 


378  NATURALIZATION 

declared  their  intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  provided  by  law,  and  have  resided  in  the 
United  States  for  three  years.  By  this  law  the  Secretary 
of  State  is  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue  pass- 
ports to  such  persons,  good  for  a  period  of  six  months. 
In  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  conferred  upon  him  by 
the  law,  there  have  been  issued  the  following 

Rules  Governing  the  Granting  and  Issuing  of  Passports  to 
Those  Who  Have  Declared  Their  Intention  to  Become 
Citizens  of  the  United  States. 

1.  The  first  section  of  the  Act  approved  March  2,  1907, 
"in  reference  to  the  expatriation  of  citizens  and  their 
protection  abroad,"  provides  "That  the  Secretary  of 
State  shall  be  authorized,  in  his  discretion,  to  issue  pass- 
ports to  persons  not  citizens  of  the  United  States,  as 
follows:  Where  any  person  has  made  a  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  such  a  citizen  as  provided  by  law 
and  has  resided  in  the  United  States  for  three  years,  a 
passport  may  be  issued  to  him  entitling  him  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  government  in  any  foreign  country:  Pro- 
vided, That  such  passport  shall  not  be  valid  for  more 
than  six  months  and  shall  not  be  renewed,  and  that  such 
passport  shall  not  entitle  the  holder  to  the  protection  of 
this  government  in  the  country  of  which  he  was  a  citizen 
prior  to  making  such  declaration  of  intention." 

2.  This  section  is  not  intended  to  confer  upon  persons 
who  have  only  declared  their  intention  to  become  citi- 
zens a  general  right  to  receive  passports  upon  applica- 
tion. Such  passports  will  be  issued  only  when  it  is  affir- 
matively shown  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that  some 
special  exigency  requires  the  temporary  absence  of  the 
applicant  from  the  United  States,  and  that  without  such 
absence  the  applicant  would  be  subjected  to  special 
hardship  or  injury. 


PASSPORTS.  379 

3.  Such  passports  will  not  be  issued  to  those  who  have 
made  the  declaration  of  intention  and  who  have  failed, 
through  their  own  neglect,  to  complete  their  intention 
and  secure  naturalization  as  citizens  of  the  United  States; 
nor  to  those  who  may  make  the  declaration  of  intention 
in  order  to  secure  passports  and  leave  the  United  States, 
nor  shall  more  than  one  such  passport  he  issued  to  any 
applicant. 

4.  It  is  therefore  ordered  that  before  a  passport  shall 
be  issued  to  any  one  who  has  made  the  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  the 
following  facts  shall  be  established  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  Secretary  of  State: 

{a)  That  the  applicant  has  resided  in  the  United 
States  for  at  least  three  years,  as  provided  by  law. 

{b)  That  he  is  not  yet  eligible  under  the  law  for  mak- 
ing application  for  final  naturalization. 

(c)  That  at  least  six  months  have  elapsed  since  the 
applicant' s  declaratioii  of  inte7itio7i. 

(d)  That  the  applicant  has  not  previously  applied  for 
and  obtained  a  similar  passport  from  this  Depaii,ment. 

{e)  That  a  special  and  imperative  exigency  exists  re- 
quiring the  absence  of  the  applicant  from  the  United 
States.  The  burden  of  proof  will,  in  each  case,  be  upon 
the  applicant  to  show  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  that  there  is  a  necessity  for  his  absence. 

(/)  That  the  applicant  has  not  applied  for  or  obtained 
a  passport  from  any  other  government  since  he  declared 
his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

5.  Applications  must  be  made  in  the  form  of  an  affidavit 
to  the  Secretary  of  State. 

6.  The  affidavit  must  be  attested  by  an  officer  au- 
thorized to  administer  oaths,  and  if  he  -has  an  official 
seal  it  must  be  affixed.  If  he  has  no  seal  his  official  char- 
acter must  be  authenticated  by  certificate  of  the  proper 
legal  officer. 


380  NATURALIZATION 

7.  If  the  applicant  signs  by  mark  two  attesting  wit- 
nesses to  his  signature  are  required. 

8.  The  applicant  is  required  to  state  the  date  and 
place  of  his  birth,  his  occupation  and  the  place  of  his 
permanent  residence,  where  he  intends  to  travel,  how 
long  he  expects  to  remain  in  each  foreign  country,  for 
what  purpose  he  is  proceeding  abroad,  the  circumstances 
which  make  his  absence  necessary,  that  he  intends  to 
return  to  the  United  States,  and  the  probable  duration 
of  his  absence  therefrom. 

9.  //  any  previous  application  for  a  similar  passport 
has  been  denied  by  the  Department,  this  fact  must  be 
stated  by  the  applicant. 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  a  description 
of   the  person  applying  and  should  state  the  following 

particulars,   namely:   Age,   ;    stature,   feet 

inches  (English  measure);   forehead, ;  eyes, 

;  nose, ;  mouth, ;  chin, ;  hair, 

;  complexion, ;  face, 

The  application  must  be  accompanied  by  two  support- 
ing affidavits  from  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who 
shall  state  that  the  applicant  is  the  person  he  represents 
himself  to  be,  how  long  they  have  known  him,  and  that 
the  facts  stated  in  his  affidavit  are  true  to  the  best  of 
their  knowledge  and  belief. 

Elihu  Root. 

Department  of  State, 

Washington,  March  23,  1907. 

3.  Issuance   of   Passports   as   Affected  by   the   Executive 
Order  of  April  6,  1907 — Emergency  Passp6rts. 

The  following  circular  instruction  relative  to  the  issu- 
ance of  passports,  dated  April  19, 1907,  has  been  sent  by 
the  Department  of  State  to  all  American  diplomatic  and 
consular  officers: 


PASSPORTS.  381 

To  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Officers 

of  the  United  States. 
Gentlemen:  Paragraphs  150,  151,  152,  and  163  of  the 
Diplomatic   Instructions   and    Consular   Regulations   as 
amended  by  the  Executive  order*  of  April  6,  1907,  read 
as  follows: 

"150.  When  Passports  May  Be  Issued. — Passports  can 
not  be  issued  by  diplomatic  or  consular  officers  if  the 
applicant  has  time  to  apply  to  the  Department  of  State 
and  await  its  reply.  Where  inconvenience  or  hardship 
would  result  to  a  person  entitled  to  receive  a  passport 
unless  he  received  it  at  once,  a  diplomatic  officer,  or  a 
consular  officer  who  shall  have  received  authority  to  do 
so  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  may  issue  to  such  person 
an  emergency  passport,  good  for  a  period  not  to  exceed 
six  months  from  the  date  of  issuance,  and  to  be  used 
for  a  purpose  which  shall  be  stated  in  the  passport. 
"This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907." 
"151.  Applications. — Persons  entitled  to  receive  pass- 
ports who  desire  to  secure  them  when  they  are  abroad 
may  make  applications  therefor  to  the  Department  of 
State  through  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer.  Native 
citizens  thus  applying  must  make  an  affidavit  with  re- 
spect to  birth,  take  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  furnish 
identification  by  a  creditable  person,  all  in  duplicate  and 
according  to  Form  No. — .  Naturalized  citizens  must 
comply  with  the  same  requirements,  using  Form  No. — ; 
and,  if  claiming  citizenship  through  naturalization  of 
husband  or  parent,  using  Form  No. — .  A  naturalized 
citizen  must  also  exhibit  his  certificate  of  naturalization 
or  that  of  the  husband  or  parent  through  whom  citizen- 
ship is  claimed,  or  a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  court 
record  thereof.  Further  evidence  of  the  applicant's 
citizenship  may  be  required,  if  deemed  necessary.  A 
loyal  resident  of  an  insular  possession  of  the  United 
States  in  addition  to  the  information  now  required  in 
the  case  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  must  state  that 
he  owes  allegiance  to  the  United  States  and  does  not 
acknowledge  allegiance   to  any  other  government,  and 

*  For  the  text  of  this  order,  see  Appendix. 


382  NATURALIZATION 

must  submit  an  affidavit  from  at  least  two  credible  wit- 
nesses having  good  means  of  knowledge  in  substantiation 
of  his  statements  of  birth,  residence  and  loyalty.  The 
identity  of  an  applicant  for  a  passport  should  always  be 
established  when  the  application  is  taken. 

"This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907." 
"  152.  Expiration  of  Passports. — A  passport  issued  by 
the  Department  is  good  for  a  period  of  two  years,  when 
it  expires;  but  it  may  be  renewed  for  a  further  period  of 
two  years  by  a  diplomatic  officer  or  by  a  consular  officer 
who  has  received  authority  for  the  purpose  from  the  Sec- 
retary of  State.  It  is  permissible  to  renew  passports 
only  once. 

"This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907." 
"  163.  Return  of  Passports. — As  soon  as  an  emergency 
passport  is  issued  by  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  he 
shall  transmit  to  the  Department  of  State  a  duplicate  of 
the  application  and  a  statement  of  the  proof  accepted  by 
him  for  the  issuance  of  the  passport  and  of  the  reason 
why  the  issuance  of  the  passport  was  necessary.  When- 
ever an  application  for  a  passport  is  made  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  through  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer 
he  shall  transmit  a  duplicate  of  the  application  and  of 
the  accompanying  proof  of  the  right  to  receive  a  pass- 
port to  the  Department  of  State,  but  he  need  not,  unless 
otherwise  instructed,  transmit  a  certificate  of  naturaliza- 
tion. 

"This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907." 

Consuls  at  the  following  places  shall  have  the  right  to 
issue  emergency  passports: 

Adis  Ababa,  Abyssinia. 

Barbados. 

Calcutta. 

Colombo,  Ceylon. 

Curacao,  W.  I. 

Nassau,  N.  P. 

St.  Michael's,  Azores. 

Seoul,  Korea. 

Sierra  Leone. 

Singapore. 

Tahiti. 

Tamatave. 


PASSPORTS.  383 

A  consul  in  a  country  where  there  is  diplomatic  repre- 
sentation of  the  United  States  may  issue  emergency 
passports  during  the  temporary  absence  of  the  diplomatic 
representative. 

Emergency  passports  may  be  issued  only  when  it  is 
clearly  shown  that  the  person  applying  for  the  passport 
is  about  to  proceed  to  a  country  to  obtain  admission 
into  which  a  passport  is  obligatory.  They  may  be  issued 
for  use  with  the  local  authorities  only  in  case  such 
authorities  will  not  accept  as  evidence  of  a  right  to 
recognition  as  an  American  citizen  the  certificate  of 
registration  provided  for  in  paragraph  172  of  the  consu- 
lar regulations  as  prescribed  in  the  executive  order  of 
April  8, 1907.  Emergency  passports  shall  be  in  the  form 
now  used  for  regular  passports,  except  that  there  shall 
be  inserted  therein  the  following  statement: 

Emergency  Passport. — This  passport  is  issued  to , 

in  order  that  he  may  proceed  to (If  the  passport 

is  issued  for  other  purposes  than  travel,  the  fact  should 
be  stated). 

Diplomatic  officers  and  all  consular  officers  may  take 
applications  for  the  issuance  of  passports  to  American 
citizens  by  this  Department,  following  the  rules  now  in 
force  on  the  subject  of  the  issuance  of  passports,  and 
shall  forward  each  application  to  the  Department  with 
the  evidence  of  the  right  to  secure  the  passport.  In  the 
case  of  an  application  by  a  naturalized  citizen  who  pre- 
sents his  certificate  of  naturalization,  this  document  need 
not  be  forwarded  to  this  Department,  being  the  property 
of  the  applicant;  but  the  application  should  set  forth 
the  name  of  the  court  in  which  the  applicant  was  natu- 
ralized and  the  date  and  place  of  such  naturalization. 

Diplomatic  and  principal  consular  officers  are  author- 
ized to  extend  for  a  period  of  two  years  passports  issued 
by  this  Department  which  are  about  to  expire  and  pre- 
sented to  them  for  extension.  Such  extension  should 
be  made  by  marking  conspicuously  across  the  passport 
the  following  words: 

"Extended  under  the  authority  of   the  Secretary  of 

State  for  two  years  and  not  valid  after (date  of 

expiration),"  this  being  signed  and  dated  by  the  diplo- 
matic or  consular  officer  and  his  seal  affixed.  A  passport 
which  has  been    thus  extended   is  not  valid  after  the 


384  NATURALIZATION 

date  to  which  it  was  extended.  A  passport  which  has 
expired  can  not  be  extended,  and  no  passport  can  be 
extended  more  than  once.  Emergency  passports  can  not 
be  extended. 

Immediately  upon  thus  extending  a  passport  the  diplo- 
matic or  consular  officer  should  notify  the  Department  of 
the  name  of  the  holder  of  the  passport,  its  number  and 
date,  and  the  reason  why  the  extension  was  asked. 

I  am,  gentlemen,  your  obedient  servant, 

Elihu  Root. 

D.  Forms. 

The  blank  forms  of  applications  for  passports  by  na- 
tive and  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  are 
subjoined: 

[form  for  native  citizen.] 
No .  Issued 

united  states  of  AMERICA. 

State  of | 

County  of f 

I, ,  a  native  and  loyal   citizen   of   the   United 

States,  hereby  apply  to  the  Department  of  State,  at 
Washington,  for  a  passport  for  myself,  accompanied  by 

as  follows:  ,  born  at  ,  on  the 

day  of ,  18 ,  and 

I  solemnly  swear  that  I  was  born  at  ,  in  the 

State  of ,  on  or  about  the  day  of  , 

18 ;    that   my   father   is  a  citizen   of   the 

United  States;  that  I  am  domiciled  in  the  United  States, 

my  permanent  residence  being  at  ,  in  the  State  of 

,  where  I  follow  the  occupation  of  ;  that  I 

am  about  to  go  abroad  temporarily,  and  that  I  intend  to 

return  to  the  United  States  ,  with  the  purpose  of 

residing  and  performing  the  duties  of  citizenship  therein. 

oath  of  ALLEGIANCE. 

Further,  I  do  solemnly  swear  that  I  will  support  and 
defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  against  all 
enemies,  foreign  and  domestic;  that  I  will  bear  true  faith 


PASSPORTS.  385 

and  allegiance  to  the  same,  and  that  I  take  this  obliga- 
tion freely,  without  any  mental  reservation  or  purpose 
of  evasion:  So  help  me  God. 

Sworn  to  before  me  this day  of ,  19 


Notary  Public. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  APPLICANT. 

Age, years.  Mouth,  

Stature, feet, Chin, 

inches,  Eng.  Hair, 

Forehead, „ Complexion, 

Eyes, Face, 

Nose , 

IDENTIFICATION. 

,19 

I  hereby  certify  that  I  know  the  above-named 

personally,  and  know  him  to  be  a  native-born  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  the  facts  stated  in  his  affi- 
davit are  true  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief. 


[Address  of  witness.]  

Applicant  desires  passport  sent  to  following  address: 


[form  for  NATURALIZED  CITIZEN.] 

No Issued. 


united  states  of  america. 

State  of / 

County  of | 

I, ,  a  naturalized  and  loyal  citizen  of  the  United 

States,  hereby  apply  to  the  Department  of  State,  at  Wash- 
ington, for  a  passport  for  myself,  accompanied  by „ 

as  follows:  ,  born  at ,  on  the day  of 

,  18 ;  and 


I  solemnly  swear  that  I  was  born  at ,  on  or  about 

the day  of ,  18 ;  that   I  emigrated  to 

5233—25 


386  NATURALIZATION 

the   United   States,  sailing   on   board    the ,  from 

,  on  or  about  the day  of ,  18 ; 

that  I  resided years,  uninterruptedly, in  the  United 

States,  from „  to ,  at ;  that  I  was  natu- 
ralized as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  before  the 

court  of ,  at ,  on   the day  of , 

19 ~,  as  shown   by  the   accompanying  certificate  of 

naturalization;   that  I  am  the  identical  person  described 
in  said  certificate;  thatlamdomiciled  in  theUnitedStates, 

my  permanent  residence  being  at ,  in  the  State  of 

,  where  I  follow  the  occupation  of ;  that  I 

am  about  to  go  abroad  temporarily  and  that  I  intend  to 

return    to    the    United    States ,  with  the  purpose 

of   residing   and    performing  the   duties  of   citizenship 
therein. 

OATH   OF   ALLEGIANCE. 

Further,  I  do  solemnly  swear  that  I  will  support  and 
defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  against  all 
enemies,  foreign  and  domestic  ;  that  I  will  bear  true  faith 
and  allegiance  to  the  same  ;  and  that  I  take  this  obliga- 
tion freely,  without  any  mental  reservation  or  purpose 
of  evasion:  So  help  me  God. 

Sworn  to  before  me  this day  of ,  19 


Notary  Public. 

DESCRIPTION   OF   APPLICANT. 

Age, years.  Mouth,  


Stature, feet, Chin, 

inches,  Eng.  Hair, 

Forehead, Complexion, 

Eyes, Face, : 

Nose, 

IDENTIFICATION. 

I  hereby  certify  that  I  know  the  above-named 

personally,  and  know  h to  be  the  identical  person 

referred  to  in  the  within-described  certificate  of  natural- 
ization, and  that  the  facts  stated  in  h affidavit  are 

true  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief. 


[Address  of  witness.] 


PASSPORTS.  387 

Applicant  desires  passport  sent  to  following  address  : 


Passports  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  State  are  in  the 
following  form  : 

[seal.] 

UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

Department  of  State. 

To  all  to  whom  these  presents  shall  come,  greeting: 

I,  the  undersigned,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  hereby  request  all  whom  it  may  con- 
cern to   permit  ,  a  citizen  of   the  United  States, 

safely  and  freely  to  pass,  and  in  case  of  need  to 

give all  lawful  aid  and  protection. 

description. 

Age, years  ;   stature feet  inches, 

Eng.;    forehead  ;    eyes ;  nose ;  mouth 

;  chin ;  hair ;  complexion ;  face 

[Signature  of  the  bearer,] 


Given  under  my  hand  and  seal  of   the  Department  of 

State,  at  the  city  of  Washington,  the day  of  , 

in  the  year  190...,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United 
States  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-eighth. 

No    


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  389 

CHAPTER  VII. 

ATTITUDE    OF     FOREIGN   GOVERNMENTvS    TOWARD    THEIR 
CITIZENS  WHO  HAVE  iBECOME  NATURALIZED  IN  UNITED 
STATES. 
Information    relative  to  rules  and   regulations  of  foreign   countries, 
compiled  by  Department  of  State. 

Austria-Hungary. 

Belgium. 

Denmark. 

France. 

Germany. 

Greece. 

Italy. 

The  Netherlands. 

Norway. 

Persia. 

Portugal. 

Roumania. 

Russia. 

Servia. 

Sweden. 

Switzerland. 

Turkey. 

Information  Relative  to  Rules  and  Regulations  of  Foreign 
Countries,  Compiled  by  Department  of  State.* 

The  following  information  relative  to  the  laws  and 
regulations  of  various  foreign  countries  has  been  care- 
fully compiled  by  the  Department  of  State,  and  is  fur- 
nished to  American  citizens,  formerly  subjects  of  those 
countries,  who  contemplate  returning  to  the  country  of 
their  origin: 
Austria-Hungary . 

All  male  subjects  of  Austria-Hungary  are  liable  to  the 
performance  of  military  service  between  the  ages  of 
nineteen  and  forty-two  years. 

Under   the   terms   of   the   treaty  between   the   United 

*  The  information  given  is  believed  to  be  correct,  yet  it  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  official,  as  it  relates  to  the  laws  and  regulations  of 
foreign  countries.     Note  by  Department  of  State. 


390  NATURALIZATION 

States  and  Austria-Hungary  a  former  subject  of  that 
country,  now  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
is  treated,  upon  his  return,  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  If  he  violated  any  of  the  criminal  laws  of  Austria- 
Hungary  before  the  date  of  emigration  he  remains  liable 
to  trial  and  punishment,  unless  the  right  to  punish  has 
been  lost  by  lapse  of  time  as  provided  by  law.  A  natural- 
ized American  citizen,  formerly  a  subject  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary, may  be  arrested  and  punished  under  the  military 
laws  only  in  the  following  cases:  (1)  If  he  was  accepted 
and  enrolled  as  a  recruit  in  the  army  before  the  date  of 
emigration,  although  he  had  not  been  put  in  service;  (2) 
if  he  was  a  soldier  when  he  emigrated,  either  in  active 
service  or  on  leave  of  absence;  (3)  if  he  was  summoned 
by  notice,  or  by  proclamation,  before  his  emigration,  to 
serve  in  the  reserve  or  militia,  and  failed  to  obey  the  call; 
(4)  if  he  emigrated  after  war  had  broken  out. 

A  naturalized  American  citizen  of  Austro-Hungarian 
origin  on  arriving  in  that  country  should  at  once  show 
his  passport  to  the  proper  authorities;  and  if,  on  in- 
quiry, it  is  found  that  his  name  is  on  the  military  rolls, 
he  should  request  that  it  be  struck  off,  calling  attention 
to  the  treaty  of  September  20,  1870  (17  Stat,  at  L.  833), 
between  this  country  and  Austria-Hungary. 

The  laws  of  Austria-Hungary  require  every  stranger  to 
produce  a  passport  on  entering.  This  provision  is  not 
usually  enforced,  but  may  be  at  any  time.  Travelers 
are  usually  called  upon  to  establish  their  identity,  and 
are  advised  to  provide  themselves  with  passports.  They 
do  not  ordinarily  require  to  be  visaed. 

Belgium. 

Every  male  Belgian  must  register  during  the  calendar 
year  in  which  he  reaches  the  age  of  nineteen  years  to 
take  part  in  the  drawing  of  lots  for  the  raising  of  the 
necessary  military  contingent. 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  391 

Anyone  who  has  drawn  a  number  which  designates 
him  for  military  service,  or,  in  case  of  his  absence,  has 
had  a  number  drawn  for  him  by  the  proper  authority,  is 
punishable  if  he  does  not  answer  the  call  for  service. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  convention  between  the  United 
States  and  Belgium,  a  Belgian,  naturalized  as  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  is  considered  by  Belgium  as  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States,  but  upon  return  to  Belgium  he 
may  be  prosecuted  for  crime  or  misdemeanor  committed 
before  naturalization,  saving  such  limitations  as  are  es- 
tablished by  the  laws  of  Belgium. 

A  naturalized  American,  formerly  a  Belgian,  who  has 
resided  five  years  in  this  country,  can  not  be  held  to 
military  service  in  Belgium,  or  to  incidental  obligation 
resulting  therefrom,  in  the  event  of  his  return,  except  in 
cases  of  desertion  from  organized  or  embodied  military 
or  naval  service. 

Passports  are  not  usually  required  in  Belgium,  but 
people  who  contemplate  sojourning  in  that  country  are 
recommended  to  carry  them  in  order  to  establish  their 
identity.     They  do  not  require  to  be  visaed  or  indorsed. 

Denmark. 

Military  service  becomes  compulsory  to  a  subject  of 
Denmark  during  the  calendar  year  in  which  he  reaches 
the  age  of  twenty-two  years. 

In  November  or  December  of  the  year  in  which  he  be- 
comes seventeen  years  old,  he  is  expected  to  report  for 
enrollment  on  the  conscription  lists.  If  he  neglects  to 
do  so,  he  may  be  fined  from  2  to  40  kroner;  but  if  his 
neglect  arises  from  a  design  to  evade  service  he  may  be 
imprisoned. 

In  case  he  fails  to  appear  when  the  law  requires  that 
he  be  assigned  to  military  duty,  he  is  liable  to  imprison- 
ment. 

When  one  whose  name  has  been,  or  should  have  been. 


392  NATURALIZATION 

entered  on  the  conscription  lists  emigrates  without  re- 
porting his  intended  departure  to  the  local  authorities 
he  is  liable  to  a  fine  of  from  25  to  100  kroner. 

A  person  above  the  age  of  twenty-two  years,  entered 
for  military  service,  must  obtain  a  permit  from  the  min- 
ister of  justice  to  emigrate.  Noncompliance  with  this 
regulation  is  punishable  by  a  fine  of  from  20  to  200 
kroner. 

The  treaty  of  naturalization  between  the  United 
States  and  Denmark  provides  that  a  former  subject  of 
Denmark,  naturalized  in  the  United  States,  shall,  upon 
his  return  to  Denmark,  be  treated  as  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States;  but  he  is  not  thereby  exempted  from 
penalties  for  offenses  committed  against  Danish  law  be- 
fore his  emigration.  If  he  renews  his  residence  in  Den- 
mark with  intent  to  remain,  he  is  held  to  have  renounced 
his  American  citizenship. 

A  naturalized  American,  formerly  a  Danish  subject,  is 
not  liable  to  perform  military  service  on  his  return  to 
Denmark,  unless  at  the  time  of  emigration  he  was  in  the 
army  and  deserted,  or,  being  twenty-two  years  old  at 
least,  had  been  enrolled  for  duty  and  notified  to  report, 
and  failed  to  do  so.  He  is  not  liable  for  service  which 
he  was  not  actually  called  upon  to  perform. 

Passports  are  not  required  to  secure  admission  to 
Denmark,  but  they  are  useful  or  necessary  as  means  of 
identification,  or  in  proof  of  citizenship.  They  should 
be  exhibited  whenever  evidence  of  citizenship  is  required. 

France. 

All  Frenchmen  who  are  not  declared  unfit  or  excused 
may  be  called  upon  for  military  duty  between  the  ages 
of  20  and  45  years.  They  are  obliged  to  serve  three 
years  in  the  active  army,  ten  in  the  reserve  of  the  active 
army,  six  in  the  territorial  army,  and  six  in  the  reserve 
of  the  territorial  army. 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  393 

If  released  from  all  military  obligations  in  France,  or 
if  the  authorization  of  the  French  government  was  ob- 
tained beforehand,  naturalization  of  a  former  French 
citizen  in  the  United  States  is  accepted  by  the  French 
government;  but  a  Frenchman  naturalized  abroad  with- 
out the  consent  of  his  government,  and  who  at  the  time 
of  his  naturalization  was  still  subject  to  military  service 
in  the  active  army,  or  in  the  reserve  of  the  active  army, 
is  held  to  be  amenable  to  the  French  military  laws.  Not 
having  responded  to  the  notice  calling  him  to  accom- 
plish his  military  service,  he  is  placed  on  the  list  of  those 
charged  with  noncompliance  with  the  military  laws,  and, 
if  he  returns  to  France,  he  is  liable  to  arrest,  trial,  and, 
upon  conviction,  is  turned  over  to  the  army,  active, 
reserve,  or  territorial,  according  to  his  age.  Long  absence 
from  France  and  old  age  do  not  prevent  this  action. 

A  Frenchman  naturalized  abroad,  after  having  passed 
the  age  of  service  in  the  active  army  and  the  reserve, 
nevertheless  continues  on  the  military  list  until  he  has 
had  his  name  struck  from  the  rolls,  which  may  usually 
be  done  by  his  sending  his  naturalization  certificate 
through  the  United  States  embassy  to  the  proper  French 
authorities. 

The  French  government  rarely  gives  consent  to  a 
Frenchman  of  military  age  to  throw  off  his  allegiance. 
Application  on  the  subject  may,  however,  be  addressed 
to  the  minister  of  justice  at  Paris,  accompanied  by  a  full 
statement  of  the  particulars  and  a  fee  of  675  francs.  If 
the  request  is  granted  the  name  of  the  person  concerned 
is  erased  from  the  military  list,  and  he  may  return  to 
France  safely. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
France  defining  the  status  of  former  French  citizens  who 
have  become  naturalized  American  citizens. 

Passports  are  not  necessary  to  enter  France,  but  are 


394  NATURALIZATION 

usually  required  from  sojourners  or  travelers  afterwards. 
They  are  recognized  without  being  visaed  or   indorsed. 

Germany. 

A  German  subject  is  liable  to  military  service  from  the 
time  he  has  completed  the  seventeenth  year  of  his  age 
until  his  forty-fifth  year,  active  service  lasting  from  the 
beginning  of  his  twentieth  year  to  the  end  of  his  thirty- 
sixth  year. 

A  German  who  emigrates  before  he  is  seventeen  years 
old,  or  before  he  has  been  actually  called  upon  to  appear 
before  the  military  authorities,  may  after  a  residence  in 
the  United  States  of  five  years  and  after  due  naturaliza- 
tion, return  to  Germany  on  a  visit,  but  his  right  to 
remain  in  his  former  home  is  denied  by  Germany,  and  he 
may  be  expelled  after  a  brief  sojourn  on  the  ground  that 
he  left  Germany  merely  to  evade  military  service.  It  is 
not  safe  for  a  person  who  has  been  once  expelled  to 
return  to  Germany  without  having  obtained  permission 
to  do  so  in  advance.  A  person  who  has  completed  his 
military  service  and  has  reached  his  thirty-first  year 
and  become  an  American  citizen  may  safely  return  to 
Germany. 

The  treaties  between  the  United  States  and  the  Ger- 
man states  provide  that  German  subjects  who  have 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall  be  recognized 
as  such  upon  their  return  to  Germany  if  they  resided  in 
the  United  States  five  years. 

But  a  naturalized  American  of  German  birth  is  liable 
to  trial  and  punishment  upon  return  to  Germany  for  an 
offense  against  German  law  committed  before  emigration, 
saving  always  the  limitations  of  the  laws  of  Germany.  If 
he  emigrated  after  he  was  enrolled  as  a  recruit  in  the 
standing  army;  if  he  emigrated  while  in  service  or  while 
on  leave  of  absence  for  a  limited  time;  if,  having  an 
unlimited  leave   or  being  in  the    reserve,  he   emigrated 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  395 

after  receiving  a  call  into  service  or  after  a  public  proc- 
lamation requiring  his  appearance,  or  after  war  broke 
out — he  is  liable  to  trial  and  punishment  on  return. 

Alsace-Lorraine  having  become  a  part  of  Germany 
since  our  naturalization  treaties  with  the  other  German 
states  were  negotiated,  American  citizens,  natives  of 
that  province,  under  existing  circumstances,  may  be 
subjected  to  inconvenience,  and  possible  detention,  by 
the  German  authorities  if  they  return  without  having 
sought  and  obtained  permission  to  do  so  from  the  im- 
perial governor  at  Strasburg. 

The  authorities  of  Wiirttemberg  require  that  the  evi- 
dence of  the  American  citizenship  of  a  former  subject  of 
Wiirttemberg,  which  is  furnished  by  a  passport,  shall  be 
supplemented  by  a  duly  authenticated  certificate  show- 
ing five  years' residence  in  the  United  States,  in  order 
that  fulfilment  of  the  treaty  condition  of  five  years'  resi- 
dence may  appear  separately  as  a  fact  of  record. 

A  former  German  subject  against  whom  there  is  an 
outstanding  sentence,  or  who  fears  molestation  upon  re- 
turn for  an  offense  against  German  law,  may  petition  the 
sovereign  of  his  native  state  for  relief,  but  this  government 
can  not  act  as  intermediary  in  presenting  the  petition. 

Travelers  are  not  required  to  show  passports  on  enter- 
ing or  leaving  Germany,  but  they  are  likely  to  be  called 
upon  to  establish  their  identity  and  citizenship  at  any 
time,  and  especially  so  if  living  in  boarding  houses  or 
renting  apartments.  They  are  consequently  recom- 
mended to  provide  themselves  with  passports.  They  do 
not  usually  require  to  be  visaed  or  indorsed,  but  the  local 
authorities  sometimes  demand  a  German  translation. 

Greece. 

The  Greek  government  does  not,  as  a  general  state- 
ment, recognize  a  change  of  nationality  on  the  part  of  a 
former  Greek  without   the  consent   of  the  King,  and  a 


396  NATURALIZATION 

former  Greek  who  has  not  completed  his  military  service, 
and  who  is  not  exempt  therefrom  under  the  military 
code,  may  be  arrested  on  his  return  to  Greece.  The 
practice  of  the  Greek  government  is  not,  however,  uni- 
form, but  American  citizens  of  Greek  origin  are  advised 
to  find  out  before  returning  what  status  they  may  expect 
to  enjoy.  Information  should  be  sought  directly  from 
the  Greek  government,  and  this  Department  always  re- 
fuses to  act  as  intermediary  in  seeking  the  information. 

There  is  no  treaty  on  the  subject  of  naturalized  citi- 
zens between  the  United  States  and  Greece. 

Passports  are  not  required  in  Greece,  but  may  be  use- 
ful in  establishing  American  citizenship. 

Italy. 

Italian  subjects,  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and 
thirty-nine  years  are  liable  for  the  performance  of  mili- 
tary duty  under  Italian  law,  except  in  the  case  of  an 
only  son  ;  or  where  two  brothers  are  so  nearly  of  the 
same  age  that  both  would  be  serving  at  the  same  time, 
in  which  event  only  one  is  drafted;  or  where  there  are 
two  sons  of  a  widow,  when  only  one  is  taken. 

Naturalization  of  an  Italian  subject  in  a  foreign  coun- 
try without  consent  of  the  Italian  government  is  no  bar 
to  liability  to  military  service. 

A  former  Italian  subject  may  visit  Italy  without  fear 
of  molestation  when  he  is  under  the  age  of  twenty  years; 
but  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  thirty-nine  he  is 
liable  to  arrest  and  forced  military  service,  if  he  has  not 
previously  reported  for  such  service.  After  the  age  of 
thirty-nine  he  may  be  arrested  and  imprisoned  (but  will 
not  be  compelled  to  do  military  duty)  unless  he  has 
been  pardoned.  He  may  petition  the  Italian  govern- 
ment for  pardon,  but  this  Department  will  not  act  as  the 
intermediary  in  presenting  his  petition. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Italy 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  397 

defining  the  status  of  former  Italian  subjects  who  have 
become  American  citizens. 

The  Italian  law  does  not  require  the  production  of 
passports  by  foreign  travelers,  but  they  are  frequently 
called  upon  to  establish  their  identity,  and  are  accord- 
ingly recommended  to  provide  themselves  with  pass- 
ports. They  are  often  useful  in  preventing  an  interfer- 
ence with  departure  from  Italy.  They  do  not  require  to 
be  visaed  or  indorsed. 

The  Netherlands. 

A  subject  of  the  Netherlands  is  liable  to  military 
service  from  his  nineteenth  to  his  fortieth  year.  He 
must  register  to  take  part  in  the  drawing  of  lots  for 
military  service  between  January  1  and  August  31  of  the 
calendar  year  in  which  he  reaches  the  age  of  nineteen. 
He  is  exempt,  however,  from  service  if  he  is  an  only  son 
or  is  physically  disabled;  and  in  the  case  of  a  family  half 
of  the  brothers  are  exempt,  or  the  majority  if  the  num- 
ber is  uneven. 

No  military  service  is  required  of  one  who  became  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  before  the  calendar  year  in 
which  he  became  nineteen  years  of  age,  and  a  Nether- 
lands subject  who  becomes  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
when  he  is  nineteen  and  between  January  1  and  August 
31  may  have  his  name  removed  from  the  register  by  ap- 
plying to  the  Queen's  commissioner  of  the  province  in 
which  he  was  registered.  If  he  does  not  have  his  name 
removed  from  the  register,  or  if  he  becomes  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  after  the  register  is  closed  (August  31), 
and  his  name  is  drawn  for  enlistment,  his  naturalization 
does  not  affect  his  military  obligations  to  the  Nether- 
lands, and  if  he  returns  he  is  liable  (1)  to  be  treated  as  a 
deserter,  if  he  did  not  respond  to  the  summons  for 
service,  or  (2)  to  be  enlisted  if  he  is  under  forty. 


398  NATURALIZATION 

Former  Netherlands  subjects  are  advised  to  ascertain 
by  inquiry  from  the  Netherlands  authorities  what  status 
they  may  expect  to  enjoy  if  they  return  to  the  Nether- 
lands. This  Department,  however,  uniformly  declines 
to  act  as  the  intermediary  in  the  inquiry. 

Passports  are  not  required  for  admission  to  the 
Netherlands,  but  American  citizens  are  advised  to  carry 
them  for  purposes  of  identification  and  in  attestation  of 
citizenship. 

Norway. 

Subjects  of  Norway  are  liable  to  performance  of  mili- 
tary duty  in  and  after  the  calendar  year  in  which  they 
reach  their  twenty-second  year. 

Under  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Sweden  and  Norway,  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  formerly  a  subject  of  Norway,  is  recognized  as 
an  American  citizen  upon  his  return  to  the  country  of 
his  origin.  He  is  liable,  however,  to  punishment  for  an 
offense  against  the  laws  of  Norway  committed  before  his 
emigration,  saving,  always,  the  limitations  and  remissions 
established  by  those  laws.  Emigration  itself  is  not  an 
offense,  but  nonfulfilment  of  military  duty  and  desertion 
from  a  military  force  or  ship  are  offenses. 

A  naturalized  American  who  performed  his  military 
service  or  emigrated  when  he  was  not  liable  to  it,  and 
who  infracted  no  laws  before  emigrating,  may  safely  re- 
turn to  Norway. 

He  must,  however,  report  to  the  conscription  officers, 
and,  on  receiving  a  summons,  present  himself  at  the 
meetings  of  the  conscripts  in  order  to  prove  his  American 
citizenship. 

If  he  has  remained  as  long  as  two  years  in  Norway,  he 
is  obliged,  without  being  summoned,  to  present  himself 
for  enrollment  at  the  first  session,  since  he  is  then  deemed 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  399 

by  Norway  to  have  renounced  his  American  citizenship. 

If  he  renews  his  residence  in  the  kingdom  without  in- 
tent to  return  to  America,  he  is  held  to  have  renounced 
his  American  citizenship. 

Passports  are  not  required  from  persons  entering  or 
traveling  in  the  kingdom,  but  they  may  be  called  upon 
to  establish  their  citizenship,  and  are  consequently 
advised  to  procure  passports. 

Persia. 

Permission  to  be  naturalized  in  a  foreign  country  is 
not  granted  by  the  Persian  government  to  a  Persian  sub- 
ject if  he  is  undercharge  for  a  crime  committed  in  Persia, 
or  is  a  fugitive  from  justice,  or  a  deserter  from  the  Per- 
sian army,  or  is  in  debt  in  Persia,  or  fled  to  avoid  pecuniary 
obligations. 

If  a  Persian  subject  becomes  a  citizen  of  another  coun- 
try with  the  permission  of  the  Persian  government  he  is 
forbidden  to  re-enter  Persian  territory,  and  if  he  had  any 
property  in  Persia  he  is  ordered  to  sell  or  dispose  of  it. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Persia  defining  the  status  of  former  Persian  subjects  who 
have  become  naturalized  American  citizens. 

Passports  are  usually  required  of  foreigners  desiring 
to  enter  Persia,  and  they  should,  if  possible,  bear  the 
visa  or  indorsement  of  a  Persian  consular  officer. 

Portugal. 

Military  service  is  obligatory  upon  Portuguese  male 
subjects,  but  by  becoming  naturalized  in  a  foreign  coun- 
try a  Portuguese  loses  his  qualifications  as  such. 

On  returning  to  the  kingdom  with  the  intention  of  re- 
siding in  it  he  may  reacquire  Portuguese  subjection  by 
requesting  it  from  the  municipal  authorities  of  the  place 


400  NATURALIZATION 

he  selects  for  his  residence.  Not  making  this  declara- 
tion, he  remains  an  alien,  and  is  not  subject  to  military 
duty. 

If  a  Portuguese  leaves  Portugal  without  having  per- 
formed the  military  duty  to  which  he  was  liable,  and 
becomes  naturalized  in  a  foreign  country,  his  property  is 
subject  to  seizure,  and  that  of  the  person  who  may  have 
become  security  for  him  when  he  left  the  kingdom  is 
equally  liable.  There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Portugal  defining  the  status  of  former  Portu- 
guese subjects  who  have  become  naturalized  American 
citizens. 

Passports  are  not  required  to  enter  Portuguese  domin- 
ions. Travelers  are,  however,  required  to  establish  their 
nationality  when  they  depart,  and  for  this  purpose  a 
passport  is  the  most  effective  document. 

[Note  by  the  author:  The  rules  as  above  stated  for 
Portugal  need  some  amplification.  If  a  Portuguese  subject 
leaves  Portugal  after  becoming  liable  to  military  duty  and 
becomes  naturalized  in  this  country,  he  is  liable  to  arrest 
upon  his  return  to  Portugal.  The  Department  of  State  has 
recognized  this  principle  in  its  treaties  and  diplomatic 
correspondence  with  many  foreign  governments.  But 
Portugal  has  taken  a  more  extreme  attitude.  In  a  case 
recently  occurring  in  Madeira,  the  Portuguese  authori- 
ties arrested  and  imprisoned  a  naturalized  American  citi- 
zen of  Portuguese  origin,  although  it  appeared  that  the 
man  had  left  Portugal  and  had  been  domiciled  in  the 
United  States  for  five  years  at  the  time  he  was  summoned 
to  report  for  military  duty,  but  had  not  yet  become  a 
naturalized  citizen.  The  Portuguese  government  held 
that  inasmuch  as  he  was  drafted  prior  to  his  naturaliza- 
tion, he  was  a  deserter  under  their  law  and  subject  to 
punishment.  His  absence  from  the  territorial  jurisdiction 
of  Portugal  at  the  time  of  his  summons  appeared  to  be 
immaterial.     This  attitude  has  been  made  the  subject  of 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  401 

protest  by  the  Department  of  State.  Mr.  Bacon,  Acting 
Secretary,  to  Mr.  Bryan,  minister  to  Portugal,  March  30, 
1907.     MS.  Inst,  to  Portugal.] 

Roumania. 

All  male  inhabitants  of  Roumania,  except  those  under 
foreign  protection,  are  liable  to  military  duty  between 
the  ages  of  twenty -one  and  thirty  years. 

American  citizens  formerly  Roumanian  subjects  are 
not  molested  upon  their  return  to  Roumania,  unless  they 
infringed  Roumanian  law  before  emigrating.  One  who 
did  not  complete  his  military  service  in  Roumania,  and 
can  not  prove  that  he  performed  military  service  in  the 
United  States,  is  subject  to  arrest,  or  fine,  or  both,  for 
evasion  of  military  duty. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Roumania  defining  the  status  of  naturalized  Americans 
of  Roumanian  birth  returning  to  Roumania. 

Passports  are  absolutely  necessary  in  Roumania,  and 
must  be  visaed  by  a  Roumanian  consul.  If  they  are  not 
so  visaed  the  holder  may  be  sent  back  from  the  frontier 
to  the  nearest  place  where  there  is  a  Roumanian  consul. 

An  American  who  intends  to  remain  in  Roumania  for 
a  longer  period  than  eight  days  must  have  his  passport 
visaed  by  the  United  States  consul  at  Bucharest,  and 
obtain  a  permit  of  residence,  valid  for  one  year,  from  the 
prefecture  of  police. 

Russia. 

A  Russian  is  enrolled  for  military  service  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  twenty-first  year  of  his  age,  and  remains  on 
the  rolls  to  the  end  of  his  forty-third  year;  but  at  the 
age  of  fifteen  he  is  considered  to  be  among  those  who 
are  liable  to  perform  military  service,  and  he  can  not, 
after  reaching  that  age,  ask  for  permission  to  become  a 
citizen  of  a  foreign  country,  unless  he  has  performed  his 

5233—26 


402  NATURALIZATION 

military  service.  A  Russian  who  becomes  a  citizen  of 
another  country  without  imperial  consent  is  liable,  under 
Russian  law,  to  the  loss  of  all  his  civil  rights,  and  to 
perpetual  banishment  from  the  Empire.  If  he  returns 
he  is  liable  to  deportation  to  Siberia.  When  a  Russian 
emigrates  before  he  is  fifteen  years  old,  and  subsequently 
becomes  a  citizen  of  another  country,  he  is  equally  liable 
to  punishment,  unless  when  he  attained  the  age  of 
twenty-one  years  he  took  steps  necessary  to  obtain  the 
consent  of  the  Emperor  to  his  expatriation. 

Naturalized  Americans  of  Russian  birth,  of  the  Jewish 
race,  are  not  allowed  to  enter  Russia  except  by  special 
permission.  For  this,  they  may  apply  to  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior,  but  the  Department  can  not  act  as  inter- 
mediary in  making  the  application. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Russia  defining  the  status  of  American  citizens  of  Rus- 
sian birth  upon  their  return  to  Russia. 

No  one  is  admitted  to  Russia  without  a  passport.  It 
must  be  visaed  by  a  Russian  diplomatic  or  consular  rep- 
resentative. Upon  entering  Russia  it  should  be  shown 
at  the  first  government  house,  and  the  holder  will  be 
given  another  passport  or  permit  of  sojourn.  At  least 
twenty-four  hours  before  departure  from  Russia  this 
permit  should  be  presented  and  a  passport  of  departure 
will  be  granted  and  the  original  passport  returned.  A 
fresh  permit  to  remain  in  Russia  must  be  obtained  every 
six  months. 

Servia. 

Ordinarily,  all  subjects  of  Servia  are  expected  to  per- 
form at  least  two  years  military  service  after  they  attain 
manhood. 

If  a  subject  of  Servia  emigrates  before  he  has  fulfilled 
his  military  obligations,  the  Servian  government  does 
not  recognize  a  change  of  nationality  made  without  the 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  403 

consent  of  the  King,  and  upon  his  return  he  may  be  sub- 
ject to  molestation. 

If,  however,  he  performed  his  military  service  before 
emigration,  his  acquisition  of  naturalization  in  the  United 
States  is  recognized  by  the  Servian  government. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Servia  defining  the  status  of  naturalized  Americans  of 
Servian  birth  returning  to  Servia. 

Passports  are  rigorously  required  of  all  persons  who 
desire  to  enter  Servia. 

Sweden. 

Subjects  of  Sweden  are  liable  to  performance  of  military 
duty  in  and  after  the  calendar  year  in  which  they  reach 
their  twenty-first  year. 

Under  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Sweden  and  Norway  [17  Stat,  at  L.  809],  a  naturalized 
citizen  of  the  United  States,  formerly  a  subject  of 
Sweden,  is  recognized  as  an  American  citizen  upon  his 
return  to  the  country  of  his  origin.  He  is  liable,  how- 
ever, to  punishment  for  an  offense  against  the  laws  of 
Sweden  committed  before  his  emigration,  saving,  always, 
the  limitations  and  remissions  established  by  those  laws. 
Emigration  itself  is  not  an  offense,  but  nonfulfilment  of 
military  duty,  and  desertion  from  a  military  force  or 
ship,  are  offenses. 

A  naturalized  American  who  performed  his  military 
service  or  emigrated  when  he  was  not  liable  to  it,  and 
who  infracted  no  laws  before  emigrating,  may  safely  re- 
turn to  Sweden. 

If  he  renews  his  residence  in  the  kingdom  without  in- 
tent to  return  to  America,  he  is  held  to  have  renounced 
his  American  citizenship,  and  he  will  be  liable  to  perform 
military  duty. 

Passports  are  not  required  from  persons  entering  or 
traveling  in  the  kingdom,  but  they  may  be  called  upon 


404  NATURALIZATION 

to  establish  their  citizenship,  and  are  consequently  ad- 
vised to  procure  passports. 

Switzerland. 

Every  Swiss  citizen  is  liable,  under  Swiss  law,  to  mili- 
tary service  from  the  beginning  of  the  year  in  which  he 
becomes  twenty  years  of  age  until  the  end  of  the  year 
when  he  becomes  forty-four.  Every  Swiss  of  military 
age  who  does  not  perform  military  service  is  subject 
to  an  annual  tax,  whether  he  resides  in  the  Confederation 
or  not,  or  to  punishment  for  nonpayment  of  the  tax  if 
he  returns  to  Switzerland. 

If  a  Swiss  citizen  renounces  Swiss  allegiance  in  the 
manner  prescribed  by  the  Swiss  law  of  July  3,  1876,  and 
his  renunciation  is  accepted,  his  naturalization  in  another 
country  is  recognized,  but  without  such  acceptance  it  is 
not  recognized,  and  is  held  to  descend  from  generation 
to  generation. 

Before  he  returns  to  Switzerland  an  American  citizen 
of  Swiss  origin  should  file  with  the  cantonal  authorities 
his  written  declaration  of  renunciation  of  his  rights  to 
communal,  cantonal,  and  in  general  Swiss  citizenship, 
with  documents  showing  that  he  has  obtained  foreign 
citizenship  for  himself,  wife,  and  minor  children,  and 
received  the  sealed  document  of  release  from  Swiss  citizen- 
ship through  the  direction  of  justice  of  the  canton  of  his 
origin.  If  he  neglects  this,  and  is  within  the  ages  when 
military  service  may  be  required,  he  is  liable  to  military 
tax,  or  to  arrest  and  punishment  in  case  of  nonpayment 
of  the  tax. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Switzerland  defining  the  status  of  former  Swiss  citizens 
who  have  become  naturalized  as  American  citizens. 

Passports  are  not  required  for  admission  to  Switzer- 
land, but  are  usually  demanded  from  persons  sojourning 


ATTITUDE  OF  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS.  405 

in  that  country.     They  do  not  require  to  be  visaed  or 

indorsed  to  be  valid. 

Turkey. 

The  Turkish  government  denies  the  right  of  a  subject 
of  Turkey  to  become  a  citizen  of  any  other  country 
without  the  authority  of  the  Turkish  government.  His 
naturalization  is,  therefore,  regarded  by  Turkey  as  void 
with  reference  to  himself  and  his  children,  and  he  is  for- 
bidden to  return  to  Turkey. 

The  consent  of  the  Turkish  government  to  the  natu- 
ralization in  another  country  of  a  former  subject  of 
Turkey  is  given  only  upon  condition  that  the  applicant 
shall  stipulate,  either  never  to  return,  or,  returning,  to 
regard  himself  as  a  Turkish  subject.  Therefore,  if  a 
naturalized  American  citizen,  formerly  a  subject  of 
Turkey,  returns  to  Turkey,  he  may  expect  arrest  and 
imprisonment,  or  expulsion. 

Jews  are  prohibited  from  colonizing  in  Turkish  domin- 
ions. 

There  is  no  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
Turkey  defining  the  status  of  naturalized  Americans, 
formerly  Turkish  subjects,  who  return  to  Turkey. 

Passports  are  required  from  all  persons  entering  Turk- 
ish dominions  (Egypt  excepted),  and  persons  who  enter 
without  passports  are  liable  to  fine  or  imprisonment. 
The  passports  should,  if  possible,  be  visaed  by  a  Turkish 
consular  officer  in  the  United  States. 


APPENDIX. 


Laws  of  the  United  States  relating  to  Naturalization  and 
Expatriation. 


Naturalization  Treaties  to  which  the  United  States  is  a 

Party. 


Executive  Orders  of  April  6  and  April  8,  1 907,  Amend- 
ing the    Instructions  to  Diplomatic  Officers  and  the 
Consular  Regulations,  Relative  to  Expatriation, 
Citizenship,  Naturalization,  and  Passports. 


Naturalization    Regulations    Promulgated  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor. 


List  of  Courts  Authorized  to  Naturalize  Aliens. 


List  of  Foreign  Countries  and  their  Rulers. 


APPENDIX.  409 


APPENDIX. 


LAWS    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES    RELATING   TO 
NATURALIZATION  AND  EXPATRIATION. 

Sections  of  Revised  Statutes  : 

Sec.  1994.  Citizenship  of  alien  woman   married   to   a   citizen  of  the 

United  States. 
Sec.  1995-  Citizenship  of  persons  born  in  Territory  of  Oregon. 
Sec.  1996.  Deserters. 
Sec.  1997.  Deserters. 
Sec.  1998.  Deserters. 
Sec.  1999.  Right  of  expatriation. 

Sec.  2000.  Protection  of  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
Sec.  2001.  Assistance  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  unjustly  deprived 

of  liberty  in  foreign  country. 
Sec.  2166.  Naturalization  of  soldiers. 
Sec.  2169.  Who  may  be  naturalized. 
Sec.  2171.  Alien  enemies. 

Sec.  2172.  Naturalization  by  naturalization  of  parent. 
Sec.  2174.  Naturalization  of  merchant  seamen. 
Sec.  5395.  False  swearing  in  naturalization. 
Sec.  5424.  False  personation,  etc. 
Sec.  5425.  Using  false  certificate  of  citizenship. 
Sec.  5426.  Using  false  certificate,  etc.,  as  evidence  of  right  to  vote. 
Sec.  5427.  Aiding  or  abetting  violation  of  preceding  sections. 
Sec.  5428.  Falsely  claiming  citizenship. 
Sec.  5429.  Provisions  applicable  to  all  courts  of  naturalization. 

Other  Acts  of  Congress  : 

Act  of  May  6,  1882  (22  Stat,  at  L/.),  forbidding  naturalization  of 
Chinese. 

Act  of  June  29,  1906  (34  Stat,  at  D.),  establishing  a  Bureau  of  Natu- 
ralization, and  providing  for  a  uniform  rule  for  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  aliens. 

Act  of  March  2,  1907,  in  reference  to  the  expatriation  of  citizens  and 
their  protection  abroad. 

SECTIONS   OF   THE    REVISED    STATUTES. 

Sec.  1994.  Any  woman  who  is  now  or  may  hereafter 
be  married  to  a  citizen  of  the   United  States,  and  who 


410  NATURALIZATION 

might  herself  be  lawfully  naturalized,  shall  be  deemed  a 
citizen. 

Sec.  1995.  All  persons  born  in  the  district  of  country 
formerly  known  as  the  Territory  of  Oregon,  and  subject 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  on  the  18th  May, 
1872,  are  citizens  in  the  same  manner  as  if  born  else- 
where in  the  United  States. 

Sec.  1996.  All  persons  who  deserted  the  military  or 
naval  service  of  the  United  States  and  did  not  return 
thereto  or  report  themselves  to  a  provost-marshal  within 
sixty  days  after  the  issuance  of  the  proclamation  by  the 
President,  dated  the  11th  day  of  March,  1865,  are 
deemed  to  have  voluntarily  relinquished  and  forfeited 
their  rights  of  citizenship,  as  well  as  their  right  to  be- 
come citizens;  and  such  deserters  shall  be  forever  in- 
capable of  holding  any  office  of  trust  or  profit  under  the 
United  States,  or  of  exercising  any  rights  of  citizens 
thereof. 

Sec.  1997.  No  soldier  or  sailor,  however,  who  faithfully 
served  according  to  his  enlistment  until  the  19th  day  of 
April,  1865,  and  who,  without  proper  authority  or  leave 
first  obtained,  quit  his  command  or  refused  to  serve 
after  that  date,  shall  be  held  to  be  a  deserter  from  the 
Army  or  Navy;  but  this  section  shall  be  construed  solely 
as  a  removal  of  any  disability  such  soldier  or  sailor  may 
have  incurred,  under  the  preceding  section,  by  the  loss 
of  citizenship  and  of  the  right  to  hold  office,  in  conse- 
quence of  his  desertion. 

Sec.  1998.  Every  person  who  hereafter  deserts  the 
military  or  naval  service  of  the  United  States,  or  who, 
being  duly  enrolled,  departs  the  jurisdiction  of  the  dis- 
trict in  which  he  is  enrolled,  or  goes  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  United  States,  with  intent  to  avoid  any  draft  into 
the  military  or  naval  service,  lawfully  ordered,  shall  be 
liable  to  all  the  penalties  and  forfeitures  of  section  nine- 
teen hundred  and  ninety-six. 


APPENDIX.  411 

Sec.  1999.  Whereas  the  right  of  expatriation  is  a 
natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people,  indispensable  to 
the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness;  and  whereas  in  the  recognition  of  this 
principle  this  government  has  freely  received  emigrants 
from  all  nations,  and  invested  them  with  the  rights  of 
citizenship;  and  whereas  it  is  claimed  that  such  Ameri- 
can citizens,  with  their  descendants,  are  subjects  of 
foreign  states,  owing  allegiance  to  the  governments 
thereof;  and  whereas  it  is  necessary  to  the  maintenance 
of  public  peace  that  this  claim  of  foreign  allegiance 
should  be  promptly  and  finally  disavowed:  Therefore 
any  declaration,  instruction,  opinion,  order,  or  decision 
of  any  officer  of  the  United  States  which  denies,  restricts, 
impairs,  or  questions  the  right  of  expatriation,  is  de- 
clared inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  principles  of 
the  Republic. 

Sec.  2000.  All  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
while  in  foreign  countries,  are  entitled  to  and  shall  re- 
ceive from  this  government  the  same  protection  of  persons 
and  property  which  is  accorded  to  native-born  citizens. 

Sec.  2001.  Whenever  it  is  made  known  to  the  President 
that  any  citizen  of  the  United  States  has  been  unjustly 
deprived  of  his  liberty  by  or  under  the  authority  of  any 
foreign  government,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  President 
forthwith  to  demand  of  that  government  the  reasons  of 
such  imprisonment;  and  if  it  appears  to  be  wrongful  and 
in  violation  of  the  rights  of  American  citizenship,  the 
President  shall  forthwith  demand  the  release  of  such 
citizen,  and  if  the  release  so  demanded  is  unreasonably 
delayed  or  refused,  the  President  shall  use  such  means, 
not  amounting  to  acts  of  war,  as  he  may  think  necessary 
and  proper  to  obtain  or  effectuate  the  release;  and  all 
the  facts  and  proceedings  relative  thereto  shall  as  soon 
as  practicable  be  communicated  by  the  President  to 
Congress. 


412  NATURALIZATION 

Sec.  2166.  Any  alien,  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years 
and  upward,  who  has  enlisted,  or  may  enlist,  in  the 
armies  of  the  United  States,  either  the  regular  or  the 
volunteer  forces,  and  has  been,  or  maybe  hereafter,  hon- 
orably discharged,  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  upon  his  petition,  without  any  pre- 
vious declaration  of  his  intention  to  become  such;  and 
he  shall  not  be  required  to  prove  more  than  one  year's 
residence  within  the  United  States  previous  to  his  ap- 
plication to  become  such  citizen;  and  the  court  admit- 
ting such  alien  shall,  in  addition  to  such  proof  of  resi- 
dence and  good  moral  character,  as  now  provided  by  law, 
be  satisfied  by  competent  proof  of  such  person's  having 
been  honorably  discharged  from  the  service  of  the  United 
States. 

Sec.  2169.  The  provisions  of  this  title  shall  apply  to 
aliens  [being  free  white  persons,  and  to  aliens]  of  African 
nativity  and  to  persons  of  African  descent. 

Sec.  2170.  No  alien  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citi- 
zen who  has  not  for  the  continued  term  of  five  years  next 
preceding  his  admission  resided  within  the  United  States. 

Sec.  2171.  No  alien  who  is  a  native  citizen  or  subject, 
or  a  denizen  of  any  country,  state,  or  sovereignty  with 
which  the  United  States  are  at  war,  at  the  time  of  his 
application,  shall  be  then  admitted  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States;  but  persons  resident  within  the 
United  States,  or  the  Territories  thereof,  on  the  eighteenth 
day  of  June,  in  the  year  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
twelve,  who  had  before  that  day  made  a  declaration,  ac- 
cording to  law,  of  their  intention  to  become  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  or  who  were  on  that  day  entitled  to 
become  citizens  without  making  such  declaration,  may 
be  admitted  to  become  citizens  thereof,  notwithstanding 
they  were  alien  enemies  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  laws  heretofore  passed  on  that  sub- 
ject; nor  shall   anything  herein  contained  be  taken  or 


APPENDIX,  413 

construed  to  interfere  with  or  prevent  the  apprehension 
and  removal,  agreeably  to  law,  of  any  alien  enemy  at  any 
time  previous  to  the  actual  naturalization  of^such  alien. 

Sec.  2172,  The  children  of  persons  who  have  been  duly 
naturalized  under  any  law  of  the  United  States,  or  who, 
previous  to  the  passing  of  any  law  on  that  subject,  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States,  may  have  become  citi- 
zens of  any  one  of  the  States,  under  the  laws  thereof, 
being  under  the  age  of  twenty-one  years  at  the  time  of 
the  naturalization  of  their  parents,  shall,  if  dwelling  in 
the  United  States,  be  considered  as  citizens  thereof;  and 
the  children  of  persons  who  now  are,  or  have  been,  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  shall,  though  born  out  of  the 
limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  be  considered 
as  citizens  thereof;  but  no  person  heretofore  proscribed 
by  any  State,  or  who  has  been  legally  convicted  of  having 
joined  the  army  of  Great  Britain  during  the  Revolution- 
ary War,  shall  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  without 
the  consent  of  the  legislature  of  the  State  in  which  such 
person  was  proscribed. 

Sec,  2174  [U,  S.  Comp,  Stat,  1901,  1334],  Every  sea- 
man, being  a  foreigner,  who  declares  his  intention  of  be- 
coming a  citizen  of  the  United  States  in  any  competent 
court,  and  shall  have  served  three  years  on  board  of  a 
merchant  vessel  of  the  United  States  subsequent  to  the 
date  of  such  declaration,  may,  on  his  application  to  any 
competent  court,  and  the  production  of  his  certificate  of 
discharge  and  good  conduct  during  that  time,  together 
with  the  certificate  of  his  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen,  be  admitted  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States;  and  every  seaman,  being  a  foreigner,  shall,  after 
his  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and  after  he  shall  have  served  such  three 
years,  be  deemed  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  for  the 
purpose  of  manning  and  serving  on  board  any  merchant- 
vessel  of  the  United   States,  anything  to  the  contrary  in 


414  NATURALIZATION 

any  Act  of  Congress  notwithstanding;  but  such  seaman 
shall,  for  all  purposes  of  protection  as  an  American  citi- 
zen, be  deemed  such,  after  the  filing  of  his  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  such  citizen. 

Sec.  5395.  In  all  cases  where  any  oath  or  affidavit  is 
made  or  taken  under  or  by  virtue  of  any  law  relating  to 
the  naturalization  of  aliens,  or  in  any  proceedings  under 
such  laws,  any  person  taking  or  making  such  oath  or  affi- 
davit who  knowingly  swears  falsely,  shall  be  punished 
by  imprisonment  not  more  than  five  years,  nor  less  than 
one  year,  and  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars. 

Sec.  5424.  Every  person  applying  to  be  admitted  a 
citizen,  or  appearing  as  a  witness  for  any  such  person, 
who  knowingly  personates  any  other  person  than  him- 
self, or  falsely  appears  in  the  name  of  a  deceased  person, 
or  in  an  assumed  or  fictitious  name,  or  falsely  makes, 
forges,  or  counterfeits  any  oath,  notice,  affidavit,  certifi- 
cate, order,  record,  signature,  or  other  instrument,  paper, 
or  proceeding  required  or  authorized  by  any  law  relating 
to  or  providing  for  the  naturalization  of  aliens;  or  who 
utters,  sells,  disposes  of,  or  uses  as  true  or  genuine,  or 
for  any  unlawful  purpose,  any  false,  forged,  ante-dated, 
or  counterfeit  oath,  notice,  certificate,  order,  record,  sig- 
nature, instrument,  paper,  or  proceeding  above  specified; 
or  sells  or  disposes  of  to  any  person  other  than  the  per- 
son for  whom  it  was  originally  issued  any  certificate  of 
citizenship,  or  certificate  showing  any  person  to  be  ad- 
mitted a  citizen,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  at 
hard  labor  not  less  than  one  year,  nor  more  than  five 
years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  three  hundred  nor 
more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine  and 
imprisonment. 

Sec.  5425.  Every  person  who  uses,  or  attempts  to  use, 
or  aids,  or  assists,  or  participates  in  the  use  of  any  cer- 
tificate of  citizenship,  knowing  the  same  to  be  forged,  or 


APPENDIX.  415 

counterfeit,  or  ante-dated,  or  knowing  the  same  to  have 
been  procured  by  fraud  or  otherwise  unlawfully  obtained; 
or  who,  without  lawful  excuse,  knowingly  is  possessed  of 
any  false,  forged,  ante-dated,  or  counterfeit  certificate  of 
citizenship,  purporting  to  have  been  issued  under  the 
provisions  of  any  law  of  the  United  States  relating  to 
naturalization,  knowing  such  certificate  to  be  false, 
forged,  ante-dated,  or  counterfeit,  with  intent  unlawfully 
to  use  the  same;  or  obtains,  accepts,  or  receives  any  cer- 
tificate of  citizenship  known  to  such  person  to  have  been 
procured  by  fraud  or  by  the  use  of  any  false  name,  or 
by  means  of  any  false  statement  made  with  intent  to 
procure,  or  to  aid  in  procuring,  the  issue  of  such  certifi- 
cate, or  known  to  such  person  to  be  fraudulently  altered 
or  ante-dated;  and  every  person  who  has  been  or  may  be 
admitted  to  be  a  citizen  who,  on  oath  or  by  affidavit, 
knowingly  denies  that  he  has  been  so  admitted,  with  in- 
tent to  evade  or  avoid  any  duty  or  liability  imposed  or 
required  by  law,  shall  be  imprisoned  at  hard  labor  not 
less  than  one  year  nor  more  than  five  years,  or  be  fined 
not  less  than  three  hundred  dollars  nor  more  than  one 
thousand  dollars,  or  both  such  punishments  may  be 
imposed. 

Sec.  5426.  Every  person  who  in  any  manner  uses  for 
the  purpose  of  registering  as  a  voter,  or  as  evidence  of  a 
right  to  vote,  or  otherwise,  unlawfully,  any  order,  certifi- 
cate of  citizenship,  or  certificate,  judgment,  or  exempli- 
fication, showing  any  person  to  be  admitted  to  be  a 
citizen,  whether  heretofore  or  hereafter  issued  or  made, 
knowing  that  such  order  or  certificate,  judgment,  or  ex- 
emplification has  been  unlawfully  issued  or  made;  and 
every  person  who  unlawfully  uses,  or  attempts  to  use, 
any  such  order  or  certificate,  issued  to  or  in  the  name  of 
any  other  person,  or  in  a  fictitious  name,  or  the  name  of 
a  deceased  person,  shall  be  punished  by  imprisonment  at 
hard    labor  not  less  than  one  year  nor  more  than  five 


416  NATURALIZATION 

years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  three  hundred  nor 
more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine 
and  imprisonment. 

Sec.  5427.  Every  person  who  knowingly  and  intention- 
ally aids  or  abets  any  person  in  the  commission  of  any 
felony  denounced  in  the  three  preceding  sections,  or 
attempts  to  do  any  act  therein  made  felony,  or  counsels, 
advises,  or  procures,  or  attempts  to  procure,  the  com- 
mission thereof,  shall  be  punished  in  the  same  manner 
and  to  the  same  extent  as  the  principal  party. 

Sec.  5428.  Every  person  who  knowingly  uses  any  cer- 
tificate of  naturalization  heretofore  granted  by  any  court 
or  hereafter  granted,  which  has  been  or  may  be  procured 
through  fraud  or  by  false  evidence,  or  has  been  or  may  be 
issued  by  the  clerk,  or  any  other  officer  of  the  court 
without  any  appearance  and  hearing  of  the  applicant  in 
court  and  without  lawful  authority;  and  every  perspn 
who  falsely  represents  himself  to  be  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  without  having  been  duly  admitted  to 
citizenship,  for  any  fraudulent  purpose  whatever,  shall 
be  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  one  thousand 
dollars,  or  be  imprisoned  not  more  than  two  years,  or 
both. 

Sec.  5429.  The  provisions  of  the  five  preceding  sections 
shall  apply  to  all  proceedings  had  or  taken,  or  attempted 
to  be  had  or  taken,  before  any  court  in  which  any 
proceeding  for  naturalization  may  be  commenced  or 
attempted  to  be  commenced. 


Later  Acts  of  Congress. 

Act  of  May  6,  1882,  22  Stat,  at  L.  61.  Hereafter  no 
state  court  or  court  of  the  United  States  shall  admit 
Chinese  to  citizenship;  and  all  laws  in  conflict  with  this 
act  are  hereby  repealed. 


APPENDIX.  417 

Act  of  June  29,  1906  (34  Stat,  at  L.  596),  Establishing  a 
Bureau  of  Naturalization. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress 
assembled,  That  the  designation  of  the  Bureau  of  Immi- 
gration in  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  is 
hereby  changed  to  the  "Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization,"  which  said  Bureau,  under  the  direction 
and  control  of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  in 
addition  to  the  duties  now  provided  by  law,  shall  have 
charge  of  all  matters  concerning  the  naturalization  of 
aliens.  That  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  said  Bureau  to 
provide,  for  use  at  the  various  immigration  stations 
throughout  the  United  States,  books  of  record,  wherein 
the  commissioners  of  immigration  shall  cause  a  registry 
to  be  made  in  the  case  of  each  alien  arriving  in  the  United 
States  from  and  after  the  passage  of  this  act  of  the  name, 
age,  occupation,  personal  description  (including  height, 
complexion,  color  of  hair  and  eyes),  the  place  of  birth,  the 
last  residence,  the  intended  place  of  residence  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  date  of  arrival  of  said  alien,  and, 
if  entered  through  a  port,  the  name  of  the  vessel  in  which 
he  comes.  And  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  said  commissioners 
of  immigration  to  cause  to  be  granted  to  such  alien 
a  certificate  of  such  registry,  with  the  particulars 
thereof. 

Sec.  2.  That  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
shall  provide  the  said  Bureau  with  such  additional  fur- 
nished offices  within  the  city  of  Washington,  such  books 
of  record  and  facilities,  and  such  additional  assistants, 
clerks,  stenographers,  typewriters,  and  other  employees 
as  may  be  necessary  for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  du- 
ties imposed  by  this  Act  upon  such  Bureau,  fixing  the 
compensation  of  such  additional  employees  until  July 
first,  nineteen  hundred  and  seven,  within  the  appropria- 
tions made  for  that  purpose. 

5233—27 


418  NATURALIZATION 

Sec.  3.  That  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens 
as  citizens  of  the  United  States  is  hereby  conferred  upon 
the  following  specified  courts: 

United  States  circuit  and  district  courts  now  existing, 
or  which  may  hereafter  be  established  by  Congress  in  any 
State,  United  States  district  courts  for  the  Territories 
of  Arizona,  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma,  Hawaii,  and  Alaska, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  the 
United  States  courts  for  the  Indian  Territory;  also  all 
courts  of  record  in  any  State  or  Territory  now  existing, 
or  which  may  hereafter  be  created,  having  a  seal,  a  clerk, 
and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law  or  equity,  or  law  and 
equity,  in  which  the  amount  in  controversy  is  un- 
limited. 

That  the  naturalization  jurisdiction  of  all  courts 
herein  specified,  State,  Territorial,  and  Federal,  shall  ex- 
tend only  to  aliens  resident  within  the  respective  judicial 
districts  of  such  courts. 

The  courts  herein  specified  shall,  upon  the  requisition 
of  the  clerks  of  such  courts,  be  furnished  from  time  to 
time  by  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization 
with  such  blank  forms  as  may  be  required  in  the  natu- 
ralization of  aliens,  and  all  certificates  of  naturalization 
shall  be  consecutively  numbered  and  printed  on  safety 
paper  furnished  by  said  Bureau. 

Sec.  4.  That  an  alien  may  be  admitted  to  become  a 
citizen  of  the  United  States  in  the  following  manner  and 
not  otherwise: 

First.  He  shall  declare  on  oath  before  the  clerk  of  any 
court  authorized  by  this  Act  to  naturalize  aliens,  or  his 
authorized  deputy,  in  the  district  in  which  such  alien 
resides,  two  years  at  least  prior  to  his  admission,  and 
after  he  has  reached  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  that  it  is 
bona  fide  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  and  to  renounce  forever  all  allegiance  and  fidelity 
to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty. 


APPENDIX.  419 

and  particularly,  by  name,  to  the  prince,  potentate,  state, 
or  sovereignty  of  which  the  alien  may  be  at  the  time  a 
citizen  or  subject.  And  such  declaration  shall  set  forth 
the  name,  age,  occupation,  personal  description,  place  of 
birth,  last  foreign  residence  and  allegiance,  the  date  of 
arrival,  the  name  of  the  vessel,  if  any,  in  which  he  came 
to  the  United  States,  and  the  present  place  of  residence 
in  the  United  States  of  said  alien:  Provided,  however, 
That  no  alien  who,  in  conformity  with  the  law  in  force 
at  the  date  of  his  declaration,  has  declared  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  shall  be  required 
to  renew  such  declaration. 

Second.  Not  less  than  two  years  nor  more  than  seven 
years  after  he  has  made  such  declaration  of  intention  he 
shall  make  and  file,  in  duplicate,  a  petition  in  writing, 
signed  by  the  applicant  in  his  own  handwriting  and  duly 
verified,  in  which  petition  such  applicant  shall  state  his 
full  name,  his  place  of  residence  (by  street  and  number, 
if  possible),  his  occupation,  and,  if  possible,  the  date 
and  place  of  his  birth;  the  place  from  which  he  emigrated, 
and  the  date  and  place  of  his  arrival  in  the  United  States, 
and,  if  he  entered  through  a  port,  the  name  of  the  ves- 
sel on  which  he  arrived;  the  time  when  and  the  place 
and  name  of  the  court  where  he  declared  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States;  if  he  is  mar- 
ried he  shall  state  the  name  of  his  wife  and,  if  possible, 
the  country  of  her  nativity  and  her  place  of  residence  at 
the  time  of  filing  his  petition;  and  if  he  has  children, 
the  name,  date,  and  place  of  birth  and  place  of  residence 
of  each  child  living  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of  his  peti- 
tion: Provided,  That  if  he  has  filed  his  declaration  be- 
fore the  passage  of  this  Act  he  shall  not  be  required  to 
sign  the  petition  in  his  own  handwriting. 

The  petition  shall  set  forth  that  he  is  not  a  disbeliever 
in  or  opposed  to  organized  government,  or  a  member  of 
or  affiliated    with  any    organization  or    body  of  persons 


420  NATURALIZATION 

teaching  disbelief  in  or  opposed  to  organized  govern- 
ment, a  polygamist  or  believer  in  the  practice  of  poly- 
gamy, and  that  it  is  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  and  to  renounce  absolutely  and  for- 
ever all  allegiance  and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince, 
potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty,  and  particularly  by 
name  to  the  prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty  of 
which  he  at  the  time  of  filing  of  his  petition  may  be  a 
citizen  or  subject,  and  that  it  is  his  intention  to  reside 
permanently  within  the  United  States,  and  whether  or 
not  he  has  been  denied  admission  as  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  and,  if  denied,  the  ground  or  grounds  of 
such  denial,  the  court  or  courts  in  which  such  decision 
was  rendered,  and  that  the  cause  for  such  denial  has 
since  been  cured  or  removed,  and  every  fact  material  to 
his  naturalization  and  required  to  be  proved  upon  the 
final  hearing  of  his  application. 

The  petition  shall  also  be  verified  by  the  affidavits  of 
at  least  two  credible  witnesses,  who  are  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  and  who  shall  state  in  their  affidavits 
that  they  have  personally  known  the  applicant  to  be  a 
resident  of  the  United  States  for  a  period  of  at  least  five 
years  continuously,  and  of  the  State,  Territory,  or  dis- 
trict in  which  the  application  is  made  for  a  period  of  at 
least  one  year  immediately  preceding  the  date  of  the 
filing  of  his  petition,  and  that  they  each  have  personal 
knowledge  that  the  petitioner  is  a  person  of  good  moral 
character,  and  that  he  is  in  every  way  qualified,  in  their 
opinion,  to  be  admitted  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States. 

At  the  time  of  filing  his  petition  there  shall  be  filed 
with  the  clerk  of  the  court  a  certificate  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor,  if  the  petitioner  arrives 
in  the  United  States  after  the  passage  of  this  Act,  stating 
the  date,  place,  and  manner  of  his  arrival  in  the  United 


APPENDIX.  421 

States,  and  the  declaration  of  intention  of  such  peti- 
tioner, which  certificate  and  declaration  shall  be  attached 
to  and  made  a  part  of  said  petition. 

Third.  He  shall,  before  he  is  admitted  to  citizenship, 
declare  on  oath  in  open  court  that  he  will  support  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  that  he  abso- 
lutely and  entirely  renounces  and  abjures  all  allegiance 
and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state,  or 
sovereignty,  and  particularly  by  name  to  the  prince, 
potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty  of  which  he  was  before 
a  citizen  or  subject;  that  he  will  support  and  defend  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  against  all 
enemies,  foreign  and  domestic,  and  bear  true  faith  and 
allegiance  to  the  same. 

Fourth.  It  shall  be  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  court  admitting  any  alien  to  citizenship  that  im- 
mediately preceding  the  date  of  his  application  he  has 
resided  continuously  within  the  United  States  five  years 
at  least,  and  within  the  State  or  Territory  where  such 
court  is  at  the  time  held  one  year  at  least,  and  that  dur- 
ing that  time  he  has  behaved  as  a  man  of  good  moral 
character,  attached  to  the  principles  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  well  disposed  to  the  good 
order  and  happiness  of  the  same.  In  addition  to  the 
oath  of  the  applicant,  the  testimony  of  at  least  two  wit- 
nesses, citizens  of  the  United  States,  as  to  the  facts  of 
residence,  moral  character,  and  attachment  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Constitution  shall  be  required,  and  the 
name,  place  of  residence,  and  occupation  of  each  witness 
shall  be  set  forth  in  the  record. 

Fifth.  In  case  the  alien  applying  to  be  admitted  to 
citizenship  has  borne  any  hereditary  title,  or  has  been 
of  any  of  the  orders  of  nobility  in  the  kingdom  or  state 
from  which  he  came,  he  shall,  in  addition  to  the  above 
requisites,  make  an  express  renunciation  of  his  title  or 


422  NATURALIZATION 

order  of  nobility  in  the  court  to  which  his  application 
is  made,  and  his  renunciation  shall  be  recorded  in  the 
court. 

Sixth.  When  any  alien  who  has  declared  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  dies  before  he 
is  actually  naturalized  the  widow  and  minor  children  of 
such  alien  may,  by  complying  with  the  other  provisions 
of  this  Act,  be  naturalized  without  making  any  declara- 
tion of  intention. 

Sec.  5.  That  the  clerk  of  the  court  shall,  immediately 
after  filing  the  petition,  give  notice  thereof  by  posting 
in  a  public  and  conspicuous  place  in  his  office,  or  in  the 
building  in  which  his  office  is  situated,  under  an  appro- 
priate heading,  the  name,  nativity,  and  residence  of  the 
alien,  the  date  and  place  of  his  arrival  in  the  United 
States,  and  the  date,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  for  the  final 
hearing  of  his  petition,  and  the  names  of  the  witnesses 
whom  the  applicant  expects  to  summon  in  his  behalf; 
and  the  clerk  shall,  if  the  applicant  requests  it,  issue  a 
subpoena  for  the  witnesses  so  named  by  the  said  appli- 
cant to  appear  upon  the  day  set  for  the  final  hearing,  but 
in  case  such  witnesses  can  not  be  produced  upon  the 
final  hearing  other  witnesses  may  be  summoned. 

Sec.  6.  That  petitions  for  naturalization  may  be  made 
and  filed  during  term  time  or  vacation  of  the  court  and 
shall  be  docketed  the  same  day  as  filed,  but  final  action 
thereon  shall  be  had  only  on  stated  days,  to  be  fixed  by 
rule  of  the  court,  and  in  no  case  shall  final  action  be  had 
upon  a  petition  until  at  least  ninety  days  have  elapsed 
after  filing  and  posting  the  notice  of  such  petition :  Pro- 
vided, That  no  person  shall  be  naturalized  nor  shall  any 
certificate  of  naturalization  be  issued  by  any  court  within 
thirty  days  preceding  the  holding  of  any  general  election 
within  its  territorial  jurisdiction.  It  shall  be  lawful,  at 
the  time  and  as  a  part  of  the  naturalization  of  any  alien, 
for  the  court,  in  its  discretion,  upon  the  petition  of  such 


APPENDIX.  423 

alien,  to  make  a  decree  changing  tlie  name  of  said  alien, 
and  his  certificate  of  naturalization  shall  be  issued  to 
him  in  accordance  therewith. 

Sec.  7.  That  no  person  who  disbelieves  in  or  who  is 
opposed  to  organized  government,  or  who  is  a  member 
of  or  affiliated  with  any  organization  entertaining  and 
teaching  such  disbelief  in  or  opposition  to  organized  gov- 
ernment, or  who  advocates  or  teaches  the  duty,  neces- 
sity, or  propriety  of  the  unlawful  assaulting  or  killing 
of  any  officer  or  officers,  either  of  specific  individuals  or 
of  officers  generally,  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  or  of  any  other  organized  government,  because  of 
his  or  their  official  character,  or  who  is  a  polygamist, 
shall  be  naturalized  or  be  made  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States. 

Sec.  8.  That  no  alien  shall  hereafter  be  naturalized  or 
admitted  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  can  not 
speak  the  English  language:  P7'ovided, That  this  require- 
ment shall  not  apply  to  aliens  who  are  physically  unable 
to  comply  therewith,  if  they  are  otherwise  qualified  to 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States :  Atid  provided  fur- 
ther, That  the  requirements  of  this  section  shall  not 
apply  to  any  alien  who  has  prior  to  the  passage  of  this 
Act  declared  his  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  in  conformity  with  the  law  in  force  at  the 
date  of  making  such  declaration :  Provided  further,  That 
the  requirements  of  section  eight  shall  not  apply  to 
aliens  who  shall  hereafter  declare  their  intention  to  be- 
come citizens  and  who  shall  make  homestead  entries 
upon  the  public  lands  of  the  United  States  and  comply 
in  all  respects  with  the  laws  providing  for  homestead 
entries  on  such  lands. 

Sec.  9.  That  every  final  hearing  upon  such  petition 
shall  be  had  in  open  court  before  a  judge  or  judges 
thereof,  and  every  final  order  which  may  be  made  upon 
such  petition  shall  be  under  the  hand  of  the  court   and 


424  NATURALIZATION 

entered  in  full  upon  a  record  kept  for  that  purpose,  and 
upon  such  final  hearing  of  such  petition  the  applicant 
and  witnesses  shall  be  examined  under  oath  before  the 
court  and  in  the  presence  of  the  court. 

Sec.  10.  That  in  case  the  petitioner  has  not  resided  in 
the  State,  Territory,  or  district  for  a  period  of  five  years 
continuously  and  immediately  preceding  the  filing  of  his 
petition  he  may  establish  by  two  witnesses,  both  in  his 
petition  and  at  the  hearing,  the  time  of  his  residence 
within  the  state,  provided  that  it  has  been  for  more  than 
one  year,  and  -the  remaining  portion  of  his  five  years' 
residence  within  the  United  States  required  by  law  to  be 
established  may  be  proved  by  the  depositions  of  two  or 
more  witnesses  who  are  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
upon  notice  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Natural- 
ization and  the  United  States  attorney  for  the  district 
in  which  said  witnesses  may  reside. 

Sec.  11.  That  the  United  States  shall  have  the  right 
to  appear  before  any  court  or  courts  exercising  jurisdic- 
tion in  naturalization  proceedings  for  the  purpose  of 
cross-examining  the  petitioner  and  the  witnesses  pro- 
duced in  support  of  his  petition  concerning  any  matter 
touching  or  in  any  way  affecting  his  right  to  admission 
to  citizenship,  and  shall  have  the  right  to  call  witnesses, 
produce  evidence,  and  be  heard  in  opposition  to  the 
granting  of  any  petition  in  naturalization  proceedings. 

Sec.  12.  That  it  is  hereby  made  the  duty  of  the  clerk 
of  each  and  every  court  exercising  jurisdiction  in  natural- 
ization matters  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  keep 
and  file  a  duplicate  of  each  declaration  of  intention  made 
before  him  and  to  send  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  at  Washington,  within  thirty  days 
after  the  issuance  of  a  certificate  of  citizenship,  a  dupli- 
cate of  such  certificate,  and  to  make  and  keep  on  file  in 
his  office  a  stub  for  each  certificate  so  issued  by  him, 
whereon  shall  be  entered  a  memorandum  of  all  the  essen- 


APPENDIX.  425 

tial  facts  set  forth  in  such  certificate.  It  shall  also  be 
the  duty  of  the  clerk  of  each  of  said  courts  to  report  to 
the  said  Bureau,  within  thirty  days  after  the  final  hear- 
ing and  decision  of  the  court,  the  name  of  each  and  every 
alien  who  shall  be  denied  naturalization,  and  to  furnish 
to  said  Bureau  duplicates  of  all  petitions  within  thirty 
days  after  the  filing  of  the  same,  and  certified  copies  of 
such  other  proceedings  and  orders  instituted  in  or  issued 
out  of  said  court  affecting  or  relating  to  the  naturaliza- 
tion of  aliens  as  may  be  required  from  time  to  time  by 
the  said  Bureau. 

In  case  any  such  clerk  or  officer  acting  under  his  direc- 
tion shall  refuse  or  neglect  to  comply  with  any  of  the 
foregoing  provisions  he  shall  forfeit  and  pay  to  the 
United  States  the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars  in  each  and 
every  case  in  which  such  violation  or  omission  occurs, 
and  the  amount  of  such  forfeiture  may  be  recovered  by 
the  United  States  in  an  action  of  debt  against  such  clerk. 

Clerks  of  courts  having  and  exercising  jurisdiction  in 
naturalization  matters  shall  be  responsible  for  all  blank 
certificates  of  citizenship  received  by  them  from  time  to 
time  from  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization, 
and  shall  account  for  the  same  to  the  said  Bureau  when- 
ever required  so  to  do  by  such  Bureau.  No  certificate  of 
citizenship  received  by  any  such  clerk  which  may  be 
defaced  or  injured  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  its  use 
as  herein  provided  shall  in  any  case  be  destroyed,  but 
such  certificate  shall  be  returned  to  the  said  Bureau;  and 
in  case  any  such  clerk  shall  fail  to  return  or  properly 
account  for  any  certificate  furnished  by  the  said  Bureau, 
as  herein  provided,  he  shall  be  liable  to  the  United 
States  in  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars,  to  be  recovered  in 
an  action  of  debt,  for  each  and  every  certificate  not 
properly  accounted  for  or  returned. 

Sec.  13.  That  the  clerk  of  each  and  every  court  exer- 
cising jurisdiction  in   naturalization   cases  shall  charge, 


426  NATURALIZATION 

collect,  and  account  for  the  following  fees  in  each  pro- 
ceeding: 

For  receiving  and  filing  a  declaration  of  intention  and 
issuing  a  duplicate  thereof,  one  dollar. 

For  making,  filing,  and  docketing  the  petition  of  an 
alien  for  admission  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  and 
for  the  final  hearing  thereon,  two  dollars;  and  for  enter- 
ing the  final  order  and  the  issuance  of  the  certificate  of 
citizenship  thereunder,  if  granted,  two  dollars. 

The  clerk  of  any  court  collecting  such  fees  is  hereby 
authorized  to  retain  one-half  of  the  fees  collected  by  him 
in  such  naturalization  proceeding ;  the  remaining  one- 
half  of  the  naturalization  fees  in  each  case  collected  by 
such  clerks,  respectively,  shall  be  accounted  for  in  their 
quarterly  accounts,  which  they  are  hereby  required  to 
render  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization, 
and  paid  over  to  such  Bureau  within  thirty  days  from 
the  close  of  each  quarter  in  each  and  every  fiscal  year, 
and  the  moneys  so  received  shall  be  paid  over  to  the  dis- 
bursing clerk  of  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 
who  shall  thereupon  deposit  them  in  the  Treasury  of  the 
United  States,  rendering  an  account  therefor  quarterly 
to  the  Auditor  for  the  State  and  other  Departments,  and 
the  said  disbursing  clerk  shall  be  held  responsible  under 
his  bond  for  said  fees  so  received. 

In  addition  to  the  fees  herein  required,  the  petitioner 
shall,  upon  the  filing  of  his  petition  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States,  deposit  with  and  pay  to  the  clerk 
of  the  court  a  sum  of  money  sufficient  to  cover  the  ex- 
penses of  subpoenaing  and  paying  the  legal  fees  of  any 
witnesses  for  whom  he  may  request  a  subpoena,  and  upon 
the  final  discharge  of  such  witnesses  they  shall  receive, 
if  they  demand  the  same  from  the  clerk,  the  customary 
and  usual  witness  fees  from  the  moneys  which  the  peti- 
tioner shall  have  paid  to  such  clerk  for  such  purpose,  and 
the  residue,  if  any,  shall  be  returned  by  the  clerk  to  the 


APPENDIX.  427 

petitioner:  Provided,  That  the  clerks  of  courts  exercising 
jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  retain  one-half  of  the  fees  in  any  fiscal  j'ear 
up  to  the  sum  of  three  thousand  dollars,  and  that  all 
fees  received  by  such  clerks  in  naturalization  proceed- 
ings in  excess  of  such  amount  shall  be  accounted  for 
and  paid  over  to  such  Bureau  as  in  case  of  other  fees  to 
which  the  United  States  may  be  entitled  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act.  The  clerks  of  the  various  courts 
exercising  jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings 
shall  pay  all  additional  clerical  force  that  may  be  re- 
quired in  performing  the  duties  imposed  by  this  Act 
upon  the  clerks  of  courts  from  fees  received  by  such 
clerks  in  naturalization  proceedings.  And  in  case  the 
clerk  of  any  court  collects  fees  in  excess  of  the  sum  of 
six  thousand  dollars  in  any  one  year,  the  Secretary  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  may  allow  to  such  clerk  from  the 
money  which  the  United  States  shall  receive  additional 
compensation  for  the  employment  of  additional  clerical 
assistance,  but  for  no  other  purpose,  if  in  the  opinion  of 
the  said  Secretary  the  business  of  such  clerk  warrants 
such  allowance. 

Sec.  14.  That  the  declarations  of  intention  and  the 
petitions  for  naturalization  shall  be  bound  in  chronolo- 
gical order  in  separate  volumes,  indexed,  consecutively 
numbered,  and  made  part  of  the  records  of  the  court. 
Each  certificate  of  naturalization  issued  shall  bear  upon 
its  face,  in  a  place  prepared  therefor,  the  volume  number 
and  page  number  of  the  petition  whereon  such  certificate 
was  issued,  and  the  volume  number  and  page  number  of 
the  stub  of  such  certificate. 

Sec.  15.  That  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
district  attorneys  for  the  respective  districts,  upon  affi- 
davit showing  good  cause  therefor,  to  institute  proceed- 
ings in  any  court  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens 
in  the  judicial  district  in  which  the    naturalized  citizen 


428  NATURALIZATION 

may  reside  at  the  time  of  bringing  the  suit,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  setting  aside  and  canceling  the  certificate  of 
citizenship  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  on  the  ground  that 
such  certificate  of  citizenship  was  illegally  procured.  In 
any  such  proceedings  the  party  holding  the  certificate 
of  citizenship  alleged  to  have  been  fraudulently  or  ille- 
gally procured  shall  have  sixty  days  personal  notice  in 
which  to  make  answer  to  the  petition  of  the  United 
States;  and  if  the  holder  of  such  certificate  be  absent 
from  the  United  States  or  from  the  district  in  which  he 
last  had  his  residence,  such  notice  shall  be  given  by  pub- 
lication in  the  manner  provided  for  the  service  of  sum- 
mons by  publication  or  upon  absentees  by  the  laws  of 
the  State  or  the  place  where  such  suit  is  brought. 

If  any  alien  who  shall  have  secured  a  certificate  of 
citizenship  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall,  within 
five  years  after  the  issuance  of  such  certificate,  return 
to  the  country  of  his  nativity,  or  go  to  any  other  for- 
eign country,  and  take  permanent  residence  therein,  it 
shall  be  considered  prima  facie  evidence  of  a  lack  of  in- 
tention on  the  part  of  such  alien  to  become  a  permanent 
citizen  of  the  United  States  at  the  time  of  filing  his  ap- 
plication for  citizenship,  and,  in  the  absence  of  counter- 
vailing evidence,  it  shall  be  sufficient  in  the  proper  pro- 
ceeding to  authorize  the  cancellation  of  his  certificate 
of  citizenship  as  fraudulent,  and  the  diplomatic  and  con- 
sular officers  of  the  United  States  in  foreign  countries 
shall  from  time  to  time,  through  the  Department  of 
State,  furnish  tne  Department  of  Justice  with  the  names 
of  those  within  their  respective  jurisdictions  who  have 
such  certificates  of  citizenship  and  who  have  taken  per- 
manent residence  in  the  country  of  their  nativity,  or  in 
any  other  foreign  country,  and  such  statements,  duly 
certified,  shall  be  admissible  in  evidence  in  all  courts  in 
proceedings  to  cancel  certificates  of  citizenship. 

Whenever  any  certificate    of  citizenship  shall    be  set 


APPENDIX.  429 

aside  or  canceled,  as  herein  provided,  the  court  in  which 
such  judgment  or  decree  is  rendered  shall  make  an  order 
canceling  such  certificate  of  citizenship  and  shall  send 
a  certified  copy  of  such  order  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization;  and  in  case  such  certificate  was 
not  originally  issued  by  the  court  making  such  order  it 
shall  direct  the  clerk  of  the  court  to  transmit  a  copy  of 
such  order  and  judgment  to  the  court  out  of  which  such 
certificate  of  citizenship  shall  have  been  originally  is- 
sued. And  it  shall  thereupon  be  the  duty  of  the  clerk 
of  the  court  receiving  such  certified  copy  of  the  order 
and  judgment  of  the  court  to  enter  the  same  of  record 
and  to  cancel  such  original  certificate  of  citizenship  upon 
the  records  and  to  notify  the  Bureau  of  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  of  such  cancellation. 

The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  apply  not  only  to 
certificates  of  citizenship  issued  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  but  to  all  certificates  of  citizenship  which  may 
have  been  issued  heretofore  by  any  court  exercising  ju- 
risdiction in  naturalization  proceedings  under  prior 
laws. 

Sec.  16.  That  every  person  who  falsely  makes,  forges, 
counterfeits,  or  causes  or  procures  to  be  falsely  made, 
forged,  or  counterfeited,  or  knowingly  aids  or  assists  in 
falsely  making,  forging,  or  counterfeiting  any  certificate 
of  citizenship,  with  intent  to  use  the  same,  or  with  the 
intent  that  the  same  may  be  used  by  some  other  person 
or  persons,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  felony,  and  a  person  con- 
victed of  such  offense  shall  be  punished  by  imprison- 
ment for  not  more  than  ten  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not  more 
than  ten  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such  fine  and  im- 
prisonment. 

Sec.  17.  That  every  person  who  engraves  or  causes  or 
procures  to  be  engraved,  or  assists  in  engraving,  any 
plate  in  the  likeness  of  any  plate  designed  for  the  print- 
ing of  a  certificate  of  citizenship,  or  who  sells   any  such 


430  NATURALIZATION 

plate,  or  who  brings  into  the  United  States  from  any 
foreign  place  any  such  plate,  except  under  the  direction 
of  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  or  other  proper 
officer,  and  any  person  who  has  in  his  control,  custody, 
or  possession  any  metallic  plate  engraved  after  the  simi- 
litude of  any  plate  from  which  any  such  certificate  has 
been  printed,  with  intent  to  use  such  plate  or  suffer  the 
same  to  be  used  in  forging  or  counterfeiting  any  such 
certificate  or  any  part  thereof;  and  every  person  who 
prints,  photographs,  or  in  any  other  manner  causes  to  be 
printed,  photographed,  made,  or  executed,  any  print  or 
impression  in  the  likeness  of  any  such  certificate,  or  any 
part  thereof,  or  who  sells  any  such  certificate,  or  brings 
the  same  into  the  United  States  from  any  foreign  place, 
except  by  direction  of  some  proper  officer  of  the  United 
States,  or  who  has  in  his  possession  a  distinctive  paper 
which  has  been  adopted  by  the  proper  officer  of  the 
United  States  for  the  printing  of  such  certificate,  with 
intent  to  unlawfully  use  the  same,  shall  be  punished  by 
a  fine  of  not  more  than  ten  thousand  dollars,  or  by  im- 
prisonment at  hard  labor  for  not  more  than  ten  years, 
or  by  both  such  fine  and  imprisonment. 

Sec.  18.  That  it  is  hereby  made  a  felony  for  any  clerk 
or  other  person  to  issue  or  be  a  party  to  the  issuance  of 
a  certificate  of  citizenship  contrary  to  the  provisions  of 
this  Act,  except  upon  a  final  order  under  the  hand  of  a 
court  having  jurisdiction  to  make  such  order,  and  upon 
conviction  thereof  such  clerk  or  other  person  shall  be 
punished  by  imprisonment  for  not  more  than  five  years 
and  by  a  fine  of  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  in 
the  discretion  of  the  court. 

Sec.  19.  That  every  person  who  without  lawful  excuse 
is  possessed  of  any  blank  certificate  of  citizenship  pro- 
vided by  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization, 
with  intent   unlawfully   to   use  the  same,  shall  be   im- 


APPENDIX.  431 

prisoned  at  hard  labor  not  more  than  five  years  or  be 
fined  not  more  than  one  thousand  dollars. 

Sec.  20.  That  any  clerk  or  other  officer  of  a  court  hav- 
ing power  under  this  Act  to  naturalize  aliens,  who  wil- 
fully neglects  to  render  true  accounts  of  moneys  received 
by  him  for  naturalization  proceedings  or  who  wilfully 
neglects  to  pay  over  any  balance  of  such  moneys  due  to 
the  United  States  within  thirty  days  after  said  payment 
shall  become  due  and  demand  therefor  has  been  made 
and  refused,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  embezzlement  of 
the  public  moneys,  and  shall  be  punishable  by  imprison- 
ment for  not  more  than  five  years,  or  by  a  fine  of  not 
more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  both. 

Sec.  21.  That  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  clerk  of  any 
court  or  his  authorized  deputy  or  assistant  exercising 
jurisdiction  in  naturalization  proceedings,  or"^  to  demand, 
charge,  collect,  or  receive  any  other  or  additional  fees  or 
moneys  in  naturalization  proceedings  save  the  fees  and 
moneys  herein  specified;  and  a  violation  of  any  of  the 
provisions  of  this  section  or  any  part  thereof  is  hereby 
declared  to  be  a  misdemeanor  and  shall  be  punished  by 
imprisonment  for  not  more  than  two  years,  or  by  a  fine 
of  not  more  than  one  thousand  dollars,  or  by  both  such 
fine  and  imprisonment. 

Sec.  22.  That  the  clerk  of  any  court  exercising  juris- 
diction in  naturalization  proceedings,  or  any  person  act- 
ing under  authority  of  this  Act,  who  shall  knowingly 
certify  that  a  petitioner,  affiant,  or  witness  named  in  an 
affidavit,  petition,  or  certificate  of  citizenship,  or  other 
paper  or  writing  required  to  be  executed  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act,  personally  appeared  before  him  and 
was  sworn  thereto,  or  acknowledged  the  execution  thereof 
or  signed  the  same,  when  in  fact  such  petitioner,  affiant, 
or  witness  did  not  personally  appear  before  him,  or  was 

*Error  in  original  Act.  Theword  "  or  "  should  be  omitted. — AUTHOR. 


432  NATURALIZATION 

not  sworn  thereto,  or  did  not  execute  the  same,  or  did 
not  acknowledge  the  execution  thereof,  shall  be  punished 
by  a  fine  not  exceeding  five  thousand  dollars,  or  by  im- 
prisonment not  to  exceed  five  years. 

Sec.  23.  That  any  person  who  knowingly  procures 
naturalization  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
shall  be  fined  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or 
shall  be  imprisoned  not  more  than  five  years,  or  both, 
and  upon  conviction  the  court  in  which  such  conviction 
is  had  shall  thereupon  adjudge  and  declare  the  final  order 
admitting  such  person  to  citizenship  void.  Jurisdiction 
is  hereby  conferred  on  the  courts  having  jurisdiction  of 
the  trial  of  such  offense  to  make  such  adjudication.  Any 
person  who  knowingly  aids,  advises,  or  encourages  any 
person  not  entitled  thereto  to  apply  for  or  to  secure 
naturalization,  or  to  file  the  preliminary  papers  declaring 
an  intent  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  or 
who  in  any  naturalization  proceeding  knowingly  procures 
or  gives  false  testimony  as  to  any  material  fact,  or  who 
knowingly  makes  an  aflEidavit  false  as  to  any  material 
fact  required  to  be  proved  in  such  proceeding,  shall  be 
fined  not  more  than  five  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisoned 
not  more  than  five  years,  or  both. 

Sec.  24.  That  no  person  shall  be  prosecuted,  tried,  or 
punished  for  any  crime  arising  under  the  provisions  of 
this  Act  unless  the  indictment  is  found  or  the  informa- 
tion is  filed  within  five  years  next  after  the  commission 
of  such  crime. 

Sec.  25.  That  for  the  purpose  of  the  prosecution  of  all 
crimes  and  offenses  against  the  naturalization  laws  of  the 
United  States  which  may  have  been  committed  prior  to 
the  date  when  this  Act  shall  go  into  effect,  the  existing 
naturalization  laws  shall  remain  in   full  force  and  effect. 

Sec.  26.  That  sections  twenty-one  hundred  and  sixty- 
five,  twenty-one  hundred  and  sixty-seven,  twenty-one 
hundred     and    sixty-eight,    twenty-one     hundred    and 


APPENDIX.  433 

seventy-three,  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  section  thirty-nine  of  chapter 
one  thousand  and  twelve  of  the  Statutes  at  Large  of  the 
United  States  of  America  for  the  year  nineteen  hundred 
and  three,  and  all  Acts  or  parts  of  Acts  inconsistent 
with  or  repugnant  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  are 
hereby  repealed. 

Sec.  27.  That  substantially  the  following  forms  shall 
be  used  in  the  proceedings  to  which  they  relate: 

DECLARATION    OF    INTENTION. 

(Invalid  for  all  purposes  seven   years  after  the  date 
hereof.) 
,  ss : 

I, ,  aged years,  occupation  , 

do  declare  on  oath  (affirm)  that  my  personal  descrip- 
tion is:  Color ,  complexion  ,  height , 

weight ,  color  of  hair ,  color  of  eyes  , 

other  visible   distinctive   marks ;    I  was   born  in 

on  the  day  of ,  anno  Domini  ; 

I   now   reside   at  ;    I   emigrated  to    the  United 

States  of  America  from on  the  vessel  ;  my 

last  foreign  residence  was It  is  my  bona  fide  in- 
tention to  renounce  forever  all  allegiance  and  fidelity  to 
any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state,  or  sovereignty,  and 
particularly  to ,  of  which  I  am  now  a  citizen  (sub- 
ject); I  arrived  at  the  (port)  of ,  in  the  State  (Ter- 
ritory or  District)  of on  or  about  the day 

of  anno  Domini ;   lam  not  an  anarchist; 

I  am  not  a  polygamist  nor  a  believer  in  the  practice  of 
polygamy;  and  it  is  my  intention  in  good  faith  to  be- 
come a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America  and  to 
permanently  reside  therein.     So  help  me  God. 

(Original  signature  of  declarant) 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  (affirmed)  before  me  this 

day  of ,  anno  Domini 

[L.  S.]  

(Official  character  of  attestor.) 

5233—28 


434  NATURALIZATION 

PETITION  FOR  NATURALIZATION. 

Court  of 

In  the  matter  of  the  petition  of to  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

To  the  Court: 

The  petition  of respectfully  shows: 

First.     M}^  full  name  is  

Second.     My  place   of  residence   is  number 

street,  city  of ,  State  (Territory   or  District)  of 


Third.     My  occupation  is 

Fourth.     I  was  born  on  the  day   of at 


Fifth.     I  emigrated  to  the  United  States  from , 

on    or   about   the day  of ,  anno    Domini 

,  and  arrived  at  the  port  of ,  in  the   United 

States,  on  the  vessel 

Sixth.     I  declared  my  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 

the  United  States  on  the  day  of  at , 

in  the court  of 

Seventh.     I    am married.     My  wife's   name  is 

She  was  born  in and  now  resides 

at  I  have  children,  and   the  name,  date, 

and  place  of  birth  and  place  of  residence  of  each  of 
said  children  is  as  follows : ; ; 


Eighth.  I  am  not  a  disbeliever  in  or  opposed  to 
organized  government  or  a  member  of  or  affiliated  with 
any  organization  or  body  of  persons  teaching  disbelief  in 
organized  government.  I  am  not  a  polygamist  nor  a  be- 
liever in  the  practice  of  polygamy.  I  am  attached  to 
the  principles  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
and  it  is  my  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  and  to  renounce  absolutely  and  forever  all  allegi- 
ance and  fidelity  to  any  foreign  prince,  potentate,  state, 

or  sovereignty,  and    particularly  to ,  of  which   at 

this  time  I  am  a  citizen  (or  subject),  and  it  is  my  inten- 
tion to  reside  permanently  in  the  United  States. 

Ninth.  I  am  able  to  speak  the  English  language. 

Tenth.  I  have  resided  continuously  in  the  United 
States  of  America  for  a  term  of  five  years  at  least  imme- 


APPENDIX.  435 

diately  preceding  the  date  of  this  petition,  to  wit,  since 

;..,  anno  Domini  ,  and  in  the  State  (Territory 

or  District)  of for  one  year  at  least  next  preced- 
ing the  date  of  this  petition,  to  wit,  since  day  of 

,  anno  Domini  

Eleventh.  I  have  not  heretofore  made  petition  for  citi- 
zenship to  any  court.      (I  made  petition  for  citizenship 

to   the  court   of  at ,  and   the  said 

petition  was  denied   by  the  said   court   for  the  following 

reasons  and  causes,  to  wit, ,  and  the  cause 

of  such  denial  has  since  been  cured  or  removed.) 

Attached  hereto  and  made  a  part  of  this  petition  are 
my  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  and  the  certificate  from  the  Department  of 
Commerce  and  Labor  required  by  law.  Wherefore  your 
petitioner  prays  that  he  ma}'  be  admitted  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Dated 

(Signature  of  petitioner) 

,  ss: 

,  being  duly  sworn,  deposes  and  says  that 

he  is  the  petitioner  in  the  above-entitled  proceeding; 
that  he  has  read  the  foregoing  petition  and  knows  the  con- 
tents thereof;  that  the  same  is  true  of  his  own  knowledge, 
except  as  to  matters  therein  stated  to  be  alleged  upon 
information  and  belief,  and  that  as  to  those  matters  he 
believes  it  to  be  true. 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  day  of 

,  anno  Domini 

[l.  s.]  , 

Clerk  of  the Court. 

AFFIDAVIT   OF    WITNESSES. 

Court  of 

In  the  matter  of  the  petition  of  to  be 

admitted  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America. 

,  ss : 


,  occupation ,  residing  at ,  and 

,  occupation ,  residing  at ,each 

being  severally,  duly,  and  respectively  sworn,  deposes  and 


436  NATURALIZATION. 

says  that  he  is  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America; 
that  he  has  personally  known, the  peti- 
tioner above  mentioned,  to  be  a  resident  of  the  United 
States  for  a  period  of  at  least  five  years  continuously 
immediately  preceding  the  date  of  filing  his  petition,  and 
of  the  State  (Territory  or  District)  in  which  the  above- 
entitled  application  is  made  for  a  period  of years 

immediately  preceding  the  date  of  filing  his  petition;  and 
that  he  has  personal  knowledge  that  the  said  petitioner 
is  a  person  of  good  moral  character,  attached  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  that 
he  is  in  every  way  qualified,  in  his  opinion,  to  be  admitted 
as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 


Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this day  of 

,  nineteen  hundred  and 

[l.  s.]  _  , 

(Official  character  of  attestor). 


CERTIFICATE    OF    NATURALIZATION. 

Number 

Petition,  volume ,  page 

Stub,  volume ,  page 

(Signature  of  holder) _ • 

Description    of    holder:  Age, ;   height, ; 

color, ;  complexion, ;  color  of  eyes, ; 

color    of    hair,  ;    visible    distinguishing    marks, 

Name,  age,  and  place  of  residence  of  wife, , 

, Names,  ages,  and  places   of  residence  of 

minor  children, ,  , ;  , , 


ss: 


Be  it  remembered,  that  at  a term  of  the 

court  of ,  held    at on    the day  of 

,  in   the   year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and 

, ,  who  previous  to  his  (her)  naturalization 

was  a  citizen  or  subject  of ,  at  present  residing  at 

number street, city    (town)  


APPENDIX.  437 

State  (Territory  or  District),  having  applied  to  be  ad- 
mitted a  citizen  of  the  United  States  of  America  pursuant 
to  law,  and  the  court  having  found  that  the  petitioner 
had  resided  continuously  within  the  United  States  for  at 
least  five  years  and  in  this  State  for  one  year  immediately 
preceding  the  date  of  the  hearing  of  his  (her)  petition, 
and  that  said  petitioner  intends  to  reside  permanently 
in  the  United  States,  had  in  all  respects  complied  with 

the  law  in  relation  thereto,  and  that he  was  entitled 

to  be  so  admitted,  it  was  thereupon  ordered  by  the  said 

court  that he  be  admitted  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 

States  of  America. 

In  testimony  whereof,  the  seal  of  said  court  is  here- 
unto affixed  on  the  day  of ,  in  the  year  of 

our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  ,  and  of  our  inde- 
pendence the 

[l.  s.]  _  , 

(Official  character  of  attestor.) 

STUB  OF  CERTIFICATE  OF  NATURALIZATION. 

No.  of  certificate, 

Name,  ;  age, 

Declaration  of  intention,  volume  ,  page 

Petition,  volume ,  page 

Name,  age,  and   place   of   residence    of    wife,  

, Names,  ages,  and  places  of  residence  o> 

minor  children, , , ;  , , 


Date  of  order,  volume  ,  page  . 

(Signature  of  holder) 


Sec.  28.  That  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Labor 
shall  have  power  to  make  such  rules  and  regulations  as 
may  be  necessary  for  properly  carrying  into  execution 
the  various  provisions  of  this  Act.  Certified  copies  of  all 
papers,  documents,  certificates,  and  records  required  to 
be  used,  filed,  recorded,  or  kept  under  any  and  all  of  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  admitted  in  evidence 
equally  with  the  originals  in  any  and  all  proceedings 
under  this  Act  and  in  all  cases  in  which  the  originals 
thereof  might  be  admissible  as  evidence. 


438  NATURALIZATION. 

Sec.  29.  That  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  into  effect 
the  provisions  of  this  Act  there  is  hereby  appropriated 
the  sum  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  out  of  any 
moneys  in  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States  not  other- 
wise appropriated,  which  appropriation  shall  be  in  full 
for  the  objects  hereby  expressed  until  June  thirtieth, 
nineteen  hundred  and  seven;  and  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion thirty-six  hundred  and  seventy-nine  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  the  United  States  shall  not  be  applicable  in 
any  way  to  this  appropriation. 

Sec.  30.  That  all  the  applicable  provisions  of  the  na- 
turalization laws  of  the  United  States  shall  apply  to  and  be 
held  to  authorize  the  admission  to  citizenship  of  all  per- 
sons not  citizens  who  owe  permanent  allegiance  to  the 
United  States,  and  who  may  become  residents  of  any 
State  or  organized  Territory  of  the  United  States,  with 
the  following  modifications:  The  applicant  shall  not  be 
required  to  renounce  allegiance  to  any  foreign  sover- 
eignty; he  shall  make  his  declaration  of  intention  to  be- 
come a  citizen  of  the  United  States  at  least  two  years 
prior  to  his  admission;  and  residence  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  United  States,  owing  such  permanent  allegi- 
ance shall  be  regarded  as  residence  within  the  United 
States  within  the  meaning  of  the  five  years'  residence 
clause  of  the  existing  law. 

Sec.  31.  That  this  Act  shall  take  effect  and  be  in  force 
from  and  after  ninety  days  from  the  date  of  its  passage: 
Provided,  That  sections  one,  two,  twenty-eight,  and 
twenty-nine  shall  go  into  effect  from  and  after  the 
passage  of  this  Act. 

Act  of  March  2,  1907  {S4  Stat,  at  L.  1228),  in  Reference 
to  the  Expatriation  of   Citizens  and   their  Protection 
Abroad. 
Be  it  eriacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  United   States  of  America  in  Congress  as- 
sembled, That  the  Secretary  of  State  shall  be  authorized, 


APPENDIX.  439 

in  his  discretion,  to  issue  passports  to  persons  not  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  as  follows:  Where  any  person 
has  made  a  declaration  of  intention  to  become  such  a 
citizen  as  provided  by  law,  and  has  resided  in  the  United 
States  for  three  years,  a  passport  may  be  issued  to  him 
entitling  him  to  the  protection  of  the  Government  in  any 
foreign  country:  Provided,  That  such  passport  shall  not 
be  valid  for  more  than  six  months  and  shall  not  be  re- 
newed, and  that  such  passport  shall  not  entitle  the  holder 
to  the  protection  of  this  Government  in  the  country  of 
which  he  was  a  citizen  prior  to  making  such  declaration 
of  intention. 

Sec.  2.  That  any  American  citizen  shall  be  deemed  to 
have  expatriated  himself  when  he  has  been  naturalized 
in  any  foreign  state  in  conformity  with  its  laws,  or  when 
he  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance   to  any  foreign  state. 

When  any  naturalized  citizen  shall  have  resided  for 
two  years  in  the  foreign  state  from  which  he  came,  or 
for  five  years  in  any  other  foreign  state  it  shall  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citizen,  and 
the  place  of  his  general  abode  shall  be  deemed  his  place 
of  residence  during  said  years:  Provided,  however, 
That  such  presumption  may  be  overcome  on  the  presenta- 
tion of  satisfactory  evidence  to  a  diplomatic  or  consular 
officer  of  the  United  States,  under  such  rules  and  regu- 
lations as  the  Department  of  State  may  prescribe:  And 
provided  also,  That  no  American  citizen  shall  be  allowed 
to  expatriate  himself  when  this  country  is  at  war. 

Sec,  3.  That  any  American  woman  who  marries  a 
foreigner  shall  take  the  nationality  of  her  husband.  At 
the  termination  of  the  marital  relation  she  may  resume 
her  American  citizenship,  if  abroad,  by  registering  as  an 
American  citizen  within  one  year  with  a  consul  of  the 
United  States,  or  by  returning  to  reside  in  the  United 
States,    or,    if    residing    in    the    United    States    at    the 


440  NATURALIZATION. 

termination  of  the  marital  relation,  by  continuing  to 
reside  therein. 

Sec.  4.  That  any  foreign  woman  who  acquires  American 
citizenship  by  marriage  to  an  American  shall  be  assumed 
to  retain  the  same  after  the  termination  of  the  marital 
relation  if  she  continue  to  reside  in  the  United  States, 
unless  she  makes  formal  renunciation  thereof  before  a 
court  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  or  if  she 
resides  abroad  she  may  retain  her  citizenship  by  regis- 
tering as  such  before  a  United  States  consul  within  one 
year  after  the  termination  of  such  marital  relation. 

Sec.  5.  That  a  child  born  without  the  United  States 
of  alien  parents  shall  be  deemed  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  by  virtue  of  the  naturalization  of  or  resumption 
of  American  citizenship  by  the  parent:  Provided,  That 
such  naturalization  or  resumption  takes  place  during  the 
minority  of  such  child:  And  provided  further,  That  the 
citizenship  of  such  minor  child  shall  begin  at  the  time 
such  minor  child  begins  to  reside  permanently  in  the 
United  States. 

Sec.  6.  That  all  children  born  outside  the  limits  of  the 
United  States  who  are  citizens  thereof  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  section  nineteen  hundred  and 
ninety-three  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States 
and  who  continue  to  reside  outside  the  United  States 
shall,  in  order  to  receive  the  protection  of  this  Govern- 
ment, be  required  upon  reaching  the  age  of  eighteen 
years  to  record  at  an  American  consulate  their  intention 
to  become  residents  and  remain  citizens  of  the  United 
States  and  shall  be  further  required  to  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  United  States  upon  attaining  their 
majority. 

Sec.  7.  That  duplicates  of  any  evidence,  registration, 
or  other  acts  required  by  this  Act  shall  be  filed  with  the 
Department  of  State  for  record. 


APPENDIX.  441 

NATURALIZATION  CONVENTIONS  TO  WHICH  THE 
UNITED  STATES  IS  A  PARTY. 

CONVENTION  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 
AND  THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  MONARCHY  [17  Stat,  at  L. 
833]. 

Signed  September  20,  1870;  Ratified  March  24,  1871; 
Ratifications  Exchanged  July  14,  187 1;  Proclaimed 
August  1,  1871. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  who  have 
resided  in  the  United  States  of  America  uninterruptedly 
at  least  five  years,  and  during  such  residence  have  be- 
come naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States,  shall  be 
held  by  the  government  of  Austria  and  Hungary  to  be 
American  citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

Reciprocally,  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America 
who  have  resided  in  the  territories  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  uninterruptedly  at  least  five  years, 
and  during  such  residence  have  become  naturalized  citi- 
zens of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  shall  be  held 
by  the  United  States  to  be  citizens  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

The  declaration  of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party  the 
effect  of  naturalization. 

Article  II. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party,  on  return  to 
the  territory  of  the  other  party,  remains  liable  to  trial 
and  punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country  committed  before  his  emigration, 
saving  always  the  limitation  established  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country  and  any  other  remission  of  liability 
to  punishment. 

In  particular,  a  former  citizen  of  the  Austro-Hungar- 
ian Monarchy,  who,  under  the  first  article,  is  to  be  held 


442  NATURALIZATION. 

as  an  American  citizen,  is  liable  to  trial  and  punishment, 
according  to  the  laws  of  Austro-Hungary,  for  non-fulfil- 
ment of  military  duty: 

1st.  If  he  has  emigrated,  after  having  been  drafted  at 
the  time  of  conscription,  and  thus  having  become  en- 
rolled as  a  recruit  for  service  in  the  standing  army. 

2d.  If  he  has  emigrated  whilst  he  stood  in  service  un- 
der the  flag,  or  had  a  leave  of  absence  only  for  a  limited 
time. 

3d.  If,  having  a  leave  of  absence  for  an  unlimited 
time,  or  belonging  to  the  reserve  or  to  the  militia,  he 
has  emigrated  after  having  received  a  call  into  serv- 
ice, or  after  a  public  proclamation  requiring  his  appear- 
ance, or  after  war  has  broken  out. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  former  citizen  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  naturalized  in  the  United  States, 
who  by  or  after  his  emigration  has  transgressed  the  legal 
provisions  on  military  duty  by  any  acts  or  omissions 
other  than  those  above  enumerated  in  the  clauses  num- 
bered one,  two,  and  three,  can,  on  his  return  to  his 
original  country,  neither  be  held  subsequently  to  military 
service  nor  remain  liable  to  trial  and  punishment  for  the 
non-fulfilment  of  his  military  duty. 

Article  III. 

The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  concluded  on  the  3d  July,  1856, 
[11  Stat,  at  L.  691],  between  the  government  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  on  the  one  part,  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  on  the  other  part,  as  well 
as  the  additional  convention,  signed  on  the  8th  May, 
1848  [9  Stat,  at  L.  944],  to  the  treaty  of  commerce  and 
navigation  concluded  between  the  said  governments  on 
the  27th  of  August,  1829  [8  Stat,  at  L.  398],  and  espe- 
cially the  stipulations  of  Article  IV  of  the  said  additional 
convention  concerning  the  delivery  of  the  deserters  from 


APPENDIX.  443 

the  ships  of  war  and   merchant  vessels,  remain   in  force 
without  change. 

Article  IV . 

The  emigrant  from  the  one  state,  who,  according  to 
Article  I,  is  to  be  held  as  a  citizen  of  the  other  state, 
shall  not,  on  his  return  to  his  original  country,  be  con- 
strained to  resume  his  former  citizenship;  yet  if  he  shall 
of  his  own  accord  re-acquire  it,  and  renounce  the  citizen- 
ship obtained  by  naturalization,  such  a  renunciation  is 
allowable,  and  no  fixed  period  of  residence  shall  be  re- 
quired for  the  recognition  of  his  recovery  of  citizenship 
in  his  original  country. 

Article  V. 
The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immedi- 
ately on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue 
in  force  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given  to 
the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention 
then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  remain  in 
force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the 
contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other 
of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the  consent  of 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  and  by  his  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  &c..  King  of  Hungary,  with  the  con- 
stitutional consent  of  the  two  legislatures  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  ex- 
changed at  Vienna  within  twelve  months  from  the  date 
hereof. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  this 
convention  as  well  in  German  as  in  English,  and  have 
thereto  affixed  their  seals. 

Done  at  Vienna  the   twentieth  day  of  September,  in 


444  NATURALIZATION. 

the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy,  in  the  ninety-fifth  year  of  the  Independence  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  and  in  the  twenty-second 
year  of  the  reign  of  his  imperial  and  royal  Apostolic 
Majesty. 

[seal.]  John  Jay. 

[seal.]  Beust. 


TREATY  BETWEEN   THE   UNITED    STATES  AND  THE  GRAND 
DUCHY  OF  BADEN  [16  Stat,  at  L.  731]. 

Concluded  July    19,    1868;    Exchanged  December    7, 
1869;  Proclaimed  January  10,  1870. 

Article  I. 
Citizens  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden,  who  have  re- 
sided uninterruptedly  within  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica five  years,  and  before,  during,  or  after  that  time  have 
become  or  shall  become  naturalized  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  held  by  Baden  to  be  American 
citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such.  Reciprocally,  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  of  America,  who  have  resided 
uninterruptedly  within  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  five 
years,  and  before,  during,  or  after  that  time  have  become 
or  shall  become  naturalized  citizens  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Baden,  shall  be  held  by  the  United  States  to  be  citi- 
zens of  Baden,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such.  The  declar- 
ation of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of  the  one  or 
the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party  the  effect  of 

naturalization. 

Article  II. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party,  on  return  to 
the  territory  of  the  other  party,  remains  liable  to  trial 
and  punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country,  and  committed  before  his  emigra- 
tion, saving  always  the  limitation  established  by  the 
laws  of    his  original  country,  or  any  other   remission  of 


APPENDIX.  445 

liability  to  punishment.  In  particular,  a  former  Badener 
who,  under  the  first  article,  is  to  be  held  as  an  American 
citizen,  is  liable  to  trial  and  punishment  according  to 
the  laws  of  Baden  for  non-fulfilment  of  military  duty: 

1.  If  he  has  emigrated  after  he,  on  occasion  of  the 
draft  from  those  owing  military  duty,  has  been  enrolled 
as  a  recruit  for  service  in  the  standing  army. 

2.  If  he  has  emigrated  whilst  he  stood  in  service  under 
the  flag,  or  had  a  leave  of  absence  only  for  a  limited 
time. 

3.  If,  having  a  leave  of  absence  for  an  unlimited  time, 
or  belonging  to  the  reserve  or  to  the  militia,  he  has  emi- 
grated after  having  received  a  call  into  service,  or  after 
a  public  proclamation  requiring  his  appearance,  or  after 
war  has  broken  out. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  former  Badener,  naturalized  in 
the  United  States,  who,  by  or  after  his  emigration,  has 
transgressed  or  shall  transgress  the  legal  provisions  on 
military  duty  by  any  acts  or  omissions  other  than  those 
above  enumerated  in  the  clauses  numbered  one  to  three, 
can,  on  his  return  to  his  original  country,  neither  be  held 
subsequently  to  military  service,  nor  remain  liable  to  trial 
and  punishment  for  the  non-fulfilment  of  his  military 
duty.  Moreover,  the  attachment  on  the  property  of  an 
emigrant  for  non-fulfilment  of  his  military  duty,  except  in 
the  cases  designated  in  the  clauses  numbered  one  to  three, 
shall  be  removed  so  soon  as  he  shall  prove  his  naturali- 
zation in  the  United  States  according  to  the  first  article. 

Article  III. 
The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  concluded  between  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Baden  on  the  one  part  and  the  United  States 
of  America  on  the  other  part,  the  thirtieth  day  of  Jan- 
uary, one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-seven,  remains 
in  force  without  change. 


446  NATURALIZATION. 

Article  IV. 
The  emigrant  from  the  one  state  who,  according  to  the 
first  article,  is  to  be  held  as  a  citizen  of  the  other  state 
shall  not  on  his  return  to  his  original  country  be  con- 
strained to  resume  his  former  citizenship;  yet  if  he  shall 
of  his  own  accord  reacquire  it  and  renounce  the  citizen- 
ship obtained  by  naturalization,  such  a  renunciation  is 
allowed,  and  no  fixed  period  of  residence  shall  be  required 
for  the  recognition  of  his  recovery  of  citizenship  in  his 
original  country. 

Article  V. 
The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immediately 
on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue  in 
force  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given  to  the 
other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention  then 
to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  remain  in  force  until  the 
end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the  contracting 
parties  shall  have  given  notice  of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  His  Royal 
Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  and  by  the  President, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged 
at  Carlsruhe  as  soon  as  possible. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Carlsruhe,  the  19th  July,  1868. 

[seal.]  George  Bancroft. 

[seal.]  v.  Freydorf. 


APPENDIX.  447 

TREATY  BETWEBN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  KINGDOM 
OF  BAVARIA  [15  Stat,  at  L.  66l]. 

Concluded  May  26 ,  1868;  Ratified  September  18,  1868; 
Proclaimed  October  8,  1868. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  Bavaria,  who  have  become,  or  shall  become, 
naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  and 
shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  within  the  United 
States  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  Bavaria  to  be  American 
citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

Reciprocally:  Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America 
who  have  become,  or  shall  become,  naturalized  citizens 
of  Bavaria,  and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  within 
Bavaria  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  the  United  States  to 
be  Bavarian  citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

The  declaration  of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party  the 
effect  of  naturalization. 

Article  II. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party  on  return  to  the 
territory  of  the  other  party  remains  liable  to  trial  and 
punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of  his 
original  country,  and  committed  before  his  emigration, 
saving  always  the  limitation  established  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country,  or  any  other  remission  of  liability 
to  punishment. 

Article  III. 
The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  in  certain  cases,  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States,  on  the  one  part,  and  Bavaria, 
on  the  other  part,  the  twelfth  day  of  September,  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifty-three,  remains  in  force 
without  change. 


448  NATURALIZATION 

Article  IV. 

If  a  Bavarian,  naturalized  in  America,  renews  his  resi- 
dence in  Bavaria,  without  the  intent  to  return  to 
America,  he  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his  nat- 
uralization in  the  United  States. 

Reciprocally,  if  an  American,  naturalized  in  Bavaria, 
renews  his  residence  in  the  United  States,  without  the 
intent  to  return  to  Bavaria,  he  shall  be  held  to  have 
renounced  his  naturalization  in  Bavaria. 

The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when 
the  person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  resides  more 
than  two  years  in  the  other  country. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  imme- 
diately on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  con- 
tinue in  force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have 
given  to  the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  in- 
tention then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  re- 
main in  force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either 
of  the  contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the 
other  of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  His  Majesty 
the  King  of  Bavaria,  and  by  the  President,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Munich 
within  twelve  months  from  the  date  hereof. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Munich,  the  26th  May,  1868. 

[seal.]  George  Bancroft. 

[seal.]  Dr.  Otto  Fhr.  von  Volderndorff. 


APPENDIX.  449 

PROTOCOL. 

Done  at  Munich,  the  26th  May,  1868, 

The  undersigned  met  to-day  to  sign  the  treaty  agreed 
upon  in  conformity  with  their  respective  full  powers, 
relating  to  the  citizenship  of  those  persons  who  emigrate 
from  Bavaria  to  the  United  States  of  America,  and  from 
the  United  States  of  America  to  Bavaria;  on  which  oc- 
casion the  following  observations,  more  exactly  defining 
and  explaining  the  contents  of  this  treaty,  were  entered 
in  the  following  protocol: 

I.    RELATING  TO  THE  FIRST  ARTICLE  OF  THE  TREATY. 

1.  Inasmuch  as  the  copulative  "and"  is  made  use 
of,  it  follows,  of  course,  that  not  the  naturalization 
alone,  but  an  additional  five  years'  uninterrupted  resi- 
dence is  required  before  a  person  can  be  regarded  as 
coming  within  the  treaty;  but  it  is  by  no  means  requisite 
that  the  five  years'  residence  should  take  place  after  the 
naturalization.  It  is  hereby  further  understood  that 
if  a  Bavarian  has  been  discharged  from  his  Bavarian 
indigenate,  or  on  the  other  side,  if  an  American  has  been 
discharged  from  his  American  citizenship  in  the  manner 
legally  prescribed  by  the  government  of  his  original 
country,  and  then  acquires  naturalization  in  the  other 
country  in  a  rightful  and  perfectly  valid  manner,  then 
an  additional  five  years'  residence  shall  no  longer  be 
required,  but  a  person  so  naturalized  shall  from  the 
moment  of  his  naturalization  be  held  and  treated  as  a 
Bavarian,  and  reciprocally  as  an  American  citizen. 

2.  The  words  "resided  uninterruptedly"  are  obviously 
to  be  understood,  not  of  a  continued  bodily  presence, 
but  in  the  legal  sense,  and  therefore  a  transient  absence, 
a  journey,  or  the  like,  by  no  means  interrupts  the  period 
of  five  years  contemplated  by  the  first  article. 

5233—29 


450  NATURALIZATION 

II.    RELATING  TO  THE  SECOND  ARTICLE  OF  THE  TREATY. 

1.  It  is  expressly  agreed,  that  a  person  who,  under  the 
first  article,  is  to  be  held  as  an  adopted  citizen  of  the 
other  state,  on  his  return  to  his  original  country  can  not 
be  made  punishable  for  the  act  of  emigration  itself, 
not  even  though  at  a  later  day  he  should  have  lost  his 
adopted  citizenship. 

III.  RELATING  TO  ARTICLE  FOUR  OF  THE  TREATY. 

1.  It  is  agreed  on  both  sides,  that  the  regulative  pow- 
ers granted  to  the  two  governments  respectively,  by 
their  laws  for  protection  against  resident  aliens,  whose 
residence  endangers  peace  and  order  in  the  land,  are  not 
affected  by  the  treaty.  In  particular  the  regulation  con- 
tained in  the  second  clause  of  the  tenth  Article  of  the 
Bavarian  military  law  of  the  30th  of  January,  1868,  accord- 
ing to  which  Bavarians  emigrating  from  Bavaria  before 
the  fulfilment  of  their  military  duty  can  not  be  admitted 
to  a  permanent  residence  in  the  land  till  they  shall  have 
become  thirty-two  years  old,  is  not  affected  by  the  treaty. 
But  yet  it  is  established  and  agreed,  that  by  the  expres- 
sion ''permanent  residence,"  used  in  the  said  article,  the 
above  described  emigrants  are  not  forbidden  to  under- 
take a  journey  to  Bavaria  for  a  less  period  of  time  and 
for  definite  purposes,  and  the  royal  Bavarian  govern- 
ment moreover  cheerfully  declares  itself  ready,  in  all 
cases  in  which  the  emigration  has  plainly  taken  place  in 
good  faith,  to  allow  a  mild  rule  in  practice  to  be  adopted. 

2.  It  is  hereby  agreed  that  when  a  Bavarian  natural- 
ized in  America  and  reciprocally  an  American  naturalized 
in  Bavaria  takes  up  his  abode  once  more  in  his  original 
country  without  the  intention  of  return  to  the  country 
of  his  adoption,  he  does  by  no  means  thereby  recover 
his  former  citizenship;  on  the  contrary,  in  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  Bavaria,  it  depends  on  his  Majesty,  the  King, 


APPENDIX.  451 

whether  he  will,  or  will  not  in  that  event  grant  the 
Bavarian  citizenship  anew. 

The  article  fourth  shall  accordingly  have  only  this 
meaning,  that  the  adopted  country  of  the  emigrant  can 
not  prevent  him  from  acquiring  once  more  his  former 
citizenship;  but  not  that  the  state  to  which  the  emigrant 
originally  belonged  is  bound  to  restore  him  at  once  to 
his  original  relation. 

On  the  contrary,  the  citizen  naturalized  abroad  must 
first  apply  to  be  received  back  into  his  original  country 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  its  laws  and  regulations, 
and  must  acquire  citizenship  anew,  exactly  like  any 
other  alien. 

But  yet  it  is  left  to  his  own  free  choice,  whether  he 
will  adopt  that  course  or  will  preserve  the  citizenship  of 
the  country  of  his  adoption. 

The  two  plenipotentiaries  give  each  other  mutually 
the  assurance  that  their  respective  governments  in  rati- 
fying this  treaty  will  also  regard  as  approved  and  will 
maintain  the  agreements  and  explanations  contained  in 
the  present  protocol,  without  any  further  formal  ratifi- 
cation of  the  same. 

[seal.]  George  Bancroft. 

[seal.]  Dr.  Otto  Fhr.  von  Volderndorff. 


CONVENTION  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  BELGIUM. 
[16  Stat,  at  L.  747]. 

Concluded  November  16 ,  1868;  Ratifications  Exchanged 
July  10,  1869;  Proclaimed  July  30,  1869. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  who  may  or  shall  have 
been  naturalized  in  Belgium  will  be  considered  by  the 
United  States  as  citizens  of  Belgium.  Reciprocally,  Bel- 
gians who  may  or  who  shall  have  been  naturalized  in  the 


452  NATURALIZATION 

United  States  will  be  considered  by  Belgium  as  citizens 
of  the  United  States. 

Article  II. 

Citizens  of  either  contracting  party,  in  case  of  their 
return  to  their  original  country,  can  be  prosecuted  there 
for  crimes  or  misdemeanors  committed  before  natu- 
ralization, saving  to  them  such  limitations  as  are  estab- 
lished by  the  laws  of  their  original  country. 

Article  III. 

Naturalized  citizens  of  either  contracting  party  who 
shall  have  resided  five  years  in  the  country  which  has 
naturalized  them,  can  not  bejheld  to  the  obligation  of 
military  service  in  their  original  country,  or  to  incidental 
obligation  resulting  therefrom,  in  the  event  of  their  re- 
turn to  it,  except  in  cases  of  desertion  from  organized 
and  embodied  military  or  naval  service,  or  those  that 
may  be  assimilated  thereto  by  the  laws  of  that  country. 

Article  IV. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  naturalized  in  Belgium 
shall  be  considered  by  Belgium  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States  when  they  shall  have  recovered  their  character  as 
citizens  of  the  United  States  according  to  the  laws  of 
the  United  States.  Reciprocally,  Belgians  naturalized 
in  the  United  States  shall  be  considered  as  Belgians  by 
the  United  States  when  they  shall  have  recovered  their 
character  as  Belgians  according  to  the  laws  of  Belgium. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  enter  into  execution  im- 
mediately after  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  re- 
main in  force  for  ten  years.     If,  at  the  expiration  of  that 


APPENDIX.  453 

period,  neither  of  the  contracting  parties  shall  have 
given  notice  six  months  in  advance  of  its  intention  to 
terminate  the  same,  it  shall  continue  in  force  until  the 
end  of  twelve  months  after  one  of  the  contracting  par- 
ties shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other  of  such  in- 
tention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  and  by  his  Majesty  the  King  of 
the  Belgians,  with  the  consent  of  Parliament,  and  the 
ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Brussels  within  twelve 
months  from  the  date  hereof,  or  sooner  if  possible. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  same,  and  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

Made  in  duplicate  at  Brussels,  the  sixteenth  of  No- 
vember, one  thousand  eight  hundred  aud  sixty-eight. 

[seal.]  H.  S.  Sanford. 

[seal.]  Jules  Vander  Stichelen. 


CONVENTION  BETWEEN   THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 
AND  DENMARK  [17  Stat,  at  L.  941]. 

Concluded  July  20,  1872;  Ratified  January  22,  1873; 
Ratifications  Exchanged  March  14-,  1873;  Pro- 
claimed April  15,  1873. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  who  have 
become,  or  shall  become,  and  are,  naturalized,  according 
to  law,  within  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark  as  Danish  sub- 
jects, shall  be  held  by  the  United  States  of  America  to 
be  in  all  respects  and  for  all  purposes   Danish  subjects, 


454  NATURALIZATION 

and   shall    be   treated   as  such  by  the  United  States  of 
America. 

In  like  manner,  Danish  subjects  who  have  become,  or 
shall  become,  and  are,  naturalized,  according  to  law, 
within  the  United  States  of  America  as  citizens  thereof, 
shall  be  held  by  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark  to  be  in  all 
respects  and  for  all  purposes  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such  by  the 
Kingdom  of  Denmark. 

Article  II. 

If  any  such  citizen  of  the  United  States,  as  aforesaid, 
naturalized  within  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark  as  a  Danish 
subject,  should  renew  his  residence  in  the  United  States, 
the  United  States  government  may,  on  his  application, 
and  on  such  conditions  as  that  government  may  see  fit 
to  impose,  readmit  him  to  the  character  and  privileges 
of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  aud  the  Danish  govern- 
ment shall  not,  in  that  case,  claim  him  as  a  Danish  sub- 
ject on  account  of  his  former  naturalization. 

In  like  manner,  if  any  such  Danish  subject,  as  afore- 
said, naturalized  within  the  United  States  as  a  citizen 
thereof,  should  renew  his  residence  within  the  Kingdom 
of  Denmark,  His  Majesty's  government  may,  on  his  ap- 
plication, and  on  such  conditions  as  that  government 
may  think  fit  to  impose,  readmit  him  to  the  character 
and  privileges  of  a  Danish  subject,  and  the  United  States 
government  shall  not,  in  that  case,  claim  him  as  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  on  account  of  his  former 
naturalization. 

Article  III. 

If,  however,  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  naturalized 
in  Denmark,  shall  renew  his  residence  in  the  former 
country  without  the  intent   to  return   to   that  in  which 


APPENDIX. 


455 


he  was  naturalized,  he  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced 
his  naturalization. 

In  like  manner,  if  a  Dane,  naturalized  in  the  United 
States,  shall  renew  his  residence  in  Denmark  without  the 
intent  to  return  to  the  former  country,  he  shall  be  held 
to  have  renounced  his  naturalization  in  the  United 
States. 

The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when  a 
person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  shall  reside  more 
than  two  years  in  the  other  country. 

Article  IV. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immedi- 
ately on  or  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications,  and 
shall  continue  in  force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party 
shall  have  given  to  the  other  six  months'  previous  notice 
of  its  intention  then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  fur- 
ther remain  in  force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after 
either  of  the  contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice 
to  the  other  of  such  intention. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  Denmark,  and  the  ratifications  shall 
be  exchanged  at  Copenhagen  as  soon  as  may  be,  within 
eight  months  from  the  date  hereof. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  re- 
spective seals. 

Done  at  Copenhagen,  the  twentieth  day  of  July,  in 
the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy-two. 

[seal.]  Michael  J.  Cramer. 

[seal.]  0.  D.  Rosenorn-Lehn. 


456  NATURALIZATION 

CONVENTION  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
GREAT  BRITAIN  [16  Stat,  at  L.  775]. 

Concluded  May   13,   1870;     Ratifications  Exchanged 
August  10,  1870;  Proclaimed  September  16 ,  1870. 

Article  I; 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  who  have 
become,  or  shall  become,  and  are  naturalized  according 
to  law  within  the  British  dominions  as  British  subjects, 
shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  II,  be  held  by 
the  United  States  to  be  in  all  respects  and  for  all  pur- 
poses British  subjects,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such  by 
the  United  States. 

Reciprocally,  British  subjects  who  have  become,  or 
shall  become,  and  are  naturalized  according  to  law  within 
the  United  States  of  America  as  citizens  thereof,  shall, 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  II,  be  held  by  Great 
Britain  to  be  in  all  respects  and  for  all  purposes  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such  by 
Great  Britain. 

Article  II. 

Such  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  aforesaid  who 
have  become  and  are  naturalized  within  the  dominions 
of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  as  British  subjects,  shall  be  at 
liberty  to  renounce  their  naturalization  and  to  resume 
their  nationality  as  citizens  of  the  United  States,  pro- 
vided that  such  renunciation  be  publicly  declared  within 
two  years  after  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the 
present  convention. 

Such  British  subjects  as  aforesaid  who  have  become 
and  are  naturalized  as  citizens  within  the  United  States, 
shall  be  at  liberty  to  renounce  their  naturalization  and 
to  resume  their  British  nationality,  provided  that  such 


APPENDIX.  457 

renunciation  be  publicly  declared  within  two  years  after 
the  twelfth  day  of  May,  1870. 

The  manner  in  which  this  renunciation  may  be  made 
and  publicly  declared  shall  be  agreed  upon  by  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  respective  countries. 

Article  III. 

If  any  such  citizen  of  the  United  States  as  aforesaid, 
naturalized  within  the  dominions  of  her  Britannic 
Majesty,  should  renew  his  residence  in  the  United  States, 
the  United  States  government  may,  on  his  own  applica- 
tion and  on  such  conditions  as  that  government  may 
think  fit  to  impose,  readmit  him  to  the  character  and 
privileges  of  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  Great 
Britain  shall  not,  in  that  case,  claim  him  as  a  British 
subject  on  account  of  his  former  naturalization. 

In  the  same  manner,  if  any  such  British  subject  as  afore- 
said naturalized  in  the  United  States  should  renew  his 
residence  within  the  dominions  of  her  Britannic  Majesty, 
her  Majesty's  government  may,  on  his  own  application 
and  on  such  conditions  as  that  government  may  think 
fit  to  impose,  readmit  him  to  the  character  and  privi- 
leges of  a  British  subject,  and  the  United  States  shall 
not,  in  that  case,  claim  him  as  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States  on  account  of  his  former  naturalization. 

Article  IV. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  her  Britannic 
Majesty,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Lon- 
don as  soon  as  may  be  within  twelve  months  from  the 
date  hereof. 

In  witness  whereof   the    respective  plenipotentiaries 


458  NATURALIZATION 

have  signed  the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their  re- 
spective seals. 

Done  at  London,  the  thirteenth  day  of  May,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
seventy. 

[seal.]  John  Lothrop  Motley. 

[seal.]  Clarendon. 

SUPPLEMENTAIv  CONVENTION  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN  CONCERNING  THE  RENUN- 
CIATION OF  NATURALIZATION  IN  CERTAIN  CASES  [17 
Stat,  at  Iv.  841]. 

Signed  February  23,  1871;  Ratified  March  24,  1871; 
Ratifications  Exchanged  May  4,  1871;  Proclaimed 
May  5,  1871. 

Article  I. 

Any  person,  being  originally  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  who  had  previously  to  May  13th,  1870,  been  natu- 
ralized as  a  British  subject,  may,  at  any  time  before  Au- 
gust 10th,  1872,  and  any  British  subject  who,  at  the  date 
first  aforesaid,  had  been  naturalized  as  a  citizen  within 
the  United  States,  may,  at  any  time  before  May  12th,  1872, 
publicly  declare  his  renunciation  of  such  naturalization 
by  subscribing  an  instrument  in  writing  substantially  in 
the  form  hereunto  appended,  and  designated  as  Annex  A. 

Such  renunciation,  by  an  original  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  of  British  nationality,  shall,  within  the  terri- 
tories and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  be  made  in 
duplicate,  in  the  presence  of  any  court  authorized  by 
law  for  the  time  being  to  admit  aliens  to  naturalization, 
or  before  the  clerk  or  prothonotary  of  any  such  court:  If 
the  declarant  be  beyond  the  territories  of  the  United 
States,  it  shall  be  made  in  duplicate,  before  any  diplo- 
matic or  consular  officer  of  the  United  States.  One  of 
such  duplicates  shall  remain  of  record  in  the  custody  of 
the  court  or  officer  in  whose  presence   it  was  made;  the 


APPENDIX.  459 

other  shall  be,  without  delay,  transmitted  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State. 

Such  renunciation,  if  declared  by  an  original  British 
subject,  of  his  acquired  nationality  as  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  shall,  if  the  declarant  be  in  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  be  made  in  dup- 
licate, in  the  presence  of  a  justice  of  the  peace;  if  else- 
where in  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  dominions,  in  tripli- 
cate, in  the  presence  of  any  judge  of  civil  or  criminal 
jurisdiction,  of  any  justice  of  the  peace,  or  of  any  other 
officer  for  the  time  being  authorized  by  law,  in  the  place 
in  which  the  declarant  is,  to  administer  an  oath  for  any 
judicial  or  other  legal  purpose:  if  out  of  Her  Majesty's 
dominions,  in  triplicate,  in  the  presence  of  any  officer  in 
the  diplomatic  or  consular  service  of  Her  Majesty. 

Article  II. 

The  contracting  parties  hereby  engage  to  communicate 
each  to  the  other,  from  time  to  time,  lists  of  the  persons 
who,  within  their  respective  dominions  and  territories, 
or  before  their  diplomatic  and  consular  officers,  have  de- 
clared their  renunciation  of  naturalization,  with  the  dates 
and  places  of  making  such  declarations,  and  such  infor- 
mation as  to  the  abode  of  the  declarants,  and  the  times 
and  places  of  their  naturalization,  as  they  may  have 
furnished. 

Article  III. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  by  Her  Britannic 
Majesty,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at 
Washington  as  soon  as  may  be  convenient. 

In  witness  whereof  the  respective  plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  same,  and  have  affixed  thereto  their 
respective  seals. 


460  NATURALIZATION 

Done  at  Washington  the  twenty-third  day  of  Febru- 
ary, in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred 
and  seventy-one. 

[seal.]  Hamilton  Fish. 

[seal.]  Edw'd  Thornton. 

Annex  A. 

I,  A.  B.,  of  [insert  abode],  being  originally  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  [or  a  British  subject,]  and 
having  become  naturalized  within  the  dominions  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty  as  a  British  subject,  [or  as  a  citizen 
within  the  United  States  of  America,]  do  hereby  renounce 
my  naturalization  as  a  British  subject,  [or  citizen  of  the 
United  States,]  and  declare  that  it  is  my  desire  to  resume 
my  nationality  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  [or 
British  subject.] 

(Signed)  A.  B. 

Made  and  subscribed  to  before  me,  ,  in  [insert 

country  or  othersubdivision,  and  State,  province, colony, 

legation,   or  consulate,]  this  day  of , 

187 

(Signed)  E.  F., 
Justice  of  the  Peace,  [or  other  title.] 
[seal.]  Hamilton  Fish. 

[seal.]  Edw'd  Thornton. 


APPENDIX.  461 

NATURALIZATION  TREATY    BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  THE  REPUBLIC  OF  HAITI  [33  Stat,  at  L.  2101]. 

Signed  at  Washington  March  22,  1902;  Ratification 
advised  by  the  Senate  February  1,  1904;  Ratified 
,  by  the  President  March  17,  1904;  Ratified  by 
Haiti,  April  24,  1903;  Ratifications  Exchanged  at 
Washington  March  19,  1904;  Proclaimed  March 
24,  1904. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  who  shall 
have  been  duly  naturalized  as  citizens  of  Haiti,  and  who 
shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  in  Haiti  during  a 
period  of  five  years,  shall  be  recognized  by  the  United 
States  as  citizens  of  Haiti. 

Reciprocally,  citizens  of  Haiti  who  shall  have  been 
duly  naturalized  as  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  who  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  in 
the  United  States  during  a  period  of  five  years,  shall  be 
recognized  by  Haiti  as  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

This  article  shall  apply  as  well  to  those  already  natu- 
ralized in  either  country  as  those  hereafter  naturalized. 

Article  II. 

The  person  who,  after  having  become  a  naturalized 
citizen  of  one  of  the  contracting  States,  shall  return  to 
live  in  the  country  of  his  origin,  without  intention  to 
return  to  the  country  where  he  has  been  naturalized, 
shall  be  considered  as  having  renounced  the  nationality 
obtained  through  naturalization. 

Article  III. 

The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when 
the  person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  resides  more 
than  two  years  in  the  other  country. 


462  NATURALIZATION 

Article  IV. 
The  naturalized  citizens  of  either  State  who  return  to 
their  country  of  origin,  will  be  there  liable  to  prosecu- 
tion and  punishment  in  conformity  to  the  laws  for  the 
crimes  or  misdemeanors  committed  before  their  emigra- 
tion and  that  are  not  covered  by  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions. 

Article  V. 

The  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party 
the  effect  of  naturalization. 

Article  VI . 
The  present  treaty  shall  remain  in  force  for  ten  years 
from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications;  and  un- 
less one  of  the  contracting  parties  shall  notify  the  other 
of  its  intention  to  terminate  it  one  year  before  the  ex- 
piration of  that  period,  the  said  treaty  shall  continue 
in  force  from  year  to  year  until  the  expiration  of  one 
year  after  official  notice  shall  have  been  given  by  either 
of  the  contracting  governments  of  a  purpose  to  termin- 
ate it. 

Article  VII. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  submitted  to  the  approval 
and  ratification  of  the  respective  appropriate  authorities 
of  each  of  the  contracting  parties,  and  the  ratifications 
shall  be  exchanged  at  Washington  as  soon  as  possible 
within  twelve  months  from  the  date  hereof. 

In  witness  whereof,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries 
have  signed  the  foregoing  articles,  and  have  affixed  their 
seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  the  City  of  Washington,  in  the 
English  and  French  languages  this  twenty-second  day  of 
March,  1902. 

[seal.]  John  Hay. 

[seal.]  J.    N.    LtGER. 


APPENDIX.  463 

TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  HAITI  EX- 
TENDING THE  TIME  WITHIN  WHICH  MAY  BE  EFFECTED 
THE  EXCHANGE  OF  RATIFICATIONS  OF  THE  TREATY  OF 
NATURALIZATION  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  COUNTRIES, 
SIGNED  MARCH  22,  1902  [33  Stat,  at  L.  2157]. 

Signed  at  Washingtori  February  28, 1903;  Ratification 
advised  by  the  Senate  February  1,  1904;  Ratified 
by  the  President  March  17,  1904;  Ratified  by 
Haiti  April  24,  1903;  Ratifications  Exchanged  at 
Washingto7i  March  19,  1904;  Proclaimed  March 
24,  1904. 

Sole  Article. 

The  respective  ratifications  of  the  said  treaty  shall  be 
exchanged  as  soon  as  possible,  and  within  twelve  months 
from  March  22,  1903. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Washington,  in  the  English  and 
French  languages,  this  28th  day  of  February,  A.  D,  1903. 

[seal.]  John  Hay. 

[seal.]  J.  N.  Leiger. 


CONVENTION   BETWEEN  THE  UNITED   STATES  AND   HESSE 
[16  Stat,  at  L.  743]. 


Concluded  August  1, 1868;    Ratifications  Exchanged 
July  23,  1869;  Proclaimed  August  31,  1869. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  parts  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse  not 
included  in  the  North  German  Confederation,  who  have 
become  or  shall  become  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly 
within  the  United  States  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  the 


464  NATURALIZATION 

Grand  Ducal  Hessian  government  to  be  American  citizens, 
and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

Reciprocally:  Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
who  have  become  or  shall  become  naturalized  citizens  of 
the  above-described  parts  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse, 
and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  therein  five  years, 
shall  be  held  by  the  United  States  to  be  citizens  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

The  declaration  of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party  the 
effect  of  naturalization. 

Article  II. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party,  on  return  to  the 
territory  of  the  other  party,  remains  liable  to  trial  and 
punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of  his 
original  country  and  committed  before  his  emigration, 
saving  always  the  limitation  established  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country. 

Article  III. 

The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  in  certain  cases,  concluded  between 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Hesse,  on  the  16th  of  June,  1852  [10  Stat,  at  L.  964], 
remains  in  force,  without  change. 

Article  IV. 

If  a  Hessian,  naturalized  in  America,  but  originally  a 
citizen  of  the  parts  of  the  Grand  Duchy  not  included  in 
the  North  German  Confederation,  renews  his  residence  in 
those  parts  without  the  intent  to  return  to  America,  he 
shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his  naturalization  in  the 
United  States. 


APPENDIX.  465 

Reciprocally:  If  an  American,  naturalized  in  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Hesse,  (within  the  above-described  parts,) 
renews  his  residence  in  the  United  States  without  the 
intent  to  return  to  Hesse,  he  shall  be  held  to  have 
renounced  his  naturalization  in  the  Grand  Duchy. 

The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist,  when 
the  person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  resides  more 
than  two  years  in  the  other  country. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immedi- 
ately, on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue 
in  force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given 
to  the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention 
then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  remain  in 
force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the 
contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other 
of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  and  by  his  Royal 
Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of  Hesse  and  by  Rhine,  &c. 
The  ratification  of  the  first  is  to  take  effect  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States;  on  the  Grand  Ducal  Hessian  side,  the  assent  of 
the  States  of  the  Grand  Duchy  is  reserved,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  required  by  the  constitution. 

The  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Berlin  within 
one  year  of  the  present  date. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Darmstadt,  the  1st  of  August,  1868. 

[seal.]  Geo.  Bancroft. 

[seal.]  Friedrich  Freiherr  von  Lindelof. 

5233-30 


466  NATURALIZATION 

TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND 
THE  NORTH  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION  [IS  Stat,  at  L.  6l5]. 

Co7icluded  February  22,  1868;  Ratification  Advised  by 
Senate,  with  Amendme7it,  March  26,  1868;  Ratified 
by  President  March  30,  1868;  Ratified  by  King  of 
Prussia,  April  11,  1868;  Ratifications  Exchanged 
at  Berlin  May  9,  1868;  Proclaimed  by  President 
May  27,  1868. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  the  North  German  Confederation,  who  be- 
come naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America 
and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  within  the  United 
States  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  the  North  German 
Confederation  to  be  American  citizens,  and  shall  be 
treated  as  such. 

Reciprocally:  Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America 
who  become  naturalized  citizens  of  the  North  German 
Confederation,  and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly 
within  North  Germany  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  the 
United  States  to  be  North  German  citizens,  and  shall  be 
treated  as  such. 

The  declaration  of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party 
the  effect  of  naturalization. 

This  article  shall  apply  as  well  to  those  already 
naturalized  in  either  country  as  those  hereafter  natu- 
ralized. 

Article  IL 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party  on  return  to  the 
territory  of  the  other  party  remains  liable  to  trial  and 
punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of  his 
original  country  and  committed  before  his  emigration; 
saving,  always,  the  limitation  established  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country. 


APPENDIX.  467 

Article  III. 
The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  in  certain  cases,  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States  on  the  one  part,  and  Prussia  and 
other  States  of  Germany  on  the  other  part,  the  sixteenth 
day  of  June,  1852,  is  hereby  extended  to  all  the  States  of 
the  North  German  Confederation. 

Article  IV. 

If  a  German  naturalized  in  America  renews  his  resi- 
dence in  North  Germany,  without  the  intent  to  return 
to  America,  he  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his  natu- 
ralization in  the  United  States. 

Reciprocally:  If  an  American  naturalized  in  North 
Germany  renews  his  residence  in  the  United  States,  with- 
out the  intent  to  return  to  North  Germany,  he  shall  be 
held  to  have  renounced  his  naturalization  in  North 
Germany. 

The  intent  not  to  return  may  be  held  to  exist  when 
the  person  naturalized  in  the  one  country  resides  more 
than  two  years  in  the  other  country. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immediately 
on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue  in 
force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given 
to  the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention 
then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  remain  in 
force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the 
contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other 
of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent, by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  and  by   his  Majesty  the  King  of 


468  NATURALIZATION 

Prussia  in  the  name  of  the  North  German  Confedera- 
tion; and  the  ratifications  shall  be  exchanged  at  Berlin 
within  six  months  from  the  date  hereof. 

In  faith  whereof,  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Berlin,  the  22d  of  February,  1868. 

[Seal.]  George  Bancroft. 

[Seal.]  Bernhard  Konig. 


CONVENTION  AND  PROTOCOL  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED 
STATES  OF  AMERICA  AND  SWEDEN  AND  NORWAY  [17 
Stat,  at  L.  809] . 

Signed  May  26,  1869;  Ratified  December  17,  1870; 
Ratifications  Exchanged  June  14,  1871;  Pro- 
claimed January  12,  1872. 

Art.  I. 

Citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America  who  have 
resided  in  Sweden  or  Norway  for  a  continuous  period  of 
at  least  five  years,  and  during  such  residence  have  be- 
come and  are  lawfully  recognized  as  citizens  of  Sweden 
or  Norway,  shall  be  held  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  be  Swedish  or  Norwegian  citizens,  and 
shall  be  treated  as  such. 

Reciprocally,  citizens  of  Sweden  or  Norway  who  have 
resided  in  the  United  States  of  America  for  a  continuous 
period  of  at  least  five  years,  and  during  such  residence 
have  become  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States, 
shall  be  held  by  the  government  of  Sweden  and  Norway 
to  be  American  citizens,  and  shall  be  treated  as  such. 

The  declaration  of  an  intention  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  one  or  the  other  country  has  not  for  either  party 
the  effect  of  citizenship  legally  acquired. 


APPENDIX.  469 

Art.  II. 

A  recognized  citizen  of  the  one  party,  on  returning  to 
the  territory  of  the  other,  remains  liable  to  trial  and 
punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of  his 
original  country  and  committed  before  his  emigration, 
but  not  for  the  emigration  itself,  saving  always  the  limi- 
tation established  by  the  laws  of  his  original  country 
and  any  other  remission  of  liability  to  punishment. 

Art.  III. 

If  a  citizen  of  the  one  party,  who  has  become  a  recog- 
nized citizen  of  the  other  party,  takes  up  his  abode  once 
more  in  his  original  country  and  applies  to  be  restored 
to  his  former  citizenship,  the  government  of  the  last- 
named  country  is  authorized  to  receive  him  again  as  a 
citizen,  on  such  conditions  as  the  said  government  may 
think  proper. 

Art.  IV. 
The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  in  certain  cases,  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States  on  the  one  part,  and  Sweden 
and  Norway  on  the  other  part,  the  21st  March,  1860  [12 
Stat,  at  L.  1125],  remains  in  force  without  change. 

Art.  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immediately 
on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue  in 
force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given 
the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention 
then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  remain  in 
force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the 
contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the  other 
of  such  intention. 


470  NATURALIZATION 

Art.  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Presi- 
dent, by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
of  the  United  States,  and  by  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Sweden  and  Norway;  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  ex- 
changed at  Stockholm  within  twenty-four  months  from 
the  date  hereof. 

In  faith  whereof  the  Plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Stockholm,  May  26,  1869. 
[seal.]  Joseph  J.  Bartlett. 

[seal.]  C.  Wachtmeister. 

protocol. 
Done  at  Stockholm,  May  26,  1869. 

The  undersigned  met  to-day  to  sign  the  convention 
agreed  upon  in  conformity  with  their  respective  full 
powers,  relating  to  the  citizenship  of  those  persons  who 
emigrate  from  the  United  States  of  America  to  Sweden 
and  Norway,  and  from  Sweden  and  Norway  to  the  United 
States  of  America;  on  which  occasion  the  following  ob- 
servations, more  exactly  defining  and  explaining  the  con- 
tents of  this  convention,  were  entered  in  the  following 
protocol: — 

I.  Relating  to  the  1st  article  of  the  convention. 

It  is  understood  that  if  a  citizen  of  the  United  States 
of  America  has  been  discharged  from  his  American  citi- 
zenship, or,  on  the  other  side,  if  a  Swede  or  a  Norwegian 
has  been  discharged  from  his  Swedish  or  Norwegian  citi- 
zenship, in  the  manner  legally  prescribed  by  the  govern- 
ment of  his  original  country,  and  then  in  the  other 
country  in  a  rightful  and  perfectly  valid  manner  ac- 
quires citizenship,  then  an  additional  five  years'  resi- 
dence shall  no  longer  be  required;  but  a  person  who  has 
in  that  manner  been  recognized  as  a  citizen  of  the  other 


APPENDIX.  471 

country  shall,  from  the  moment  thereof,  be  held  and 
treated  as  a  Swedish  or  Norwegian  citizen,  and,  recipro- 
cally, as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 

II.  Relating  to  the  second  article  of  the  convention. 
If  a  former  Swede  or  Norwegian,  who  under  the  first 

article  is  to  be  held  as  an  adopted  citizen  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  has  emigrated  after  he  has  attained 
the  age  when  he  becomes  liable  to  military  service,  and 
returns  again  to  his  original  country,  it  is  agreed  that  he 
remains  liable  to  trial  and  punishment  for  an  action 
punishable  by  the  laws  of  his  original  country  and  com- 
mitted before  his  emigration,  but  not  for  the  act  of  emi- 
gration itself,  unless  thereby  have  been  committed 
any  punishable  action  against  Sweden  or  Norway,  or 
against  a  Swedish  or  Norwegian  citizen,  such  as  non-fulfil- 
ment of  military  service,  or  desertion  from  the  military 
force  or  from  a  ship,  saving  always  the  limitation  estab- 
lished by  the  laws  of  the  original  country,  and  any  other 
remission  of  liability  to  punishment;  and  that  he  can  be 
held  to  fulfil,  according  to  the  laws,  his  military  service, 
or  the  remaining  part  thereof. 

III.  Relating  to  the  third  article  of  the  convention. 
It  is  further  agreed  that  if  a  Swede  or  Norwegian,  who 

has  become  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
renews  his  residence  in  Sweden  or  Norway  without  the 
intent  to  return  to  America,  he  shall  be  held  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States  to  have  renounced  his 
American  citizenship. 

The  intent  not  to  return  to  America  may  be  held  to 
exist  when  the  person  so  naturalized  resides  more  than 
two  years  in  Sweden  or  Norway. 

[seal.]  Joseph  J.  Bartlett. 

[seal.]  C.  Wachtmeister. 


472  NATURALIZATION 

TREATY  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  KINGDOM 
OF  WUERTTEMBERG  [16  Stat,  at  L.  735]. 

Concluded  July  27,  1868;  Proclaimed  March  7,  1870. 

Article  I. 

Citizens  of  Wiirttemberg,  who  have  become  or  shall 
become  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  shall  have  resided  uninterruptedly  within 
the  United  States  five  years,  shall  be  held  by  Wiirttem- 
berg to  be  American  citizens  and  shall  be  treated  as 
such.  Reciprocally,  citizens  of  the  United  States  of 
America  who  have  become  or  shall  become  naturalized 
citizens  of  Wiirttemberg,  and  shall  have  resided  unin- 
terruptedly within  Wiirttemberg  five  years,  shall  be  held 
by  the  United  States  to  be  citizens  of  Wiirttemberg,  and 
shall  be  treated  as  such.  The  declaration  of  an  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  one  or  the  other  country  has 
not  for  either  party  the  effect  of  naturalization. 

Article  II. 

A  naturalized  citizen  of  the  one  party  on  return  to 
the  territory  of  the  other  party  remains  liable  to  trial 
and  punishment  for  an  action  punishable  by  the  laws  of 
his  original  country,  and  committed  before  his  emigra- 
tion; saving  always  the  limitation  established  by  the 
laws  of  his  original  country,  or  any  other  remission  of 
liability  to  punishment. 

Article  III. 

The  convention  for  the  mutual  delivery  of  criminals, 
fugitives  from  justice,  in  certain  cases,  concluded  between 
Wiirttemberg  and  the  United  States  the  16  June,  1852 
—13  October,  1853  [10  Stat,  at  L.  971],  remains  in  force 
without  change. 


APPENDIX.  473 

Article  IV. 

If  a  Wiirttemberger,  naturalized  in  America,  renews 
his  residence  in  Wiirttemberg  without  the  intent  to  re- 
turn to  America,  he  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his 
naturalization  in  the  United  States.  Reciprocally,  if  an 
American  naturalized  in  Wiirttemberg,  renews  his  resi- 
dence in  the  United  States  without  the  intent  to  return 
to  Wiirttemberg,  he  shall  be  held  to  have  renounced  his 
naturalization  in  Wiirttemberg.  The  intent  not  to  return 
may  be  held  to  exist  when  the  person  naturalized  in  the 
one  country  resides  more  than  two  years  in  the  other 
country. 

Article  V. 

The  present  convention  shall  go  into  effect  immedi- 
ately on  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  shall  continue 
in  force  for  ten  years.  If  neither  party  shall  have  given 
to  the  other  six  months'  previous  notice  of  its  intention 
then  to  terminate  the  same,  it  shall  further  remain  in 
force  until  the  end  of  twelve  months  after  either  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  shall  have  given  notice  to  the 
other  of  such  intention. 

Article  VI. 

The  present  convention  shall  be  ratified  by  his 
Majesty  the  King  of  Wiirttemberg,  with  the  consent  of 
the  Chambers  of  the  kingdom,  and  by  the  President  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  ratifications  shall  be  changed  at 
Stuttgart  as  soon  as  possible,  within  twelve  months  from 
the  date  hereof. 

In  faith  whereof  the  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  this  convention. 

Stuttgart,  the  twenty-seventh  of  July,  one  thousand 
eight  hundred  and  sixty-eight. 

[seal.]  Geo.  Bancroft. 

[seal.]  Freiherr  Von  Varnbuler. 


APPENDIX.  475 

EXECUTIVE  ORDERS  OF  APRIL  6  AND  APRIL 

8,  1907. 

AMENDING  THE  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  DIPLOMATIC  OFFICERS 
AND  THE  CONSULAR  REGULATIONS  RELATIVE  TO 
EXPATRIATION,  CITIZENSHIP,  NATURALIZATION  AND 
PASSPORTS.* 

Executive  Order  of  April  6,  1907. 

It  is  hereby  ordered  that  the  instructions  to  the 
diplomatic  officers  of  the  United  States  and  the  regula- 
tions prescribed  for  the  use  of  the  consular  service  of 
the  United  States  be  amended  in  the  following  parti- 
culars, the  numbers  of  the  paragraphs  amended  being 
the  same  in  both  the  instructions  and  the  regulations. 

Paragraph  138  shall  read  as  follows: 

Children  of  Citizens  Born  Abroad.  —  All  children  born 
out  of  the  limits  and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States 
whose  fathers  were  at  the  time  of  their  birth  citizens 
thereof  are  citizens  of  the  United  States;  but  the  rights 
of  citizenship  do  not  descend  to  children  whose  fathers 
never  resided  in  the  United  States.  All  children  who 
are,  in  accordance  with  this  paragraph,  born  citizens  of 
the  United  States,  and  who  continue  to  reside  outside 
of  the  United  States,  are  required  in  order  to  receive 
the  protection  of  this  government,  upon  reaching  the 
age  of  eighteen  years  to  record  at  an  American  Consulate 
their  intention  to   become  residents  and  remain  citizens, 

*Togive  effect  to  the  principal  provisions  of  these  Orders,  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  on  April  19,  1907.  issued  a  set  of  circular  instructions,  six 
in  number,  addressed  to  the  American  diplomatic  and  consular  officers. 
The  subjects  of  these  circulars,  and  the  reference  to  the  pages  of  this 
volume  where  they  may  be  found,  are  as  follows: 

"Children  of  Citizens  Born  Abroad,"  pp.  350,  351. 

"  Expatriation,"  pp.  341-343. 

"  Issuance  of  Passports,"  pp.  380-384. 

"  Registration  of  American  Citizens,"  pp.  352-354. 

"  Registration  of  Women  Who  Desire  to  Resume  or  Retain  American 
Citizenship,"  pp.  241-243  and  257,  258. 

"  Reports  of  Fraudulent  Naturalizadon,"  pp. 136-138. 


476  NATURALIZATION 

and  upon  reaching  their  majority  are  further  required  to 
take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States. — R.  S. 
Sec.  1993;  Act  of  March  2,   1907,  Sec.  6. 

Paragraph  141  shall  read  as  follows: 

Wife  of  Citizen. — Any  white  woman  or  woman  of 
African  nativity  or  descent  or  Indian  woman  married  to 
a  citizen  of  the  United  States  is  a  citizen  thereof;  and 
it  is  immaterial  whether  the  husband  became  a  citizen 
before  or  after  marriage.  Any  woman  who  acquires 
American  citizenship  by  marriage  shall  be  assumed  to 
have  retained  it  after  the  termination  of  the  marital  re- 
lation by  death  or  absolute  divorce  if  she  continues  to 
reside  in  the  United  States,  unless  she  makes  formal  re- 
nunciation thereof  before  a  court  having  jurisdiction  to 
naturalize  aliens;  or,  if  she  resides  abroad,  she  may  re- 
tain American  citizenship  by  registering  as  an  American 
citizen  before  a  United  States  Consul  within  one  year 
after  the  termination  of  the  marital  relation. — R.  S.  Sec. 
1994;  25  Stat.  L.  392;  Act  of  March  2,  1907,  Sec.  4. 

After  paragraph  141,  a  new  paragraph  shall  be  added 
as  follows: 

An  American  Woman  Who  Marries  a  Foreigner. — An 
American  woman  who  marries  a  foreigner  takes  the 
nationality  of  her  husband.  At  the  termination  of  the 
marital  relation,  by  death  or  absolute  divorce,  she  may 
resume  her  American  citizenship,  if  abroad,  by  register- 
ing as  an  American  citizen  within  one  year  with  a  consul 
of  the  United  States,  or  by  returning  to  reside  in  the 
United  States,  or,  if  residing  in  the  United  States  at  the 
termination  of  the  marital  relation,  by  continuing  to 
reside  therein. — Act  of  March  2,  1907,  Sec.  4. 

Paragraph  142  shall  read  as  follows: 

Children  of  Naturalized  Citizens. — The  naturalization 
or  resumption  of  American  citizenship  of  the  parents 
confers  American  citizenship  upon  the  minor  children 
and  such  citizenship  shall   begin  at  the  time  such  minor 


APPENDIX.  477 

children  begin  to  reside  permanently  in  the  United 
States.— Act  of  March  2,  1907,  Sec.  5. 

Paragraph  143  shall  read  as  follows: 

Declaration  of  Intention. — The  declaration  of  inten- 
tion to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  does  not 
make  one  a  citizen,  and  the  certificate  of  a  court  that 
such  declaration  has  been  made  is  not  evidence  of  citi- 
zenship; but  when  any  alien  who  has  declared  his  inten- 
tion to  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  dies  be- 
fore he  is  actually  naturalized  his  widow  and  minor 
children  may,  by  complying  with  the  other  provisions  of 
the  naturalization  laws,  be  admitted  to  citizenship  with- 
out making  the  declaration  of  intention. — Act  of  June 
29,  1906,  Sec.  4,  Par.  6. 

Paragraph  144  shall  read  as  follows: 

Expatriation. — An  American  citizen  shall  be  deemed 
to  have  expatriated  himself  when  he  has  been  naturalized 
in  any  foreign  state  in  conformity  with  its  laws,  or  when 
he  has  taken  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  any  foreign  state. 
When  any  naturalized  citizen  shall  have  resided  for  two 
years  in  the  foreign  state  from  which  he  came,  or  for  five 
years  in  any  other  foreign  state,  it  shall  be  presumed 
that  he  has  ceased  to  be  an  American  citizen,  and  his 
place  of  general  abode  shall  be  deemed  his  place  of  resi- 
dence during  the  said  years:  Provided,  That  such  pre- 
sumption may  be  overcome  on  the  presentation  of  satis- 
factory evidence  to  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  of 
the  United  States,  under  such  rules  and  regulations  as 
the  Department  of  State  may  prescribe. 

An  American  citizen  shall  not  be  allowed  to  expatriate 
himself  when  this  country  is  at  war. — Act  of  March  2, 1907, 
Sec.  2. 

After  paragraph  144,  add  the  following  three  para- 
graphs: 

Registration  to  Resume  or  Retain  Citizenship. — When 
an  American  woman  has  married  a  foreigner  and  he  dies 


478  NATURALIZATION 

or  they  are  absolutely  divorced,  in  order  to  resume  her 
rights  as  an  American  citizen,  she  must  register  with  an 
American  consulate  within  one  year  after  the  termination 
of  the  marital  relation.  Whenever  any  foreign  woman 
has  acquired  American  citizenship  through  her  marriage, 
upon  the  death  of  her  husband  or  upon  their  absolute 
divorce  she  must,  if  she  is  abroad  and  desires  to  retain  her 
American  citizenship,  register  as  an  American  citizen  be- 
fore a  United  States  consul  within  one  year  after  the 
termination  of  the  marital  relation.  All  minor  children, 
born  of  American  parents  outside  of  the  United  States, 
must,  in  order  to  receive  the  protection  of  this  govern- 
ment, at  the  age  of  eighteen  years,  record  at  an  American 
consulate  their  intention  to  become  residents  and  remain 
citizens  of  the  United  States. — Act  of  March  2, 1907,  Sec- 
tions 3,  4,  and  6. 

Oath  of  Allegiance. — Every  child  born  without  the 
United  States  of  American  parents  and  resident  abroad 
is  required,  in  order  to  conserve  his  American  citizenship, 
to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  before 
an  American  consul,  upon  attaining  his  majority. — Act  of 
March  2,  1907,  Sec.  6. 

Duplicates  of  Evidence  of  Citizenship. — Diplomatic 
and  consular  officers  are  required  to  file  with  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  duplicates  of  any  evidence,  registration,  or 
other  acts,  taken  before  them  in  conservation  or  resump- 
tion of  citizenship  and  the  right  to  protection. — Act  of 
March  2,  1907,  Sec.  7. 

Paragraph  149  shall  read  as  follows: 

To  Whom  Issued. — No  passport  shall  be  granted  or 
issued  to  or  verified  for  any  persons  other  than  citizens 
of  the  United  States  or  loyal  residents  of  the  insular  pos- 
sessions of  the  United  States  by  diplomatic  or  consular 
officers.  In  his  discretion  the  Secretary  of  State  may 
issue  passports  to  those  who  have  made  the  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States,  but  such 


APPENDIX.  479 

passports  are  not  permitted  to  be  issued  by  diplomatic 
and  consular  officers. — Section  4076,  R.  S.;  Act  of  June 
14,  1902;   Act  of  March  2,  1907,  Sec.  1. 

Paragraph  150  shall  read  as  follows: 

When  Passports  May  be  Issued. — Passports  can  not  be 
issued  by  diplomatic  or  consular  officers,  if  the  applicant 
has  time  to  apply  to  the  Department  of  State  and  await 
its  reply.  Where  inconvenience  or  hardship  would  re- 
sult to  a  person  entitled  to  receive  a  passport  unless  he 
received  it  at  once,  a  diplomatic  officer,  or  a  consular 
officer  who  shall  have  received  authority  to  do  so  from 
the  Secretary  of  State,  may  issue  to  such  person  an 
emergency  passport,  good  for  a  period  not  to  exceed  six 
months  from  the  date  of  issuance,  and  to  be  used  for  a 
purpose  which  shall  be  stated  in  the  passport. 

This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907. 

Paragraph  151  shall  read  as  follows: 

Applications. — Persons  entitled  to  receive  passports 
who  desire  to  secure  them  when  they  are  abroad  may 
make  applications  therefor  to  the  Department  of  State 
through  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer.  Native  citizens 
thus  applying  must  make  an  affidavit  with  respect  to 
birth,  take  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  furnish  identifica- 
tion by  a  creditable  person,  all  in  duplicate  and  according 

to  Form  No. .     Naturalized   citizens   must   comply 

with  the  same  requirements,  using  Form  No. ;   and, 

if  claiming  citizenship  through  naturalization  of  husband 

or  parent,  using   Form  No. .     A  naturalized  citizen 

must  also  exhibit  his  certificate  of  naturalization  or  that 
of  the  husband  or  parent  through  whom  citizenship  is 
claimed,  or  a  duly  certified  copy  of  the  court  record 
thereof.  Further  evidence  of  the  applicant's  citizenship 
may  be  required,  if  deemed  necessary.  A  loyal  resident 
of  an  insular  possession  of  the  United  States  in  addition 
to  the  information  now  required  in  the  case  of  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  must  state  that  he  owes  allegiance 


480  NATURALIZATION 

to  the  United  States  and  does  not  acknowledge  allegiance 
to  any  other  government,  and  must  submit  an  affidavit 
from  at  least  two  credible  witnesses  having  good  means 
of  knowledge  in  substantiation  of  his  statements  of  birth, 
residence  and  loyalty.  The  identity  of  an  applicant  for 
a  passport  should  always  be  established  when  the  appli- 
cation is  taken. 

This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907. 

Paragraph  152  shall  read  as  follows: 

Expiration  of  Passports. — A  passport  issued  by  the 
Department  is  good  for  a  period  of  two  years,  when  it 
expires;  but  it  may  be  renewed  for  a  further  period  of 
two  years  by  a  diplomatic  officer  or  by  a  consular  officer 
who  has  received  authority  for  the  purpose  from  the 
Secretary  of  State.  It  is  permissible  to  renew  passports 
only  once. 

This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907. 

Paragraph  153  shall  read  as  follows: 

Old  Passport  in  Lieu  of  Naturalization  Certificate. — An 
American  citizen  who  is  abroad  and  who  holds  a  pass- 
port which  has  expired  after  renewal  may  apply  through 
a  diplomatic  officer  or  a  consular  officer  for  a  new  pass- 
port, and  the  old  passport  will  be  accepted  as  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  citizenship  of  the  applicant  was  prop- 
erly proved  when  the  old  passport  was  granted,  and  a 
naturalized  citizen  need  not,  therefore,  be  required  to 
produce  again  the  certificate  of  naturalization  through 
which  he  acquired  his  citizenship.  The  old  passport 
should  be  retained  and  sent  to  the  Department  of  State 
with  the  application.  If  there  is  any  doubt  surrounding 
the  case,  however,  the  applicant  should  be  required  to 
produce  the  same  evidence  that  would  be  required  of 
him  if  he  were  making  his  first  application  for  a  pass- 
port. 

Paragraph  154  shall  be  struck  out. 


APPENDIX.  481 

Paragraph  159  shall  read  as  follows: 

Fees. — An  official  fee  equivalent  to  one  dollar  in  the 
gold  coin  of  the  United  States  must  be  collected  for 
each  passport  issued. 

Paragraph  160  shall  read  as  follows: 

Visa. — A  diplomatic  officer  or  a  consular  officer,  includ- 
ing a  consular  agent,  may  visa  or  verify  regularly  issued 
passports  by  endorsing  thereon  the  word  "Good"  in  the 
language  of  the  country  and  affixing  to  the  endorsement 
his  official  signature  and  seal.  A  diplomatic  officer 
should  visa  a  passport  only  when  there  is  no  American 
consulate  established  in  the  city  where  the  mission  is 
situated,  or  when  the  consular  officer  is  absent,  or  the 
government  of  the  country  refuses  to  acknowledge  the 
validity  of  the  consular  visa.  Whenever  a  passport 
without  signature  is  presented  to  be  visaed  the  holder 
should  be  required  to  sign  it  before  it  is  visaed  by  a 
diplomatic  or  consular  officer.  An  official  fee  equivalent 
to  one  dollar  in  the  gold  coin  of  the  United  States  should 
be  collected  for  each  passport  visaed.  No  visa  shall  be 
attached  to  a  passport  after  its  validity  has  expired. 

Paragraph  163  shall  read  as  follows: 

Return  of  Passports. — As  soon  as  an  emergency  pass- 
port is  issued  by  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  he  shall 
transmit  to  the  Department  of  State  a  duplicate  of  the 
application  and  a  statement  of  the  proof  accepted  by 
him  for  the  issuance  of  the  passport  and  of  the  reason 
why  the  issuance  of  the  passport  was  necessary.  When- 
ever an  application  for  a  passport  is  made  to  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  through  a  diplomatic  or  consular  officer 
he  shall  transmit  a  duplicate  of  the  application  and  of 
the  accompanying  proof  of  the  right  to  receive  a  pass- 
port to  the  Department  of  State,  but  he  need  not,  unless 
otherwise  instructed,  transmit  a  certificate  of  naturaliza- 
tion. 

This  paragraph  shall  become  effective  July  1,  1907. 

5233-31 


482  NATURALIZATION 

Add,  as  a  separate  paragraph,  after  paragraph  169: 

When  Protection  Should  be  Denied. — Any  one  who  has 
expatriated  himself  is  not  entitled  to  intervention  on 
the  part  of  any  diplomatic  or  consular  officer  of  the 
United  States.     (See  Paragraph  144.) 

After  paragraph  170  add: 

Reports  of  Fraudulent  Naturalization. — When  any  alien 
who  has  secured  naturalization  of  the  United  States 
shall  proceed  abroad  within  five  years  after  his  naturali- 
zation and  shall  take  up  his  permanent  residence  in  any 
foreign  country  within  five  years  after  the  date  of  his 
naturalization,  it  shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  evidence 
that  he  did  not  intend  in  good  faith  to  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  when  he  applied  for  naturalization, 
and  in  the  absence  of  countervailing  evidence  it  shall  be 
sufficient  in  the  proper  proceedings  to  authorize  the  can- 
cellation of  his  certificate  of  citizenship  as  fraudulent. 
Diplomatic  and  consular  officers  shall  furnish  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  to  be  transmitted  to  the  Department  of 
Justice,  the  names  of  those  within  their  jurisdictions, 
respectively,  who  are  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this 
requirement,  and  such  statements  from  diplomatic  and 
consular  officers  shall  be  certified  to  by  such  officers 
under  their  official  seal,  and  are  under  the  law  admissi- 
ble in  evidence  in  all  courts  to  cancel  certificates  of 
naturalization. — Act  of  June  29,  1906,  Sec.  15. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 

The  White  House,  April  6,  1907. 


Executive  Order  of  April  8,  1907. 

It  is  hereby  ordered  that  paragraph  172  of  the  regu- 
lations prescribed  for  the  use  of  the  consular  service  of 
the  United  States  be  so  amended  as  to  read  as  follows: 


APPENDIX.  483 

Registration  of  American  Citizens. — Principal  consular 
officers  should  keep  at  their  offices  a  register  of  all  Ameri- 
can citizens  residing  in  their  several  districts,  and  will 
therefore  make  it  known  that  such  a  register  is  kept  and 
invite  all  resident  Americans  to  cause  their  names  to  be 
entered  therein.  The  same  general  principles  govern 
applications  for  registry  which  govern  applications  for 
passports.     (Paragraph  151.) 

The  register  should  show  the  date  of  registration,  the 
full  name  of  the  person  registered,  the  date  and  place  of 
his  birth,  the  place  of  his  last  domicile  in  the  United 
States,  the  date  of  his  arrival  in  the  foreign  country 
where  he  is  residing  and  his  place  of  residence  therein, 
the  reasons  for  his  foreign  residence,  whether  or  not  he 
is  married  and  if  married  the  name  of  his  wife,  her  place 
of  birth  and  residence,  and  if  he  has  children  the  name, 
date,  and  place  of  birth  and  residence  of  each.  The 
nature  of  the  proof  accepted  to  establish  his  citizenship 
should  also  appear,  and  his  signature  should  be  inscribed 
in  the  register. 

Consuls  may  issue  certificates  of  the  registration  pre- 
scribed above  for  use  with  the  authorities  of  the  place 
where  the  person  registered  is  residing.  Each  certificate 
shall  set  forth  the  facts  contained  in  the  register  and 
shall  be  good  for  use  for  one  year  only  and  shall  be  in  a 
a   form   prescribed   by   the  Secretary   of   State    (Form 

No. .).     When  a  certificate  expires  a  new  one  may 

be  issued,  the  old  one  being  destroyed,  if  it  is  clearly 
shown  that  the  residence  abroad  has  not  assumed  a  per- 
manent character.  Persons  who  hold  passports  which 
have  not  expired  shall  not  be  furnished  with  certificates 
of  registration,  and  it  is  strictly  forbidden  to  furnish 
them  to  be  used  for  traveling  in  the  place  of  passports. 
Returns  of  all  registrations  made  and  of  all  certificates 
of  registration  issued  shall  be  made  to  the  embassy  or 


484  NATURALIZATION. 

legation  in  the  country  in  which  the  consulate  is  situ- 
ated and  to  the  Secretary  of  State  at  intervals  and  under 
regulations  to  be  prescribed  by  him.  No  fee  will  be 
charged  for  registration  nor  for  any  service  connected 
therewith,  nor  for  certificates  of  registration. 

This  paragraph  shall  go  into  effect  July  1,  1907. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 

The  White  House,  April  8,  1907. 


APPENDIX.  485 

NATURALIZATION  REGULATIONS. 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 

Office  of  the  Secretary, 

Washington,  October  2,  1906. 

1.  On  and  after  September  27,  1906,  declarations  of 
intention  to  become  citizens  of  the  United  States  shall 
be  filed  with  the  clerks  of  such  state  courts  only  as  have 
"a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law  or 
equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in  which  the  amount  in  con- 
troversy is  unlimited." 

2.  Declarations  of  intention  made  prior  to  September 
27,  1906,  before  clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  to 
naturalize  aliens  under  the  provisions  of  the  law  exist- 
ing at  the  time  such  declarations  were  made,  may  be 
used  in  lieu  of  the  declarations  required  by  the  act  of 
June  29,  1906,  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  two 
years  from  the  date  when  made. 

3.  Aliens  who  have  made  declarations  of  intention 
prior  to  September  27,  1906,  under  the  provisions  of  law 
in  force  at  the  time  of  making  such  declarations,  cannot 
be  required,  as  a  preliminary  to  filing  their  petitions  for 
naturalization,  to  file  new  declarations  of  intention  under 
the  act  of  June  29,  1906;  nor  are  such  aliens  required, 
as  a  condition  precedent  to  naturalization,  to  speak  the 
English  language. 

4.  Aliens  who  make  the  declaration  of  intention 
required  by  law  prior  to  September  27, 1906,  unless  they 
can  be  naturalized  before  that  date  under  the  laws  then 
in  force,  must  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  act 
of  June  29,  1906,  in  regard  to  the  filing  of  petitions  for 
naturalization  and  furnishing  proof,  except  that  they 
will  not  be  required  to  speak  the  English  language  or  to 
sign  petitions  in  their  own  handwriting. 

5.  Declarations  of  intention  will  be  furnished  in  bound 


486  NATURALIZATION 

volumes  (Form  2202,2202A,  or  2202B),as  a  court  record, 
varying  in  size  according  to  the  amount  of  sucli  business 
transacted  by  the  court.  In  addition  to  the  bound 
records,  the  duplicate  and  triplicate  declarations  of  in- 
tention (Form  2203)  will  be  furnished  as  loose  sheets 
attached  together  and  perforated,  so  that  they  can  be 
readily  torn  apart,  the  triplicate  to  be  given  to  the  peti- 
tioner and  the  duplicate  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Bureau 
of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Natu- 
ralization). Each  bound  record  will  consist  of  the 
original  declarations  of  intention,  paged  in  consecutive 
order  and  indexed.  These  volumes  are  to  be  numbered 
and  will  form  a  permanent  record  of  the  court. 

6.  The  original  of  the  petitions  for  naturalization  will 
also  be  furnished  in  bound  volumes  (Form  2204,  2204A 
or  2204B)  of  varying  size,  paged  in  consecutive  order  and 
indexed.  The  duplicate  petitions  (Form  2205)  will  be 
furnished  as  loose  sheets  and  must  be  forwarded  to  the 
Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of 
Naturalization)  within  thirty  days  after  execution.  The 
original  petitions  for  naturalization  must  be  filled  out 
and  signed  in  the  bound  volumes,  and  remain  as  a  part 
of  the  permanent  records  of  the  office  in  which  filed. 

7.  Certificates  of  naturalization  (Form  2207)  will  be 
supplied  in  bound  volumes  consisting  of  original  and 
duplicate  certificates*  and  stubs.  Each  original  and 
duplicate  certificate  and  the  stub  will  be  given  the  same 
serial  number,  the  stub  to  the  original  certificate  bear- 
ing a  page  number  in  addition  to  its  serial  number.  Each 
book  will  bear  a  volume  number,  and  the  volume  number 
and  page  of  the  stub  must  be  given  on  the  face  of  the 
certificate.  The  original  certificate  will  be  given  to  the 
petitioner  in  accordance  with  the  final  order  of  the  court, 
and  the  duplicate  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  Bureau  of 
Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturaliza- 
tion) by  registered  mail  within  thirty  days  after  the  issu- 


APPENDIX.  487 

ance  of  the  original,  the  stub  to  the  original  constituting 
a  part  of  the  permanent  records  of  the  court. 

8.  No  certificate  of  naturalization  shall  be  issued  to  a 
petitioner  until  after  the  judge  of  the  court  granting 
naturalization  has  signed  the  order  to  that  effect. 

9.  Clerks  of  courts  will  be  furnished  with  requisition 
blanks  (Form  2201)  on  which  are  listed,  by  number  and 
title,  all  blank  forms,  including  record  and  order  books, 
to  be  used  in  the  naturalization  of  aliens,  and  these 
forms  must  be  obtained  exclusively  from  the  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  and  Labor  (Division  of  Naturaliza- 
tion), none  other  being  official.  Manila  envelopes  or 
jackets  (Form  2211)  will  be  furnished  to  clerks  in  which 
to  place  the  triplicate  declaration  of  intention  or  the 
original  certificate  of  naturalization  before  delivering 
them  to  the  person  making  the  declaration  or  to  the 
person  naturalized. 

10.  The  first  supply  of  blank  forms  will  be  furnished 
upon  the  written  application  of  the  clerks  of  courts  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  accompanied,  in  the 
case  of  clerks  of  state  courts,  by  authoritative  evidence 
(preferably  the  certificate  of  the  attorney-general  of  the 
state)  that  the  courts  of  which  such  clerks  are  officers 
have  "a  seal,  a  clerk,  and  jurisdiction  in  actions  at  law 
or  equity,  or  law  and  equity,  in  which  the  amount  in 
controversy  is  unlimited."  Subsequent  supplies  of  such 
blank  forms  will  be  furnished  the  clerks  of  courts  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens  upon  the  receipt  by 
the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division 
of  Naturalization)  of  requisitions  made  on  Form  2201. 

11.  Clerks  of  courts  when  first  making  applications  to 
the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division 
of  Naturalization)  for  supplies  of  the  blank  forms  re- 
quired in  the  naturalization  of  aliens  shall  state,  as  to 
the  two  years  next  preceding  the  date  of  such  applica- 
tion, the  number  of  declarations  of   intention  filed  with 


488  NATURALIZATION 

them  and  the   number  of  orders  of  naturalization  made 
by  their  courts,  respectively. 

12.  All  applications  for  supplies  of  certificates  of 
naturalization  (Form  2207)  should  be  accompanied  by 
a  statement  of  the  number,  if  any,  of  certificates  of 
naturalization  issued  by  the  clerks  of  courts  making 
such  applications  since  June  1,  1903,  if  such  certificates 
failed  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  Immigra- 
tion Act  of  March  3,  1903. 

13.  Where  the  same  court  holds  sessions  at  different 
places,  whether  a  clerk  is  appointed  at  each  of  said 
places  or  the  one  clerk  is  required  to  transact  the  busi- 
ness of  the  court  wherever  it  may  sit,  separate  supplies 
shall  be  kept,  in  order  to  comply  with  the  requirements 
of  Section  14  of  the  Naturalization  Act,  which  provides 
that  the  bound  declarations  of  intention  and  of  petitions 
for  naturalization  shall  be  in  chronological  order. 

14.  In  every  case  in  which  the  name  of  a  naturalized 
alien  is  changed  by  order  of  court,  as  provided  in  Sec- 
tion 6,  the  clerks  of  courts  are  required  to  report  to  the 
Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of 
Naturalization),  when  transmitting  to  it  the  duplicate  of 
the  certificate  of  naturalization  of  the  alien  whose  name 
is  changed,  both  the  original  and  the  new  name  of  the 
said  person. 

15.  Within  thirty  days  after  posting  the  notice  (Form 
2206)  required  by  Section  5  of  the  Naturalization  Act  of 
June  29,  1906,  the  clerk  shall  inform  the  Bureau  of  Im- 
migration and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturaliza- 
tion), on  Form  2209,  of  the  date,  as  near  as  may  be,  for 
the  final  hearing  of  each  and  every  petition  for  natural- 
ization. 

16.  Applications  for  the  issuance  of  declarations  of 
intention  (Form  2203)  or  certificates  of  naturalization 
(Form  2207),  in  lieu  of  declarations  of  intention  or  cer- 
tificates of  naturalization  claimed  to  have   been  lost  or 


APPENDIX.  489 

destroyed,  shall  be  made  under  oath  to  the  clerk  of  the 
court  by  which  any  such  declarations  of  intention  or  cer- 
tificates of  naturalization  were  originally  issued,  and  shall 
contain  full  information  in  regard  to  the  lost  or  destroyed 
papers,  and  as  to  the  time,  place,  and  circumstances  of 
such  alleged  loss  or  destruction.  The  clerk  shall  forward 
to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Di- 
vision of  Naturalization)  the  above-mentioned  applica- 
tions, together  with  such  information  as  he  may  have 
bearing  upon  the  merits  thereof,  for  investigation,  and 
no  such  paper  so  applied  for  shall  be  issued  until  the 
Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization  (Division  of 
Naturalization)  reports  the  results  of  its  investigation 
as  to  the  merits  of  the  application. 

17.  In  every  case  in  which  the  clerk  of  a  court  issues, 
in  accordance  with  the  preceding  rule,  a  declaration  of 
intention  (Form  2203)  or  a  certificate  of  naturalization 
(Form  2207),  upon  proof  of  the  loss  or  destruction  of  the 
original,  he  shall  make  an  entry  on  the  original  declara- 
tion, or  on  the  stub  of  the  original  certificate  of  natu- 
ralization, as  the  case  may  require,  showing  the  issuance 
of  a  new  paper  and  the  number  thereof,  and  shall  imme- 
diately thereafter  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturalization)  the  du- 
plicate of  any  such  paper  so  issued. 

18.  If  an  alien  is  physically  unable  to  speak,  that  fact 
should  be  stated  in  his  petition  for  naturalization  in  lieu 
of  the  statement,  "  I  am  able  to  speak  the  English  lan- 
guage." 

19.  Within  thirty  days  after  the  sitting  of  a  court  in 
naturalization  cases,  the  clerk  of  such  court  shall  for- 
ward to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization 
(Division  of  Naturalization)  on  Form  2210  a  list  contain- 
ing the  name  of  each  and  every  alien  who,  during  such 
sitting  of  court,  has  been  denied  naturalization,  and  the 
reason  or  reasons  for  such  denial. 


490  NATURALIZATION 

20.  The  names  of  aliens  making  declarations  of  inten- 
tion, or  filing  petitions  for  naturalization,  must  be  entered 
in  full  in  the  appropriate  places  on  the  various  blank 
forms,  without  abbreviation,  and  the  signatures  of  such 
aliens  must  also  be  written  out  without  abbreviation. 
Great  care  should  be  taken  to  get  in  every  case  the  cor- 
rect spelling  of  names. 

21.  Clerks  of  courts  shall  not  receive  declarations  of 
intention  (Form  2203)  to  become  citizens  from  other 
aliens  than  white  persons  and  persons  of  African  nativity 
or  of  African  descent. 

22.  Beginning  with  October  1,  1906,  and  on  the  first 
working  day  of  each  and  every  month  thereafter,  clerks 
of  courts  shall  forward  to  the  Bureau  of  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  (Division  of  Naturalization)  dupli- 
cate declarations  of  intention  and  petitions  for  naturali- 
zation filed,  and  all  duplicates  of  certificates  of  naturali- 
zation issued,  during  the  preceding  month.  Duplicate 
petitions  for  naturalization  and  duplicate  certificates 
of  naturalization  shall  be  forwarded  by  registered  mail; 
and  duplicate  declarations  of  intention  shall  be  sent 
therewith,  provided  the  combined  weight  of  the  docu- 
ments does  not  exceed  four  pounds,  otherwise  they  shall 
be  forwarded  in  a  separate  package  by  unregistered  mail. 
The  clerks  making  such  shipments  are  required  to  notify 
the  chief  of  the  Division  of  Naturalization  of  the  date 
thereof,  by  unregistered  mail,  on  Form  2208,  provided 
for  that  purpose.  In  transmitting  petitions  clerks  of 
courts  are  directed  to  state  that  the  names  of  the  peti- 
tioners and  their  witnesses  have  been  conspicuously 
posted,  as  required  by  law. 

23.  All  fees  provided  for  in  Sec.  13  of  the  Act  of  June 
29,  1906,  collected  by  clerks  of  courts  during  any  quar- 
ter of  a  fiscal  year,  shall  be  accounted  for  within  thirty 
days  after    the   close  of  such   quarter,  on    Form  2212, 


APPENDIX.  491 

provided  for  that  purpose;  and  one-half  of  all  moneys  so 
collected  shall  be  remitted  to  the  Chief  of  the  Division 
of  Naturalization,  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Natural- 
ization, with  said  quarterly  accounts.  In  cases  where  no 
naturalization  business  is  transacted  during  any  quarter, 
said  blank  form  shall  be  forwarded  as  aforesaid  with  the 
words  "  No  transactions  "   noted  thereon. 

24.  Under  Sec.  2166  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  an  hon- 
orably discharged  soldier,  who  is  of  the  age  of  21  years 
and  upward,  may  be  admitted  to  become  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States  without  making  the  declaration  of  in- 
tention required  of  other  aliens.  Also,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Act  of  July  26,  1894,  Ch.  165,  any  alien, 
of  the  age  of  21  years  and  upward,  who  has  enlisted,  or 
may  enlist  in  the  United  States  Navy  or  Marine  Corps, 
having  been  honorably  discharged  therefrom,  after  a 
residence  of  five  years  may  be  admitted  to  become  a  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  without  making  the  declaration 
of  intention  required  of  other  aliens.  Clerks  of  courts  are 
therefore  instructed  to  appropriately  note  upon  the  peti- 
tion of  such  discharged  alien  soldier,  or  member  of  the 
Navy  or  Marine  Corps,  and  upon  the  stub  of  the  certificate 
of  naturalization  issued  to  him^  in  lieu  of  the  information 
required  thereon  as  to  the  filing  of  the  declaration  of  in- 
tention, that  the  petitioner  was  an  honorably  discharged 
alien  soldier,  or  member  of  the  Navy  or  Marine  Corps, 
and  applied  for  citizenship  under  the  said  Sec.  2166,  or 
the  Act  of  July  26,  1894. 

25.  So  far  as  is  practicable,  the  clerks  of  courts  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  under  the  provisions  of  the  naturaliza- 
tion laws  will  be  furnished  with  appropriately  addressed 
envelopes  for  communicating  with  the  Bureau.  When 
not  using  such  envelopes,  however,  all  communications, 
in  addition  to  the  other  necessary  address,  should  be 
plainly  marked  "Division  of  Naturalization." 


492  NATURALIZATION 

26.  Clerks  of  courts  having  jurisdiction  to  naturalize 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  are  re- 
quested, in  case  the  foregoing  rules  and  regulations  fail 
to  remove  from  their  minds  doubt  as  to  the  proper 
course  of  action  in  any  case,  to  write  to  the  chief  of  the 
Division  of  Naturalization,  Bureau  of  Immigration  and 
Naturalization,  for  instructions  before  taking  such  action. 


APPENDIX.  493 


LIST  OF  COURTS  HAVING  JURISDICTION  UNDER 
THE  ACT  OF  JUNE  29,  1906,  TO  NATURALIZE 
ALIENS. 

ALABAMA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 

Northern  District,  Birmingham. 
Middle  District,  Montgomery. 
Southern  District,  Mobile. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

City  Courts: 

Anniston. 

Gadsden. 

Birmingham. 

Bessemer. 

Mobile. 

Montgomery. 

Talladega. 

Selma. 

County  Courts: 

Tuscaloosa  County  Court. 

Walker  County  Law  and  Equity  Court. 

ALASKA. 
District  Courts: 

Division  No.  1,  Juneau. 
Division  No.  2,  Nome. 
Division  No.  3,  Fairbanks. 


494  NATURALIZATION 

ARIZONA. 
United  States  District  Courts: 
First  District,  Tucson. 
Second  District,  Tombstone. 
Third  District,  Phoenix. 
Fourth  District,  Prescott. 
Fifth  District,  Solomonville. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  ter- 
ritory. 

ARKANSAS. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 

Eastern  District:  Little  Rock,  Batesville,  Helena. 
Western  District:  Fort  Smith,  Texarkana,  Harri- 
son. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state 

CALIFORNIA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Northern  District,  San  Francisco. 
Southern  District,  Los  Angeles. 
Superior  courtsof  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

COLORADO. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Denver. 
District   courts    of    the  several   counties  within   the 
state. 

CONNECTICUT. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Hartford. 
Superior  courts  of   the  several    counties  within  the 
state. 


APPENDIX.  495 

DELAWARE. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts-' 
Wilmington. 
Courts   of  chancery  in  and  for  the  several  counties 

within  the  state. 
Superior  courts  in  and  for  the  several  counties  within 
the  state. 

DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  District  of  Columbia. 

FLORIDA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 

Northern  District,  Pensacola. 
Southern  District,  Jacksonville. 

GEORGIA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Northern  District,  Atlanta. 
Southern  District,  Savannah. 
Superior   courts  of  the   several   counties  within  the 
state. 

HAWAII. 

United  States  District  Courts: 

Honolulu. 
Supreme  court  of  the  Territory  of  Hawaii. 
Circuit   courts    of    the    several    counties    within  the 

territory. 

IDAHO. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Boise. 
District  courts  of    the   several    counties    within    the 
state. 


496  NATURALIZATION 

ILLINOIS. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 

Northern  District,  Chicago. 

Southern  District,  Springfield. 

Eastern  District,  Danville. 
Appellate  and  Supreme  Court  of  the  State  of  Illinois. 
Superior  Court  of  Cook  county. 

Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 
City  Courts: 

Alton. 

Aurora. 

Canton. 

Chicago  Heights. 

East  St.  Louis. 

Elgin. 

Litchfield. 

Matton. 

Zion. 

INDIANA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 

Indianapolis. 
Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  Indianapolis. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 
Superior  Courts  of  the  following  tiamed  cities: 

Fort  Wayne. 

Marion. 

Kokomo. 

Frankfort. 

Laporte. 

Anderson. 

Indianapolis. 

Valparaiso. 

La  Fayette. 

Evansville. 

Terre  Haute. 


APPENDIX.  497 

INDIAN  TERRITORY. 

United  States  Courts : 
Northern  District,  Vinita. 
Miami  Division. 
Nowata  Division. 
Claremore  Division. 
Pryor  Creek  Division. 
Bartlesville  Division. 
Tahlequah  Division. 
Sallisaw  Division. 

Western  District,  Muskogee: 
Wewoka  Division. 
Eufaula  Division. 
Sapulpa  Division. 
Tulsa  Division. 
Okmulgee  Division. 
Wagoner  Division. 

Central  District,  South  McAlester: 
Atoka  Division. 
Antlers  Division. 
Durant  Division. 
Poteau  Division. 
Wilburton  Division. 

Southern  District,  Ardmore. 
Pauls  Valley  Division. 
Ada  Division. 
Ryan  Division. 
Purcell  Division. 
Marietta  Division. 
Chickasha  Division. 
Tishomingo  Division. 
Duncan  Division. 

6233—32 


498  NATURALIZATION 

IOWA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Northern  District,  Dubuque. 
Southern  District,  Des  Moines. 
Supreme  Court  of   Iowa,  Des  Moines. 
District    courts    of    the    several   counties  within   the 
state. 
Superior  Courts  of  the  following  named  cities: 
Cedar  Rapids. 
Council  Bluffs. 

KANSAS. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Topeka. 
District    courts    of   the   several   counties   within   the 
state. 

KENTUCKY. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District: 

Frankfort  Division. 

Covington  Division. 

Richmond  Division. 

London  Division. 

Catlettsburg  Division. 
Western  District: 

Louisville  Division. 

Owensboro  Division. 

Bowling  Green  Division. 

Paducah  Division. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

LOUISIANA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District,  New  Orleans. 
Western  District,  Shreveport. 
District  courts  of  the  several  parishes  within  the  state. 


APPENDIX.  499 

MAINE. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Portland. 
Supreme  judicial  courts  of   the  several  counties  within 

the  state. 
Superior  Court  of  Cumberland  County. 

MARYLAND. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Baltimore. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 
Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  Baltimore. 
Superior  Court  of  Baltimore. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Boston. 
Supreme   judicial  and  superior  courts  of  the   several 
counties  within  the  state. 

MICHIGAN. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District,  Detroit. 
Western  District,  Grand  Rapids. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 
Superior  Court  of  Grand  Rapids. 

MINNESOTA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts : 
St.  Paul. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

MISSISSIPPI. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts : 
Northern  District,  Oxford. 
Southern  District,  Jackson. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


500  NATURALIZATION 

MISSOURI. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts : 
Eastern  District,  St.  Louis. 
Western  District: 

Kansas  City  Division. 

St.  Joseph  Division. 

Jefferson  City  Division. 

Springfield  Division. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

MONTANA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts  : 
Helena. 
District   courts   of   the   several    counties   within   the 
state. 

NEBRASKA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Omaha. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

NEVADA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Carson  City. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Concord. 
Superior  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

NEW  JERSEY. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Trenton. 
Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey,  Trenton. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


APPENDIX.  501 

NEW  MEXICO. 

United  States  District  Courts: 
Santa  Fe  Division. 
Albuquerque  Division. 
Las  Cruces  Division. 
Las  Vegas  Division. 
Roswell  Division. 
Alamogordo  Division. 

NEW  YORK. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Northern  District,  Utica. 
Southern  District,  New  York. 
Eastern  District,  Brooklyn. 
Western  District,  Buffalo. 
Supreme  courts   of   the  several  counties   within  the 
state. 

NORTH  CAROLINA 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District: 

Raleigh  and  Washington  Division. 
Wilmington  Division. 
Newbern  Division. 
Elizabeth  City  Division. 

Western  District: 

Statesville  Division. 
Asheville  Division. 
Greensboro  Division. 
Wilkesboro  Division. 

Superior  courts   of    the   several   counties  within   the 
state. 


502  NATURALIZATION 

NORTH  DAKOTA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Fargo. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

OHIO. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Northern  District,  Cleveland. 
Southern  District,  Cincinnati. 
Court  of  common  pleas  of  the  several  counties  within 
the  state. 

OKLAHOMA. 

United  States  District  Courts: 
Guthrie  Division, 
El  Reno  Division. 
Oklahoma  Division. 
Perry  Division. 
Enid  Division. 
Alva  Division. 
Anadarko  Division. 

OREGON. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Portland. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District,  Philadelphia. 
Middle  District,  Scranton. 
Western  District,  Pittsburg. 
Court  of  common  pleas  of  the  several  counties  within 

the  state. 

RHODE  ISLAND. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Providence. 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State  of  Rhode  Island. 
Superior  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


APPENDIX.  503 

SOUTH  CAROLINA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Charleston. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

SOUTH  DAKOTA. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts : 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

TENNESSEE. 

United  States  Circuit  Courts: 

Eastern  District,  Chattanooga. 

Middle  District,  Nashville. 

Western  District,  Memphis. 
United  States  District  Courts: 

Eastern  District,  Knoxville. 

Middle  District,  Nashville. 

Western  District,  Memphis. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

TEXAS. 
United  States  Circuit  Courts: 

Northern  District,  Dallas. 

Southern  District,  Galveston. 

Eastern  District,  Beaumont. 

Western  District,  Austin. 
United  States  District  Courts: 

Northern  District,  Fort  Worth. 

Southern  District,  Galveston 

Eastern  District,  Sherman 

Western  District,  Austin. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

UTAH. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts : 
Salt  Lake  City. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


504  NATURALIZATION 

VERMONT. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Burlington. 
County  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

VIRGINIA. 

United  States  Circuit  Cowts: 
Eastern  District,  Richmond. 
Western  District: 

Lynchburg  Division. 

Danville  Division. 

Abingdon  Division. 

Harrisonburg  Division. 

United  States  District  Cour^ts: 
Eastern  District,  Norfolk. 
Western  District: 

Lynchburg  Division. 

Danville  Division. 

Abingdon  Division. 

Harrisonburg  Division. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 
Circuit  Court  of  the  City  of  Richmond. 
Law  and  Equity  Court  of  the  City  of  Richmond. 
Chancery  Court  of  the  City  of  Richmond. 
Law  and  Chancery  Court  of  the  City  of  Norfolk. 

Corporation  courts  of  the  following  cities: 
Norfolk. 
Newport  News. 
Lynchburg. 
Roanoke. 
Danville. 


APPENDIX.  *  505 

Virginia — Corporation  Courts — Continued. 
Charlottesville. 
Portsmouth. 
Staunton. 
Alexandria. 
Bristol. 

Fredericksburg. 
Manchester. 
Winchester. 
Radford. 
Buena  Vista. 
Petersburg. 

WASHINGTON. 

United  States  Cii^cuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District,  Spokane. 

United  States  Circuit  Court: 

Western  District,  Tacoma. 

United  States  District  Court: 

Western  District,  Seattle. 

Superior   courts    of    the   several  counties  within  the 
state. 

WEST  VIRGINIA. 

United  States  Circuit  Court: 

Northern  District,  Parkersburg. 

United  States  District  Court: 

Northern  District,  Clarksburg. 

United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Southern  District,  Charleston. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


506  NATURALIZATION 

WISCONSIN. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Eastern  District,  Milwaukee. 
Western  District,  Madison. 
Circuit  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 

WYOMING. 
United  States  Circuit  and  District  Courts: 
Cheyenne. 
District  courts  of  the  several  counties  within  the  state. 


APPENDIX.  507 

LIST  OF  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES  AND  THEIR 
RULERS. 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor, 

Washington,  November,  1906. 

The  following  list  of  foreign  countries  and  the  names 
and  titles  of  their  rulers  is  furnished  for  the  information 
of  clerks  of  courts  to  assist  them  in  preparing  declara- 
tions of  intention  and  petitions  for  naturalization  as  re- 
quired by  law. 

Several  of  these  rulers  are  succeeded  periodically,  and 
care  should  be  taken  in  such  cases  to  secure  information 
as  to  their  successors  before  filling  out  the  naturaliza- 
tion forms.  Revised  lists  will  be  sent  out  by  the  Bureau 
from  time  to  time. 

Name  of  Ruler,  Title,  and  Country. 

Menelik  II,  Emperor  of  Abyssinia. 

Habibullah  Khan,  Ameer  of  Afghanistan. 

Thanh  Thai,  King  of  Annam. 
*Dr.  Jose  Figueroa  Alcorta,  President  of  the  Argentine 

Republic. 
tFrancis  Joseph,  Emperor  of  Austria-Hungary. 

Mir  Mahmud,  Khan  of  Baluchistan. 

Leopold  II,  King  of  the  Belgians. 

Sayid  Abdul  Ahad,  Ameer  of  Bokhara. 
*Dr.  Ismael  Montes,  President  of  Bolivia. 

Dr.  Francisco  de    P.  Rodrigues  Alves,  President   of 
Brazil. 

*  Renunciations  by  citizens  of  foreign  republics  should  be  to  the  re- 
public only,  as,  for  example,  "The  Argentine  Republic,"  "The  Republic 
of  Bolivia,"  etc. 

t  Austrians  should  renounce  allegiance  to  "  Francis  Joseph,  Emperor  of 
Austria;"  Hungarians  to  "  Francis  Joseph,  Apostolic  King  of  Hungary," 


508  NATURALIZATION 

Ferdinand,  Prince  of  Bulgaria. 
*Pedro  Montt,  President  of  Chile. 
*General  Rafael  Reyes,  President  of  Colombia. 

Leopold  II  (King  of   the   Belgians),  Sovereign  of   the 
Congo  Free  State. 
*Cleto  Gonzales  Viquez,  President  of  Costa  Rica. 

Frederik  VIII,  King  of  Denmark. 
*Ramon  Caceres,  President  of  the  Dominican  Republic. 
*Lizardo  Garcia,  President  of  Ecuador. 

Abbas  Pacha,  Khedive  of  Egypt. 
*Armand  Fallieres,  President  of  France. 

William  II,  Emperor  of  Germany. 

Edward  VII,  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

George  I,  King  of  Greece. 
*Don  Manuel  Estrada  Cabrera,  President  of  Guatemala. 
^General  Nord  Alexis,  President  of  Hayti. 
*General  Manuel  Bonilla,  President  of  Honduras. 

Edward  VII,  Emperor  of  the  Empire  of  India. 

Victor  Emmanuel  III,  King  of  Italy. 

Muteuhito,  Mikado  of  Japan. 

Say  id  Mahomed  Rahim,  Khan  of  Khiva. 

Yi  Heung,  Emperor  of  Korea. 
*Arthur  Barclay,  President  of  Liberia. 

William,  Grand  Duke  of  Luxembourg. 
*General  Porfirio  Diaz,  President  of  Mexico. 

Albert,  Prince  of  Monaco. 

Nicholas  I,  Prince  of  Montenegro. 

Mulai-Abd-el-Aziz,  Sultan  of  Morocco. 

Prithvi  Bir  Bikram-Shamsher  Jang,  Maharaja  of  Nepal. 

Wilhelmina,  Queen  of  the  Netherlands. 
*General  Jose  S.  Zelaya,  President  of  Nicaragua. 

Haakon  VII,  King  of   Norway. 

Seyyid  Feysil  bin  Turki,  Sultan  of  Oman. 

*  Renunciations  by  citizens  of  foreign  republics  should  be  to  the  re- 
public only,  as, for  example,  "  The  Argentine  Republic,"  "The Republic 
of  Bolivia,"  etc. 


APPENDIX.  509 

*Dr.  Manuel  Amador  Guerrero,  President  of  Panama. 
*Juan  B.  Gaona,  President  of  Paraguay. 

Mohammed  Ali,  Shah  of  Persia. 
*Jose  Pardo,  President  of  Peru. 

Carlos  I,  King  of  Portugal. 

Charles,  King  of  Roumania. 

Nicholas  II,  Emperor  of  Russia. 
*Pedro  Jose  Escalon,  President  of  Salvador. 

Peter  I  (Karageorgevitch),  King  of  Servia. 

Chulalongkorn  I,  King  of  Siam. 

Alphonso  XIII,  King  of  Spain. 

Oscar  II,  King  of  Sweden. 
*L.  Forrer,  President  of  Switzerland. 

Sidi  Mohamed,  Bey  of  Tunis. 

Abdul  Hamid  II,  Sultan  of  Turkey. 
*Jose  Batlle  y  Ordonez,  President  of  Uruguay, 
*Cipriano  Castro,  President  of  Venezuela. 

Seyyid  Ali,  Sultan  of  Zanzibar. 

^Renunciations  by  citizens  of  foreign  republics  should  be  to  the  re- 
public only,  as,  for  example,  "The  Argentine  Republic,"  "The  Republic 
of  Bolivia,"  etc. 


INDEX. 


A 

ABDOO'S  CASE,  81-84. 
ADOPTION. 

citizenship  not  conferred  by,  223. 
AFFIDAVIT 

of  witnesses  of  applicant  for  naturalization,  90. 

of  chief  of  Passport  Bureau,  showing  cause  to  institute  proceedings 
to  cancel  naturalization  certificate,  138. 
AFRICAN. 

naturalization  of,  40. 
AFRICAN  WOMAN. 

naturalization  of  by  marriage  to  a  citizen,  230. 

AGE. 

qualification  as  to,  of  applicant  for  naturalization.  111. 
AGENTS. 

American,  residing  abroad,  355. 
ALASKA. 

citizenship  of  inhabitants,  291, 
ALIEN  ENEMIES. 

ineligible  to  naturalization,  49,  SO. 
ALLEGIANCE. 

renunciation  of,  121. 

'>ath  of,  123. 
AMERICAN  ANTE-NATI,  272. 
ANARCHISTS. 

incapable  of  naturalization,  53,  88. 
ARMY. 

enlisted  men  not  required  to  make  declaration  of  intention,  61. 

not  required  to  prove   more  than  one  year's  residence  in  United 
States,  109,  110. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 
naturalization  convention  with,  441. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  389. 

(511) 


512  INDEX 

B 

BADEN. 

naturalization  convention  with,  444. 
BAVARIA. 

naturalization  convention  with,  447. 
BELGIUM. 

naturalization  convention  with,  451. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  390. 
BLANK  CERTIFICATES,  129. 
BOND,  see  Disbursing  Clerk. 
BOYD'S  CASE,  77. 
BUREAU  OF  CITIZENSHIP. 

Passport  Bureau  now  designated  as,  see  Preface. 

BUREAU  OF  IMMIGRATION  AND  NATURALIZATION, 
creation  of,  36. 
functions  of,  36-39. 

supervision  of  naturalization,  38. 

as  to  registry  of  alien  immigrants,  38. 

as  to  blank  certificates  of  citizenship,  37,  39. 

as  to  naturalization  fees,  39. 

BURMESE, 
ineligibility  of,  to  naturalization,  44. 


CANCELLATION  OF  NATURALIZATION  CERTIFICATE, 
procedure,  34-36. 

power  of  United  States  to  impeach  naturalization  certificate,  138. 
power  of  state  to  impeach  naturalization  certificate,  140. 
CANCELLED  CERTIFICATES,  29. 
CAUCASIAN. 

eligibility  of,  to  naturalization,  40-44. 
CERTIFICATE     FROM     DEPARTMENT     OF     COMMERCE    AND 

LABOR,  93. 
CERTIFICATE  OF  NATURALIZATION,  26-31,  125-129,  133. 
under  Act  of  March  3,  1903,  125. 
under  Act  of  June  29,  1906,  126. 
blank  certificates,  26-28,  129. 
accountability  for,  28. 
defaced  and  injured  certificates,  28. 
.  form,  126-128. 
duplicates,  29,  128. 
stub,  29,  128. 


INDEX  513 

Certificate  of  Naturalization — Continued : 

impeachment  of,  134-189. 
cancelled  certificates,  29. 

CERTIFICATES  OF   REGISTRATION   OF  AMERICAN  CITIZENS 

ABROAD,  353. 
CERTIFIED  COPIES  OF  NATURALIZATION  PROCEEDINGS,  30. 
CHANGE  OF  NAME,'.124. 
CHIEF  OF  PASSPORT  BUREAU. 
affidavit  of,  showing  good   cause  to  institute  proceedings  to    cancel 
naturalization  certificate,  138. 
CHILDREN  OF  DECEASED  DECLARANT, 
naturalization  of,  62. 

CHINESE. 

ineligibility  of  to  naturalization,  42,  43. 
citizens  of  Hawaii  at  time  of  annexation,  318. 

CIRCULAR  INSTRUCTIONS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 
reports  on  fraudulent  naturalization,  136. 

registration  of  women  desiring  to  resume  or  retain  American  citizen- 
ship, 241,  257. 
expatriation,  341. 

children  born  abroad^of  citizens,  350. 
registration  of  American  citizens,  352. 
issuance  of  passports,  380. 

CLERKS  OF  COURTS. 

functions  of  in  naturalization  proceedings,  22-34. 
as  to  declaration  of  intention,  22-24. 
as  to  petition  for  naturalization,  24,  26. 

as  to  certificate  from 'Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  25,  93. 
as  to  notice  of  petition,  25,  92. 
as  to  witnesses,  26. 
as  to  final  hearing,  26. 
as  to  aliens  denied  naturalization, [26. 
as  to  certificates  of  citizenship,  26-30. 
as  to  blank  certificates,  26-28,  39. 
as  to  defaced  or  injured  certificates,  28. 
accountability  for  certificates,  28,  39. 
duplicates,  29. 
stub,  29. 

cancelled  certificates,  29. 
crimes  by,  24,  33, -34,  194,  195. 
fees,  31-34. 

for  receiving  and  filing  declaration  of  intention,  32. 

for  making,   filing  and  docketing  petition,  32. 

for  entering  final  order  and  issuance  of  certificate,  32. 


514  INDEX  \ 

Clerks  of  Courts — Continued: 

for  subpoenaing  witnesses,  32,  33. 

additional  compensation  to,  for  clerical  assistance,  33,  38. 
COLLECTIVE  NATURALIZATION,  265-332. 
how  effected,  266. 
by  conquest,  266-272. 
by  treaty,  273-317. 
by  special  act  of  Congress,  317. 
by  admission  of  territory  to  statehood,  321-332. 
COMMISSIONERS  OF  IMMIGRATION. 
'registry  of  aliens,  39. 
certificate  of  registry,  39. 
COMMON  LAW  JURISDICTION, 
definition  of,  14-17. 

CONGRESS. 

power  to  establish  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  6. 

power  to  regulate  naturalization,  6-9. 

power  to  determine  political  status  of  native  inhabitants  of  Porto  Rico 
and  Philippine  Islands,  295. 

power  over  territories,  330. 
CONQUEST. 

naturalization  by,  266-272. 

CONSTITUTION. 

citizenship  clause  of  Fourteenth  Amendment,  5. 

judgment   of   naturalization    comprehended   in   terms   of    section    1, 
article  4,  U. 

treaty-making  power  conferred  by,  273. 

power  to  acquire  territory  conferred  by,  273. 

power  to  dispose  of  the  territory  of  United  States  conferred  by,  300. 
CONSTRUCTIVE  RESIDENCE,  105. 
CONSULAR  SERVICE.  FOREIGN. 

effect  of  engaging  in,  360. 

CONSULS. 

registration  of  American  citizens,  352. 

registration  of  foreign-born  wddow  of  American,  22,  241. 

registration  of  American-born  widow  of  foreigner,  256,  257. 

reports  of  fraudulent  naturalization,  35,  135. 

statements  certified  under  official  seal  admissible  in  evidence  in  courts 
in  proceedings  to  cancel  certificate,  136. 

passports,  381,  382. 
"CONTINUED  RESIDENCE,"  95-104. 

COURTS, 
what  courts  can  naturalize,  11-19. 
list  of,  493-506. 


INDEX  515 

Courts — Continued : 
functions  of  in  naturalization  proceeding,  19-21. 

in    case  of   renunciation  of  citizenship  by  foreign-born  widow  of 
American,  21,  22. 
COURTS  OF  RECORD. 

definition  of,  11-14. 
CRIMES  AGAINST  NATURALIZATION  LAWS,  189-196. 
false  swearing,  189-194. 
false  personation,  189. 
counterfeiting,  189. 
uttering,  l89. 

selling  certificate  of  citizenship,  189,  190. 
use  of  forged  or  counterfeit  certificate,  190,  191. 
use  of  certificate  fraudulently  procured,  193. 
unlawful  possession  of  blank  certificate,  193. 

unlawful  possession  of  plate  or  distinctive  paper  for  printing  certifi- 
cate, 192. 
unlawfully  engraving,  printing,  or  photographing  plate  designed  for 

certificate,  192. 
unlawfully  procuring  naturalization,  194. 

By  Clerks. 

unlawful  issuance  of  certificate  of  citizenship,  194. 

neglect  to  account  for  naturalization  fees,  194. 

charging  or  receiving  more  than  lawful  fees.  195. 

false  certificate  in  naturalization  proceedings,  195. 
Limitation  of  Actions. 
Act  of  1906. 

indictments  must  be  found  within  five  years,  195. 

time  of  going  into  operation,  196. 
Under  Prior  Laws. 

crimes  committed  before  Act  of  1906  went  into  effect  prosecuted  un- 
der existing  naturalization  laws,  196. 


D 


DECLARATION  OF  INTENTION, 
law  relative  to,  54. 
time  of  making,  55. 
place  of  making,  24,  56. 
age  of  declarant,  55,  63. 
life  of  declaration,  55. 
before  whom  made,  55. 
duties  of  clerk  in  relation  to,  22-24. 
form  of,  57-59. 


516  INDEX 

Declaration  of  Intention — Continued : 

to  be  filed  with  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor  with  petition  for 

naturalization,  93. 
exceptions  to  usual  requirement,  61-64. 
army,  6l. 

navy  and  marine  corps,  62. 
widow  and  children  of  deceased  declarant,  62. 
in  Hawaii,  63. 
rights  conferred  by,  64-76. 
under  federal  laws,  64. 
under  state  laws,  64. 
without  the  United  States,  66,  67. 
Burnato's  case,  67- 
Koszta's  case,  68-73. 
effect  of  on  minor  child,  224. 
effect  of  on  absent  children,  224. 
effect  of  on  wife,  262. 
DENMARK, 
naturalization  convention  with,  453. 
treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  391. 

E. 

EXECUTIVE  ORDERS. 
April  6,  1907: 

children  of  citizens  born  abroad,  475. 
wife  of  citizen,  476. 

American  woman  who  marries  a  foreigner,  476. 
children  of  naturalized  citizen,  476. 
declaration  of  intention,  477. 
expatriation,  477. 

registration  to  resume  or  retain  citizenship,  477. 
oath  of  allegiance,  478. 
duplica  es  of  evidence  of  citizenship,  478. 
passports,  478-481. 

when  protection  should  be  denied,  482. 
reports  of  fraudulent  naturalization,  482. 
April  8,  1907: 

registration  of  American  citizens,  483. 

EXPATRIATION, 
definition,  333. 
right  of,  333,  411. 

statutes  relating  to,  334,  336,  411,  438. 
treaties  recognizing  right  of,  335- 
modes  of,  336-362. 

by  naturalization  in  foreign  state,  337. 


INDEX  517 

Expatriation — Continued : 

by  taking  oath  of  allegiance  to  foreign  government,  338. 

by  residence  in  foreign  country,  340. 

b)'  desertion  from  military  or  naval  service,  357. 

F. 

FALSE  PERSONATION,  189- 

FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  AS  TO  CITIZENSHIP,  193. 

FALSE  SWEARING   IN  NATURALIZATION   PROCEEDING,    l89, 

193,  194. 
FILIPINOS. 

eligibility  to  naturalization,  48. 

declaration  of  intention  by,  60. 

status  of,  48,  49,  293,  309-316. 

passports  to,  316. 

FINAL  HEARING, 
time  of,  119. 
place,  120. 

duty  of  clerk  as  to,  26. 
procedure,  120. 

appearance  and  examination  of  applicant  and  witnesses,  120. 

appearance  of  United  States,  120. 

proof  of  residence  and  moral  character,  121. 

renunciation  of  foreign  allegiance,  121. 
Filipinos  and  Porto  Ricans,  122. 

renunciation  of  title  or  order  of  nobility,  122. 
oath  of  allegiance  to  United  States,  123. 
change  of  name,  124. 

FINAL  ORDER  IN  NATURALIZATION  PROCEEDING. 

to  be  under  hand  of  court,  31. 
FLORIDA  TREATY,  327. 
FOREIGN  COUNTRIES. 

list  of,  507. 
FOREIGN  GOVERNMENTS. 

right  of,  to  impeach  American  certificate  of  naturalization  denied,  142. 
FOREIGN  JUDGMENTS. 

impeachable  for  fraud,  167-170. 
FORMS. 

declaration  of  intention,  57. 

petition  for  naturalization,  86. 

affidavit  of  witnesses,  91. 

notice  of  application  for  admission,  93. 

certificate  of  naturalization,  126. 


518  INDEX 

Forms — Continued : 

stub  of  certificate  of  naturalization,  128. 

registration  of  foreign-born  widow  of  American,  24 1,  242. 

registration  of  American-born  widow  of  alien,  257,  258. 

certification  by  diplomatic  or  consular   officer  as  to  expatriation  of 
American  citizens,  341,  342. 

declaration  of  intention  to  conserve  American  citizenship  by  children 
of  citizens  born  abroad,  350,  351- 

certificate  of  registration  of  American  citizens  residing  abroad,  353,  354. 

applications  for  passports,  384-386. 

passport,  387. 

emergency  passport,  383. 
FORGERY. 

uttering  and  counterfeiting  in  naturalization  proceeding,  189-191. 

FRANCE. 

treaty  of  1803,  276. 

treatment  of  former  citizens  naturalized  in  United  Statesi  392. 

FRAUD, 
impeachment  of  naturalization  judgment  for,  134,  144,  153. 

FRAUDULENT  NATURALIZATION. 

reports  of  by  diplomatic  aud  consular  officers,  135. 

G 

GERMANY. 

naturalization  convention  with,  466. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  394. 

GOxMZALES'  CASE.  313. 

GOOD  BEHAVIOR. 

proof  of,  of  applicant  for  naturalization,  121. 

GREAT  BRITAIN. 

naturalization  conventions  with,  456,  458. 
treaty  of  1794  with,  276. 

GREECE, 
treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  395. 

H 

HABERACKER'S  CASE,  239. 

HAITI. 

naturalization  convention  with,  46l. 

HAWAII. 

naturalization  by  annexation  of,  318. 

HEISINGER'S  CASE,  207. 

HESSE. 

naturalization  convention  with,  463. 


INDEX  519 

I 

ILLEGITIMATE  CHILDREN. 

naturalization  of,  by  naturalization  of  mother  b)'  marriage  to  reputed 
father,  222,  223. 
IMMIGRANT. 

landing  of,  what  constitutes,  82. 
IMPEACHMENT  OF  NATURALIZATION,  134-189. 
municipal  practice,  134. 
under  Act  of  1906,  135-138. 
under  prior  laws,  138-141. 
international  practice,  141-189. 

executive  department  of  government,  141,  142. 
power  to  treat  certificate  as  invalid,  141. 
right  of  foreign  governments  to  impeach  denied,  142. 
international  claims  commissions,  142-189, 
Spanish  Claims  Commission  of  1871,  142. 
Costa  Rica  Claims  Commission  of  i860,  143. 
Venezuelan  Claims  Commission  of  1903,  143. 
Spanish  Treat}'  Claims  Commission  (1905),  144. 
INCORPORATION    OF    INHABITANTS    OF    ACQUIRED    TERRI- 
TORY, 295,  296-309. 
INDIAN  TERRITORY. 

jurisdiction  of  United  States  courts  in  to  naturalize,  12. 
INDIANS. 

naturalization  statutes  inapplicable  to,  45- 
status  of,  316. 

naturalization  by  special  statute,  46,  319. 
naturalization  by  treaty,  46,  31 6. 
INDIAN  WOMEN. 

naturalization  of  by  marriage  to  citizen,  230. 
INSULAR  CASES,  267,  273,  296-309. 
INTERNATIONAL  CLAIMS  COMMISSIONS. 

practice  as  to  impeachment  of  naturalization,  142-189. 
ITALY. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  396. 

J 

JAPANESE. 

ineligible  to  naturalization,  43,  44. 
JUDGES. 

functions  in  naturalization  proceeding,  19-21. 

renunciation  of  foreign-born  widow  of  American,  21,  22. 
JUDGMENT  OF  MUNICIPAL  COURT. 

not  conclusive  upon  international  tribunal,  142-189. 


520  INDEX 

JUDGMENT  OF  NATURALIZATION. 

nature  of  155-189. 

impeachment  of,  134-189. 
JUDGMENT  IN  REM,  180. 


LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS,  195. 

LOSS  OF  RECORD  OF  NATURALIZATION,  132. 

LOUISIANA  TREATY,  321. 

M 

MARINE  CORPS. 

enlisted  men  not  required  to  make  declaration  of  intention,  62. 

not  required  to  make  other  proof  of  residence  in  United  States  than  of 
service  in  marine  corps,  110. 
MARRIAGE. 

naturalization  by,  227-263. 
"MARRIED." 

meaning  of  term  in  statute,  231. 
MARRIED  WOMEN. 

naturalization  of,  51-53. 

effect  of  death  of  husband  upon,  240,  256. 

registration  of,  241,  257. 
MERCHANT  SEAMEN. 

declaration  of  intention  and  three  years  service  on  American  merchant 
vessel,  75. 

MEXICANS. 

eligibility  of  to  naturalization,  46-48. 

meaning  of  "Mexicans"  in  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  289. 
MEXICO. 

treaty  of  l848  (Guadalupe  Hidalgo),  284. 

treaty  of  1853  (Gadsden),  291. 
MILITARY  SERVICE. 

desertion  from,  effect  of,  357. 

in  foreign  country,  effect  of,  358. 
MINOR  CHILDREN. 

naturalization  of  by  naturalization  of  parent,  197-226. 

naturalization  of  by  resumption  of  citizenship  of  parent,  219,  220. 

naturalization  of  by  naturalization  of  mother  by  marriage,  220. 

adoption  does  not  confer  citizenship  upon,  223. 

effect  of  declaration  of  intention  of  parent,  76-84,  224. 

election  of  American  citizenship  by  minors  abroad,  349-351- 


INDEX  521 

MINOR  RESIDENTS. 

declaration  of  intention  by,  63. 

MINOR'S  CLAUSE. 

repeal  of,  63. 
MISSIONARIES,  356. 
MONGOLIAN. 

ineligibility  of  to  naturalization,  42-44. 

MORAL  CHARACTER. 
qualifications  as  to,  of  applicant  for  naturalization,  114-118. 
what  acts  are  immoral,  115,  11 6. 
anarchists,  II6. 
polygamists,  115-118. 
proof  of,  118,  121. 

MUNICIPAL  COURTS, 
practice  as  to  impeachment  of  naturalization,  134-141. 

N 

NAME. 

change  of,  124. 

misstatement  of,  13O. 
NATURALIZATION, 
definition  of,  5. 

constitutional  provisions  relating  to,  5,  6. 
control  of,  6-9. 
laws  of  United  States  relative  to,  409-440. 

By  formal  papers,  1-196. 

By  naturalization  of  parent,  197-226. 

By  marriage,  227-263. 

Collective,  265. 

By  special  Act  of  Congress,  317-321. 

By  treaty,  220,  273-317. 

By  admission  of  territory  to  statehood,  321. 
NATURALIZATION  CERTIFICATE,  124-129. 
NATURALIZATION  REGULATIONS,  485-492. 
NATURALIZATION  TREATIES,  441-473. 
NATURALIZED  CITIZENS. 

protection  of  in  foreign  countries,  411,  438. 

NAVAL  SERVICE. 

desertion  from,  357. 

in  foreign  country,  effect  of,  358. 
NAVY. 

enlisted  men  not  required  to  make  declaration  of  intention,  62. 

enlisted  men  not  required  to  make  other  proof  of  residence  in  United 
States  than  of  service  in  Navy,  110. 


522  INDEX 

NELLIE  GRANT  SARTORIS'  CASE,  258. 
NETHERLANDS. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  397. 
NORTH  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION. 

naturalization  convention  with,  466. 
NORTHWEST  TERRITORY. 

naturalization  of  inhabitants  of  by  admission  of  states  carved  there- 
from, 324-327. 
NORWAY. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  398. 

NOTICE. 

in  proceedings  to  cancel  naturalization  certificate,  35- 

NOTICE  OF  PETITION,  25,  92. 

0 

OATH  OF  ALLEGIANCE,  123. 

OATH  OF  ALLEGIANCE  TO  FOREIGN  GOVERNMENT, 
effect  of,  338. 

ORDER  OF  NOBILITY, 
renunciation  of,  31,  122, 

P 

PASSPORT  BUREAU. 

designation  changed  to  Bureau  of  Citizenship.     See  Preface. 

PASSPORTS. 

definition,  363. 

laws  relating  to,  363. 

rules  and  regulations,  365-384. 

to  persons  who  have  declared  intention  and   resided  three  years  in 
United  States,  74,  378-380. 

duties  of  diplomatic  and  consular  officers  relative  to,  381-384. 

emergency  passports,  381-384. 

forms,  384-387. 

to  be   refused    to  naturalized  citizens  who  go    abroad  and  take    up 
permanent  residence  within  five  years  after  naturalization,  137. 

not  competent  judicial  proof  of  naturalization,  13O. 
PERJURY,  18. 
PERSIA. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  399. 
PERSONAL  STATUS, 
rule  of,  181. 

PETITION  FOR  NATURALIZATION,  84-94. 
time  of  filing,  85. 
to  whom  made,  85. 


INDEX  523 

Petition  for  Naturalization — Continued : 

docketing  of,  26,  31. 
duty  of  clerk  as  to,  25. 
form,  85. 

description  of  applicant,  88. 
allegations  of  petition,  85-90. 

of  disbelief  in  anarchy  and  polygamy,  88. 
of  intention  to  become  a  citizen,  88. 
to  renounce  allegiance,  88. 
to  reside  permanently  in  United  States,  88. 
of  previous  denial  of  naturalization,  89. 
as  to  residence,  89. 
as  to  abilit}-  to  speak  English,  89. 
duplicate,  26. 
signature  of  petitioner,  90. 
verification  of  petition,  90. 
witnesses,  90. 

citizenship  of,  90. 

personal  acquaintance  with  petitioner,  90. 
form  of  affidavit,  91,  92. 
fees  of,  92. 
notice  of  petition,  92, 
form,  93. 
PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS. 

law  of  citizenship  of  residents,  310,  note. 
PHOTOGRAPHING  PRINT  OR  IMPRESSION. 

of  certificate  of  citizenship  unlawfully,  192, 
POLYGAMISTS. 

incapable  of  naturalization,  53,  54,  88. 
PORTO  RICANS. 
status  of,  309-316,  48,  49,  293,  305. 
eligible  to  naturalization,  49. 
declaration  of  intention  by,  60. 
passports  to,  31 6. 

PORTUGAL. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  399. 
PRINTING. 

impression  of  certificate  of  citizenship  unlawfully,  192. 

PROOF  OF  NATURALIZATION,  129-134. 

record,  129. 

where  record  has  been  lost  or  destroyed,  132. 

certificate  of  naturalization,  133. 
PROTECTION. 

aliens  who  have  declared  intention  and  resided  three  years  in  United 
States,  74. 


524  INDEX 

Protection — Continued : 

merchant  seamen  who  have  declared  intention  and  served  three  years 
on  merchant  vessel  of  United  States,  75. 
PUBLIC  OFFICE  IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRY, 
acceptance  of,  effect  of,  360. 


QUALIFICATIONS  OF  APPLICANT  FOR  NATURALIZATION, 
111-119. 
as  to  age,  111. 
as  to  education,  112. 

exceptions,  112,  113. 
as  to  moral  character,  114-119. 

R 

RECORD  OF  NATURALIZATION. 

usual  evidence,  129. 

loss  or  destruction  of,  132. 
RECORD. 

of  final  order  in  naturalization  proceedings,  31. 
RECORDER  OF  MUNICIPAL  COURT. 

clerk  within  meaning  of  Revised  Statutes  Sec.  2165,  23. 
REGISTRATION. 

of  American  citizens  abroad,  352-355. 

duties  of  consuls  relative  to,  352-355. 
RENUNCIATION  OF  CITIZENSHIP  BY  FOREIGN-BORN  WIDOW 

OF  AMERICAN,  21. 
RENUNCIATION  OF  FOREIGN  ALLEGIANCE,  121. 
RENUNCIATION  OF  TITLE   OR   ORDER   OF   NOBILITY,  31,  122. 
RESIDENCE. 

of  applicant  for  naturalization,  94-111. 

meaning  of  term,  95. 
"continued  residence,"  95-104. 

constructive  residence,  105,  106. 
merchant  seamen,  I05. 
in  countries  in  which  United  States  has  extra-territorial  rights,  105 

residence  within  states,  106. 

in  Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico,  107. 

in  Hawaii,  107. 

married  women,  233-238. 

proof  of,  108. 

exceptions  to  requirement  as  to  residence,  109. 
arm}',  109. 


INDEX  525 

Residence — Coutinued : 

Navy  and  Marine  Corps,  110. 
merchant  seamen,  110. 

RESIDENCE  IN  FOREIGN   COUNTRY   OF  NATURALIZED  CITI- 
ZEN. 

effect  of,  35. 
RESIDENCE  IN  FOREIGN  COUNTRY. 

effect  of,  on  citizenship  of  American,  340. 
RESUMPTION  OF  CITIZENSHIP,  219,  220. 
ROUMANIA. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  401. 
RUIZ'S  CASE,  144-189. 
RULERS  OF  FOREIGN  COUNTRIES. 

list  of,  507. 
RUSSIA. 

treaty  of  1867  with,  291. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  401. 


SARTORIS,  NELLIE  GRANT. 

case  of,  258. 
SECRETARY  OF  COMMERCE  AND  LABOR.  ♦ 

functions  of,  in  relation  to  naturalization,  36-40. 

direction  and  control  of  Bureau  of  Immigration  and  Naturalization, 

36,  38. 
rules  and  regulations,  37,  485-492. 
as  to  blank  certificates,  37. 
additional  allowances  to  clerks  of  courts,  38. 
certificate  of  registry  of  alien,  39. 
SELLING  CERTIFICATE  OF  CITIZENSHIP,  190. 
SERVIA. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  402. 
SETTING  ASIDE  NATURALIZATION  CERTIFICATE, 
procedure,  34-36,  138-141. 

SPAIN. 

treaty  of  I819  with,  283. 

treaty  of  1898,  293. 
SPANISH  TREATY  CLAIMS  COMMISSION  (1905). 

status  of,  145. 

impeachment  of  naturalization  certificate  before,  144-189. 


526  INDEX 

STATE  COURTS, 
jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  12-19. 

required  to  furnish  Bureau  of  Naturalization  with   evidence  of  com- 
petency to  act  under  the  law,  17. 
STATE  DEPARTMENT. 

treats  as  invalid  naturalization  certificate  which  has  been  improperly 
obtained,  141. 

STATE  LEGISLATURE. 

power  to  prohibit  state  court  from  naturalizing,  19. 

STATES. 

power  with  respect  to  naturalization,  6-9. 

power  to  impeach  naturalization  proceedings,  140,  141. 
STUB  OF  CERTIFICATE  OF  NATURALIZATION,  128. 
SUPREME  COURT  OF  DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA. 

jurisdiction  to  naturalize  aliens,  12. 
SWEDEN  AND  NORWAY. 

naturalization  convention  with,  468. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  403. 

SWITZERLAND. 

treatment  of  former  citizens  naturalized  in  United  States,  404. 


TEXAS. 

citizenship  of  residents  at  time  of  admission  into  Union,  290,  291. 
naturalization  of  citizens  by  annexation,  329. 

TITLE. 

renunciation  of,  31,  122. 

TRABING'S  CASE,  79. 
TREATIES  OF  CESSION,  275-316. 
with  Great  Britain  of  1794,  276. 
with  France  of  1803,  276. 
with  Spain  of  1819,  283. 
of  1898,  293. 
with  Mexico  of  1848,  284. 
of  1853,  291. 
with  Russia  of  1867,  291. 

TREATIES  OF  NATURALIZATION,  441-473. 
with  Austria-Hungary,  441. 
with  Baden,  444. 
with  Bavaria,  447. 
with  Belgium,  451. 
with  Denmark,  453. 
with  Germany,  466. 


INDEX  527 

Treaties  of  Naturalization — Continued : 
with  Great  Britain,  456,  458. 
with  Haiti,  46l. 
with  Hesse,  463. 
with  Sweden  and  Norway,  468. 
with  Wiirttemberg,  472. 

TREATY,  NATURALIZATION  BY,  273-317. 
TURKEY. 

treatment  of  former  subjects  naturalized  in  United  States,  405. 

u 

UNIFORM  RULE  OF  NATURALIZATION, 
power  of  Congress  to  establish,  6. 

UNITED  STATES. 

appearance  of  in  naturalization  proceedings,  120.  " 

power  to  sue  for  cancellation  of  decree  of  naturalization,  138,  139. 
power  to  acquire  territory  bj'  treaty,  273. 

power  to  prescribe  terms  upon   which  it  will  receive  inhabitants  of 
ceded  territory,  296. 

UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  ATTORNEYS, 
duties: 

appearance  in  opposition  to  naturalization,  34. 

proceedings  to  set  aside  or  cancel  naturalization  certificate,  34,  138. 
UNLAWFUL  POSSESSION  OF  BLANK   CERTIFICATES  OF  CITI- 
ZENSHIP, 193. 
UNLAWFULLY    ENGRAVING   PLATE    DESIGNED    FOR  PRINT- 
ING CERTIFICATE  OF  CITIZENSHIP,  192. 
UNLAWFULLY  PROCURING  NATURALIZATION,  193. 


V 

VENEZUELAN  CLAIMS  COMMISSION  OF  1903. 
impeachment  of  naturalization  certificate  before,  144. 


w 

"WHITE  PERSONS." 

meaning  of  in  naturalization  law,  40-42, 

WIDOW,  AMERICAN-BORN,  OF  FOREIGN  HUSBAND, 
registration  of,  256. 

WIDOW  OF  DECEASED  DECLARANT, 
naturalization  of,  62,  262. 


528  INDEX 

WIDOW,  FOREIGN   BORN,  OF  AMERICAN, 
renunciation  of  citizenship  by,  21. 
registration  of,  240. 

WIFE, 
of  alien  who  has  declared  intention,  right  to  enter  United  States,  84, 
206. 

WITNESSES    IN     BEHALF    OF    APPLICANT    FOR     NATURALI- 
ZATION, 
citizenship  of,  90, 
WOMEN. 

naturalization  of  by  formal  papers,  51. 
by  marriage,  227-263. 

common  law  doctrine,  227. 
statutory  rule,  228,  229. 
what  women  are  capable  of,  229-231. 
WURTTEMBERG. 

naturalization  convention  with,  472. 


ZARTARIAN'S  CASE,  202. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


7    1970 

JAN  SI  1377 


Form  L9-Series  4939 


